Files
3x-ui/internal/web/job/check_client_ip_job.go
T
n0ctal d6472740dc feat(limitip): let operators exempt trusted addresses from the IP limit (#6230)
* feat(limitip): let operators exempt trusted addresses from the IP limit

Behind a shared address — an office gateway, a campus NAT, a residential
carrier — every user looks like the same client. One of them trips the IP
limit and the address is disconnected and handed to fail2ban, taking the
others with it. Today the only way out is editing jail.d by hand, which an
update overwrites.

Add an allowlist setting of addresses and networks. A matching address is
neither banned nor counted towards the limit: counting it would still cut the
shared network the entry exists to protect.

Entries are validated on save rather than skipped at scan time — a typo would
otherwise leave the address unprotected until someone noticed the bans.

* fix(limitip): keep each doc comment on its function and one grammar for the list

Three review follow-ups. loadAllowlist landed between hasLimitIp's doc comment
and hasLimitIp itself, so godoc showed one function's rationale above another's
body; it now sits after that function with its own comment.

The parser advertised semicolons and whitespace as separators while the
settings validator accepts commas only, making those forms unreachable through
the panel and the API — a promise the software never keeps. Both sides now read
the same comma-separated grammar.

The dist stub was a build artifact and does not belong in the tree.

* chore: drop the accidentally committed dist build stub

internal/web/dist/.gitkeep is what make dist-stub creates locally. Committing
it changes fresh-clone behaviour for everyone: today a bare go build fails
loudly on //go:embed all:dist, which is the documented signal to run the stub
target; with the file present the build succeeds and the panel serves an empty
dist instead.

* chore(i18n): translate the IP limit allowlist strings into the remaining locales

Ten locales carried the English source text verbatim; only ru-RU and uk-UA
were translated. The i18n dead-key test only checks that a key exists in every
file, so an untranslated value passes it silently.

Wording follows each locale's existing terms: the ipLimit noun already in the
file, and the comma-separated IP/CIDR phrasing from trustedProxyCidrsDesc.

* refactor(limitip): share one IP/CIDR list validator and read the allowlist only when enforcing

The allowlist check in CheckValid was a line-for-line copy of the trusted-proxy
loop directly above it. Both now call one helper, each passing its own message,
so the two lists cannot drift apart.

Run() read the allowlist on every 10s scan, including the majority of panels
where no client carries an IP limit and the value is discarded. It is now read
only once enforcement is known to apply.

CheckValid had no test for either list. The new one pins that a malformed entry
is rejected and that each list still names itself in the error, which is what
the shared helper could otherwise break.

---------

Co-authored-by: n0ctal <n0ctal@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Sanaei <ho3ein.sanaei@gmail.com>
2026-08-18 12:23:10 +02:00

