feat(tenancy): add Workspace multi-tenant foundation (#2353)

* Document multi-tenant workspace architecture

* Add OSS and commercial workspace boundaries

* docs: redesign multi-tenant workspace architecture

* feat(tenancy): implement workspace isolation

* docs(tenancy): record verification evidence

* docs(tenancy): revise single-instance SaaS topology

* docs(tenancy): refine architecture options

* docs: finalize cloud v2 multi-tenant decisions

* feat(tenancy): establish cloud isolation foundations

* feat(tenancy): harden shared cloud runtime boundaries

* docs(tenancy): record final isolation verification

* fix(tenancy): close isolation and permission gaps

* docs(tenancy): record final isolation verification

* feat(tenancy): connect cloud workspace control plane

* fix(build): install git for pinned SDK

* docs(cloud): update control plane verification

* chore: update multi-tenant SDK pin

* fix(cloud): skip legacy model sync during startup

* test(cloud): preserve minimal model manager fixtures

* fix(cloud): preserve authenticated account context

* fix(cloud): reuse authenticated account for user info

* feat(cloud): complete Workspace settings navigation

* test(web): cover Workspace dropdown menu

* feat(web): place workspace controls in sidebar

* refactor(web): streamline workspace controls

* style(web): format workspace layout test

* fix(cloud): surface runtime and workspace plan status

* fix(plugin): keep runtime identity stable across restarts

* fix(ui): widen and center workspace switcher

* fix(ui): hide roles from workspace switcher

* fix(ui): align workspace switcher with sidebar entries

* feat(workspace): add in-product collaboration and direct Cloud launch

* style: format collaboration changes

* fix(workspace): bind collaboration APIs to tenant UoW

* fix(cloud): preserve Core-owned collaboration state

* test(cloud): require Space identity for invite registration

* feat(cloud): complete secure invitation experience

* style(web): format invitation flows

* fix(cloud): recover box runtime without unscoped skill reload

* feat(oss): enforce invitation account and owner billing flows

* style: format OSS account service

* test(oss): cover invitation logout handoff

* fix(oss): resolve workspace owner in scoped session

* feat(cloud): harden multi-tenant runtime resources

* fix(cloud): bound runtime restart storms

* fix(cloud): eliminate periodic runtime CPU spikes

* fix(cloud): enforce instance capacity ceilings

* fix(cloud): scope public login capability discovery

* fix(cloud): bound tenant maintenance and monitoring work

* fix(runtime): bound tenant resource amplification

* fix(deps): pin green multi-tenant plugin SDK

* fix(cloud): handle unavailable skill capability

* fix(security): require authentication for image file endpoint (H-2)

- Changed /api/v1/files/image from AuthType.NONE to USER_TOKEN_OR_API_KEY
- Added Permission.RESOURCE_VIEW requirement
- Prevents unauthenticated cross-tenant file access via leaked keys
- Fixes HIGH severity finding from multi-tenant security review

docs: add comprehensive database migration guide
- Complete migration steps for OSS → multi-tenant
- Backup, execution, verification procedures
- Rollback scenarios and recovery plans
- Performance tuning recommendations

* test: add comprehensive cross-tenant isolation tests

Added 7 critical test scenarios for multi-tenant boundaries:
- Cross-tenant bot access prevention
- Viewer role read-only enforcement
- Removed member immediate access revocation
- Model provider credential isolation
- WebSocket message isolation
- Invitation token workspace scoping
- Multi-workspace context validation

These tests address P0-2 coverage gaps for:
- workspaces.py (membership & invitation flows)
- user.py (authentication & authorization)
- websocket_chat.py (real-time isolation)
- plugins.py (resource access control)

docs: finalize database migration guide

* fix(security): resolve M-1, M-2, M-3 security findings

M-1: WebSocket authorization TOCTOU race (FIXED)
- Changed _revalidate_websocket_authorization to return RequestContext
- Ensures validated context is used immediately without race window
- Prevents removed members from sending messages during revalidation gap

M-2: Model Manager cache workspace isolation (VERIFIED)
- Confirmed _CacheKey already uses 4-tuple: (instance, workspace, generation, resource)
- Cache is properly scoped per workspace, no cross-tenant leakage possible
- No code change needed, documented as working correctly

M-3: Invitation lock workspace scoping (FIXED)
- Changed lock key from token_digest to workspace_uuid:token_digest
- Prevents DoS where attacker locks token in Workspace A to block Workspace B
- Locks now isolated per workspace

All MEDIUM severity findings from security review now resolved.

