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https://github.com/MHSanaei/3x-ui.git
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feat(mtproto): per-client ad-tags, management-API auth, and record secret sync
Catch the panel up to the mtg-multi README (v1.14.0): - Each client can now carry its own 32-hex advertising tag overriding the inbound-level one. The tag lives on the client (settings JSON is the source of truth, clients.ad_tag is the UI projection), is rendered into the fork's [secret-ad-tags] section for active secrets only (mtg rejects a config whose override names an unknown secret), is pushed per entry through PUT /secrets, and is part of the reload fingerprint so a tag edit hot-applies without dropping connections. - The loopback management API can replace the whole secret set, so every mtg process now gets a random per-process api-token; the manager sends it as a bearer token on PUT /secrets and GET /stats and reuses it across config rewrites, because mtg reads the token only at startup. - Malformed tags are rejected at every save path and additionally dropped in InstanceFromInbound: one bad tag would otherwise fail the whole generated config and take every client of the inbound down with it. - SyncInbound never copied a re-keyed mtproto secret into the canonical clients table, so the clients page and subscription links kept serving the old secret, which mtg then rejects. It is now guarded-copied like the other credentials.
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@@ -456,6 +456,18 @@ func mtprotoSecretMiddle(secret string) string {
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return mtprotoRandomMiddle()
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}
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// ValidMtprotoAdTag reports whether a Telegram advertising tag from
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// @MTProxybot is well-formed: exactly 16 bytes as 32 hex characters. mtg
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// refuses to start (or rejects a live update) on a malformed tag, so every
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// write path validates before the tag can reach a generated config.
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func ValidMtprotoAdTag(tag string) bool {
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if len(tag) != 32 {
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return false
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}
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_, err := hex.DecodeString(tag)
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return err == nil
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}
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// StripMtprotoInboundSecret removes the vestigial inbound-level `secret` from an
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// mtproto inbound's settings JSON. MTProto is multi-client: every secret lives on
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// a client, and mtg's [secrets] config plus every share link read only the
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@@ -666,6 +678,7 @@ type Client struct {
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PreSharedKey string `json:"preSharedKey,omitempty"`
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KeepAlive int `json:"keepAlive,omitempty"`
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Secret string `json:"secret,omitempty" example:"ee1234567890abcdef1234567890abcd7777772e636c6f7564666c6172652e636f6d"`
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AdTag string `json:"adTag,omitempty" example:"0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef"`
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Email string `json:"email"` // Client email identifier
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LimitIP int `json:"limitIp"` // IP limit for this client
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TotalGB int64 `json:"totalGB" form:"totalGB"` // Total traffic limit in GB
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@@ -696,6 +709,7 @@ type ClientRecord struct {
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PreSharedKey string `json:"preSharedKey" gorm:"column:wg_pre_shared_key"`
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KeepAlive int `json:"keepAlive" gorm:"column:wg_keep_alive;default:0"`
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Secret string `json:"secret" gorm:"column:secret"`
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AdTag string `json:"adTag" gorm:"column:ad_tag;default:''"`
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LimitIP int `json:"limitIp" gorm:"column:limit_ip"`
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TotalGB int64 `json:"totalGB" gorm:"column:total_gb"`
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ExpiryTime int64 `json:"expiryTime" gorm:"column:expiry_time"`
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@@ -880,6 +894,7 @@ func (c *Client) ToRecord() *ClientRecord {
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PreSharedKey: c.PreSharedKey,
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KeepAlive: c.KeepAlive,
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Secret: c.Secret,
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AdTag: c.AdTag,
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}
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if c.Reverse != nil {
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if b, err := json.Marshal(c.Reverse); err == nil {
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@@ -932,6 +947,7 @@ func (r *ClientRecord) ToClient() *Client {
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PreSharedKey: r.PreSharedKey,
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KeepAlive: r.KeepAlive,
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Secret: r.Secret,
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AdTag: r.AdTag,
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}
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if r.Reverse != "" {
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var rev ClientReverse
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