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https://github.com/langbot-app/LangBot.git
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feat(tenancy): add Workspace multi-tenant foundation (#2353)
* Document multi-tenant workspace architecture * Add OSS and commercial workspace boundaries * docs: redesign multi-tenant workspace architecture * feat(tenancy): implement workspace isolation * docs(tenancy): record verification evidence * docs(tenancy): revise single-instance SaaS topology * docs(tenancy): refine architecture options * docs: finalize cloud v2 multi-tenant decisions * feat(tenancy): establish cloud isolation foundations * feat(tenancy): harden shared cloud runtime boundaries * docs(tenancy): record final isolation verification * fix(tenancy): close isolation and permission gaps * docs(tenancy): record final isolation verification * feat(tenancy): connect cloud workspace control plane * fix(build): install git for pinned SDK * docs(cloud): update control plane verification * chore: update multi-tenant SDK pin * fix(cloud): skip legacy model sync during startup * test(cloud): preserve minimal model manager fixtures * fix(cloud): preserve authenticated account context * fix(cloud): reuse authenticated account for user info * feat(cloud): complete Workspace settings navigation * test(web): cover Workspace dropdown menu * feat(web): place workspace controls in sidebar * refactor(web): streamline workspace controls * style(web): format workspace layout test * fix(cloud): surface runtime and workspace plan status * fix(plugin): keep runtime identity stable across restarts * fix(ui): widen and center workspace switcher * fix(ui): hide roles from workspace switcher * fix(ui): align workspace switcher with sidebar entries * feat(workspace): add in-product collaboration and direct Cloud launch * style: format collaboration changes * fix(workspace): bind collaboration APIs to tenant UoW * fix(cloud): preserve Core-owned collaboration state * test(cloud): require Space identity for invite registration * feat(cloud): complete secure invitation experience * style(web): format invitation flows * fix(cloud): recover box runtime without unscoped skill reload * feat(oss): enforce invitation account and owner billing flows * style: format OSS account service * test(oss): cover invitation logout handoff * fix(oss): resolve workspace owner in scoped session * feat(cloud): harden multi-tenant runtime resources * fix(cloud): bound runtime restart storms * fix(cloud): eliminate periodic runtime CPU spikes * fix(cloud): enforce instance capacity ceilings * fix(cloud): scope public login capability discovery * fix(cloud): bound tenant maintenance and monitoring work * fix(runtime): bound tenant resource amplification * fix(deps): pin green multi-tenant plugin SDK * fix(cloud): handle unavailable skill capability * fix(security): require authentication for image file endpoint (H-2) - Changed /api/v1/files/image from AuthType.NONE to USER_TOKEN_OR_API_KEY - Added Permission.RESOURCE_VIEW requirement - Prevents unauthenticated cross-tenant file access via leaked keys - Fixes HIGH severity finding from multi-tenant security review docs: add comprehensive database migration guide - Complete migration steps for OSS → multi-tenant - Backup, execution, verification procedures - Rollback scenarios and recovery plans - Performance tuning recommendations * test: add comprehensive cross-tenant isolation tests Added 7 critical test scenarios for multi-tenant boundaries: - Cross-tenant bot access prevention - Viewer role read-only enforcement - Removed member immediate access revocation - Model provider credential isolation - WebSocket message isolation - Invitation token workspace scoping - Multi-workspace context validation These tests address P0-2 coverage gaps for: - workspaces.py (membership & invitation flows) - user.py (authentication & authorization) - websocket_chat.py (real-time isolation) - plugins.py (resource access control) docs: finalize database migration guide * fix(security): resolve M-1, M-2, M-3 security findings M-1: WebSocket authorization TOCTOU race (FIXED) - Changed _revalidate_websocket_authorization to return RequestContext - Ensures validated context is used immediately without race window - Prevents removed members from sending messages during revalidation gap M-2: Model Manager cache workspace isolation (VERIFIED) - Confirmed _CacheKey already uses 4-tuple: (instance, workspace, generation, resource) - Cache is properly scoped per workspace, no cross-tenant leakage possible - No code change needed, documented as working correctly M-3: Invitation lock workspace scoping (FIXED) - Changed lock key from token_digest to workspace_uuid:token_digest - Prevents DoS where attacker locks token in Workspace A to block Workspace B - Locks now isolated per workspace All MEDIUM severity findings from security review now resolved. * fix(cloud): unblock tenant CI and enforce knowledge quotas * fix(tenancy): scope rerank model sync --------- Co-authored-by: dadachann <185672915+dadachann@users.noreply.github.com>
This commit is contained in:
RockChinQ
@@ -10,7 +10,9 @@ from __future__ import annotations
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import asyncio
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import base64
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import hashlib
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import io
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import json
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import logging
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import os
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import struct
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@@ -21,6 +23,8 @@ from urllib.parse import quote
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import aiohttp
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from langbot.pkg.utils import httpclient
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from .types import (
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ApiError,
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CDNMedia,
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@@ -58,6 +62,51 @@ DEFAULT_BOT_TYPE = '3'
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# Maximum text length per message chunk (WeChat limit)
