feat(tenancy): add Workspace multi-tenant foundation (#2353)

* Document multi-tenant workspace architecture * Add OSS and commercial workspace boundaries * docs: redesign multi-tenant workspace architecture * feat(tenancy): implement workspace isolation * docs(tenancy): record verification evidence * docs(tenancy): revise single-instance SaaS topology * docs(tenancy): refine architecture options * docs: finalize cloud v2 multi-tenant decisions * feat(tenancy): establish cloud isolation foundations * feat(tenancy): harden shared cloud runtime boundaries * docs(tenancy): record final isolation verification * fix(tenancy): close isolation and permission gaps * docs(tenancy): record final isolation verification * feat(tenancy): connect cloud workspace control plane * fix(build): install git for pinned SDK * docs(cloud): update control plane verification * chore: update multi-tenant SDK pin * fix(cloud): skip legacy model sync during startup * test(cloud): preserve minimal model manager fixtures * fix(cloud): preserve authenticated account context * fix(cloud): reuse authenticated account for user info * feat(cloud): complete Workspace settings navigation * test(web): cover Workspace dropdown menu * feat(web): place workspace controls in sidebar * refactor(web): streamline workspace controls * style(web): format workspace layout test * fix(cloud): surface runtime and workspace plan status * fix(plugin): keep runtime identity stable across restarts * fix(ui): widen and center workspace switcher * fix(ui): hide roles from workspace switcher * fix(ui): align workspace switcher with sidebar entries * feat(workspace): add in-product collaboration and direct Cloud launch * style: format collaboration changes * fix(workspace): bind collaboration APIs to tenant UoW * fix(cloud): preserve Core-owned collaboration state * test(cloud): require Space identity for invite registration * feat(cloud): complete secure invitation experience * style(web): format invitation flows * fix(cloud): recover box runtime without unscoped skill reload * feat(oss): enforce invitation account and owner billing flows * style: format OSS account service * test(oss): cover invitation logout handoff * fix(oss): resolve workspace owner in scoped session * feat(cloud): harden multi-tenant runtime resources * fix(cloud): bound runtime restart storms * fix(cloud): eliminate periodic runtime CPU spikes * fix(cloud): enforce instance capacity ceilings * fix(cloud): scope public login capability discovery * fix(cloud): bound tenant maintenance and monitoring work * fix(runtime): bound tenant resource amplification * fix(deps): pin green multi-tenant plugin SDK * fix(cloud): handle unavailable skill capability * fix(security): require authentication for image file endpoint (H-2) - Changed /api/v1/files/image from AuthType.NONE to USER_TOKEN_OR_API_KEY - Added Permission.RESOURCE_VIEW requirement - Prevents unauthenticated cross-tenant file access via leaked keys - Fixes HIGH severity finding from multi-tenant security review docs: add comprehensive database migration guide - Complete migration steps for OSS → multi-tenant - Backup, execution, verification procedures - Rollback scenarios and recovery plans - Performance tuning recommendations * test: add comprehensive cross-tenant isolation tests Added 7 critical test scenarios for multi-tenant boundaries: - Cross-tenant bot access prevention - Viewer role read-only enforcement - Removed member immediate access revocation - Model provider credential isolation - WebSocket message isolation - Invitation token workspace scoping - Multi-workspace context validation These tests address P0-2 coverage gaps for: - workspaces.py (membership & invitation flows) - user.py (authentication & authorization) - websocket_chat.py (real-time isolation) - plugins.py (resource access control) docs: finalize database migration guide * fix(security): resolve M-1, M-2, M-3 security findings M-1: WebSocket authorization TOCTOU race (FIXED) - Changed _revalidate_websocket_authorization to return RequestContext - Ensures validated context is used immediately without race window - Prevents removed members from sending messages during revalidation gap M-2: Model Manager cache workspace isolation (VERIFIED) - Confirmed _CacheKey already uses 4-tuple: (instance, workspace, generation, resource) - Cache is properly scoped per workspace, no cross-tenant leakage possible - No code change needed, documented as working correctly M-3: Invitation lock workspace scoping (FIXED) - Changed lock key from token_digest to workspace_uuid:token_digest - Prevents DoS where attacker locks token in Workspace A to block Workspace B - Locks now isolated per workspace All MEDIUM severity findings from security review now resolved. * fix(cloud): unblock tenant CI and enforce knowledge quotas * fix(tenancy): scope rerank model sync --------- Co-authored-by: dadachann <185672915+dadachann@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-08-09 04:40:57 +00:00 · 2026-07-30 21:43:35 +08:00
parent 463b120923
commit e1ac5e0fc8
468 changed files with 78320 additions and 13137 deletions
@@ -1,49 +1,80 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
 import quart

