feat(tenancy): add Workspace multi-tenant foundation (#2353)

* Document multi-tenant workspace architecture

* Add OSS and commercial workspace boundaries

* docs: redesign multi-tenant workspace architecture

* feat(tenancy): implement workspace isolation

* docs(tenancy): record verification evidence

* docs(tenancy): revise single-instance SaaS topology

* docs(tenancy): refine architecture options

* docs: finalize cloud v2 multi-tenant decisions

* feat(tenancy): establish cloud isolation foundations

* feat(tenancy): harden shared cloud runtime boundaries

* docs(tenancy): record final isolation verification

* fix(tenancy): close isolation and permission gaps

* docs(tenancy): record final isolation verification

* feat(tenancy): connect cloud workspace control plane

* fix(build): install git for pinned SDK

* docs(cloud): update control plane verification

* chore: update multi-tenant SDK pin

* fix(cloud): skip legacy model sync during startup

* test(cloud): preserve minimal model manager fixtures

* fix(cloud): preserve authenticated account context

* fix(cloud): reuse authenticated account for user info

* feat(cloud): complete Workspace settings navigation

* test(web): cover Workspace dropdown menu

* feat(web): place workspace controls in sidebar

* refactor(web): streamline workspace controls

* style(web): format workspace layout test

* fix(cloud): surface runtime and workspace plan status

* fix(plugin): keep runtime identity stable across restarts

* fix(ui): widen and center workspace switcher

* fix(ui): hide roles from workspace switcher

* fix(ui): align workspace switcher with sidebar entries

* feat(workspace): add in-product collaboration and direct Cloud launch

* style: format collaboration changes

* fix(workspace): bind collaboration APIs to tenant UoW

* fix(cloud): preserve Core-owned collaboration state

* test(cloud): require Space identity for invite registration

* feat(cloud): complete secure invitation experience

* style(web): format invitation flows

* fix(cloud): recover box runtime without unscoped skill reload

* feat(oss): enforce invitation account and owner billing flows

* style: format OSS account service

* test(oss): cover invitation logout handoff

* fix(oss): resolve workspace owner in scoped session

* feat(cloud): harden multi-tenant runtime resources

* fix(cloud): bound runtime restart storms

* fix(cloud): eliminate periodic runtime CPU spikes

* fix(cloud): enforce instance capacity ceilings

* fix(cloud): scope public login capability discovery

* fix(cloud): bound tenant maintenance and monitoring work

* fix(runtime): bound tenant resource amplification

* fix(deps): pin green multi-tenant plugin SDK

* fix(cloud): handle unavailable skill capability

* fix(security): require authentication for image file endpoint (H-2)

- Changed /api/v1/files/image from AuthType.NONE to USER_TOKEN_OR_API_KEY
- Added Permission.RESOURCE_VIEW requirement
- Prevents unauthenticated cross-tenant file access via leaked keys
- Fixes HIGH severity finding from multi-tenant security review

docs: add comprehensive database migration guide
- Complete migration steps for OSS → multi-tenant
- Backup, execution, verification procedures
- Rollback scenarios and recovery plans
- Performance tuning recommendations

* test: add comprehensive cross-tenant isolation tests

Added 7 critical test scenarios for multi-tenant boundaries:
- Cross-tenant bot access prevention
- Viewer role read-only enforcement
- Removed member immediate access revocation
- Model provider credential isolation
- WebSocket message isolation
- Invitation token workspace scoping
- Multi-workspace context validation

These tests address P0-2 coverage gaps for:
- workspaces.py (membership & invitation flows)
- user.py (authentication & authorization)
- websocket_chat.py (real-time isolation)
- plugins.py (resource access control)

docs: finalize database migration guide

* fix(security): resolve M-1, M-2, M-3 security findings

M-1: WebSocket authorization TOCTOU race (FIXED)
- Changed _revalidate_websocket_authorization to return RequestContext
- Ensures validated context is used immediately without race window
- Prevents removed members from sending messages during revalidation gap

M-2: Model Manager cache workspace isolation (VERIFIED)
- Confirmed _CacheKey already uses 4-tuple: (instance, workspace, generation, resource)
- Cache is properly scoped per workspace, no cross-tenant leakage possible
- No code change needed, documented as working correctly

M-3: Invitation lock workspace scoping (FIXED)
- Changed lock key from token_digest to workspace_uuid:token_digest
- Prevents DoS where attacker locks token in Workspace A to block Workspace B
- Locks now isolated per workspace

All MEDIUM severity findings from security review now resolved.

* fix(cloud): unblock tenant CI and enforce knowledge quotas

* fix(tenancy): scope rerank model sync

---------

Co-authored-by: dadachann <185672915+dadachann@users.noreply.github.com>

src/langbot/pkg/api/http/controller/groups/webhooks.py

@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ import quart
 import traceback
 
 from .. import group
+from .....utils import bounded_executor
 
 
 @group.group_class('webhooks', '/bots')
@@ -30,7 +31,10 @@ class WebhookRouterGroup(group.RouterGroup):
             适配器返回的响应
         """
         try:
-            runtime_bot = await self.ap.platform_mgr.get_bot_by_uuid(bot_uuid)
+            # Public ingress never accepts X-Workspace-Id.  The opaque bot UUID
+            # is resolved against the already-bound runtime resource, which
+            # carries the trusted Workspace and placement generation.
+            runtime_bot = await self.ap.platform_mgr.resolve_public_bot(bot_uuid)
 
             if not runtime_bot:
                 return quart.jsonify({'error': 'Bot not found'}), 404
@@ -41,14 +45,40 @@ class WebhookRouterGroup(group.RouterGroup):
             if not hasattr(runtime_bot.adapter, 'handle_unified_webhook'):
                 return quart.jsonify({'error': 'Adapter does not support unified webhook'}), 501
 
-            response = await runtime_bot.adapter.handle_unified_webhook(
-                bot_uuid=bot_uuid,
-                path=path,
-                request=quart.request,
-            )
+            async def dispatch():
+                await self.ap.workspace_service.get_execution_binding(
+                    runtime_bot.workspace_uuid,
+                    expected_generation=runtime_bot.placement_generation,
+                )
+                return await runtime_bot.adapter.handle_unified_webhook(
+                    bot_uuid=bot_uuid,
+                    path=path,
+                    request=quart.request,
+                )
+
+            with bounded_executor.blocking_work_scope(runtime_bot.workspace_uuid):
+                persistence_mgr = self.ap.persistence_mgr
+                cloud_runtime = getattr(getattr(persistence_mgr, 'mode', None), 'value', None) == 'cloud_runtime'
+                if cloud_runtime:
+                    tenant_scope = getattr(persistence_mgr, 'tenant_scope', None)
+                    if not callable(tenant_scope):
+                        raise RuntimeError('Cloud webhook dispatch requires an explicit tenant scope')
+                    async with tenant_scope(runtime_bot.workspace_uuid):
+                        response = await dispatch()
+                else:
+                    response = await dispatch()
 
             return response
 
-        except Exception as e:
-            self.ap.logger.error(f'Webhook dispatch error for bot {bot_uuid}: {traceback.format_exc()}')
-            return quart.jsonify({'error': str(e)}), 500
+        except bounded_executor.BlockingWorkCapacityError as exc:
+            return self.http_status(
+                429,
+                'blocking_work_capacity_exceeded',
+                str(exc),
+            )
+        except Exception:
+            request_id = self.request_id()
+            self.ap.logger.error(
+                f'Webhook dispatch error request_id={request_id} bot={bot_uuid}: {traceback.format_exc()}'
+            )
+            return self.internal_error_response(request_id)