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n0ctal
3f1dd4bf5a
* fix: follow-ups from the post-merge reviews of #6221, #6227, #6230 and #6239 Six defects the automated reviews found after those PRs merged. Each is verified rather than taken on trust — two by experiment, the rest by reading the merged code. **Import restore never wrote an empty local value** (#6227). GORM builds the assignment map from the struct passed to Assign and drops zero-valued fields, so `Assign(model.Setting{Value: ""})` produced an empty Updates and the imported row survived. Empty is the normal state: UpdateAllSetting writes a row for every AllSetting field including the blank ones. That is exactly the case the PR existed for — a destination with no certificate inheriting the source machine's path. Confirmed with a throwaway test before changing anything: the value stayed "IMPORTED". Now uses saveSetting, which is not zero-filtered. **Import destroyed node mTLS material** (#6227). The "no local row means the default applied, so drop the import" branch fires for the five nodeMtls* keys, which are minted on demand and deliberately absent from AllSetting, so a fresh install has no row for them. Reinstall-then-restore therefore deleted the CA certificate and its private key — and the backup was the only copy, since neither is surfaced in the UI or the export. Those keys are now kept. **The clients-list enable toggle wiped renewal state** (#6239, #6238). setEnable hand-builds the update payload and carried reset but not resetDay or resetMax, so one click on the switch turned calendar mode off and lifted the renewal cap permanently. The form-modal tests could not catch it because that path does send both fields. **"Delete depleted clients" deleted calendar clients** (#6239). The predicate read `reset = 0` as "does not auto-renew", which is exactly the calendar shape, in two places. Both now share one constant that also requires `reset_day = 0`. **Allowlist validation and parsing disagreed** (#6230). Save used net, scan used netip, and they differ: `198.51.100.0/024` saves without complaint and is silently dropped at scan — the failure the PR set out to remove. Verified by running both parsers. An IPv4-mapped prefix parsed but could never match, because contains() unmaps the query while the prefix stayed 128-bit; it is unmapped at parse now. A test asserts the two acceptance sets agree. **A comment stated the opposite of the truth** (#6221). GetInbounds has no enable filter, so a node reports a disabled inbound normally; the row in that bug report was missing only because it was never delivered. Reworded to the real invariant. Also trims two comment blocks in ip_limit_allowlist.go to the repo's two-line maximum. Not included: the reviewer's suggestion to lift the node hand-off out of `if inbound.Enable` in AddInbound. It is the right root-cause fix, but it changes delivery behaviour on multi-node deployments and belongs in its own change with its own testing, not in a cleanup batch. One reported finding is not real: BulkCreate does call validateClientResetDay, validateClientResetMax and validateClientTrafficReset — verified in the merged tree. * fix(netsafe): wrap both errors so errorlint passes Unrelated to this PR's subject and in a file it does not otherwise touch. It is here only because CI lints the merge result, and `main` has been red since #6242 landed: `fmt.Errorf("%w; %v", ...)` wraps the first error and formats the second, which errorlint rejects. Go 1.20 allows more than one %w, so both are wrapped now and `errors.Is` works against either.
84 lines
2.1 KiB
Go
84 lines
2.1 KiB
Go
package job
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import (
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"net/netip"
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"strings"
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)
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// An address that matches is neither counted towards a client's IP limit nor
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// banned: counting it would still cut the shared network it protects (#5378).
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type ipLimitAllowlist struct {
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prefixes []netip.Prefix
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addrs []netip.Addr
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}
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// Comma-separated, each entry a CIDR or a bare address. Unparseable entries are
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// skipped: the validator uses these same rules, so only a hand-edited DB differs.
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func parseIpLimitAllowlist(raw string) ipLimitAllowlist {
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var list ipLimitAllowlist
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for _, field := range strings.Split(raw, ",") {
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field = strings.TrimSpace(field)
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if field == "" {
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continue
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}
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if prefix, err := netip.ParsePrefix(field); err == nil {
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// Unmapped: contains() unmaps the queried address, and Prefix.Contains
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// is false whenever the bit lengths disagree.
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if addr := prefix.Addr(); addr.Is4In6() {
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if p4, perr := addr.Unmap().Prefix(prefix.Bits() - 96); perr == nil {
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prefix = p4
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}
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}
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list.prefixes = append(list.prefixes, prefix.Masked())
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continue
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}
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if addr, err := netip.ParseAddr(field); err == nil {
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list.addrs = append(list.addrs, addr.Unmap())
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}
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}
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return list
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}
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func (l ipLimitAllowlist) empty() bool {
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return len(l.prefixes) == 0 && len(l.addrs) == 0
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}
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func (l ipLimitAllowlist) contains(ip string) bool {
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if l.empty() {
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return false
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}
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addr, err := netip.ParseAddr(strings.TrimSpace(ip))
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if err != nil {
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return false
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}
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addr = addr.Unmap()
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for _, allowed := range l.addrs {
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if allowed == addr {
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return true
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}
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}
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for _, prefix := range l.prefixes {
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if prefix.Contains(addr) {
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return true
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}
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}
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return false
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}
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// split separates the entries an allowlist protects from the ones the limit
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// still applies to, preserving the caller's ordering in both.
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func (l ipLimitAllowlist) split(entries []IPWithTimestamp) (limited, allowed []IPWithTimestamp) {
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if l.empty() {
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return entries, nil
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}
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limited = make([]IPWithTimestamp, 0, len(entries))
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for _, entry := range entries {
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if l.contains(entry.IP) {
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allowed = append(allowed, entry)
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continue
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}
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limited = append(limited, entry)
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}
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return limited, allowed
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}
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