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MAX_TEXT_CHUNK_SIZE = 2000
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MAX_CDN_MEDIA_BYTES = 10 * 1024 * 1024
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async def _response_text(response: aiohttp.ClientResponse) -> str:
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body = await httpclient.read_limited(
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response,
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max_bytes=MAX_CDN_MEDIA_BYTES,
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)
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return body.decode('utf-8', errors='replace')
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async def _response_json(response: aiohttp.ClientResponse) -> dict:
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payload = json.loads(await _response_text(response))
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if not isinstance(payload, dict):
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raise ApiError('OpenClaw API returned a non-object response', status=response.status)
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return payload
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def _decrypt_cdn_payload(encrypted: bytes, aes_key: bytes) -> bytes:
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from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.ciphers import Cipher, algorithms, modes
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from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.padding import PKCS7
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cipher = Cipher(algorithms.AES(aes_key), modes.ECB())
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decryptor = cipher.decryptor()
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padded = decryptor.update(encrypted) + decryptor.finalize()
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unpadder = PKCS7(128).unpadder()
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return unpadder.update(padded) + unpadder.finalize()
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def _encrypt_cdn_payload(
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file_bytes: bytes,
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) -> tuple[str, str, bytes, str]:
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from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.ciphers import Cipher, algorithms, modes
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from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.padding import PKCS7
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raw_key = os.urandom(16)
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aes_key_hex = raw_key.hex()
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encoded_key = base64.b64encode(aes_key_hex.encode('utf-8')).decode('utf-8')
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padder = PKCS7(128).padder()
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padded = padder.update(file_bytes) + padder.finalize()
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cipher = Cipher(algorithms.AES(raw_key), modes.ECB())
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encryptor = cipher.encryptor()
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encrypted = encryptor.update(padded) + encryptor.finalize()
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raw_md5 = hashlib.md5(file_bytes).hexdigest()
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return aes_key_hex, encoded_key, encrypted, raw_md5
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def _random_wechat_uin() -> str:
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@@ -125,12 +174,12 @@ class OpenClawWeixinClient:
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url, json=payload, headers=headers, timeout=aiohttp.ClientTimeout(total=timeout)
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) as resp:
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if resp.status != 200:
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text = await resp.text()
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text = await _response_text(resp)
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raise ApiError(
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f'OpenClaw API error {resp.status}: {text}',
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status=resp.status,
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)
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data = await resp.json(content_type=None)
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data = await _response_json(resp)
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# Check for application-level errors in the response body
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errcode = data.get('errcode') or data.get('ret')
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@@ -170,12 +219,12 @@ class OpenClawWeixinClient:
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timeout=aiohttp.ClientTimeout(total=timeout),
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) as resp:
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if resp.status != 200:
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text = await resp.text()
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text = await _response_text(resp)
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raise ApiError(
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f'OpenClaw API error {resp.status}: {text}',
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status=resp.status,
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)
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data = await resp.json(content_type=None)
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data = await _response_json(resp)
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except (asyncio.TimeoutError, aiohttp.ServerTimeoutError):
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return GetUpdatesResponse(ret=0, msgs=[], get_updates_buf=get_updates_buf)
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@@ -258,9 +307,6 @@ class OpenClawWeixinClient:
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Returns:
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Decrypted file bytes.
