Files
3x-ui/internal/amneziawg/params.go
T
Kuzz007 83cc545953 feat(amneziawg): add native AmneziaWG protocol backend
AmneziaWG (WireGuard plus DPI-resistant obfuscation) needs no Docker
here — it runs as a genuine kernel interface via awg-quick/awg, managed
the same way internal/mtproto manages mtg: one Inbound row is one
desired Instance, and a Manager reconciles running interfaces toward
the database every 10s (internal/web/job/amneziawg_job.go) plus
immediately after a client edit (applyLocalAmneziaWG).

Clients reuse model.Client verbatim (the same PrivateKey/PublicKey/
PreSharedKey/AllowedIPs fields WireGuard already uses), so bulk
operations, the QR/share-link modal and subscriptions come from the
shared inbound infrastructure instead of a parallel implementation.
internal/amneziawg owns the obfuscation param generator/validator
(ported from coinman-dev/3ax-ui, upgraded to AmneziaWG 2.0's S3/S4
padding and I1 signature packet) and the exec wrapper around
awg-quick/awg, with fingerprint-based reconcile (noop / reload-via-
syncconf / full restart) mirroring mtproto.Manager so a same-protocol
edit doesn't force an unnecessary interface bounce that would drop
every peer's connection.

Frontend and install.sh's DKMS/awg-tools setup are tracked separately;
this is backend-only.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-25 00:39:41 +03:00

146 lines
4.6 KiB
Go

package amneziawg
import (
"crypto/rand"
"fmt"
"math/big"
"strconv"
"strings"
)
// awgHMax is the upper bound for generated H values: 2^31-1. The AmneziaWG
// spec allows the full uint32, but the amneziawg-windows-client config editor
// rejects values above 2^31-1, so generation stays in the safe half for
// cross-client compatibility.
const awgHMax = 2147483647
// hMinWidth is the minimum width of each generated H1-H4 range.
const hMinWidth = 1000
// hMaxValid is the largest value ValidateObfuscation accepts for an H
// parameter: uint32 max, the kernel's own limit.
const hMaxValid int64 = 4294967295
// randInt returns a uniform random int in [min, max] using crypto/rand. Falls
// back to min on the (practically impossible) RNG error.
func randInt(min, max int) int {
if max <= min {
return min
}
n, err := rand.Int(rand.Reader, big.NewInt(int64(max-min)+1))
if err != nil {
return min
}
return min + int(n.Int64())
}
// GenerateObfuscation20 produces a randomized AmneziaWG 2.0 parameter set.
// preset "mobile" tunes junk packets for restrictive mobile carriers; any
// other value uses the balanced "default" preset. Values are randomized per
// call so each server gets a unique fingerprint — a static value gets
// profiled by DPI, defeating the point of the obfuscation.
func GenerateObfuscation20(preset string) Obfuscation20 {
var o Obfuscation20
switch preset {
case "mobile":
// Jc=3 and a narrow Jmax survive carriers like Tele2/Yota/Megafon.
o.Jc = 3
o.Jmin = randInt(30, 50)
o.Jmax = o.Jmin + randInt(20, 80)
default:
o.Jc = randInt(3, 6)
o.Jmin = randInt(40, 89)
o.Jmax = o.Jmin + randInt(50, 250)
}
o.S1 = randInt(15, 150)
o.S2 = randInt(15, 150)
// Kernel constraint: S1+56 must not equal S2 (else init and response
// handshake packets end up the same size after padding).
for o.S1+56 == o.S2 {
o.S2 = randInt(15, 150)
}
o.S3 = randInt(8, 55) // cookie padding (max 64)
o.S4 = randInt(4, 27) // transport padding (max 32)
h := generateHRanges()
o.H1, o.H2, o.H3, o.H4 = h[0], h[1], h[2], h[3]
// CPS signature packet: N random bytes prepended before each handshake.
o.I1 = fmt.Sprintf("<r %d>", randInt(32, 256))
return o
}
// generateHRanges returns four non-overlapping "low-high" ranges for H1-H4.
// Each is at least hMinWidth wide, the lowest bound is >= 5 (values 1-4 are
// reserved for vanilla WireGuard message types) and the highest is <=
// 2^31-1. The space is split into four bands and a random sub-range is taken
// from each, which guarantees non-overlap (with a gap) and a valid width
// without retries.
func generateHRanges() [4]string {
const lo = 5
bandSize := (awgHMax - lo + 1) / 4
var out [4]string
for i := 0; i < 4; i++ {
bandLo := lo + i*bandSize
bandHi := bandLo + bandSize - 1
start := randInt(bandLo, bandHi-hMinWidth-1)
end := randInt(start+hMinWidth, bandHi-1)
out[i] = fmt.Sprintf("%d-%d", start, end)
}
return out
}
// ValidateObfuscation rejects malformed obfuscation parameters before they
// are saved and applied, so a bad manual entry can't bring the interface
// down on `awg-quick up`. Empty H values are allowed (they fall back to a
// default when the config is generated). Each H value accepts either a
// single integer ("1") or a range ("100-800").
func ValidateObfuscation(o Obfuscation20) error {
if o.Jmin > o.Jmax {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid Jmin/Jmax: %d must not exceed %d", o.Jmin, o.Jmax)
}
if o.S3 < 0 || o.S3 > 64 {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid S3 value %d (must be 0..64)", o.S3)
}
if o.S4 < 0 || o.S4 > 32 {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid S4 value %d (must be 0..32)", o.S4)
}
if o.S1+56 == o.S2 {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid S1/S2: S1+56 must not equal S2 (%d+56 == %d)", o.S1, o.S2)
}
for i, h := range []string{o.H1, o.H2, o.H3, o.H4} {
if err := validateHValue(h); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid H%d: %w", i+1, err)
}
}
return nil
}
// validateHValue checks one H parameter: empty, a single uint32, or
// "low-high" with 0 <= low <= high <= uint32 max.
func validateHValue(v string) error {
v = strings.TrimSpace(v)
if v == "" {
return nil
}
if lo, hi, isRange := strings.Cut(v, "-"); isRange {
l, err1 := strconv.ParseInt(strings.TrimSpace(lo), 10, 64)
h, err2 := strconv.ParseInt(strings.TrimSpace(hi), 10, 64)
if err1 != nil || err2 != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("range %q must be two integers", v)
}
if l < 0 || h > hMaxValid || l > h {
return fmt.Errorf("range %q must satisfy 0 <= low <= high <= %d", v, hMaxValid)
}
return nil
}
n, err := strconv.ParseInt(v, 10, 64)
if err != nil || n < 0 || n > hMaxValid {
return fmt.Errorf("value %q must be an integer in 0..%d or a low-high range", v, hMaxValid)
}
return nil
}