mirror of
https://github.com/MHSanaei/3x-ui.git
synced 2026-09-16 15:17:14 +00:00
6d96accd63
* Feat(tuic): Implement native TUIC v5 protocol support via Rust sidecar daemon - Add internal/tuic package for official tuic-server sidecar lifecycle management, configuration generation, and graceful process control - Bridge decrypted TUIC QUIC traffic into loopback Xray SOCKS5 inbounds (63200+id) for traffic accounting, statistics, and routing rules - Implement periodic reconciliation job (cadence @every 10s) and immediate runtime synchronization on inbound/client mutations - Add TUIC inbound & multi-user client settings (UUID + Password authentication) in Web UI with SNI auto-fill and panel certificate loader - Integrate tuic:// subscription links and Clash.Meta (Mihomo) proxy generation for TUIC - Update install.sh to automatically download and install official tuic-server release for x86_64, aarch64, and armv7 - Add full localization for TUIC protocol across all 13 supported languages * Feat(install): Support custom repository and branch in install and update scripts * Ci(release): Enable publish-dev for feature branch and workflow dispatch * Feat(sub): Add TUIC to subscription resolution and client QR config generator - Add 'tuic' to getInboundsBySubId SQL allowlist to resolve TUIC inbounds in subscriptions and sub links - Enhance buildTuicProxy in Clash subscription generator with robust host and credentials resolution - Add tuicConfig.ts to generate standalone Clash/Mihomo YAML configuration - Add dedicated TUIC Config tab in ClientQrModal with QR code and .yaml download button - Add localization keys for TUIC config across all 13 supported languages * Fix(tuic): Exclude TUIC from native Xray inbounds and strip udp_relay_mode from server config - Exclude model.TUIC from native Xray inbounds in GetXrayConfig to prevent Xray startup failure - Remove udp_relay_mode from tuic-server JSON configuration builder - Update install.sh to install tuic-server binary to both xui_folder/bin and /usr/local/bin * Fix(install): Fallback to dev-latest when releases/latest is not present on fork * Feat(tuic): Add real-time online status and LastOnline tracking for TUIC clients - Track client activity by mapping client UUID in tuic-server logs to email - Integrate TUIC active clients into XrayTrafficJob to refresh local online clients - Bump LastOnline timestamp in database and broadcast live online status over WebSocket * Feat(tuic): Implement real-time traffic statistics and live speed reporting for TUIC - Collect precise I/O traffic deltas for tuic-server child processes via /proc/<pid>/io - Aggregate and attribute TUIC traffic deltas per client in tuic Manager - Integrate TUIC traffic deltas into XrayTrafficJob to update database and broadcast live speed * Feat(tuic): Finalize TUIC v5 integration with 1:1 traffic counting and orphan process cleanup - Use exact 1:1 byte delta accounting from /proc/<pid>/io - Add killStrayTuicProcesses to terminate orphan sidecars on panel startup - Fully integrate TUIC with subscriptions, live speed meter, and all 13 locales * Feat(frontend): Polish TUIC UI, support bulk operations, and update translations - Align TUIC inbound certificate form with standard 3X-UI layout (Set Default Cert, Clear) - Remove extra subtitle hint text from TUIC inbound form fields - Support TUIC in client bulk attach/detach and bulk add modals - Add TUIC badge color to client info modal, clients table, and host list - Update password tooltip across all 13 locales to include TUIC - Remove obsolete dead translation keys across all 13 locales * Chore(ci): Finalize TUIC v5 bundling across release workflow, Docker, and scripts * Feat(openapi): Update OpenAPI generator and schemas for TUIC types * Fix(backend): Address core review findings for TUIC types, port checks, and xray bridge * Refactor(traffic): Isolate proc reading with build tags and decouple TUIC metering into TuicJob * Feat(client): Add TuicServer to InboundOption, fix config export and clean share links * Fix(frontend): Register TUIC in multi-user helpers, tracked protocols, and tag derivation * Chore(openapi): Re-generate OpenAPI specification and sync Zod schemas * Chore(scripts): Add Alpine musl binaries, 386 and Windows packaging, and anchor pkill * Fix(review): Remove stale import, correct binary names, switch to musl, and drop unreachable relay gate * Feat(frontend): Show share link in Inbound Info and display UDP tag for TUIC * Docs: Add TUIC v5 configuration guide and link specifications * Docs(tuic): Correct Clash Meta configuration parameter to reduce-rtt * Fix(tuic): Generate client credentials on copy, enforce ID/password validation, and add i386 to DockerInit * Fix(tuic): drop unused relay, fix traffic accounting, and honor host endpoints - Drop unused loopback SOCKS relay and eliminate port collision with AmneziaWG - Correct inbound traffic calculation without double-counting - Drop heuristic client traffic division while retaining online tracking - Support externalProxy host fan-out and conditional parameters in share links - Scope orphan process termination to managed config directory * Fix(tuic): enforce client quotas, decouple Xray restart, and sync openapi schemas - Regenerate OpenAPI, Zod schemas, and TypeScript types without route_through_xray - Populate clientTraffics in TuicJob to enforce client quotas and first-use expiry - Split process I/O delta into up and down in Process.CollectTraffic - Remove SetNeedRestart from updateTuicInbound to prevent Xray session drops - Use InstanceFromInbound for default ALPN and UDP relay mode in tuic:// share links - Support allow_insecure on externalProxy host endpoints without parameter collision * Fix(tuic): attribute client traffic only on single-user inbounds and sync link defaults - Attribute I/O deltas to the client only when the inbound has exactly one configured client, avoiding false billing and disablings on multi-user inbounds - Aggregate client traffic by email in TuicJob so clients on multiple inbounds don't lose deltas - Match frontend genTuicLink defaults for alpn and udp_relay_mode with backend subscription links * Fix(tuic): gate client traffic by total sidecar clients and require client email * Fix(tuic): enforce inbound-only traffic limits and disable client totalGB * fix(tuic): restore delayed start, remove client totalGB rejection, and document linux-only limits * fix(tuic): anchor pkill, fix io baseline/split, escape yaml, and deduplicate start errors * fix(tuic): prevent traffic double-counting, ensure info log level for delayed start, and broaden pkill matching * fix(tuic): address review round 11 findings - internal/sub/json_service: skip tuic protocol in json subscription to prevent direct routing leak - internal/sub/clash_service: honor externalProxy/host row allowInsecure, sni, and alpn in buildTuicProxy - internal/web/runtime: decouple tuic inbound add/delete from xray restart - internal/tuic/config: restore user log-level options (warn, error) without forced info clamp - frontend/src/lib/xray/inbound-link: fix duplicate remark suffix and apply externalProxy TLS overrides - frontend/src/schemas/protocols/stream/external-proxy: propagate allowInsecure through host mapping - tests: add coverage for json sub skip, clash proxy overrides, and link generation * fix(tuic): meter inbound traffic through a UDP relay and bracket IPv6 binds Review repairs on the TUIC v5 sidecar integration: - Inbound traffic was read from the sidecar's /proc/<pid>/io rchar, but the kernel only counts read()/write() there and tuic-server moves its sockets with recvfrom/recvmmsg/sendmmsg/sendto, so an inbound's up/down stayed at 0 forever and inbound total limits never tripped (measured: 12 MiB relayed, rchar delta 0). The panel now owns the inbound's public UDP port with a small relay and runs tuic-server behind it on a loopback port, counting up/down exactly on every OS. tuic-server therefore logs 127.0.0.1 as every client's address; per-client attribution stays unsupported since QUIC is opaque. - Instance.BindTo formatted an IPv6 listen address as ":::8443", which tuic-server rejects with "invalid socket address syntax", so an inbound listening on "::" or any IPv6 literal never started. It now uses net.JoinHostPort; IPv4 output is unchanged. - The log level is passed to the sidecar as chosen. Online status, last-online and delayed start are read from its Info lines, so the Log Level field now says that Warn and Error switch them off for the inbound, and the docs say the same. - Drop two frontend tests that only exercised a getter and a set lookup, and strip the trailing blank line that made gofumpt fail on two of the new Go test files. * fix(tuic): harden tag updates, runtime routing, and relay stability --------- Co-authored-by: poise52 <equipoise52@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Sanaei <ho3ein.sanaei@gmail.com>
1182 lines
38 KiB
Go
1182 lines
38 KiB
Go
package service
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import (
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"encoding/base64"
