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https://github.com/MHSanaei/3x-ui.git
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59dff059c1
Hard cutover, part 3: everything that only ever existed to drive the kernel-module (DKMS) + awg-quick + TPROXY architecture is gone now that internal/amneziawgnet's embedded path is wired in as the real thing. internal/amneziawg/manager.go -> instance.go (renamed, ~90% smaller): kept InstanceFromInbound and its direct helpers (interfaceNameForID, serverAddress, serverAddressV6) plus the exported FirstIPv4 (still used by server.go's access-log email index) -- all pure, protocol-shape-only code with no OS dependency, reused by both the old and new paths historically. Deleted the old Manager (GetManager/Ensure/Reconcile/StopAll/CollectTraffic/ the fingerprint methods), generateServerConfig and everything under it (writeObfuscation, defaultPostUpDown, appendOrTrue, detectDefaultInterface), and process control (interfaceUp/Down, syncConfig, getPeerStats, IsAwgInstalled). route_egress.go deleted entirely (the TPROXY bridge's port/fwmark/table constants and rule-rendering, fully superseded by internal/amneziawgnet's SOCKSPortForInbound/SocksPassword). portfwd.go trimmed to just the parsing/validation half (ForwardedPortsInclude, still used for save-time conflict checks); the iptables DNAT rendering half is gone -- per-client port-forwarding has no equivalent under the embedded path yet (tracked as Phase 3.6). install.sh: removed install_ndppd, enable_ipv6_forwarding, enable_tproxy_support, should/install_amneziawg, and check_secure_boot (and their call sites) -- roughly 265 lines. No more DKMS build, PPA/keyring setup, TPROXY kernel module loading, or Secure Boot warning: the embedded path needs none of it. Not in this commit (tracked as an explicit follow-up, not silently dropped): the frontend's routeThroughXray toggle is now vestigial (the field stays in the Go/JSON schema for backward compat with existing stored settings, see types.go) but its UI/schema removal needs the frontend type-regen + openapi.json hand-patch dance this fork always does for a settings-shape change, which is its own separate pass. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
144 lines
5.1 KiB
Go
144 lines
5.1 KiB
Go
package service
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import (
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"encoding/json"
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"github.com/mhsanaei/3x-ui/v3/internal/database/model"
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)
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// inboundShadowsocksMethod extracts settings.method for Shadowsocks inbounds so
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// the client UI can generate a valid PSK (base64 of the method's key length)
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// for Shadowsocks 2022 ciphers. Returns "" for non-Shadowsocks inbounds.
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func inboundShadowsocksMethod(protocol, settings string) string {
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if protocol != string(model.Shadowsocks) || settings == "" {
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return ""
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}
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var s struct {
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Method string `json:"method"`
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}
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if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(settings), &s); err != nil {
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return ""
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}
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return s.Method
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}
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// inboundCanEnableTlsFlow mirrors canEnableTlsFlow() from the frontend
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// (frontend/src/lib/xray/protocol-capabilities.ts). XTLS Vision is valid for
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// VLESS on TCP with tls or reality (classic), and on XHTTP when VLESS encryption
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// (vlessenc / ML-KEM) is enabled — there the post-quantum, VLESS-level
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// encryption stands in for the transport TLS that Vision relies on. settings is
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// the inbound's raw settings JSON, which carries the encryption value
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// (streamSettings does not).
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func inboundCanEnableTlsFlow(protocol, streamSettings, settings string) bool {
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if protocol != string(model.VLESS) {
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return false
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}
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if streamSettings == "" {
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return false
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}
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var stream struct {
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Network string `json:"network"`
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Security string `json:"security"`
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}
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if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(streamSettings), &stream); err != nil {
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return false
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}
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switch stream.Network {
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case "tcp":
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return stream.Security == "tls" || stream.Security == "reality"
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case "xhttp":
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return vlessEncryptionEnabled(settings)
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default:
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return false
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}
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}
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// nodeEligibleProtocols mirrors NODE_ELIGIBLE_PROTOCOLS from the frontend
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// (frontend/src/pages/inbounds/form/InboundFormModal.tsx), which hides the
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// "Deploy To" node picker for anything not in this set. MTProto and
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// AmneziaWG are both sidecar-managed rather than plain Xray inbounds, and
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// their reconcile loops (mtproto.Manager, amneziawgnet.Manager) only ever
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// query for NodeID IS NULL rows -- a node-assigned instance of either would
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// never be reconciled by the master, yet nothing previously stopped one
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// from being created that way (the frontend allowlist has no server-side
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// mirror). A future protocol defaults to ineligible until added here,
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// matching the frontend's own opt-in shape.
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var nodeEligibleProtocols = map[model.Protocol]bool{
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model.VLESS: true,
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model.VMESS: true,
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model.Trojan: true,
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model.Shadowsocks: true,
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model.Hysteria: true,
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model.WireGuard: true,
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}
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// isNodeEligibleProtocol reports whether protocol may be assigned to a node.
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func isNodeEligibleProtocol(protocol model.Protocol) bool {
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return nodeEligibleProtocols[protocol]
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}
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// vlessEncryptionEnabled reports whether a VLESS inbound has VLESS-level
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// encryption (vlessenc / ML-KEM) configured. When enabled these fields hold a
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// generated dotted string (e.g. "mlkem768x25519plus.native.0rtt.<key>"); "none"
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// or empty means off. The value is never the literal "vlessenc" — that is the
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// name of the `xray vlessenc` CLI subcommand, not a stored value.
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//
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// Both fields are checked: decryption is the authoritative server-side value
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// xray-core reads, while encryption is stored by the panel for link generation.
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// The ML-KEM/X25519 buttons set both, but accepting either keeps the gate
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// working for inbounds configured via the API or raw JSON.
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func vlessEncryptionEnabled(settings string) bool {
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if settings == "" {
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return false
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}
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var s struct {
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Encryption string `json:"encryption"`
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Decryption string `json:"decryption"`
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}
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if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(settings), &s); err != nil {
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return false
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}
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return vlessEncValueSet(s.Encryption) || vlessEncValueSet(s.Decryption)
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}
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// vlessEncValueSet reports whether a VLESS encryption/decryption field holds a
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// real (generated) value rather than the "none"/empty sentinel.
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func vlessEncValueSet(v string) bool {
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return v != "" && v != "none"
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}
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// inboundCanHostFallbacks gates the settings.fallbacks injection.
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// Xray only honors fallbacks on VLESS and Trojan inbounds carried over
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// TCP transport with TLS or Reality security. This is intentionally stricter
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// than inboundCanEnableTlsFlow (which also accepts XHTTP+vlessenc): fallbacks
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// are a raw-TCP-only feature.
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func inboundCanHostFallbacks(ib *model.Inbound) bool {
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if ib == nil {
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return false
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}
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if ib.Protocol != model.VLESS && ib.Protocol != model.Trojan {
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return false
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}
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return streamSupportsFallbacks(ib.StreamSettings)
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}
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// streamSupportsFallbacks reports whether the stream is raw TCP carried over
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// TLS or REALITY — the only transport Xray honors inbound fallbacks on (and the
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// classic requirement for XTLS Vision before vlessenc).
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func streamSupportsFallbacks(streamSettings string) bool {
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if streamSettings == "" {
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return false
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}
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var stream struct {
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Network string `json:"network"`
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Security string `json:"security"`
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}
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if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(streamSettings), &stream); err != nil {
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return false
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}
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if stream.Network != "tcp" {
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return false
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}
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return stream.Security == "tls" || stream.Security == "reality"
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}
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