feat(tenancy): add Workspace multi-tenant foundation (#2353)

* Document multi-tenant workspace architecture

* Add OSS and commercial workspace boundaries

* docs: redesign multi-tenant workspace architecture

* feat(tenancy): implement workspace isolation

* docs(tenancy): record verification evidence

* docs(tenancy): revise single-instance SaaS topology

* docs(tenancy): refine architecture options

* docs: finalize cloud v2 multi-tenant decisions

* feat(tenancy): establish cloud isolation foundations

* feat(tenancy): harden shared cloud runtime boundaries

* docs(tenancy): record final isolation verification

* fix(tenancy): close isolation and permission gaps

* docs(tenancy): record final isolation verification

* feat(tenancy): connect cloud workspace control plane

* fix(build): install git for pinned SDK

* docs(cloud): update control plane verification

* chore: update multi-tenant SDK pin

* fix(cloud): skip legacy model sync during startup

* test(cloud): preserve minimal model manager fixtures

* fix(cloud): preserve authenticated account context

* fix(cloud): reuse authenticated account for user info

* feat(cloud): complete Workspace settings navigation

* test(web): cover Workspace dropdown menu

* feat(web): place workspace controls in sidebar

* refactor(web): streamline workspace controls

* style(web): format workspace layout test

* fix(cloud): surface runtime and workspace plan status

* fix(plugin): keep runtime identity stable across restarts

* fix(ui): widen and center workspace switcher

* fix(ui): hide roles from workspace switcher

* fix(ui): align workspace switcher with sidebar entries

* feat(workspace): add in-product collaboration and direct Cloud launch

* style: format collaboration changes

* fix(workspace): bind collaboration APIs to tenant UoW

* fix(cloud): preserve Core-owned collaboration state

* test(cloud): require Space identity for invite registration

* feat(cloud): complete secure invitation experience

* style(web): format invitation flows

* fix(cloud): recover box runtime without unscoped skill reload

* feat(oss): enforce invitation account and owner billing flows

* style: format OSS account service

* test(oss): cover invitation logout handoff

* fix(oss): resolve workspace owner in scoped session

* feat(cloud): harden multi-tenant runtime resources

* fix(cloud): bound runtime restart storms

* fix(cloud): eliminate periodic runtime CPU spikes

* fix(cloud): enforce instance capacity ceilings

* fix(cloud): scope public login capability discovery

* fix(cloud): bound tenant maintenance and monitoring work

* fix(runtime): bound tenant resource amplification

* fix(deps): pin green multi-tenant plugin SDK

* fix(cloud): handle unavailable skill capability

* fix(security): require authentication for image file endpoint (H-2)

- Changed /api/v1/files/image from AuthType.NONE to USER_TOKEN_OR_API_KEY
- Added Permission.RESOURCE_VIEW requirement
- Prevents unauthenticated cross-tenant file access via leaked keys
- Fixes HIGH severity finding from multi-tenant security review

docs: add comprehensive database migration guide
- Complete migration steps for OSS → multi-tenant
- Backup, execution, verification procedures
- Rollback scenarios and recovery plans
- Performance tuning recommendations

* test: add comprehensive cross-tenant isolation tests

Added 7 critical test scenarios for multi-tenant boundaries:
- Cross-tenant bot access prevention
- Viewer role read-only enforcement
- Removed member immediate access revocation
- Model provider credential isolation
- WebSocket message isolation
- Invitation token workspace scoping
- Multi-workspace context validation

These tests address P0-2 coverage gaps for:
- workspaces.py (membership & invitation flows)
- user.py (authentication & authorization)
- websocket_chat.py (real-time isolation)
- plugins.py (resource access control)

docs: finalize database migration guide

* fix(security): resolve M-1, M-2, M-3 security findings

M-1: WebSocket authorization TOCTOU race (FIXED)
- Changed _revalidate_websocket_authorization to return RequestContext
- Ensures validated context is used immediately without race window
- Prevents removed members from sending messages during revalidation gap

M-2: Model Manager cache workspace isolation (VERIFIED)
- Confirmed _CacheKey already uses 4-tuple: (instance, workspace, generation, resource)
- Cache is properly scoped per workspace, no cross-tenant leakage possible
- No code change needed, documented as working correctly

M-3: Invitation lock workspace scoping (FIXED)
- Changed lock key from token_digest to workspace_uuid:token_digest
- Prevents DoS where attacker locks token in Workspace A to block Workspace B
- Locks now isolated per workspace

All MEDIUM severity findings from security review now resolved.