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"encoding/json"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"net/netip"
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"runtime/debug"
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"slices"
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"strings"
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"sync"
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"sync/atomic"
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"time"
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"unicode"
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"github.com/google/uuid"
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"github.com/mhsanaei/3x-ui/v3/internal/database"
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"github.com/mhsanaei/3x-ui/v3/internal/database/model"
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"github.com/mhsanaei/3x-ui/v3/internal/logger"
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"github.com/mhsanaei/3x-ui/v3/internal/util/common"
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"github.com/mhsanaei/3x-ui/v3/internal/util/random"
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"github.com/mhsanaei/3x-ui/v3/internal/xray"
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"gorm.io/gorm"
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)
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func hasForbiddenClientChar(s string) bool {
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for _, r := range s {
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if r == '/' || r == '\\' || r < 0x20 || r == 0x7f || unicode.IsSpace(r) {
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return true
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}
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}
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return false
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}
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func validateClientEmail(email string) error {
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if hasForbiddenClientChar(email) {
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return common.NewError("client email contains an invalid character:", email)
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}
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return nil
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}
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func validateClientSubID(subID string) error {
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if hasForbiddenClientChar(subID) {
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return common.NewError("client subId contains an invalid character:", subID)
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}
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return nil
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}
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// Rejected rather than coerced: an unknown cycle would leave the operator with
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// a field that reads as configured while no job ever selects the client.
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func validateClientTrafficReset(period string, day int) error {
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switch period {
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case "", "never", "hourly", "daily", "weekly", "monthly":
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default:
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return common.NewError("client trafficReset must be never, hourly, daily, weekly or monthly, got:", period)
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}
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if day < 0 || day > 31 {
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return common.NewError("client trafficResetDay must be between 0 and 31, got:", day)
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}
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return nil
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}
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// Rejected rather than clamped: nextCalendarRenewal would silently move an
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// out-of-range day, and a negative one drops out of the renewal query entirely.
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func validateClientResetDay(day int) error {
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if day < 0 || day > 31 {
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return common.NewError("client resetDay must be between 0 and 31, got:", day)
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}
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return nil
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}
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// Rejected rather than coerced: a negative cap reads as "unlimited" to a caller
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// but selects nothing, so the client would silently stop renewing.
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func validateClientResetMax(resetMax int) error {
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if resetMax < 0 {
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return common.NewError("client resetMax must not be negative, got:", resetMax)
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}
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return nil
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}
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// normalizeClientTrafficReset stores what the inbound path would store, so the
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// day never reaches the DB as a 0 that three layers downstream each clamp to 1.
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func normalizeClientTrafficReset(c *model.Client) {
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if c.TrafficReset == "" {
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c.TrafficReset = "never"
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}
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c.TrafficResetDay = normalizeTrafficResetDay(c.TrafficResetDay)
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}
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// ClientResetCycle is the slice of a client the reset job needs: enough to know
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// whether it is due, and whether its disable is the quota's doing or the operator's.
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type ClientResetCycle struct {
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Email string
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TrafficResetDay int
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Enable bool
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Total int64
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Used int64
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}
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// Depleted reports a client the quota switched off. A reset restores that one;
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// a client disabled below its quota was switched off by hand and stays off.
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func (c ClientResetCycle) Depleted() bool {
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return c.Total > 0 && c.Used >= c.Total
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}
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// GetClientsByTrafficReset returns the clients whose own reset cycle matches the
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// period, independent of the cycle configured on the inbounds they belong to.
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func (s *ClientService) GetClientsByTrafficReset(period string) ([]ClientResetCycle, error) {
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var cycles []ClientResetCycle
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err := database.GetDB().Table("clients c").
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Select("c.email, c.traffic_reset_day, c.enable, COALESCE(ct.total, 0) AS total, COALESCE(ct.up, 0) + COALESCE(ct.down, 0) AS used").
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Joins("LEFT JOIN client_traffics ct ON ct.email = c.email").
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Where("c.traffic_reset = ?", period).
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Scan(&cycles).Error
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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return cycles, nil
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}
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// Create applies the client to every requested inbound: one failing inbound no
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// longer aborts the others, so the error can name several and needRestart holds.
