feat(box): unify native agent tools around exec/read/write/edit

This commit is contained in:
youhuanghe
2026-03-24 07:57:05 +00:00
committed by WangCham
parent 3f368c5764
commit 93104a947a
10 changed files with 519 additions and 114 deletions
+98
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@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
"""Three-layer security policy for LangBot Box.
The design separates concerns into three independent layers, aligned with
OpenCode / OpenClaw patterns:
1. **SandboxPolicy** *where* tools run (host vs sandbox).
2. **ToolPolicy** *which* tools are allowed (allow/deny lists).
3. **ElevatedPolicy** *whether* a single exec call may temporarily
escape the default sandbox boundary.
These three layers are orthogonal:
- ToolPolicy is a hard boundary; ``elevated`` cannot bypass a denied tool.
- SandboxPolicy decides the default execution location.
- ElevatedPolicy only affects ``exec`` and only when the framework allows it.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import enum
from typing import Sequence
# ── Layer 1: Sandbox Policy ──────────────────────────────────────────
class SandboxMode(str, enum.Enum):
"""Determines when agent execution is routed through the sandbox."""
OFF = 'off'
"""Sandbox disabled; all exec runs on the host."""
NON_DEFAULT = 'non_default'
"""Only non-default sessions are sandboxed (e.g. sub-agents, MCP)."""
ALL = 'all'
"""Every agent exec call is routed through the sandbox."""
class SandboxPolicy:
"""Decides whether a given execution context should use the sandbox."""
def __init__(self, mode: SandboxMode = SandboxMode.ALL):
self.mode = mode
def should_sandbox(self, *, is_default_session: bool = True) -> bool:
if self.mode == SandboxMode.OFF:
return False
if self.mode == SandboxMode.ALL:
return True
# NON_DEFAULT: sandbox everything except the default session
return not is_default_session
# ── Layer 2: Tool Policy ─────────────────────────────────────────────
class ToolPolicy:
"""Controls which tools are available to the current agent/session.
Rules:
- ``deny`` always takes precedence over ``allow``.
- An empty ``allow`` list means "all tools allowed" (no allowlist filter).
- ``elevated`` cannot bypass a denied tool.
"""
def __init__(
self,
allow: Sequence[str] = (),
deny: Sequence[str] = (),
):
self._allow: frozenset[str] = frozenset(allow)
self._deny: frozenset[str] = frozenset(deny)
def is_tool_allowed(self, tool_name: str) -> bool:
if tool_name in self._deny:
return False
if self._allow and tool_name not in self._allow:
return False
return True
# ── Layer 3: Elevated Policy ─────────────────────────────────────────
class ElevatedPolicy:
"""Controls whether ``exec`` may request temporary privilege escalation.
``elevated`` only applies to the ``exec`` tool. It means "run this
command outside the default sandbox boundary" (e.g. with network, or
on the host). The framework decides whether to honor the request.
"""
def __init__(self, *, allow_elevated: bool = False, require_approval: bool = True):
self.allow_elevated = allow_elevated
self.require_approval = require_approval
def is_elevation_permitted(self) -> bool:
return self.allow_elevated
+22 -9
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@@ -105,9 +105,22 @@ class BoxService:
)
return self._serialize_result(result)
async def execute_sandbox_tool(self, parameters: dict, query: pipeline_query.Query) -> dict:
spec_payload = dict(parameters)
async def execute_tool(self, parameters: dict, query: pipeline_query.Query) -> dict:
"""Execute an agent-facing ``exec`` tool call.
Translates the agent-facing ``command`` field to the internal
``BoxSpec.cmd`` field and injects the session id from the query.
"""
spec_payload: dict = {'cmd': parameters['command']}
# Pass through allowed agent-facing fields
for key in ('workdir', 'timeout_sec', 'env'):
if key in parameters:
spec_payload[key] = parameters[key]
# Inject context the agent must not control
spec_payload.setdefault('session_id', str(query.query_id))
return await self.execute_spec_payload(spec_payload, query)
async def shutdown(self):
@@ -379,23 +392,23 @@ class BoxService:
return list(self._recent_errors)
def get_system_guidance(self) -> str:
"""Return LLM system-prompt guidance for sandbox_exec.
"""Return LLM system-prompt guidance for the exec tool.
All sandbox-specific prompt text is kept here so that callers
All execution-specific prompt text is kept here so that callers
(e.g. LocalAgentRunner) stay free of box domain knowledge.
"""
guidance = (
'When sandbox_exec is available, use it for exact calculations, statistics, structured data parsing, '
'When the exec tool is available, use it for exact calculations, statistics, structured data parsing, '
'and code execution instead of estimating mentally. If the user provides numbers, tables, CSV-like text, '
'JSON, or other data and asks for a computed answer, prefer running a short Python script in sandbox_exec '
'JSON, or other data and asks for a computed answer, prefer running a short Python script via exec '
'and then answer from the tool result. Unless the user explicitly asks for the script, code, or implementation '
'details, do not include the generated script in the final answer; return the result and a brief explanation only.'
)
if self.default_host_workspace:
guidance += (
' A default host workspace is mounted at /workspace for file tasks. When the user asks to read, create, or '
'modify local files in the working directory, use sandbox_exec with /workspace paths directly; do not ask the '
'user for sandbox parameters such as host_path unless they explicitly need a different directory.'
' A default workspace is mounted at /workspace for file tasks. When the user asks to read, create, or '
'modify local files in the working directory, use exec with /workspace paths directly; do not ask the '
'user for directory parameters unless they explicitly need a different directory.'
)
return guidance