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"""
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from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.ciphers import Cipher, algorithms, modes
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from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.padding import PKCS7
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if not media.encrypt_query_param:
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raise ApiError('CDN media has no encrypt_query_param', status=0)
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if not media.aes_key:
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@@ -285,17 +331,14 @@ class OpenClawWeixinClient:
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async with session.get(cdn_url, timeout=aiohttp.ClientTimeout(total=120)) as resp:
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if resp.status != 200:
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text = await resp.text()
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text = await _response_text(resp)
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raise ApiError(f'CDN download failed: {resp.status} {text}', status=resp.status)
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encrypted = await resp.read()
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encrypted = await httpclient.read_limited(
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resp,
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max_bytes=MAX_CDN_MEDIA_BYTES,
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)
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# Decrypt AES-128-ECB with PKCS7 padding
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cipher = Cipher(algorithms.AES(aes_key), modes.ECB())
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decryptor = cipher.decryptor()
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padded = decryptor.update(encrypted) + decryptor.finalize()
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unpadder = PKCS7(128).unpadder()
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return unpadder.update(padded) + unpadder.finalize()
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return await asyncio.to_thread(_decrypt_cdn_payload, encrypted, aes_key)
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async def upload_media(
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self,
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@@ -313,28 +356,13 @@ class OpenClawWeixinClient:
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Returns:
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CDNMedia with encrypt_query_param and aes_key for use in sendMessage.
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"""
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import hashlib
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if len(file_bytes) > MAX_CDN_MEDIA_BYTES:
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raise ApiError('CDN media exceeds the size limit', status=0)
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from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.ciphers import Cipher, algorithms, modes
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from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.padding import PKCS7
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# 1. Generate random 16-byte AES key
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raw_key = os.urandom(16)
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aes_key_hex = raw_key.hex() # 32-char hex string
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# 2. Encode key for CDNMedia: base64(hex_string) — same for all media types
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# Matches official SDK: Buffer.from(aeskey_hex).toString("base64")
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encoded_key = base64.b64encode(aes_key_hex.encode('utf-8')).decode('utf-8')
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# 3. Encrypt file with AES-128-ECB + PKCS7
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padder = PKCS7(128).padder()
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padded = padder.update(file_bytes) + padder.finalize()
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cipher = Cipher(algorithms.AES(raw_key), modes.ECB())
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encryptor = cipher.encryptor()
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encrypted = encryptor.update(padded) + encryptor.finalize()
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# 4. Get upload URL
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raw_md5 = hashlib.md5(file_bytes).hexdigest()
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aes_key_hex, encoded_key, encrypted, raw_md5 = await asyncio.to_thread(
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_encrypt_cdn_payload,
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file_bytes,
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)
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filekey = os.urandom(16).hex() # 32-char hex, matches official SDK
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upload_resp = await self.get_upload_url(
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@@ -370,7 +398,7 @@ class OpenClawWeixinClient:
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timeout=aiohttp.ClientTimeout(total=120),
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) as resp:
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if resp.status != 200:
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text = await resp.text()
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text = await _response_text(resp)
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logger.error('CDN upload failed: status=%d url=%s body=%s', resp.status, cdn_url, text[:500])
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raise ApiError(f'CDN upload failed: {resp.status} {text}', status=resp.status)
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download_param = resp.headers.get('x-encrypted-param', '')
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@@ -491,12 +519,12 @@ class OpenClawWeixinClient:
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async with session.get(url, timeout=aiohttp.ClientTimeout(total=DEFAULT_API_TIMEOUT)) as resp:
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if resp.status != 200:
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text = await resp.text()
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text = await _response_text(resp)
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raise ApiError(
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f'Failed to fetch QR code: {resp.status} {text}',
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status=resp.status,
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)
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data = await resp.json(content_type=None)
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data = await _response_json(resp)
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logger.debug(
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'fetch_qrcode response: qrcode=%s, img=%s', data.get('qrcode'), bool(data.get('qrcode_img_content'))
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@@ -536,12 +564,12 @@ class OpenClawWeixinClient:
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url, headers=headers, timeout=aiohttp.ClientTimeout(total=DEFAULT_QR_POLL_TIMEOUT)
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) as resp:
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if resp.status != 200:
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text = await resp.text()
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text = await _response_text(resp)
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raise ApiError(
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f'Failed to poll QR status: {resp.status} {text}',
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status=resp.status,
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)
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data = await resp.json(content_type=None)
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data = await _response_json(resp)
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logger.debug('QR status poll response: %s', data)
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except (asyncio.TimeoutError, aiohttp.ServerTimeoutError):
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return QRStatusResponse(status='wait')
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