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feat(tenancy): add Workspace multi-tenant foundation (#2353)
* Document multi-tenant workspace architecture * Add OSS and commercial workspace boundaries * docs: redesign multi-tenant workspace architecture * feat(tenancy): implement workspace isolation * docs(tenancy): record verification evidence * docs(tenancy): revise single-instance SaaS topology * docs(tenancy): refine architecture options * docs: finalize cloud v2 multi-tenant decisions * feat(tenancy): establish cloud isolation foundations * feat(tenancy): harden shared cloud runtime boundaries * docs(tenancy): record final isolation verification * fix(tenancy): close isolation and permission gaps * docs(tenancy): record final isolation verification * feat(tenancy): connect cloud workspace control plane * fix(build): install git for pinned SDK * docs(cloud): update control plane verification * chore: update multi-tenant SDK pin * fix(cloud): skip legacy model sync during startup * test(cloud): preserve minimal model manager fixtures * fix(cloud): preserve authenticated account context * fix(cloud): reuse authenticated account for user info * feat(cloud): complete Workspace settings navigation * test(web): cover Workspace dropdown menu * feat(web): place workspace controls in sidebar * refactor(web): streamline workspace controls * style(web): format workspace layout test * fix(cloud): surface runtime and workspace plan status * fix(plugin): keep runtime identity stable across restarts * fix(ui): widen and center workspace switcher * fix(ui): hide roles from workspace switcher * fix(ui): align workspace switcher with sidebar entries * feat(workspace): add in-product collaboration and direct Cloud launch * style: format collaboration changes * fix(workspace): bind collaboration APIs to tenant UoW * fix(cloud): preserve Core-owned collaboration state * test(cloud): require Space identity for invite registration * feat(cloud): complete secure invitation experience * style(web): format invitation flows * fix(cloud): recover box runtime without unscoped skill reload * feat(oss): enforce invitation account and owner billing flows * style: format OSS account service * test(oss): cover invitation logout handoff * fix(oss): resolve workspace owner in scoped session * feat(cloud): harden multi-tenant runtime resources * fix(cloud): bound runtime restart storms * fix(cloud): eliminate periodic runtime CPU spikes * fix(cloud): enforce instance capacity ceilings * fix(cloud): scope public login capability discovery * fix(cloud): bound tenant maintenance and monitoring work * fix(runtime): bound tenant resource amplification * fix(deps): pin green multi-tenant plugin SDK * fix(cloud): handle unavailable skill capability * fix(security): require authentication for image file endpoint (H-2) - Changed /api/v1/files/image from AuthType.NONE to USER_TOKEN_OR_API_KEY - Added Permission.RESOURCE_VIEW requirement - Prevents unauthenticated cross-tenant file access via leaked keys - Fixes HIGH severity finding from multi-tenant security review docs: add comprehensive database migration guide - Complete migration steps for OSS → multi-tenant - Backup, execution, verification procedures - Rollback scenarios and recovery plans - Performance tuning recommendations * test: add comprehensive cross-tenant isolation tests Added 7 critical test scenarios for multi-tenant boundaries: - Cross-tenant bot access prevention - Viewer role read-only enforcement - Removed member immediate access revocation - Model provider credential isolation - WebSocket message isolation - Invitation token workspace scoping - Multi-workspace context validation These tests address P0-2 coverage gaps for: - workspaces.py (membership & invitation flows) - user.py (authentication & authorization) - websocket_chat.py (real-time isolation) - plugins.py (resource access control) docs: finalize database migration guide * fix(security): resolve M-1, M-2, M-3 security findings M-1: WebSocket authorization TOCTOU race (FIXED) - Changed _revalidate_websocket_authorization to return RequestContext - Ensures validated context is used immediately without race window - Prevents removed members from sending messages during revalidation gap M-2: Model Manager cache workspace isolation (VERIFIED) - Confirmed _CacheKey already uses 4-tuple: (instance, workspace, generation, resource) - Cache is properly scoped per workspace, no cross-tenant leakage possible - No code change needed, documented as working correctly M-3: Invitation lock workspace scoping (FIXED) - Changed lock key from token_digest to workspace_uuid:token_digest - Prevents DoS where attacker locks token in Workspace A to block Workspace B - Locks now isolated per workspace All MEDIUM severity findings from security review now resolved. * fix(cloud): unblock tenant CI and enforce knowledge quotas * fix(tenancy): scope rerank model sync --------- Co-authored-by: dadachann <185672915+dadachann@users.noreply.github.com>
This commit is contained in:
RockChinQ
@@ -1,43 +1,66 @@
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from __future__ import annotations
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import datetime
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import quart
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from ...authz import Permission
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from ...context import RequestContext
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from .. import group
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@group.group_class('apikeys', '/api/v1/apikeys')
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class ApiKeysRouterGroup(group.RouterGroup):
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async def initialize(self) -> None:
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@self.route('', methods=['GET', 'POST'])
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async def _() -> str:
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if quart.request.method == 'GET':
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keys = await self.ap.apikey_service.get_api_keys()
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return self.success(data={'keys': keys})
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elif quart.request.method == 'POST':
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json_data = await quart.request.json
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name = json_data.get('name', '')