* fix(cloud): unblock tenant CI and enforce knowledge quotas

* fix(tenancy): scope rerank model sync

---------

Co-authored-by: dadachann <185672915+dadachann@users.noreply.github.com>
This commit is contained in:
RockChinQ
2026-07-30 21:43:35 +08:00
committed by GitHub
parent 463b120923
commit e1ac5e0fc8
468 changed files with 78320 additions and 13137 deletions
+121 -19
View File
@@ -4,6 +4,12 @@ import sqlalchemy
from ....core import app
from ....entity.persistence import webhook
from .secrets import SECRET_MASK, mask_secret_value, restore_secret_placeholders
from .tenant import TenantContext, require_workspace_uuid, scope_statement
_DEFAULT_MAX_WEBHOOKS_PER_WORKSPACE = 16
_HARD_MAX_WEBHOOKS_PER_WORKSPACE = 64
class WebhookService:
@@ -12,31 +18,99 @@ class WebhookService:
def __init__(self, ap: app.Application) -> None:
self.ap = ap
async def get_webhooks(self) -> list[dict]:
def max_per_workspace(self) -> int:
"""Return the configured webhook cap within the process hard limit."""
config = getattr(getattr(self.ap, 'instance_config', None), 'data', {})
try:
value = int(
config.get('webhooks', {}).get(
'max_per_workspace',
_DEFAULT_MAX_WEBHOOKS_PER_WORKSPACE,
)
)
except (AttributeError, TypeError, ValueError):
value = _DEFAULT_MAX_WEBHOOKS_PER_WORKSPACE
return min(max(value, 1), _HARD_MAX_WEBHOOKS_PER_WORKSPACE)
def _serialize_webhook(self, entity, *, include_secret: bool) -> dict:
serialized = self.ap.persistence_mgr.serialize_model(webhook.Webhook, entity)
if not include_secret:
serialized = serialized.copy()
serialized['url'] = mask_secret_value(serialized.get('url'))
return serialized
async def get_webhooks(self, context: TenantContext, *, include_secret: bool = False) -> list[dict]:
"""Get all webhooks"""
result = await self.ap.persistence_mgr.execute_async(sqlalchemy.select(webhook.Webhook))
result = await self.ap.persistence_mgr.execute_async(
scope_statement(
sqlalchemy.select(webhook.Webhook).order_by(webhook.Webhook.id).limit(_HARD_MAX_WEBHOOKS_PER_WORKSPACE),
webhook.Webhook,
context,
)
)
webhooks = result.all()
return [self.ap.persistence_mgr.serialize_model(webhook.Webhook, wh) for wh in webhooks]
return [self._serialize_webhook(wh, include_secret=include_secret) for wh in webhooks]
async def create_webhook(self, name: str, url: str, description: str = '', enabled: bool = True) -> dict:
async def create_webhook(
self,
context: TenantContext,
name: str,
url: str,
description: str = '',
enabled: bool = True,
) -> dict:
"""Create a new webhook"""
webhook_data = {'name': name, 'url': url, 'description': description, 'enabled': enabled}
workspace_uuid = require_workspace_uuid(context)
max_webhooks = self.max_per_workspace()
count_result = await self.ap.persistence_mgr.execute_async(
sqlalchemy.select(sqlalchemy.func.count())
.select_from(webhook.Webhook)
.where(webhook.Webhook.workspace_uuid == workspace_uuid)
)
if (count_result.scalar() or 0) >= max_webhooks:
raise ValueError(f'Maximum number of webhooks ({max_webhooks}) reached')
await self.ap.persistence_mgr.execute_async(sqlalchemy.insert(webhook.Webhook).values(**webhook_data))
url = restore_secret_placeholders(url, sensitive=True)
webhook_data = {
'workspace_uuid': workspace_uuid,
'name': name,
'url': url,
'description': description,
'enabled': enabled,
}
insert_result = await self.ap.persistence_mgr.execute_async(
sqlalchemy.insert(webhook.Webhook).values(**webhook_data)
