feat(tenancy): add Workspace multi-tenant foundation (#2353)

* Document multi-tenant workspace architecture

* Add OSS and commercial workspace boundaries

* docs: redesign multi-tenant workspace architecture

* feat(tenancy): implement workspace isolation

* docs(tenancy): record verification evidence

* docs(tenancy): revise single-instance SaaS topology

* docs(tenancy): refine architecture options

* docs: finalize cloud v2 multi-tenant decisions

* feat(tenancy): establish cloud isolation foundations

* feat(tenancy): harden shared cloud runtime boundaries

* docs(tenancy): record final isolation verification

* fix(tenancy): close isolation and permission gaps

* docs(tenancy): record final isolation verification

* feat(tenancy): connect cloud workspace control plane

* fix(build): install git for pinned SDK

* docs(cloud): update control plane verification

* chore: update multi-tenant SDK pin

* fix(cloud): skip legacy model sync during startup

* test(cloud): preserve minimal model manager fixtures

* fix(cloud): preserve authenticated account context

* fix(cloud): reuse authenticated account for user info

* feat(cloud): complete Workspace settings navigation

* test(web): cover Workspace dropdown menu

* feat(web): place workspace controls in sidebar

* refactor(web): streamline workspace controls

* style(web): format workspace layout test

* fix(cloud): surface runtime and workspace plan status

* fix(plugin): keep runtime identity stable across restarts

* fix(ui): widen and center workspace switcher

* fix(ui): hide roles from workspace switcher

* fix(ui): align workspace switcher with sidebar entries

* feat(workspace): add in-product collaboration and direct Cloud launch

* style: format collaboration changes

* fix(workspace): bind collaboration APIs to tenant UoW

* fix(cloud): preserve Core-owned collaboration state

* test(cloud): require Space identity for invite registration

* feat(cloud): complete secure invitation experience

* style(web): format invitation flows

* fix(cloud): recover box runtime without unscoped skill reload

* feat(oss): enforce invitation account and owner billing flows

* style: format OSS account service

* test(oss): cover invitation logout handoff

* fix(oss): resolve workspace owner in scoped session

* feat(cloud): harden multi-tenant runtime resources

* fix(cloud): bound runtime restart storms

* fix(cloud): eliminate periodic runtime CPU spikes

* fix(cloud): enforce instance capacity ceilings

* fix(cloud): scope public login capability discovery

* fix(cloud): bound tenant maintenance and monitoring work

* fix(runtime): bound tenant resource amplification

* fix(deps): pin green multi-tenant plugin SDK

* fix(cloud): handle unavailable skill capability

* fix(security): require authentication for image file endpoint (H-2)

- Changed /api/v1/files/image from AuthType.NONE to USER_TOKEN_OR_API_KEY
- Added Permission.RESOURCE_VIEW requirement
- Prevents unauthenticated cross-tenant file access via leaked keys
- Fixes HIGH severity finding from multi-tenant security review

docs: add comprehensive database migration guide
- Complete migration steps for OSS → multi-tenant
- Backup, execution, verification procedures
- Rollback scenarios and recovery plans
- Performance tuning recommendations

* test: add comprehensive cross-tenant isolation tests

Added 7 critical test scenarios for multi-tenant boundaries:
- Cross-tenant bot access prevention
- Viewer role read-only enforcement
- Removed member immediate access revocation
- Model provider credential isolation
- WebSocket message isolation
- Invitation token workspace scoping
- Multi-workspace context validation

These tests address P0-2 coverage gaps for:
- workspaces.py (membership & invitation flows)
- user.py (authentication & authorization)
- websocket_chat.py (real-time isolation)
- plugins.py (resource access control)

docs: finalize database migration guide

* fix(security): resolve M-1, M-2, M-3 security findings

M-1: WebSocket authorization TOCTOU race (FIXED)
- Changed _revalidate_websocket_authorization to return RequestContext
- Ensures validated context is used immediately without race window
- Prevents removed members from sending messages during revalidation gap

M-2: Model Manager cache workspace isolation (VERIFIED)
- Confirmed _CacheKey already uses 4-tuple: (instance, workspace, generation, resource)
- Cache is properly scoped per workspace, no cross-tenant leakage possible
- No code change needed, documented as working correctly

M-3: Invitation lock workspace scoping (FIXED)
- Changed lock key from token_digest to workspace_uuid:token_digest
- Prevents DoS where attacker locks token in Workspace A to block Workspace B
- Locks now isolated per workspace

All MEDIUM severity findings from security review now resolved.