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description = json_data.get('description', '')
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@self.route('', methods=['GET'], permission=Permission.API_KEY_MANAGE)
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async def _(request_context: RequestContext) -> str:
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keys = await self.ap.apikey_service.get_api_keys(request_context)
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return self.success(data={'keys': keys})
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if not name:
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return self.http_status(400, -1, 'Name is required')
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@self.route('', methods=['POST'], permission=Permission.API_KEY_MANAGE)
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async def _(request_context: RequestContext) -> str:
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json_data = await quart.request.json
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expires_at = json_data.get('expires_at')
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parsed_expiry = None
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if expires_at:
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try:
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parsed_expiry = datetime.datetime.fromisoformat(str(expires_at).replace('Z', '+00:00'))
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except ValueError:
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return self.http_status(400, 'invalid_expiry', 'Invalid API key expiry')
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try:
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key = await self.ap.apikey_service.create_api_key(
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request_context,
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json_data.get('name', ''),
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json_data.get('description', ''),
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scopes=json_data.get('scopes'),
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expires_at=parsed_expiry,
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)
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except ValueError as error:
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return self.http_status(400, 'invalid_api_key', str(error))
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return self.success(data={'key': key})
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key = await self.ap.apikey_service.create_api_key(name, description)
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return self.success(data={'key': key})
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@self.route('/<int:key_id>', methods=['GET'], permission=Permission.API_KEY_MANAGE)
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async def _(key_id: int, request_context: RequestContext) -> str:
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key = await self.ap.apikey_service.get_api_key(request_context, key_id)
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if key is None:
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return self.http_status(404, 'resource_not_found', 'API key not found')
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return self.success(data={'key': key})
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@self.route('/<int:key_id>', methods=['GET', 'PUT', 'DELETE'])
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async def _(key_id: int) -> str:
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if quart.request.method == 'GET':
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key = await self.ap.apikey_service.get_api_key(key_id)
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if key is None:
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return self.http_status(404, -1, 'API key not found')
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return self.success(data={'key': key})
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@self.route('/<int:key_id>', methods=['PUT'], permission=Permission.API_KEY_MANAGE)
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async def _(key_id: int, request_context: RequestContext) -> str:
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json_data = await quart.request.json
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try:
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await self.ap.apikey_service.update_api_key(
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request_context,
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key_id,
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json_data.get('name'),
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json_data.get('description'),
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)
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except ValueError as error:
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return self.http_status(400, 'invalid_api_key', str(error))
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return self.success()
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elif quart.request.method == 'PUT':
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json_data = await quart.request.json
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name = json_data.get('name')
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description = json_data.get('description')
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await self.ap.apikey_service.update_api_key(key_id, name, description)
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return self.success()
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elif quart.request.method == 'DELETE':
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await self.ap.apikey_service.delete_api_key(key_id)
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return self.success()
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@self.route('/<int:key_id>', methods=['DELETE'], permission=Permission.API_KEY_MANAGE)
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async def _(key_id: int, request_context: RequestContext) -> str:
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await self.ap.apikey_service.delete_api_key(request_context, key_id)
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return self.success()
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