* fix(cloud): unblock tenant CI and enforce knowledge quotas

* fix(tenancy): scope rerank model sync

---------

Co-authored-by: dadachann <185672915+dadachann@users.noreply.github.com>
This commit is contained in:
RockChinQ
2026-07-30 21:43:35 +08:00
committed by GitHub
parent 463b120923
commit e1ac5e0fc8
468 changed files with 78320 additions and 13137 deletions
@@ -1,7 +1,32 @@
from langbot.libs.wechatpad_api.util.http_util import post_json
import httpx
import asyncio
import base64
import httpx
from langbot.libs.wechatpad_api.util.http_util import post_json
from langbot.pkg.utils import httpclient
_MAX_WECHATPAD_MEDIA_BYTES = 16 * 1024 * 1024
async def _read_media_limited(response: httpx.Response) -> bytes:
content_length = response.headers.get('content-length')
if content_length is not None:
try:
declared_size = int(content_length)
except ValueError:
declared_size = None
if declared_size is not None and declared_size > _MAX_WECHATPAD_MEDIA_BYTES:
raise RuntimeError('WeChatPad media exceeds the runtime limit')
body = bytearray()
async for chunk in response.aiter_bytes(chunk_size=64 * 1024):
body.extend(chunk)
if len(body) > _MAX_WECHATPAD_MEDIA_BYTES:
raise RuntimeError('WeChatPad media exceeds the runtime limit')
return bytes(body)
class DownloadApi:
def __init__(self, base_url, token):
@@ -19,12 +44,13 @@ class DownloadApi:
return post_json(url, token=self.token, data=json_data)
async def download_url_to_base64(self, download_url):
async with httpx.AsyncClient() as client:
response = await client.get(download_url)
if response.status_code == 200:
file_bytes = response.content
base64_str = base64.b64encode(file_bytes).decode('utf-8') # 返回字符串格式
return base64_str
else:
raise Exception('获取文件失败')
async with httpx.AsyncClient(
timeout=30,
event_hooks=httpclient.httpx_response_limit_hooks(_MAX_WECHATPAD_MEDIA_BYTES),
) as client:
async with client.stream('GET', download_url) as response:
if response.status_code != 200:
raise RuntimeError('获取文件失败')
file_bytes = await _read_media_limited(response)
encoded = await asyncio.to_thread(base64.b64encode, file_bytes)
return encoded.decode('utf-8')
@@ -1,6 +1,29 @@
import json as json_module
import requests
from langbot.pkg.utils import httpclient
_MAX_WECHATPAD_RESPONSE_BYTES = 16 * 1024 * 1024
def _read_requests_response_limited(response: requests.Response) -> dict:
content_length = response.headers.get('Content-Length')
if content_length is not None:
try:
if int(content_length) > _MAX_WECHATPAD_RESPONSE_BYTES:
raise RuntimeError('WeChatPad response exceeds the runtime limit')
except (TypeError, ValueError):
pass
body = bytearray()
for chunk in response.iter_content(chunk_size=64 * 1024):
body.extend(chunk)
if len(body) > _MAX_WECHATPAD_RESPONSE_BYTES:
raise RuntimeError('WeChatPad response exceeds the runtime limit')
result = json_module.loads(body)
if not isinstance(result, dict):
raise RuntimeError('WeChatPad returned a non-object response')
return result
def post_json(base_url, token, data=None):
headers = {'Content-Type': 'application/json'}
@@ -8,16 +31,21 @@ def post_json(base_url, token, data=None):
url = base_url + f'?key={token}'
try:
response = requests.post(url, json=data, headers=headers, timeout=60)
response.raise_for_status()
result = response.json()
with requests.post(
url,
json=data,
headers=headers,
timeout=60,
stream=True,
) as response:
response.raise_for_status()
result = _read_requests_response_limited(response)
if result:
return result
else:
raise RuntimeError(response.text)
raise RuntimeError('WeChatPad returned an empty response')
except Exception as e:
print(f'http请求失败, url={url}, exception={e}')
raise RuntimeError(str(e))
@@ -27,16 +55,20 @@ def get_json(base_url, token):
url = base_url + f'?key={token}'
try:
response = requests.get(url, headers=headers, timeout=60)
response.raise_for_status()
result = response.json()
with requests.get(
url,
headers=headers,
timeout=60,
stream=True,
) as response:
response.raise_for_status()
result = _read_requests_response_limited(response)
if result:
return result
else:
raise RuntimeError(response.text)
raise RuntimeError('WeChatPad returned an empty response')
except Exception as e:
print(f'http请求失败, url={url}, exception={e}')
raise RuntimeError(str(e))
@@ -68,7 +100,12 @@ async def async_request(
method=method, url=url, params=params, headers=headers, data=data, json=json
) as response:
response.raise_for_status() # 如果状态码不是200,抛出异常
result = await response.json()
result = json_module.loads(
await httpclient.read_limited(
response,
max_bytes=_MAX_WECHATPAD_RESPONSE_BYTES,
)
)
# print(result)
return result
# if result.get('Code') == 200: