feat(tenancy): implement workspace isolation

This commit is contained in:
Junyan Qin
2026-07-19 09:58:59 +08:00
parent 37099ddf7e
commit 8b7ce77cec
271 changed files with 31166 additions and 6513 deletions
+17 -4
View File
@@ -65,10 +65,23 @@ Route auth is declared per-route via `AuthType` in
- `API_KEY``X-API-Key` or `Authorization: Bearer <key>`.
- `USER_TOKEN_OR_API_KEY` — either.
API keys are verified by `apikey_service.verify_api_key()`, which accepts:
1. the **global key** from `config.yaml` `api.global_api_key` (no DB, no login,
no `lbk_` prefix required), then
2. **web-UI keys** (DB-stored, `lbk_` prefix).
Authenticated routes receive an immutable `RequestContext` containing the
principal, authorized Workspace membership, fixed-role permissions, instance,
request id, and placement generation. A browser's `X-Workspace-Id` is only a
selector and is always checked against the Account membership. Tenant services
must accept this context (or an explicit trusted execution context) and fail
closed when it is absent.
API-key authentication accepts:
1. the **global key** from `config.yaml` `api.global_api_key` only for a
community instance with exactly one local Workspace, then
2. **web-UI keys** whose one-time `lbk_` secret is stored only as a hash and is
bound to one Workspace, explicit scopes, status, and optional expiry.
An API key derives its Workspace from the key record and ignores a caller's
Workspace selector. Public Bot/Webhook routes similarly derive Workspace from
the opaque owning resource rather than a header.
Route groups self-register via `@group.group_class(name, path)` and are
discovered by `importutil.import_modules_in_pkg`.