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func (s *ClientService) Create(inboundSvc *InboundService, payload *ClientCreatePayload) (bool, error) {
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if payload == nil {
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return false, common.NewError("empty payload")
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}
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client := payload.Client
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if strings.TrimSpace(client.Email) == "" {
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return false, common.NewError("client email is required")
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}
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if err := validateClientEmail(client.Email); err != nil {
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return false, err
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}
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if err := validateClientSubID(client.SubID); err != nil {
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return false, err
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}
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if err := validateClientResetDay(client.ResetDay); err != nil {
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return false, err
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}
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if err := validateClientResetMax(client.ResetMax); err != nil {
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return false, err
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}
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if err := validateClientTrafficReset(client.TrafficReset, client.TrafficResetDay); err != nil {
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return false, err
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}
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normalizeClientTrafficReset(&client)
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if len(payload.InboundIds) == 0 {
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return false, common.NewError("at least one inbound is required")
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}
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if client.SubID == "" {
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client.SubID = uuid.NewString()
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}
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if !client.Enable {
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client.Enable = true
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}
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now := time.Now().UnixMilli()
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if client.CreatedAt == 0 {
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client.CreatedAt = now
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}
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client.UpdatedAt = now
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existing := &model.ClientRecord{}
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err := database.GetDB().Where("email = ?", client.Email).First(existing).Error
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if err != nil && !errors.Is(err, gorm.ErrRecordNotFound) {
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return false, err
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}
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emailTaken := !errors.Is(err, gorm.ErrRecordNotFound)
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if emailTaken {
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if existing.SubID == "" || existing.SubID != client.SubID {
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return false, common.NewError("email already in use:", client.Email)
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}
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// Reuse stored credentials when re-adding an existing identity, or
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// fillProtocolDefaults mints a fresh UUID that desyncs other inbounds.
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if client.ID == "" {
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client.ID = existing.UUID
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}
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if client.Password == "" {
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client.Password = existing.Password
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}
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if client.Auth == "" {
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client.Auth = existing.Auth
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}
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if client.Secret == "" {
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client.Secret = existing.Secret
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}
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}
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if client.SubID != "" {
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var subTaken int64
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if err := database.GetDB().Model(&model.ClientRecord{}).
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Where("sub_id = ? AND email <> ?", client.SubID, client.Email).
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Count(&subTaken).Error; err != nil {
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return false, err
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}
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if subTaken > 0 {
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return false, common.NewError("subId already in use:", client.SubID)
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}
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}
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// Prepared before any inbound is written: fillProtocolDefaults mints the
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// shared credentials on the first inbound and every later one reuses them.
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adds := make([]*model.Inbound, 0, len(payload.InboundIds))
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for _, ibId := range payload.InboundIds {
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inbound, getErr := inboundSvc.GetInbound(ibId)
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if getErr != nil {
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return false, fmt.Errorf("inbound %d: %w", ibId, getErr)
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}
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if err := s.fillProtocolDefaults(&client, inbound); err != nil {
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return false, fmt.Errorf("inbound %d: %w", ibId, err)
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}
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clientForInbound := client
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if ips, ok := client.AllowedIPsByInbound[ibId]; ok {
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clientForInbound.AllowedIPs = ips
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} else if !addressesFitAmneziaWGInbound(clientForInbound.AllowedIPs, inbound) {
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// The shared AllowedIPs value (e.g. from a single-field legacy
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// caller) came from a different subnet than this inbound's own --
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// clear it so defaultAmneziaWGClients allocates a fresh, correct
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// address for THIS inbound instead of persisting an unroutable
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// peer. Same reasoning as addressesFitAmneziaWGInbound's own doc
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// comment on the Attach path.
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clientForInbound.AllowedIPs = nil
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}
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settingsPayload, mErr := json.Marshal(map[string][]model.Client{"clients": {clientWithInboundFlow(clientForInbound, inbound)}})
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if mErr != nil {
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return false, fmt.Errorf("inbound %d: %w", ibId, mErr)
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}
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adds = append(adds, &model.Inbound{Id: ibId, Settings: string(settingsPayload)})
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}
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needRestart, fanoutErr := s.fanoutInboundClientAdds(inboundSvc, adds)
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if fanoutErr != nil {
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// Never on a failed create: this retrims the devices of an email that
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// already existed, and a create the panel reported as failed must not.
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return needRestart, fanoutErr
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}
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// A re-created email is a live identity again: a delete tombstone left
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// standing makes the next node merge prune the new client's inbound links.
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withdrawClientTombstones(client.Email)
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return needRestart, s.setClientLimitHwidByEmail(nil, client.Email, payload.LimitHwid)
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}
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// inboundFanoutConcurrency caps how many inbounds one client op applies at
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// once, so a client spanning many of them can't start an unbounded RPC burst.
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const inboundFanoutConcurrency = 4
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// inboundApply is one inbound's share of a client op, ready to run.
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type inboundApply struct {
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id int
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run func() (bool, error)
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}
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// fanoutInboundApplies runs the applies with the node pushes overlapping, so a
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// client spanning several nodes no longer costs one RPC round-trip per node.
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func fanoutInboundApplies(applies []inboundApply) (bool, error) {
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var needRestart atomic.Bool
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errs := make([]error, len(applies))
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sem := make(chan struct{}, inboundFanoutConcurrency)
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var wg sync.WaitGroup
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for i := range applies {
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wg.Add(1)
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sem <- struct{}{}
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go func() {
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defer wg.Done()
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defer func() { <-sem }()
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// Off the request goroutine gin's Recovery no longer covers this,
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// so an unrecovered panic here would take the whole panel down.
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defer func() {
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if r := recover(); r != nil {
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// The apply may already have committed, so ask for the
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// restart the lost return value can no longer report.
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needRestart.Store(true)
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errs[i] = fmt.Errorf("inbound %d: panic: %v", applies[i].id, r)
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logger.Errorf("panic applying client change to inbound %d: %v\n%s", applies[i].id, r, debug.Stack())
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}
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}()
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nr, err := applies[i].run()
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if nr {
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needRestart.Store(true)
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}
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if err != nil {
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errs[i] = fmt.Errorf("inbound %d: %w", applies[i].id, err)
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}
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}()
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}
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wg.Wait()
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return needRestart.Load(), errors.Join(errs...)
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}
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// fanoutInboundClientAdds applies one payload per inbound.
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func (s *ClientService) fanoutInboundClientAdds(inboundSvc *InboundService, adds []*model.Inbound) (bool, error) {
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applies := make([]inboundApply, 0, len(adds))
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for _, add := range adds {
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applies = append(applies, inboundApply{id: add.Id, run: func() (bool, error) {
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return s.AddInboundClient(inboundSvc, add)
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}})
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}
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return fanoutInboundApplies(applies)
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}
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// fanoutInboundResults runs one job per inbound with the node pushes
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// overlapping, so a bulk op costs one RPC round-trip instead of one per node.
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// limit is the caller's own cap: an op that allocates tunnel addresses passes 1,
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// because allocation reads a cross-inbound used-set before it writes.
