feat(tenancy): add Workspace multi-tenant foundation (#2353)

* Document multi-tenant workspace architecture * Add OSS and commercial workspace boundaries * docs: redesign multi-tenant workspace architecture * feat(tenancy): implement workspace isolation * docs(tenancy): record verification evidence * docs(tenancy): revise single-instance SaaS topology * docs(tenancy): refine architecture options * docs: finalize cloud v2 multi-tenant decisions * feat(tenancy): establish cloud isolation foundations * feat(tenancy): harden shared cloud runtime boundaries * docs(tenancy): record final isolation verification * fix(tenancy): close isolation and permission gaps * docs(tenancy): record final isolation verification * feat(tenancy): connect cloud workspace control plane * fix(build): install git for pinned SDK * docs(cloud): update control plane verification * chore: update multi-tenant SDK pin * fix(cloud): skip legacy model sync during startup * test(cloud): preserve minimal model manager fixtures * fix(cloud): preserve authenticated account context * fix(cloud): reuse authenticated account for user info * feat(cloud): complete Workspace settings navigation * test(web): cover Workspace dropdown menu * feat(web): place workspace controls in sidebar * refactor(web): streamline workspace controls * style(web): format workspace layout test * fix(cloud): surface runtime and workspace plan status * fix(plugin): keep runtime identity stable across restarts * fix(ui): widen and center workspace switcher * fix(ui): hide roles from workspace switcher * fix(ui): align workspace switcher with sidebar entries * feat(workspace): add in-product collaboration and direct Cloud launch * style: format collaboration changes * fix(workspace): bind collaboration APIs to tenant UoW * fix(cloud): preserve Core-owned collaboration state * test(cloud): require Space identity for invite registration * feat(cloud): complete secure invitation experience * style(web): format invitation flows * fix(cloud): recover box runtime without unscoped skill reload * feat(oss): enforce invitation account and owner billing flows * style: format OSS account service * test(oss): cover invitation logout handoff * fix(oss): resolve workspace owner in scoped session * feat(cloud): harden multi-tenant runtime resources * fix(cloud): bound runtime restart storms * fix(cloud): eliminate periodic runtime CPU spikes * fix(cloud): enforce instance capacity ceilings * fix(cloud): scope public login capability discovery * fix(cloud): bound tenant maintenance and monitoring work * fix(runtime): bound tenant resource amplification * fix(deps): pin green multi-tenant plugin SDK * fix(cloud): handle unavailable skill capability * fix(security): require authentication for image file endpoint (H-2) - Changed /api/v1/files/image from AuthType.NONE to USER_TOKEN_OR_API_KEY - Added Permission.RESOURCE_VIEW requirement - Prevents unauthenticated cross-tenant file access via leaked keys - Fixes HIGH severity finding from multi-tenant security review docs: add comprehensive database migration guide - Complete migration steps for OSS → multi-tenant - Backup, execution, verification procedures - Rollback scenarios and recovery plans - Performance tuning recommendations * test: add comprehensive cross-tenant isolation tests Added 7 critical test scenarios for multi-tenant boundaries: - Cross-tenant bot access prevention - Viewer role read-only enforcement - Removed member immediate access revocation - Model provider credential isolation - WebSocket message isolation - Invitation token workspace scoping - Multi-workspace context validation These tests address P0-2 coverage gaps for: - workspaces.py (membership & invitation flows) - user.py (authentication & authorization) - websocket_chat.py (real-time isolation) - plugins.py (resource access control) docs: finalize database migration guide * fix(security): resolve M-1, M-2, M-3 security findings M-1: WebSocket authorization TOCTOU race (FIXED) - Changed _revalidate_websocket_authorization to return RequestContext - Ensures validated context is used immediately without race window - Prevents removed members from sending messages during revalidation gap M-2: Model Manager cache workspace isolation (VERIFIED) - Confirmed _CacheKey already uses 4-tuple: (instance, workspace, generation, resource) - Cache is properly scoped per workspace, no cross-tenant leakage possible - No code change needed, documented as working correctly M-3: Invitation lock workspace scoping (FIXED) - Changed lock key from token_digest to workspace_uuid:token_digest - Prevents DoS where attacker locks token in Workspace A to block Workspace B - Locks now isolated per workspace All MEDIUM severity findings from security review now resolved. * fix(cloud): unblock tenant CI and enforce knowledge quotas * fix(tenancy): scope rerank model sync --------- Co-authored-by: dadachann <185672915+dadachann@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-08-09 04:40:57 +00:00 · 2026-07-30 21:43:35 +08:00
parent 463b120923
commit e1ac5e0fc8
468 changed files with 78320 additions and 13137 deletions
@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import enum
+import types
+import typing
+
+from .context import RequestContext
+
+
+class WorkspaceRole(enum.StrEnum):
+    OWNER = 'owner'
+    ADMIN = 'admin'
+    DEVELOPER = 'developer'
+    OPERATOR = 'operator'
+    VIEWER = 'viewer'
+
+
+class Permission(enum.StrEnum):
+    WORKSPACE_VIEW = 'workspace.view'
+    WORKSPACE_UPDATE = 'workspace.update'
+    WORKSPACE_DELETE = 'workspace.delete'
+    OWNER_TRANSFER = 'owner.transfer'
+    MEMBER_VIEW = 'member.view'
+    MEMBER_INVITE = 'member.invite'
+    MEMBER_UPDATE_ROLE = 'member.update_role'
+    MEMBER_REMOVE = 'member.remove'
+    RESOURCE_VIEW = 'resource.view'
+    RESOURCE_MANAGE = 'resource.manage'
+    RUNTIME_OPERATE = 'runtime.operate'
+    PROVIDER_SECRET_MANAGE = 'provider_secret.manage'
+    API_KEY_MANAGE = 'api_key.manage'
+    AUDIT_VIEW = 'audit.view'
+    DATA_EXPORT = 'data.export'
+    BILLING_LINK_MANAGE = 'billing_link.manage'
+
+
+_VIEW_PERMISSIONS = {
+    Permission.WORKSPACE_VIEW,
+    Permission.MEMBER_VIEW,
+    Permission.RESOURCE_VIEW,
+}
+
+_ROLE_PERMISSIONS: typing.Final = types.MappingProxyType(
+    {
+        WorkspaceRole.OWNER: frozenset(Permission),
+        WorkspaceRole.ADMIN: frozenset(
+            permission
+            for permission in Permission
+            if permission
+            not in {
+                Permission.WORKSPACE_DELETE,
+                Permission.OWNER_TRANSFER,
+                Permission.BILLING_LINK_MANAGE,
+            }
+        ),
+        WorkspaceRole.DEVELOPER: frozenset(
+            _VIEW_PERMISSIONS
+            | {
+                Permission.RESOURCE_MANAGE,
+                Permission.RUNTIME_OPERATE,
+                Permission.PROVIDER_SECRET_MANAGE,
+            }
+        ),
+        WorkspaceRole.OPERATOR: frozenset(_VIEW_PERMISSIONS | {Permission.RUNTIME_OPERATE}),
+        WorkspaceRole.VIEWER: frozenset(_VIEW_PERMISSIONS),
+    }
+)
+
+
+class AuthorizationError(Exception):
+    """Base class for errors that map to an HTTP authorization response."""
+
+    status_code = 403
+    error_code = 'forbidden'
+
+
+class WorkspaceRequiredError(AuthorizationError):
+    status_code = 400
+    error_code = 'workspace_required'
+
+
+class PermissionDeniedError(AuthorizationError):
+    error_code = 'permission_denied'
+
+    def __init__(self, permission: str) -> None:
+        super().__init__(f'Missing Workspace permission: {permission}')
+        self.permission = permission
+
+
+class EditionLimitError(AuthorizationError):
+    error_code = 'edition_limit'
+
+
+def permissions_for_role(role: str | WorkspaceRole) -> frozenset[str]:
+    """Return the canonical fixed permissions for a Workspace role."""
+
+    try:
+        parsed_role = WorkspaceRole(role)
+    except ValueError:
+        return frozenset()
+    return frozenset(permission.value for permission in _ROLE_PERMISSIONS[parsed_role])
+
+
+def has_permission(ctx: RequestContext, permission: str | Permission) -> bool:
+    """Return whether the context contains one effective permission."""
+
+    permission_value = permission.value if isinstance(permission, Permission) else permission
+    return permission_value in ctx.workspace.permissions
+
+
+def require_permission(ctx: RequestContext, permission: str | Permission) -> None:
+    """Raise a stable authorization error when a permission is missing."""
+
+    permission_value = permission.value if isinstance(permission, Permission) else permission
+    if not has_permission(ctx, permission_value):
+        raise PermissionDeniedError(permission_value)