771 lines
25 KiB
Go

package job
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"log"
"os"
"os/exec"
"runtime"
"sort"
"strings"
"time"
"github.com/mhsanaei/3x-ui/v3/internal/database"
"github.com/mhsanaei/3x-ui/v3/internal/database/model"
"github.com/mhsanaei/3x-ui/v3/internal/logger"
"github.com/mhsanaei/3x-ui/v3/internal/web/service"
"github.com/mhsanaei/3x-ui/v3/internal/xray"
"gorm.io/gorm"
)
// IPWithTimestamp tracks an IP address with its last seen timestamp
type IPWithTimestamp struct {
IP string `json:"ip"`
Timestamp int64 `json:"timestamp"`
}
// CheckClientIpJob monitors client IP addresses and manages IP blocking based
// on configured limits. The per-client IPs come from the core's online-stats
// API; no access log is involved. On a core too old to expose that API the job
// simply skips the run (the bundled core always supports it).
type CheckClientIpJob struct {
disAllowedIps []string
bannedSeen map[string]int64
xrayService service.XrayService
allowlist ipLimitAllowlist
}
var job *CheckClientIpJob
const defaultXrayAPIPort = 62789
const ipStaleAfterSeconds = int64(30 * 60)
// NewCheckClientIpJob creates a new client IP monitoring job instance.
func NewCheckClientIpJob() *CheckClientIpJob {
job = new(CheckClientIpJob)
return job
}
func (j *CheckClientIpJob) Run() {
observed, apiMode := j.collectFromOnlineAPI()
if !apiMode {
// xray is down or predates the online-stats API. There is no access-log
// fallback anymore, so there is nothing to do this run.
logger.Debug("[LimitIP] online-stats API unavailable this run; skipping")
return
}
if !isFail2BanEnabled() {
return
}
hasLimit := j.hasLimitIp()
f2bInstalled := false
if hasLimit {
f2bInstalled = j.checkFail2BanInstalled()
}
// Read only when the limit is actually applied: this runs every 10s and
// most panels carry no IP limit at all.
enforce := j.resolveEnforce(hasLimit, f2bInstalled)
if enforce {
j.allowlist = j.loadAllowlist()
}
j.processObserved(observed, enforce, true)
}
// resolveEnforce decides whether limits can actually be enforced this run.
// Without fail2ban on a platform that needs it the limit can't be applied, so
// enforcement is skipped (the panel resets these limits to 0 on upgrade and
// disables the field, so this is normally a no-op).
func (j *CheckClientIpJob) resolveEnforce(hasLimit, f2bInstalled bool) bool {
if hasLimit && runtime.GOOS != "windows" && !f2bInstalled {
return false
}
return hasLimit
}
// collectFromOnlineAPI builds per-email IP observations (email -> ip ->
// last-seen unix seconds) from the core's online-stats API. ok=false means the
// API is unavailable — xray not running, an older core, or a transient gRPC
// failure — and the caller skips the run (there is no access-log fallback).
func (j *CheckClientIpJob) collectFromOnlineAPI() (map[string]map[string]int64, bool) {
onlineUsers, ok, err := j.xrayService.GetOnlineUsers()
if err != nil {
logger.Debug("[LimitIP] online-stats API unavailable this run:", err)
return nil, false
}
if !ok {
return nil, false
}
now := time.Now().Unix()
observed := make(map[string]map[string]int64, len(onlineUsers))
for _, user := range onlineUsers {
for _, entry := range user.IPs {
// No localhost guard needed here: the core's OnlineMap.AddIP drops
// 127.0.0.1/[::1] itself, so they never reach this list.
ts := entry.LastSeen
if ts <= 0 {
ts = now
}
if _, exists := observed[user.Email]; !exists {
observed[user.Email] = make(map[string]int64)
}
if existing, seen := observed[user.Email][entry.IP]; !seen || ts > existing {
observed[user.Email][entry.IP] = ts
}
}
}
return observed, true
}
// hasLimitIp reports whether any client carries an IP limit. It probes the
// normalized clients table (limit_ip is synced there by SyncInbound and the
// legacy seeder), replacing the old `settings LIKE '%limitIp%'` scan that
// loaded and JSON-parsed every inbound's settings blob on each 10s run.
func (j *CheckClientIpJob) hasLimitIp() bool {
db := database.GetDB()
var probe int64
err := db.Model(&model.ClientRecord{}).Where("limit_ip > 0").Limit(1).Count(&probe).Error
return err == nil && probe > 0
}
// loadAllowlist reads the operator's trusted addresses once per scan; a bad