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func fanoutInboundResults[T any](inboundIds []int, limit int, run func(i int) T) ([]T, []error) {
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if limit < 1 {
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limit = 1
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}
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out := make([]T, len(inboundIds))
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errs := make([]error, len(inboundIds))
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sem := make(chan struct{}, limit)
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var wg sync.WaitGroup
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for i := range inboundIds {
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wg.Add(1)
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sem <- struct{}{}
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go func() {
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defer wg.Done()
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defer func() { <-sem }()
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// Off the request goroutine gin's Recovery no longer covers this,
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// so an unrecovered panic here would take the whole panel down.
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defer func() {
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if r := recover(); r != nil {
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errs[i] = fmt.Errorf("inbound %d: panic: %v", inboundIds[i], r)
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logger.Errorf("panic applying bulk client change to inbound %d: %v\n%s", inboundIds[i], r, debug.Stack())
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}
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}()
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out[i] = run(i)
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}()
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}
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wg.Wait()
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return out, errs
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}
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// addFanoutLimit serializes an add that touches a tunnel inbound. WireGuard and
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// AmneziaWG pick a free peer address by reading every inbound's used-set first,
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// so two overlapping allocations hand out the same one and the second is refused.
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func addFanoutLimit(anyTunnel bool) int {
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if anyTunnel {
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return 1
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}
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return inboundFanoutConcurrency
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}
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// sortedInboundIds gives the fanout a stable order, so which inbound wins a
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// per-email report no longer depends on Go's map iteration order.
|
|
func sortedInboundIds[V any](byInbound map[int]V) []int {
|
|
ids := make([]int, 0, len(byInbound))
|
|
for id := range byInbound {
|
|
ids = append(ids, id)
|
|
}
|
|
slices.Sort(ids)
|
|
return ids
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// markInboundNodesDirty makes a half-applied client edit unobservable to a node
|
|
// snapshot merge, which skips a node whose config is already flagged dirty.
|
|
func markInboundNodesDirty(inboundIds []int) error {
|
|
if len(inboundIds) == 0 {
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
var nodeIDs []int
|
|
for _, batch := range chunkInts(inboundIds, sqlInChunk) {
|
|
var ids []int
|
|
if err := database.GetDB().Model(&model.Inbound{}).
|
|
Where("id IN ? AND node_id IS NOT NULL", batch).
|
|
Distinct().Pluck("node_id", &ids).Error; err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
nodeIDs = append(nodeIDs, ids...)
|
|
}
|
|
if len(nodeIDs) == 0 {
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
return runSerializedTx(func(tx *gorm.DB) error {
|
|
svc := &NodeService{}
|
|
for _, id := range nodeIDs {
|
|
if err := svc.MarkNodeDirtyTx(tx, id); err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return nil
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (s *ClientService) fillProtocolDefaults(c *model.Client, ib *model.Inbound) error {
|
|
switch ib.Protocol {
|
|
case model.VMESS, model.VLESS:
|
|
if c.ID == "" {
|
|
c.ID = uuid.NewString()
|
|
}
|
|
case model.Trojan:
|
|
if c.Password == "" {
|
|
c.Password = strings.ReplaceAll(uuid.NewString(), "-", "")
|
|
}
|
|
case model.Shadowsocks:
|
|
method := shadowsocksMethodFromSettings(ib.Settings)
|
|
if c.Password == "" || !validShadowsocksClientKey(method, c.Password) {
|
|
c.Password = randomShadowsocksClientKey(method)
|
|
}
|
|
case model.Hysteria:
|
|
if c.Auth == "" {
|
|
c.Auth = strings.ReplaceAll(uuid.NewString(), "-", "")
|
|
}
|
|
case model.MTProto:
|
|
if c.Secret == "" {
|
|
c.Secret = model.GenerateFakeTLSSecret(mtprotoDomainFromSettings(ib.Settings))
|
|
}
|
|
case model.TUIC:
|
|
if c.ID == "" {
|
|
c.ID = uuid.NewString()
|
|
}
|
|
if c.Password == "" {
|
|
c.Password = strings.ReplaceAll(uuid.NewString(), "-", "")
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// defaultMtprotoDomain is the FakeTLS fronting domain used when an mtproto
|
|
// inbound carries no fakeTlsDomain of its own; it mirrors the frontend default.
|
|
const defaultMtprotoDomain = "www.cloudflare.com"
|
|
|
|
// mtprotoDomainFromSettings returns the inbound-level FakeTLS domain, falling
|
|
// back to the default when unset, so a generated client secret always fronts a
|
|
// real hostname.
|
|
func mtprotoDomainFromSettings(settings string) string {
|
|
domain := ""
|
|
if settings != "" {
|
|
var m map[string]any
|
|
if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(settings), &m); err == nil {
|
|
domain, _ = m["fakeTlsDomain"].(string)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
domain = strings.TrimSpace(domain)
|
|
if domain == "" {
|
|
return defaultMtprotoDomain
|
|
}
|
|
return domain
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func clientWithInboundFlow(c model.Client, ib *model.Inbound) model.Client {
|
|
if ib.DisableFlow || !inboundCanEnableTlsFlow(string(ib.Protocol), ib.StreamSettings, ib.Settings) {
|
|
c.Flow = ""
|
|
}
|
|
return c
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func shadowsocksMethodFromSettings(settings string) string {
|
|
if settings == "" {
|
|
return ""
|
|
}
|
|
var m map[string]any
|
|
if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(settings), &m); err != nil {
|
|
return ""
|
|
}
|
|
method, _ := m["method"].(string)
|
|
return method
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func randomShadowsocksClientKey(method string) string {
|
|
if n := shadowsocksKeyBytes(method); n > 0 {
|
|
return random.Base64Bytes(n)
|
|
}
|
|
return strings.ReplaceAll(uuid.NewString(), "-", "")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func validShadowsocksClientKey(method, key string) bool {
|
|
n := shadowsocksKeyBytes(method)
|
|
if n == 0 {
|
|
return key != ""
|
|
}
|
|
decoded, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(key)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
return len(decoded) == n
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func shadowsocksKeyBytes(method string) int {
|
|
switch method {
|
|
case "2022-blake3-aes-128-gcm":
|
|
return 16
|
|
case "2022-blake3-aes-256-gcm", "2022-blake3-chacha20-poly1305":
|
|
return 32
|
|
}
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// normalizeShadowsocksClientKeys rewrites any Shadowsocks-2022 client password
|
|
// whose decoded length no longer matches settings.method, which happens after the
|
|
// inbound method is switched between ciphers of different key sizes (e.g.
|
|
// aes-256↔aes-128). A wrong-length uPSK makes xray reject the user, so the link
|
|
// fails to connect; regenerating restores a valid key (clients must re-fetch).
|
|
// Non-Shadowsocks / legacy-SS settings pass through unchanged.
|
|
func normalizeShadowsocksClientKeys(settings string) (string, bool) {
|
|
method := shadowsocksMethodFromSettings(settings)
|
|
if shadowsocksKeyBytes(method) == 0 {
|
|
return settings, false
|
|
}
|
|
var m map[string]any
|
|
if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(settings), &m); err != nil {
|
|
return settings, false
|
|
}
|
|
clients, ok := m["clients"].([]any)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return settings, false
|
|
}
|
|
changed := false
|
|
for i := range clients {
|
|
c, ok := clients[i].(map[string]any)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
if pw, _ := c["password"].(string); validShadowsocksClientKey(method, pw) {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
c["password"] = randomShadowsocksClientKey(method)
|
|
clients[i] = c
|
|
changed = true
|
|
}
|
|
if !changed {
|
|
return settings, false
|
|
}
|
|
m["clients"] = clients
|
|
bs, err := json.MarshalIndent(m, "", " ")
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return settings, false
|
|
}
|
|
return string(bs), true
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func applyShadowsocksClientMethod(clients []any, settings map[string]any) {
|
|
method, _ := settings["method"].(string)
|
|
is2022 := strings.HasPrefix(method, "2022-blake3-")
|
|
for i := range clients {
|
|
cm, ok := clients[i].(map[string]any)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
if is2022 {
|
|
if _, hasKey := cm["method"]; hasKey {
|
|
delete(cm, "method")
|
|
clients[i] = cm
|
|
}
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
if method == "" {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
if existing, _ := cm["method"].(string); existing != "" {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
cm["method"] = method
|
|
clients[i] = cm
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (s *ClientService) Update(inboundSvc *InboundService, id int, updated model.Client, limitHwid int, inboundFilter ...int) (bool, error) {
|
|
existing, err := s.GetByID(id)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return false, err
|
|
}
|
|
inboundIds, err := s.GetInboundIdsForRecord(id)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return false, err
|
|
}
|
|
// The rename rewrites the one shared client record, so every node holding
|
|
// this client goes stale — not just the ones an inboundIds filter applies.
|
|
attachedIds := append([]int(nil), inboundIds...)
|
|
if len(inboundFilter) > 0 {
|
|
allow := make(map[int]struct{}, len(inboundFilter))
|
|
for _, fid := range inboundFilter {
|
|
allow[fid] = struct{}{}
|
|
}
|
|
filtered := inboundIds[:0:0]
|
|
for _, ibId := range inboundIds {
|
|
if _, ok := allow[ibId]; ok {
|
|
filtered = append(filtered, ibId)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
inboundIds = filtered
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if strings.TrimSpace(updated.Email) == "" {
|
|
return false, common.NewError("client email is required")
|
|
}
|
|
if err := validateClientEmail(updated.Email); err != nil {
|
|
return false, err
|
|
}
|
|
if err := validateClientSubID(updated.SubID); err != nil {
|
|
return false, err
|
|
}
|
|
if err := validateClientResetDay(updated.ResetDay); err != nil {
|
|
return false, err
|
|
}
|
|
if err := validateClientResetMax(updated.ResetMax); err != nil {
|
|
return false, err
|
|
}
|
|
if err := validateClientTrafficReset(updated.TrafficReset, updated.TrafficResetDay); err != nil {
|
|
return false, err
|
|
}
|
|
normalizeClientTrafficReset(&updated)
|
|
if updated.SubID == "" {
|
|
updated.SubID = existing.SubID
|
|
}
|
|
if updated.SubID == "" {
|
|
updated.SubID = uuid.NewString()
|
|
}
|
|
updated.UpdatedAt = time.Now().UnixMilli()
|
|
if updated.CreatedAt == 0 {
|
|
updated.CreatedAt = existing.CreatedAt
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Preserve existing credentials when the caller omits them, so a partial
|
|
// update (e.g. only changing traffic/expiry) doesn't silently rotate the
|
|
// client's UUID/password/auth via fillProtocolDefaults. Supplying a new
|
|
// value still rotates it intentionally.
|
|
if updated.ID == "" {
|
|
updated.ID = existing.UUID
|
|
}
|
|
if updated.Password == "" {
|
|
updated.Password = existing.Password
|
|
}
|
|
if updated.Auth == "" {
|
|
updated.Auth = existing.Auth
|
|
}
|
|
if updated.Secret == "" {
|
|
updated.Secret = existing.Secret
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if updated.Email != existing.Email {
|
|
var collisionCount int64
|
|
if err := database.GetDB().Model(&model.ClientRecord{}).
|
|
Where("email = ? AND id <> ?", updated.Email, id).
|
|
Count(&collisionCount).Error; err != nil {
|
|
return false, err
|
|
}
|
|
if collisionCount > 0 {
|
|
return false, common.NewError("Duplicate email:", updated.Email)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if updated.SubID != existing.SubID {
|
|
var subCollision int64
|
|
if err := database.GetDB().Model(&model.ClientRecord{}).
|
|
Where("sub_id = ? AND id <> ?", updated.SubID, id).
|
|
Count(&subCollision).Error; err != nil {
|
|
return false, err
|
|
}
|
|
if subCollision > 0 {
|
|
return false, common.NewError("Duplicate subId:", updated.SubID)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
tunnelCount, tcErr := tunnelInboundCount(inboundIds)
|
|
if tcErr != nil {
|
|
return false, tcErr
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Built before any inbound is written, as in Create: fillProtocolDefaults
|
|
// mints the shared credentials on the first inbound, later ones reuse them.
|
|
applies := make([]inboundApply, 0, len(inboundIds))
|
|
for _, ibId := range inboundIds {
|
|
inbound, getErr := inboundSvc.GetInbound(ibId)
|
|
if getErr != nil {
|
|
if errors.Is(getErr, gorm.ErrRecordNotFound) {
|
|
if err := database.GetDB().
|
|
Where("client_id = ? AND inbound_id = ?", id, ibId).
|
|
Delete(&model.ClientInbound{}).Error; err != nil {
|
|
return false, err
|
|
}
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
return false, getErr
|
|
}
|
|
if existing.Email == "" {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
if err := s.fillProtocolDefaults(&updated, inbound); err != nil {
|
|
return false, err
|
|
}
|
|
clientForInbound := updated
|
|
if ips, ok := updated.AllowedIPsByInbound[ibId]; ok {
|
|
clientForInbound.AllowedIPs = ips
|
|
} else if tunnelCount > 1 && (inbound.Protocol == model.WireGuard || inbound.Protocol == model.AmneziaWG) {
|
|
// One shared peer field set cannot describe several peers: broadcast
|
|
// it and they all end up with the same keys and tunnel address.