+from ...authz import Permission, has_permission
+from ...context import RequestContext
 from .. import group


@group.group_class('webhook_mgmt', '/api/v1/webhooks')
 class WebhookManagementRouterGroup(group.RouterGroup):
    async def initialize(self) -> None:
-        @self.route('', methods=['GET', 'POST'])
-        async def _() -> str:
-            if quart.request.method == 'GET':
-                webhooks = await self.ap.webhook_service.get_webhooks()
-                return self.success(data={'webhooks': webhooks})
-            elif quart.request.method == 'POST':
-                json_data = await quart.request.json
-                name = json_data.get('name', '')
-                url = json_data.get('url', '')
-                description = json_data.get('description', '')
-                enabled = json_data.get('enabled', True)
+        @self.route('', methods=['GET'], permission=Permission.RESOURCE_VIEW)
+        async def _(request_context: RequestContext) -> str:
+            webhooks = await self.ap.webhook_service.get_webhooks(
+                request_context,
+                include_secret=has_permission(request_context, Permission.RESOURCE_MANAGE),
+            )
+            return self.success(data={'webhooks': webhooks})

-                if not name:
-                    return self.http_status(400, -1, 'Name is required')
-                if not url:
-                    return self.http_status(400, -1, 'URL is required')
+        @self.route('', methods=['POST'], permission=Permission.RESOURCE_MANAGE)
+        async def _(request_context: RequestContext) -> str:
+            json_data = await quart.request.get_json(silent=True) or {}
+            name = json_data.get('name', '')
+            url = json_data.get('url', '')
+            description = json_data.get('description', '')
+            enabled = json_data.get('enabled', True)

-                webhook = await self.ap.webhook_service.create_webhook(name, url, description, enabled)
-                return self.success(data={'webhook': webhook})
+            if not name:
+                return self.http_status(400, -1, 'Name is required')
+            if not url:
+                return self.http_status(400, -1, 'URL is required')

-        @self.route('/<int:webhook_id>', methods=['GET', 'PUT', 'DELETE'])
-        async def _(webhook_id: int) -> str:
-            if quart.request.method == 'GET':
-                webhook = await self.ap.webhook_service.get_webhook(webhook_id)
-                if webhook is None:
+            try:
+                webhook = await self.ap.webhook_service.create_webhook(
+                    request_context,
+                    name,
+                    url,
+                    description,
+                    enabled,
+                )
+            except ValueError as exc:
+                return self.http_status(400, -1, str(exc))
+            return self.success(data={'webhook': webhook})
+
+        @self.route('/<int:webhook_id>', methods=['GET'], permission=Permission.RESOURCE_VIEW)
+        async def _(webhook_id: int, request_context: RequestContext) -> str:
+            webhook = await self.ap.webhook_service.get_webhook(
+                request_context,
+                webhook_id,
+                include_secret=has_permission(request_context, Permission.RESOURCE_MANAGE),
+            )
+            if webhook is None:
+                return self.http_status(404, -1, 'Webhook not found')
+            return self.success(data={'webhook': webhook})
+
+        @self.route(
+            '/<int:webhook_id>',
+            methods=['PUT', 'DELETE'],
+            permission=Permission.RESOURCE_MANAGE,
+        )
+        async def _(webhook_id: int, request_context: RequestContext) -> str:
+            if quart.request.method == 'PUT':
+                json_data = await quart.request.get_json(silent=True) or {}
+                updated = await self.ap.webhook_service.update_webhook(
+                    request_context,
+                    webhook_id,
+                    json_data.get('name'),
+                    json_data.get('url'),
+                    json_data.get('description'),
+                    json_data.get('enabled'),
+                )
+                if not updated:
                    return self.http_status(404, -1, 'Webhook not found')
-                return self.success(data={'webhook': webhook})
-
-            elif quart.request.method == 'PUT':
-                json_data = await quart.request.json
-                name = json_data.get('name')
-                url = json_data.get('url')
-                description = json_data.get('description')
-                enabled = json_data.get('enabled')
-
-                await self.ap.webhook_service.update_webhook(webhook_id, name, url, description, enabled)
                return self.success()

-            elif quart.request.method == 'DELETE':
-                await self.ap.webhook_service.delete_webhook(webhook_id)
-                return self.success()
+            deleted = await self.ap.webhook_service.delete_webhook(request_context, webhook_id)
+            if not deleted:
+                return self.http_status(404, -1, 'Webhook not found')
+            return self.success()