// read leaves the list empty, which enforces the limit as before rather than
// silently exempting everyone.
func (j *CheckClientIpJob) loadAllowlist() ipLimitAllowlist {
raw, err := (&service.SettingService{}).GetIpLimitAllowlist()
if err != nil {
logger.Warning("[LimitIP] could not read the allowlist, enforcing without it:", err)
return ipLimitAllowlist{}
}
return parseIpLimitAllowlist(raw)
}
const ipScanChunk = 400
func chunkEmails(s []string, size int) [][]string {
if len(s) == 0 {
return nil
}
chunks := make([][]string, 0, (len(s)+size-1)/size)
for size < len(s) {
s, chunks = s[size:], append(chunks, s[:size])
}
return append(chunks, s)
}
// loadClientLimits maps each observed email to its clients.limit_ip in a few
// chunked queries, replacing the per-email settings-JSON parse that previously
// resolved the limit.
func (j *CheckClientIpJob) loadClientLimits(emails []string) map[string]int {
db := database.GetDB()
out := make(map[string]int, len(emails))
for _, batch := range chunkEmails(emails, ipScanChunk) {
var rows []struct {
Email string
LimitIp int
}
if err := db.Model(&model.ClientRecord{}).
Select("email, limit_ip").
Where("email IN ?", batch).
Scan(&rows).Error; err != nil {
j.checkError(err)
continue
}
for _, r := range rows {
out[r.Email] = r.LimitIp
}
}
return out
}
// loadInboundsByEmails resolves each email's owning inbound through the
// clients/client_inbounds relation in chunked queries. Like the old per-email
// First() it keeps the lowest inbound id when a client spans several inbounds.
func (j *CheckClientIpJob) loadInboundsByEmails(emails []string) map[string]*model.Inbound {
db := database.GetDB()
minInboundByEmail := make(map[string]int, len(emails))
for _, batch := range chunkEmails(emails, ipScanChunk) {
var pairs []struct {
Email string
InboundId int
}
if err := db.Table("client_inbounds").
Select("clients.email AS email, client_inbounds.inbound_id AS inbound_id").
Joins("JOIN clients ON clients.id = client_inbounds.client_id").
Where("clients.email IN ?", batch).
Scan(&pairs).Error; err != nil {
j.checkError(err)
return nil
}
for _, p := range pairs {
if cur, ok := minInboundByEmail[p.Email]; !ok || p.InboundId < cur {
minInboundByEmail[p.Email] = p.InboundId
}
}
}
if len(minInboundByEmail) == 0 {
return nil
}
idSet := make(map[int]struct{}, len(minInboundByEmail))
ids := make([]int, 0, len(minInboundByEmail))
for _, id := range minInboundByEmail {
if _, seen := idSet[id]; !seen {
idSet[id] = struct{}{}
ids = append(ids, id)
}
}
sort.Ints(ids)
inboundsById := make(map[int]*model.Inbound, len(ids))
for lo := 0; lo < len(ids); lo += ipScanChunk {
hi := min(lo+ipScanChunk, len(ids))
var page []*model.Inbound
if err := db.Model(&model.Inbound{}).Where("id IN ?", ids[lo:hi]).Find(&page).Error; err != nil {
j.checkError(err)
return nil
}
for _, ib := range page {
inboundsById[ib.Id] = ib
}
}
out := make(map[string]*model.Inbound, len(minInboundByEmail))
for email, id := range minInboundByEmail {
if ib, ok := inboundsById[id]; ok {
out[email] = ib
}
}
return out
}
func (j *CheckClientIpJob) loadClientIpRows(emails []string) map[string]*model.InboundClientIps {
db := database.GetDB()
out := make(map[string]*model.InboundClientIps, len(emails))
for _, batch := range chunkEmails(emails, ipScanChunk) {
var rows []model.InboundClientIps
if err := db.Where("client_email IN ?", batch).Find(&rows).Error; err != nil {
j.checkError(err)
continue
}
for i := range rows {
out[rows[i].ClientEmail] = &rows[i]
}
}
return out
}
// processObserved runs collection + enforcement for one scan's observations
// (email -> ip -> last-seen unix seconds). observedAreLive marks the
// observations as live connections, which bypass the stale cutoff: a connection
// that opened hours ago is still live even though its timestamp is old. The
// online-stats API always reports live connections, so the job passes true.
// Lookups are batched up front and all inbound_client_ips writes share one
// transaction, so a scan costs a handful of queries and one fsync instead of
// several per observed email.
func (j *CheckClientIpJob) processObserved(observed map[string]map[string]int64, enforce, observedAreLive bool) bool {
shouldCleanLog := false
now := time.Now().Unix()
emails := make([]string, 0, len(observed))
for email := range observed {
emails = append(emails, email)
}
sort.Strings(emails)
limitByEmail := j.loadClientLimits(emails)
inboundByEmail := j.loadInboundsByEmails(emails)
ipRowByEmail := j.loadClientIpRows(emails)
// attribution accumulates this scan's local observations per email so they can
// be recorded under this panel's own guid for cross-node IP attribution.
attribution := make(map[string][]model.ClientIpEntry, len(observed))
type pendingDisconnect struct {
inbound *model.Inbound
email string
}
var disconnects []pendingDisconnect
db := database.GetDB()
tx := db.Begin()
if tx.Error != nil {
j.checkError(tx.Error)
return false
}
committed := false
defer func() {
if !committed {
tx.Rollback()
}
}()
for _, email := range emails {
ipTimestamps := observed[email]
// The observations can still reference a client that was just renamed
// or deleted; its email no longer matches any inbound. Skip it (and
// drop any orphaned tracking row) instead of recreating a row and
// logging an ERROR every run (#4963). The batch map resolves through
// the clients relation; the per-email fallback keeps its settings LIKE
// net for clients not yet present there.
inbound, ok := inboundByEmail[email]
if !ok {
var err error
inbound, err = j.getInboundByEmail(email)
if err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, gorm.ErrRecordNotFound) {
logger.Debugf("[LimitIP] skipping stale observed email %q (renamed or deleted)", email)
j.delInboundClientIps(tx, email)
} else {
j.checkError(err)
}
continue
}
}
// Convert to IPWithTimestamp slice
ipsWithTime := make([]IPWithTimestamp, 0, len(ipTimestamps))
attrEntries := make([]model.ClientIpEntry, 0, len(ipTimestamps))
for ip, timestamp := range ipTimestamps {
ipsWithTime = append(ipsWithTime, IPWithTimestamp{IP: ip, Timestamp: timestamp})
// Live API observations may carry an old lastSeen (connection start),
// so stamp attribution with now; otherwise the stale cutoff would evict
// an IP that is connected right now.
attrTs := timestamp
if observedAreLive {
attrTs = now
}
attrEntries = append(attrEntries, model.ClientIpEntry{IP: ip, Timestamp: attrTs})
}
if len(attrEntries) > 0 {
attribution[email] = attrEntries
}
clientIpsRecord, ok := ipRowByEmail[email]
if !ok {
jsonIps, err := json.Marshal(ipsWithTime)
if err != nil {
j.checkError(err)
continue
}
if err := tx.Save(&model.InboundClientIps{ClientEmail: email, Ips: string(jsonIps)}).Error; err != nil {
j.checkError(err)
}
continue
}
cleaned, banned := j.updateInboundClientIps(tx, clientIpsRecord, inbound, email, limitByEmail[email], ipsWithTime, enforce, observedAreLive)
shouldCleanLog = cleaned || shouldCleanLog
if banned {
disconnects = append(disconnects, pendingDisconnect{inbound: inbound, email: email})
}
}
if err := tx.Commit().Error; err != nil {
j.checkError(err)
return shouldCleanLog
}
committed = true
// Xray disconnects run after the commit so their network round-trips never
// extend the scan's write transaction (node syncs upsert the same table).
clientsCache := make(map[int][]model.Client)
for _, d := range disconnects {
clients, cached := clientsCache[d.inbound.Id]
if !cached {
clients, _ = service.ParseInboundSettingsClients(d.inbound.Settings)
clientsCache[d.inbound.Id] = clients
}
j.disconnectClientTemporarily(d.inbound, d.email, clients)
}
j.recordLocalAttribution(attribution)
return shouldCleanLog
}
// recordLocalAttribution stores this scan's local observations under this panel's
// own guid so a parent panel can attribute each IP to the node it is on.
// Best-effort: attribution is advisory and must never block IP-limit enforcement.
func (j *CheckClientIpJob) recordLocalAttribution(attribution map[string][]model.ClientIpEntry) {
if len(attribution) == 0 {
return
}
guid, err := (&service.SettingService{}).GetPanelGuid()
if err != nil || guid == "" {
return
}
if err := (&service.InboundService{}).RecordLocalClientIps(guid, attribution); err != nil {
logger.Debug("[LimitIP] record local ip attribution failed:", err)
}
}
// mergeClientIps folds this scan's observations into the persisted set,
// dropping entries older than staleCutoff. newAlwaysLive exempts the new
// entries from that cutoff: an API-observed IP is a live connection by
// definition, even when its lastSeen (set at dispatch time) is hours old.
func mergeClientIps(old, new []IPWithTimestamp, staleCutoff int64, newAlwaysLive bool) map[string]int64 {
ipMap := make(map[string]int64, len(old)+len(new))
for _, ipTime := range old {
if ipTime.Timestamp < staleCutoff {
continue
}
ipMap[ipTime.IP] = ipTime.Timestamp
}
for _, ipTime := range new {
if !newAlwaysLive && ipTime.Timestamp < staleCutoff {
continue
}
if existingTime, ok := ipMap[ipTime.IP]; !ok || ipTime.Timestamp > existingTime {
ipMap[ipTime.IP] = ipTime.Timestamp
}
}
return ipMap
}
// selectIpsToBan splits the live IPs (sorted oldest-first by partitionLiveIps)
// into the newest `limit` entries to keep and the older remainder to ban.
func selectIpsToBan(live []IPWithTimestamp, limit int) (kept, banned []IPWithTimestamp) {
if limit <= 0 || len(live) <= limit {
return live, nil
}
cutoff := len(live) - limit
return live[cutoff:], live[:cutoff]
}
func partitionLiveIps(ipMap map[string]int64, observedThisScan map[string]bool) (live, historical []IPWithTimestamp) {
live = make([]IPWithTimestamp, 0, len(observedThisScan))
historical = make([]IPWithTimestamp, 0, len(ipMap))
now := time.Now().Unix()
for ip, ts := range ipMap {
entry := IPWithTimestamp{IP: ip, Timestamp: ts}
// Consider an IP "live" if it was seen locally in this scan, OR if its
// timestamp from the synced database is very recent (e.g. within 2 minutes).
// This ensures cluster-wide limits work even if the IP was seen on another node.
if observedThisScan[ip] || now-ts < 120 {
live = append(live, entry)
} else {
historical = append(historical, entry)
}
}
sort.Slice(live, func(i, j int) bool { return live[i].Timestamp < live[j].Timestamp })
sort.Slice(historical, func(i, j int) bool { return historical[i].Timestamp < historical[j].Timestamp })
return live, historical
}
func (j *CheckClientIpJob) checkFail2BanInstalled() bool {
if !isFail2BanEnabled() {
return false
}
cmd := "fail2ban-client"
args := []string{"-h"}
err := exec.CommandContext(context.Background(), cmd, args...).Run()
return err == nil
}
func isFail2BanEnabled() bool {
value, ok := os.LookupEnv("XUI_ENABLE_FAIL2BAN")
return !ok || value == "true"
}
func (j *CheckClientIpJob) checkError(e error) {
if e != nil {
logger.Warning("client ip job err:", e)
}
}
// delInboundClientIps drops the inbound_client_ips tracking row for an email
// that no longer maps to any inbound (a renamed or deleted client), so stale
// access-log entries don't keep a ghost row alive (#4963).
func (j *CheckClientIpJob) delInboundClientIps(tx *gorm.DB, clientEmail string) {
if err := tx.Where("client_email = ?", clientEmail).Delete(&model.InboundClientIps{}).Error; err != nil {
j.checkError(err)
}
}
// updateInboundClientIps merges one email's observed IPs into its tracking row
// and applies the IP limit. limitIp comes from the caller (the clients table);
// writes go through the caller's transaction. banned=true asks the caller to
// disconnect the client after the transaction commits.
func (j *CheckClientIpJob) updateInboundClientIps(tx *gorm.DB, inboundClientIps *model.InboundClientIps, inbound *model.Inbound, clientEmail string, limitIp int, newIpsWithTime []IPWithTimestamp, enforce, observedAreLive bool) (shouldCleanLog, banned bool) {
if inbound.Settings == "" {
logger.Debug("wrong data:", inbound)
return false, false
}
if !enforce || limitIp <= 0 || !inbound.Enable {
// Nothing to enforce (collection-only run, no limit on the clients row,
// or inbound disabled): record the observed IPs for the panel and return.
jsonIps, _ := json.Marshal(newIpsWithTime)
inboundClientIps.Ips = string(jsonIps)
if err := tx.Save(inboundClientIps).Error; err != nil {
logger.Error("failed to save inboundClientIps:", err)
}
return false, false
}
// Parse old IPs from database
var oldIpsWithTime []IPWithTimestamp
if inboundClientIps.Ips != "" {