|
|
clientForInbound.AllowedIPs = nil
|
|
clientForInbound.PrivateKey = ""
|
|
clientForInbound.PublicKey = ""
|
|
clientForInbound.PreSharedKey = ""
|
|
} else if !addressesFitAmneziaWGInbound(clientForInbound.AllowedIPs, inbound) {
|
|
// A single shared AllowedIPs field (the common case for a caller
|
|
// that never sends AllowedIPsByInbound) must never overwrite an
|
|
// inbound it doesn't belong to -- e.g. a client attached to both
|
|
// wg and awg saving its wg-labeled address would otherwise get
|
|
// that same address silently written into the awg peer config
|
|
// too. Clearing it here makes UpdateInboundClient's own
|
|
// empty-AllowedIPs carry-forward (see its WireGuard/AmneziaWG
|
|
// branch) preserve THIS inbound's existing, correct value
|
|
// instead.
|
|
clientForInbound.AllowedIPs = nil
|
|
}
|
|
settingsPayload, mErr := json.Marshal(map[string][]model.Client{"clients": {clientWithInboundFlow(clientForInbound, inbound)}})
|
|
if mErr != nil {
|
|
return false, mErr
|
|
}
|
|
data := &model.Inbound{Id: ibId, Settings: string(settingsPayload)}
|
|
applies = append(applies, inboundApply{id: ibId, run: func() (bool, error) {
|
|
return s.UpdateInboundClient(inboundSvc, data, existing.Email)
|
|
}})
|
|
}
|
|
// Each apply marks only its OWN node dirty, so between the first and last
|
|
// one a merge could resurrect the pre-edit email as a second client.
|
|
if err := markInboundNodesDirty(attachedIds); err != nil {
|
|
return false, err
|
|
}
|
|
needRestart, applyErr := fanoutInboundApplies(applies)
|
|
if applyErr != nil {
|
|
return needRestart, applyErr
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// UpdateInboundClient renames the record atomically with each inbound's
|
|
// settings JSON; this direct write only covers records with no inbound left.
|
|
if updated.Email != existing.Email {
|
|
if err := database.GetDB().Model(&model.ClientRecord{}).
|
|
Where("id = ? AND email = ?", id, existing.Email).
|
|
Update("email", updated.Email).Error; err != nil {
|
|
return needRestart, err
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if len(inboundIds) == 0 {
|
|
merged := *existing
|
|
applyClientRecordMerge(&merged, updated.ToRecord())
|
|
if err := database.GetDB().Model(&model.ClientRecord{}).
|
|
Where("id = ?", id).
|
|
Updates(map[string]any{
|
|
"sub_id": merged.SubID,
|
|
"uuid": merged.UUID,
|
|
"password": merged.Password,
|
|
"auth": merged.Auth,
|
|
"secret": merged.Secret,
|
|
"flow": merged.Flow,
|
|
"security": merged.Security,
|
|
"wg_private_key": merged.PrivateKey,
|
|
"wg_public_key": merged.PublicKey,
|
|
"wg_allowed_ips": merged.AllowedIPs,
|
|
"wg_pre_shared_key": merged.PreSharedKey,
|
|
"wg_keep_alive": merged.KeepAlive,
|
|
"limit_ip": merged.LimitIP,
|
|
"total_gb": merged.TotalGB,
|
|
"expiry_time": merged.ExpiryTime,
|
|
"tg_id": merged.TgID,
|
|
"comment": merged.Comment,
|
|
"reset": merged.Reset,
|
|
"reset_day": merged.ResetDay,
|
|
"reset_max": merged.ResetMax,
|
|
"traffic_reset": merged.TrafficReset,
|
|
"traffic_reset_day": merged.TrafficResetDay,
|
|
}).Error; err != nil {
|
|
return needRestart, err
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
reverseStr := ""
|
|
if updated.Reverse != nil && strings.TrimSpace(updated.Reverse.Tag) != "" {
|
|
if b, mErr := json.Marshal(updated.Reverse); mErr == nil {
|
|
reverseStr = string(b)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if err := database.GetDB().Model(&model.ClientRecord{}).
|
|
Where("id = ?", id).
|
|
Update("reverse", reverseStr).Error; err != nil {
|
|
return needRestart, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Persist the group explicitly. SyncInbound deliberately preserves the
|
|
// stored group when the inbound settings carry none — so a node snapshot or a
|
|
// group-less settings rebuild can't wipe it (see SyncInbound + its tests).
|
|
// That guard also meant clearing the group in the client editor never took
|
|
// effect. The editor always round-trips the field, so apply it here,
|
|
// including the empty string that removes the client from its group.
|
|
if err := database.GetDB().Model(&model.ClientRecord{}).
|
|
Where("id = ?", id).
|
|
UpdateColumn("group_name", updated.Group).Error; err != nil {
|
|
return needRestart, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Same shape as the group write above: SyncInbound keeps a stored ad-tag
|
|
// when the incoming settings carry none, so clearing the override must be
|
|
// applied here, where the editor always round-trips the field.
|
|
if err := database.GetDB().Model(&model.ClientRecord{}).
|
|
Where("id = ?", id).
|
|
UpdateColumn("ad_tag", updated.AdTag).Error; err != nil {
|
|
return needRestart, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if err := database.GetDB().Model(&model.ClientRecord{}).
|
|
Where("id = ?", id).
|
|
UpdateColumn("enable", updated.Enable).Error; err != nil {
|
|
return needRestart, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if err := s.setClientLimitHwidByEmail(nil, updated.Email, limitHwid); err != nil {
|
|
return needRestart, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if err := database.GetDB().Model(&model.ClientRecord{}).
|
|
Where("id = ?", id).
|
|
UpdateColumn("updated_at", time.Now().UnixMilli()).Error; err != nil {
|
|
return needRestart, err
|
|
}
|
|
return needRestart, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (s *ClientService) Delete(inboundSvc *InboundService, id int, keepTraffic bool) (bool, error) {
|
|
existing, err := s.GetByID(id)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return false, err
|
|
}
|
|
tombstoneClientEmail(existing.Email)
|
|
|
|
inboundIds, err := s.GetInboundIdsForRecord(id)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
withdrawClientTombstones(existing.Email)
|
|
return false, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
applies := make([]inboundApply, 0, len(inboundIds))
|
|
var delErrs []error
|
|
for _, ibId := range inboundIds {
|
|
if _, getErr := inboundSvc.GetInbound(ibId); getErr != nil {
|
|
if errors.Is(getErr, gorm.ErrRecordNotFound) {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
delErrs = append(delErrs, fmt.Errorf("inbound %d: %w", ibId, getErr))
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Always delete by email — the client's stable identity. This removes
|
|
// every matching entry from the inbound's settings even when the stored
|
|
// credential (UUID/password/auth) drifted from the inbound JSON, or a
|
|
// duplicate entry with the same email exists.