)
# Retrieve the created webhook
result = await self.ap.persistence_mgr.execute_async(
sqlalchemy.select(webhook.Webhook).where(webhook.Webhook.url == url).order_by(webhook.Webhook.id.desc())
scope_statement(
sqlalchemy.select(webhook.Webhook).where(webhook.Webhook.id == insert_result.inserted_primary_key[0]),
webhook.Webhook,
workspace_uuid,
)
)
created_webhook = result.first()
return self.ap.persistence_mgr.serialize_model(webhook.Webhook, created_webhook)
async def get_webhook(self, webhook_id: int) -> dict | None:
async def get_webhook(
self,
context: TenantContext,
webhook_id: int,
*,
include_secret: bool = False,
) -> dict | None:
"""Get a specific webhook by ID"""
result = await self.ap.persistence_mgr.execute_async(
sqlalchemy.select(webhook.Webhook).where(webhook.Webhook.id == webhook_id)
scope_statement(
sqlalchemy.select(webhook.Webhook).where(webhook.Webhook.id == webhook_id),
webhook.Webhook,
context,
)
)
wh = result.first()
@@ -44,16 +118,27 @@ class WebhookService:
if wh is None:
return None
return self.ap.persistence_mgr.serialize_model(webhook.Webhook, wh)
return self._serialize_webhook(wh, include_secret=include_secret)
async def update_webhook(
self, webhook_id: int, name: str = None, url: str = None, description: str = None, enabled: bool = None
) -> None:
self,
context: TenantContext,
webhook_id: int,
name: str | None = None,
url: str | None = None,
description: str | None = None,
enabled: bool | None = None,
) -> bool:
"""Update a webhook's metadata"""
update_data = {}
if name is not None:
update_data['name'] = name
if url is not None:
if url == SECRET_MASK:
current = await self.get_webhook(context, webhook_id, include_secret=True)
if current is None:
return False
url = restore_secret_placeholders(url, current.get('url'), sensitive=True)
update_data['url'] = url
if description is not None:
update_data['description'] = description
@@ -61,20 +146,37 @@ class WebhookService:
update_data['enabled'] = enabled
if update_data:
await self.ap.persistence_mgr.execute_async(
sqlalchemy.update(webhook.Webhook).where(webhook.Webhook.id == webhook_id).values(**update_data)
result = await self.ap.persistence_mgr.execute_async(
scope_statement(
sqlalchemy.update(webhook.Webhook).where(webhook.Webhook.id == webhook_id).values(**update_data),
webhook.Webhook,
context,
)
)
return (result.rowcount or 0) > 0
return await self.get_webhook(context, webhook_id) is not None
async def delete_webhook(self, webhook_id: int) -> None:
async def delete_webhook(self, context: TenantContext, webhook_id: int) -> bool:
"""Delete a webhook"""
await self.ap.persistence_mgr.execute_async(
sqlalchemy.delete(webhook.Webhook).where(webhook.Webhook.id == webhook_id)
result = await self.ap.persistence_mgr.execute_async(
scope_statement(
sqlalchemy.delete(webhook.Webhook).where(webhook.Webhook.id == webhook_id),
webhook.Webhook,
context,
)
)
return (result.rowcount or 0) > 0
async def get_enabled_webhooks(self) -> list[dict]:
async def get_enabled_webhooks(self, context: TenantContext) -> list[dict]:
"""Get all enabled webhooks"""
result = await self.ap.persistence_mgr.execute_async(
sqlalchemy.select(webhook.Webhook).where(webhook.Webhook.enabled == True)
scope_statement(
sqlalchemy.select(webhook.Webhook).where(webhook.Webhook.enabled == True),
webhook.Webhook,
context,
)
.order_by(webhook.Webhook.id)
.limit(self.max_per_workspace())
)
webhooks = result.all()