_ = json.Unmarshal([]byte(inboundClientIps.Ips), &oldIpsWithTime)
}
ipMap := mergeClientIps(oldIpsWithTime, newIpsWithTime, time.Now().Unix()-ipStaleAfterSeconds, observedAreLive)
// only ips seen in this scan count toward the limit. see
// partitionLiveIps.
observedThisScan := make(map[string]bool, len(newIpsWithTime))
for _, ipTime := range newIpsWithTime {
observedThisScan[ipTime.IP] = true
}
liveIps, historicalIps := partitionLiveIps(ipMap, observedThisScan)
j.disAllowedIps = []string{}
// historical db-only ips are excluded from this count on purpose.
limitedIps, allowedIps := j.allowlist.split(liveIps)
keptLive, bannedLive := selectIpsToBan(limitedIps, limitIp)
// Allowlisted addresses stay connected and out of the count: charging them
// against the limit would still cut the shared network the entry protects.
keptLive = append(keptLive, allowedIps...)
actionable := j.filterAdvancedSinceLastBan(clientEmail, bannedLive)
if len(actionable) > 0 {
shouldCleanLog = true
banned = true
logIpFile, err := os.OpenFile(xray.GetIPLimitLogPath(), os.O_CREATE|os.O_APPEND|os.O_WRONLY, 0o644)
if err != nil {
logger.Errorf("failed to open IP limit log file: %s", err)
return false, false
}
defer logIpFile.Close()
ipLogger := log.New(logIpFile, "", log.LstdFlags)
// log format is load-bearing: x-ui.sh create_iplimit_jails builds
// filter.d/3x-ipl.conf with
// failregex = \[LIMIT_IP\]\s*Email\s*=\s*<F-USER>.+</F-USER>\s*\|\|\s*Disconnecting OLD IP\s*=\s*<ADDR>\s*\|\|\s*Timestamp\s*=\s*\d+
// don't change the wording.
for _, ipTime := range actionable {
j.disAllowedIps = append(j.disAllowedIps, ipTime.IP)
ipLogger.Printf("[LIMIT_IP] Email = %s || Disconnecting OLD IP = %s || Timestamp = %d", clientEmail, ipTime.IP, ipTime.Timestamp)
}
}
// keep kept-live + historical in the blob so the panel keeps showing
// recently seen ips. banned live ips are already in the fail2ban log
// and will reappear in the next scan if they reconnect.
dbIps := make([]IPWithTimestamp, 0, len(keptLive)+len(historicalIps))
dbIps = append(dbIps, keptLive...)
dbIps = append(dbIps, historicalIps...)
jsonIps, _ := json.Marshal(dbIps)
inboundClientIps.Ips = string(jsonIps)
if err := tx.Save(inboundClientIps).Error; err != nil {
logger.Error("failed to save inboundClientIps:", err)
return false, banned
}
if len(j.disAllowedIps) > 0 {
logger.Infof("[LIMIT_IP] Client %s: Kept %d live IPs, queued %d old IPs for fail2ban", clientEmail, len(keptLive), len(j.disAllowedIps))
}
return shouldCleanLog, banned
}
// filterAdvancedSinceLastBan keeps only banned pairs whose lastSeen advanced since
// the previous ban: the core refreshes lastSeen solely on a new dispatch, so a
// frozen value is a dead connection it hasn't reaped yet, not a reconnect.
func (j *CheckClientIpJob) filterAdvancedSinceLastBan(email string, banned []IPWithTimestamp) []IPWithTimestamp {
if j.bannedSeen == nil {
j.bannedSeen = make(map[string]int64)
}
current := make(map[string]struct{}, len(banned))
actionable := make([]IPWithTimestamp, 0, len(banned))
for _, ipTime := range banned {
key := email + "|" + ipTime.IP
current[key] = struct{}{}
if last, ok := j.bannedSeen[key]; ok && ipTime.Timestamp <= last {
continue
}
j.bannedSeen[key] = ipTime.Timestamp
actionable = append(actionable, ipTime)
}
prefix := email + "|"
for key := range j.bannedSeen {
if strings.HasPrefix(key, prefix) {
if _, still := current[key]; !still {
delete(j.bannedSeen, key)
}
}
}
return actionable
}
// disconnectClientTemporarily removes and re-adds a client to force disconnect banned connections
func (j *CheckClientIpJob) disconnectClientTemporarily(inbound *model.Inbound, clientEmail string, clients []model.Client) {
var xrayAPI xray.XrayAPI
apiPort := j.resolveXrayAPIPort()
err := xrayAPI.Init(apiPort)
if err != nil {
logger.Warningf("[LIMIT_IP] Failed to init Xray API for disconnection: %v", err)
return
}
defer xrayAPI.Close()
// Find the client config
var clientConfig map[string]any
for _, client := range clients {
if client.Email == clientEmail {
// Convert client to map for API
clientBytes, _ := json.Marshal(client)
_ = json.Unmarshal(clientBytes, &clientConfig)