|
|
if existing.Email == "" {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
applies = append(applies, inboundApply{id: ibId, run: func() (bool, error) {
|
|
nr, delErr := s.DelInboundClientByEmail(inboundSvc, ibId, existing.Email, keepTraffic, true)
|
|
// The client is already absent from this inbound (data drift or a
|
|
// retried delete). Skip it — deletion stays idempotent.
|
|
if errors.Is(delErr, ErrClientNotInInbound) {
|
|
return nr, nil
|
|
}
|
|
return nr, delErr
|
|
}})
|
|
}
|
|
needRestart, applyErr := fanoutInboundApplies(applies)
|
|
if applyErr != nil {
|
|
delErrs = append(delErrs, applyErr)
|
|
}
|
|
// A failed inbound still holds the client in its settings JSON: keep the
|
|
// record so the next delete retries exactly the leftovers, and report it.
|
|
// The tombstone lifts with it, or the next node merge finishes the deletion.
|
|
if len(delErrs) > 0 {
|
|
withdrawClientTombstones(existing.Email)
|
|
return needRestart, errors.Join(delErrs...)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
db := database.GetDB()
|
|
if err := db.Transaction(func(tx *gorm.DB) error {
|
|
if existing.Email != "" {
|
|
if err := adjustGroupBaselinesForRemovedTraffic(tx, []string{existing.Email}); err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if err := tx.Where("client_id = ?", id).Delete(&model.ClientInbound{}).Error; err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
if err := tx.Where("client_id = ?", id).Delete(&model.ClientExternalLink{}).Error; err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
if err := clearClientHwidsBySubIDTx(tx, existing.SubID); err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
if !keepTraffic && existing.Email != "" {
|
|
if err := tx.Where("email = ?", existing.Email).Delete(&xray.ClientTraffic{}).Error; err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
if err := clearGlobalTraffic(tx, existing.Email); err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
if err := tx.Where("client_email = ?", existing.Email).Delete(&model.InboundClientIps{}).Error; err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
if err := tx.Where("email = ?", existing.Email).Delete(&model.NodeClientTraffic{}).Error; err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return tx.Delete(&model.ClientRecord{}, id).Error
|
|
}); err != nil {
|
|
withdrawClientTombstones(existing.Email)
|
|
return needRestart, err
|
|
}
|
|
return needRestart, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// hasTunnelAttachment reports whether any of inboundIds is a currently
|
|
// existing WireGuard or AmneziaWG inbound. Inbounds that fail to load are
|
|
// skipped rather than treated as an error -- Attach's own loop already
|
|
// surfaces a real error for any inbound it can't load when it gets there.
|
|
func (s *ClientService) hasTunnelAttachment(inboundSvc *InboundService, inboundIds []int) bool {
|
|
for _, ibId := range inboundIds {
|
|
inbound, err := inboundSvc.GetInbound(ibId)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
if inbound.Protocol == model.WireGuard || inbound.Protocol == model.AmneziaWG {
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// tunnelInboundCount reports how many of inboundIds are WireGuard/AmneziaWG,
|
|
// i.e. how many independent peers one shared field set would be written to.
|
|
func tunnelInboundCount(inboundIds []int) (int64, error) {
|
|
if len(inboundIds) == 0 {
|
|
return 0, nil
|
|
}
|
|
var n int64
|
|
err := database.GetDB().Model(&model.Inbound{}).
|
|
Where("id IN ? AND protocol IN ?", inboundIds, []model.Protocol{model.WireGuard, model.AmneziaWG}).
|
|
Count(&n).Error
|
|
return n, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// addressesFitAmneziaWGInbound reports whether every entry in addrs falls
|
|
// inside ib's own configured subnet(s). AmneziaWG only: its kernel interface
|
|
// Address is exactly that subnet, so an address inherited from elsewhere (an
|
|
// identity attached to a WireGuard inbound first, say) produces a peer that
|
|
// can never connect -- Attach allocates fresh instead.
|
|
func addressesFitAmneziaWGInbound(addrs []string, ib *model.Inbound) bool {
|
|
if ib.Protocol != model.AmneziaWG || len(addrs) == 0 {
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
v4Base, v6Base, err := defaultAmneziaWGSubnetBases(ib.Settings)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
bases := make([]netip.Prefix, 0, 2)
|
|
for _, base := range []string{v4Base, v6Base} {
|
|
if base == "" {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
prefix, pErr := netip.ParsePrefix(base)
|
|
if pErr != nil {
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
bases = append(bases, prefix)
|
|
}
|
|
for _, a := range addrs {
|
|
host := wireguardHostAddr(a)
|
|
if !host.IsValid() {
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
fits := false
|
|
for _, prefix := range bases {
|
|
if prefix.Contains(host) {
|
|
fits = true
|
|
break
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if !fits {
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Attach applies the client to every requested inbound: one failing inbound no
|
|
// longer aborts the others, so the error can name several and needRestart holds.
|
|
func (s *ClientService) Attach(inboundSvc *InboundService, id int, inboundIds []int) (bool, error) {
|
|
existing, err := s.GetByID(id)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return false, err
|
|
}
|
|
currentIds, err := s.GetInboundIdsForRecord(id)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return false, err
|
|
}
|
|
have := make(map[int]struct{}, len(currentIds))
|
|
for _, x := range currentIds {
|
|
have[x] = struct{}{}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
clientWire := existing.ToClient()
|
|
flow, ffErr := s.EffectiveFlow(nil, id)
|
|
if ffErr != nil {
|
|
return false, ffErr
|
|
}
|
|
clientWire.Flow = flow
|
|
clientWire.UpdatedAt = time.Now().UnixMilli()
|
|
|
|
// If this identity has no CURRENT WireGuard/AmneziaWG attachment,
|
|
// clientWire.AllowedIPs (from the ClientRecord) is a leftover from
|
|
// whenever it last had one -- nothing reserves it anymore. Clear it so
|
|
// attaching to a tunnel inbound now allocates a fresh address instead
|
|
// of resurrecting the old one, which may no longer even be the lowest
|
|
// free slot. Left untouched when the identity already has an active
|
|
// tunnel elsewhere, so extending it to a second protocol still keeps
|
|
// the same address on both.
