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https://github.com/MHSanaei/3x-ui.git
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Kuzz007
8d83a51668
CI caught this: the "genuinely different client" (other@wg) was seeded onto the SAME inbound passed as excludeID, which otherTunnelAllowedIPs already excludes entirely regardless of the selfEmails fix -- so the assertion that its address is still reported could never have passed, proving nothing either way. Move it onto the sibling inbound alongside shared@id, which is what the test actually needs to exercise (two clients on one sibling, one excluded by email, one not).
106 lines
4.8 KiB
Go
106 lines
4.8 KiB
Go
package service
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import (
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"testing"
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"github.com/mhsanaei/3x-ui/v3/internal/database"
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"github.com/mhsanaei/3x-ui/v3/internal/database/model"
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)
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// otherTunnelAllowedIPs must see across protocols (a WireGuard inbound's
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// client address collides with an AmneziaWG one just as easily as two
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// AmneziaWG inbounds would), must exclude the inbound doing the asking, and
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// must ignore inbounds that aren't WireGuard/AmneziaWG entirely.
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func TestOtherTunnelAllowedIPs(t *testing.T) {
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setupConflictDB(t)
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seedInboundConflict(t, "wg-1", "0.0.0.0", 51820, model.WireGuard, ``, `{"clients":[{"email":"a@wg","allowedIPs":["10.0.0.5/32"]}]}`)
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seedInboundConflict(t, "awg-1", "0.0.0.0", 443, model.AmneziaWG, ``, `{"server":{"subnetIp":"10.8.1.0","subnetCidr":24},"clients":[{"email":"b@awg","allowedIPs":["10.8.1.21/32"]}]}`)
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seedInboundConflict(t, "vless-1", "0.0.0.0", 8443, model.VLESS, `{"network":"tcp"}`, `{"clients":[{"email":"c@vless"}]}`)
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var wgInbound model.Inbound
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if err := database.GetDB().Where("tag = ?", "wg-1").First(&wgInbound).Error; err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("read seeded wg row: %v", err)
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}
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svc := &ClientService{}
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inboundSvc := &InboundService{}
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used, err := svc.otherTunnelAllowedIPs(inboundSvc, wgInbound.Id, nil)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("otherTunnelAllowedIPs: %v", err)
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}
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if len(used) != 1 {
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t.Fatalf("expected exactly one cross-inbound address (self excluded, vless ignored), got %v", used)
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}
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label, ok := used["10.8.1.21/32"]
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if !ok {
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t.Fatalf("expected the awg inbound's address to be reported as used, got %v", used)
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}
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if label == "" {
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t.Fatal("expected a non-empty description of which inbound holds the address")
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}
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}
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// TestOtherTunnelAllowedIPsExcludesSelfEmail is a regression test for a real
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// bug in ClientService.Attach: attaching one identity to multiple
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// WireGuard/AmneziaWG inbounds in the same call copies that identity's own
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// stored AllowedIPs into every inbound it processes (by design -- the same
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// person should get the same tunnel address on every protocol they use).
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// Attach's loop calls addInboundClient once per inbound, and each of those
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// calls independently computes otherTunnelAllowedIPs -- so by the second
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// inbound in the loop, the first inbound's now-successful copy of the
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// identity's own address looked like a cross-inbound collision against
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// itself, and the attach failed with exactly the error a real user hit:
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// "wireguard: allowedIPs entry 10.8.1.21/32 is already used by a client on
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// inbound 'awg' (#10)". selfEmails must exclude this identity's own entries
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// on sibling inbounds -- safe to do unconditionally because ClientRecord.Email
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// is globally unique, so a same-email match can only ever be this identity,
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// never a genuine different client.
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func TestOtherTunnelAllowedIPsExcludesSelfEmail(t *testing.T) {
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setupConflictDB(t)
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// Both shared@id (to be excluded) and other@awg (a genuinely different
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// client, must still be reported) live on the SAME sibling inbound --
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// otherTunnelAllowedIPs already excludes the asking inbound entirely via
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// excludeID, so putting other@awg there instead would make it invisible
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// to the scan regardless of the selfEmails fix, proving nothing.
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seedInboundConflict(t, "awg-1", "0.0.0.0", 443, model.AmneziaWG, ``, `{"server":{"subnetIp":"10.8.1.0","subnetCidr":24},"clients":[{"email":"shared@id","allowedIPs":["10.8.1.21/32"]},{"email":"other@awg","allowedIPs":["10.8.1.5/32"]}]}`)
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seedInboundConflict(t, "wg-1", "0.0.0.0", 51820, model.WireGuard, ``, `{"clients":[]}`)
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var wgInbound model.Inbound
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if err := database.GetDB().Where("tag = ?", "wg-1").First(&wgInbound).Error; err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("read seeded wg row: %v", err)
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}
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svc := &ClientService{}
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inboundSvc := &InboundService{}
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used, err := svc.otherTunnelAllowedIPs(inboundSvc, wgInbound.Id, map[string]struct{}{"shared@id": {}})
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("otherTunnelAllowedIPs: %v", err)
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}
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if _, stillThere := used["10.8.1.21/32"]; stillThere {
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t.Fatalf("shared@id's own address on the awg inbound must be excluded from used, got %v", used)
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}
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if _, ok := used["10.8.1.5/32"]; !ok {
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t.Fatalf("a genuinely different client's address must still be reported as used, got %v", used)
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}
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}
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func TestOtherTunnelAllowedIPsEmptyWhenNoSiblings(t *testing.T) {
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setupConflictDB(t)
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seedInboundConflict(t, "wg-1", "0.0.0.0", 51820, model.WireGuard, ``, `{"clients":[{"email":"a@wg","allowedIPs":["10.0.0.5/32"]}]}`)
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var wgInbound model.Inbound
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if err := database.GetDB().Where("tag = ?", "wg-1").First(&wgInbound).Error; err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("read seeded wg row: %v", err)
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}
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svc := &ClientService{}
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inboundSvc := &InboundService{}
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used, err := svc.otherTunnelAllowedIPs(inboundSvc, wgInbound.Id, nil)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("otherTunnelAllowedIPs: %v", err)
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}
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if len(used) != 0 {
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t.Fatalf("expected no cross-inbound addresses with only one tunnel inbound present, got %v", used)
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}
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}
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