break
}
}
if clientConfig == nil {
return
}
// Only perform remove/re-add for protocols supported by XrayAPI.AddUser
protocol := string(inbound.Protocol)
switch protocol {
case "vmess", "vless", "trojan", "shadowsocks":
// supported protocols, continue
default:
logger.Warningf("[LIMIT_IP] Temporary disconnect is not supported for protocol %s on inbound %s", protocol, inbound.Tag)
return
}
// For Shadowsocks, ensure the required "cipher" field is present by
// reading it from the inbound settings (e.g., settings["method"]).
if string(inbound.Protocol) == "shadowsocks" {
var inboundSettings map[string]any
if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(inbound.Settings), &inboundSettings); err != nil {
logger.Warningf("[LIMIT_IP] Failed to parse inbound settings for shadowsocks cipher: %v", err)
} else {
if method, ok := inboundSettings["method"].(string); ok && method != "" {
clientConfig["cipher"] = method
}
}
}
// Remove user to disconnect all connections
err = xrayAPI.RemoveUser(inbound.Tag, clientEmail)
if err != nil {
logger.Warningf("[LIMIT_IP] Failed to remove user %s: %v", clientEmail, err)
return
}
// Wait a moment for disconnection to take effect
time.Sleep(100 * time.Millisecond)
// Re-add user to allow new connections
err = xrayAPI.AddUser(protocol, inbound.Tag, clientConfig)
if err != nil {
logger.Warningf("[LIMIT_IP] Failed to re-add user %s: %v", clientEmail, err)
}
}
// resolveXrayAPIPort returns the API inbound port from running config, then template config, then default.
func (j *CheckClientIpJob) resolveXrayAPIPort() int {
var configErr error
var templateErr error
if port, err := getAPIPortFromConfigPath(xray.GetConfigPath()); err == nil {
return port
} else {
configErr = err
}
db := database.GetDB()
var template model.Setting
if err := db.Where("key = ?", "xrayTemplateConfig").First(&template).Error; err == nil {
if port, parseErr := getAPIPortFromConfigData([]byte(template.Value)); parseErr == nil {
return port
} else {
templateErr = parseErr
}
} else {
templateErr = err
}
logger.Warningf(
"[LIMIT_IP] Could not determine Xray API port from config or template; falling back to default port %d (config error: %v, template error: %v)",
defaultXrayAPIPort,
configErr,
templateErr,
)
return defaultXrayAPIPort
}
func getAPIPortFromConfigPath(configPath string) (int, error) {
configData, err := os.ReadFile(configPath)
if err != nil {
return 0, err
}
return getAPIPortFromConfigData(configData)
}
func getAPIPortFromConfigData(configData []byte) (int, error) {
xrayConfig := &xray.Config{}
if err := json.Unmarshal(configData, xrayConfig); err != nil {
return 0, err
}
for _, inboundConfig := range xrayConfig.InboundConfigs {
if inboundConfig.Tag == "api" && inboundConfig.Port > 0 {
return inboundConfig.Port, nil
}
}
return 0, errors.New("api inbound port not found")
}
// getInboundByEmail resolves the inbound that owns a client email. It prefers
// the exact clients/client_inbounds relation; a substring "settings LIKE
// %email%" can match the wrong inbound (an email that is a substring of another,
// or text that merely appears elsewhere in the settings JSON). The LIKE + JSON
// scan stays only as a fallback for clients not yet present in the relation, so
// nothing regresses when the join finds no row.
func (j *CheckClientIpJob) getInboundByEmail(clientEmail string) (*model.Inbound, error) {
db := database.GetDB()
inbound := &model.Inbound{}
err := db.Model(&model.Inbound{}).
Joins("JOIN client_inbounds ON client_inbounds.inbound_id = inbounds.id").
Joins("JOIN clients ON clients.id = client_inbounds.client_id").
Where("clients.email = ?", clientEmail).
First(inbound).Error
if err == nil {
return inbound, nil
}
var candidates []model.Inbound
if listErr := db.Model(&model.Inbound{}).Where("settings LIKE ?", "%"+clientEmail+"%").Find(&candidates).Error; listErr != nil {
return nil, listErr
}
for i := range candidates {
clients, jsonErr := service.ParseInboundSettingsClients(candidates[i].Settings)
if jsonErr != nil {
continue
}
for _, client := range clients {
if client.Email == clientEmail {
return &candidates[i], nil
}
}
}
return nil, err
}