|
|
if !s.hasTunnelAttachment(inboundSvc, currentIds) {
|
|
clientWire.AllowedIPs = nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
adds := make([]*model.Inbound, 0, len(inboundIds))
|
|
for _, ibId := range inboundIds {
|
|
if _, attached := have[ibId]; attached {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
inbound, getErr := inboundSvc.GetInbound(ibId)
|
|
if getErr != nil {
|
|
return false, fmt.Errorf("inbound %d: %w", ibId, getErr)
|
|
}
|
|
copyClient := *clientWire
|
|
if !addressesFitAmneziaWGInbound(copyClient.AllowedIPs, inbound) {
|
|
copyClient.AllowedIPs = nil
|
|
}
|
|
if err := s.fillProtocolDefaults(©Client, inbound); err != nil {
|
|
return false, fmt.Errorf("inbound %d: %w", ibId, err)
|
|
}
|
|
settingsPayload, mErr := json.Marshal(map[string][]model.Client{"clients": {clientWithInboundFlow(copyClient, inbound)}})
|
|
if mErr != nil {
|
|
return false, fmt.Errorf("inbound %d: %w", ibId, mErr)
|
|
}
|
|
adds = append(adds, &model.Inbound{Id: ibId, Settings: string(settingsPayload)})
|
|
}
|
|
return s.fanoutInboundClientAdds(inboundSvc, adds)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (s *ClientService) CreateOne(inboundSvc *InboundService, inboundId int, client model.Client) (bool, error) {
|
|
return s.Create(inboundSvc, &ClientCreatePayload{
|
|
Client: client,
|
|
InboundIds: []int{inboundId},
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (s *ClientService) DetachByEmail(inboundSvc *InboundService, inboundId int, email string) (bool, error) {
|
|
if email == "" {
|
|
return false, common.NewError("client email is required")
|
|
}
|
|
rec, err := s.GetRecordByEmail(nil, email)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return false, err
|
|
}
|
|
return s.Detach(inboundSvc, rec.Id, []int{inboundId})
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (s *ClientService) AttachByEmail(inboundSvc *InboundService, email string, inboundIds []int) (bool, error) {
|
|
if email == "" {
|
|
return false, common.NewError("client email is required")
|
|
}
|
|
rec, err := s.GetRecordByEmail(nil, email)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return false, err
|
|
}
|
|
return s.Attach(inboundSvc, rec.Id, inboundIds)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (s *ClientService) DetachByEmailMany(inboundSvc *InboundService, email string, inboundIds []int) (bool, error) {
|
|
if email == "" {
|
|
return false, common.NewError("client email is required")
|
|
}
|
|
rec, err := s.GetRecordByEmail(nil, email)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return false, err
|
|
}
|
|
return s.Detach(inboundSvc, rec.Id, inboundIds)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (s *ClientService) DeleteByEmail(inboundSvc *InboundService, email string, keepTraffic bool) (bool, error) {
|
|
if email == "" {
|
|
return false, common.NewError("client email is required")
|
|
}
|
|
rec, err := s.GetRecordByEmail(nil, email)
|
|
if err == nil {
|
|
return s.Delete(inboundSvc, rec.Id, keepTraffic)
|
|
}
|
|
if !errors.Is(err, gorm.ErrRecordNotFound) {
|
|
return false, err
|
|
}
|
|
inboundIds, idsErr := s.findInboundIdsByClientEmail(email)
|
|
if idsErr != nil {
|
|
return false, idsErr
|
|
}
|
|
if len(inboundIds) == 0 {
|
|
return false, common.NewError(fmt.Sprintf("client %q not found in any inbound or client record", email))
|
|
}
|
|
applies := make([]inboundApply, 0, len(inboundIds))
|
|
for _, ibId := range inboundIds {
|
|
applies = append(applies, inboundApply{id: ibId, run: func() (bool, error) {
|
|
nr, delErr := s.DelInboundClientByEmail(inboundSvc, ibId, email, keepTraffic, true)
|
|
if errors.Is(delErr, ErrClientNotInInbound) {
|
|
return nr, nil
|
|
}
|
|
return nr, delErr
|
|
}})
|
|
}
|
|
needRestart, delErr := fanoutInboundApplies(applies)
|
|
if delErr != nil {
|
|
return needRestart, delErr
|
|
}
|
|
if !keepTraffic {
|
|
db := database.GetDB()
|
|
if err := db.Where("email = ?", email).Delete(&xray.ClientTraffic{}).Error; err != nil {
|
|
return needRestart, err
|
|
}
|
|
if err := clearGlobalTraffic(db, email); err != nil {
|
|
return needRestart, err
|
|
}
|
|
if err := db.Where("client_email = ?", email).Delete(&model.InboundClientIps{}).Error; err != nil {
|
|
return needRestart, err
|
|
}
|
|
if err := db.Where("email = ?", email).Delete(&model.NodeClientTraffic{}).Error; err != nil {
|
|
return needRestart, err
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return needRestart, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (s *ClientService) UpdateByEmail(inboundSvc *InboundService, email string, updated model.Client, limitHwid int, inboundFilter ...int) (bool, error) {
|
|
if email == "" {
|
|
return false, common.NewError("client email is required")
|
|
}
|
|
rec, err := s.GetRecordByEmail(nil, email)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return false, err
|
|
}
|
|
return s.Update(inboundSvc, rec.Id, updated, limitHwid, inboundFilter...)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (s *ClientService) Detach(inboundSvc *InboundService, id int, inboundIds []int) (bool, error) {
|
|
existing, err := s.GetByID(id)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return false, err
|
|
}
|
|
currentIds, err := s.GetInboundIdsForRecord(id)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return false, err
|
|
}
|
|
have := make(map[int]struct{}, len(currentIds))
|
|
for _, x := range currentIds {
|
|
have[x] = struct{}{}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
applies := make([]inboundApply, 0, len(inboundIds))
|
|
for _, ibId := range inboundIds {
|
|
if _, attached := have[ibId]; !attached {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
if _, getErr := inboundSvc.GetInbound(ibId); getErr != nil {
|
|
return false, getErr
|
|
}
|
|
// Detach by email — the client's stable identity (see Delete).
|
|
if existing.Email == "" {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
applies = append(applies, inboundApply{id: ibId, run: func() (bool, error) {
|
|
nr, delErr := s.DelInboundClientByEmail(inboundSvc, ibId, existing.Email, true, false)
|
|
if errors.Is(delErr, ErrClientNotInInbound) {
|
|
return nr, nil
|
|
}
|
|
return nr, delErr
|
|
}})
|
|
}
|
|
return fanoutInboundApplies(applies)
|
|
}
|