* fix(cloud): unblock tenant CI and enforce knowledge quotas

* fix(tenancy): scope rerank model sync

---------

Co-authored-by: dadachann <185672915+dadachann@users.noreply.github.com>
This commit is contained in:
RockChinQ
2026-07-30 21:43:35 +08:00
committed by GitHub
parent 463b120923
commit e1ac5e0fc8
468 changed files with 78320 additions and 13137 deletions
+61 -1
View File
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ import asyncio
import contextlib
import json
import os
import secrets
import sys
import typing
from typing import TYPE_CHECKING
@@ -16,6 +17,17 @@ from langbot_plugin.runtime.io.connection import Connection
from langbot_plugin.box.client import ActionRPCBoxClient
from langbot_plugin.box.errors import BoxRuntimeUnavailableError
from langbot_plugin.box.actions import LangBotToBoxAction
from langbot_plugin.box.security import (
BOX_CONTROL_TOKEN_ENV,
BOX_CONTROL_TOKEN_HEADER,
BOX_INSTANCE_HEADER,
BOX_PLACEMENT_GENERATION_HEADER,
BOX_TRUSTED_INSTANCE_ENV,
BOX_WORKSPACE_HEADER,
normalize_instance_uuid,
validate_control_token,
)
from langbot_plugin.entities.io.context import ActionContext
from ..utils import platform
from ..utils.managed_runtime import ManagedRuntimeConnector
@@ -123,6 +135,8 @@ class BoxRuntimeConnector(ManagedRuntimeConnector):
self._relay_host = parsed.hostname or '127.0.0.1'
self._relay_port = parsed.port or _DEFAULT_PORT
self._filtered_box_config = _filter_config_for_runtime(_get_box_config(ap))
self._trusted_instance_uuid = normalize_instance_uuid(self.ap.workspace_service.instance_uuid)
self._control_token = str(os.environ.get(BOX_CONTROL_TOKEN_ENV) or '').strip()
def uses_websocket(self) -> bool:
"""Whether the connector should use WebSocket to reach the Box runtime.
@@ -223,8 +237,11 @@ class BoxRuntimeConnector(ManagedRuntimeConnector):
from langbot_plugin.runtime.io.controllers.stdio.client import StdioClientController
self.ap.logger.info('Use stdio to connect to box runtime')
self._ensure_control_token(allow_generate=True)
python_path = sys.executable
env = os.environ.copy()
env[BOX_CONTROL_TOKEN_ENV] = self._control_token
env[BOX_TRUSTED_INSTANCE_ENV] = self._trusted_instance_uuid
if self._filtered_box_config:
env['LANGBOT_BOX_CONFIG'] = json.dumps(self._filtered_box_config)
@@ -259,7 +276,10 @@ class BoxRuntimeConnector(ManagedRuntimeConnector):
"""Launch box server as detached subprocess, then connect via WS (Windows)."""
self.ap.logger.info('(windows) Use cmd to launch box runtime and communicate via ws')
self._ensure_control_token(allow_generate=True)
env = os.environ.copy()
env[BOX_CONTROL_TOKEN_ENV] = self._control_token
env[BOX_TRUSTED_INSTANCE_ENV] = self._trusted_instance_uuid
if self._filtered_box_config:
env['LANGBOT_BOX_CONFIG'] = json.dumps(self._filtered_box_config)
@@ -282,6 +302,7 @@ class BoxRuntimeConnector(ManagedRuntimeConnector):
async def _connect_remote_ws(self) -> None:
"""Connect to a remote (or Docker) box server via WebSocket."""
self._ensure_control_token(allow_generate=False)
ws_url = self._resolve_rpc_ws_url()
self.ap.logger.info(f'Use WebSocket to connect to box runtime ({ws_url})')
await self._connect_ws(ws_url, 'WebSocket')
@@ -325,7 +346,11 @@ class BoxRuntimeConnector(ManagedRuntimeConnector):
if self.runtime_disconnect_callback is not None:
await self.runtime_disconnect_callback(self)
ctrl = WebSocketClientController(ws_url=ws_url, make_connection_failed_callback=on_connect_failed)
ctrl = WebSocketClientController(
ws_url=ws_url,
make_connection_failed_callback=on_connect_failed,
additional_headers=self.get_control_headers(),
)
self._ctrl = ctrl
self._ctrl_task = asyncio.create_task(
ctrl.run(self._make_connection_callback(transport_name, connected, connect_error, self._generation))
@@ -339,6 +364,41 @@ class BoxRuntimeConnector(ManagedRuntimeConnector):
if connect_error:
raise BoxRuntimeUnavailableError(f'box runtime connection failed: {connect_error[0]}')
def _ensure_control_token(self, *, allow_generate: bool) -> str:
if not self._control_token and allow_generate:
self._control_token = secrets.token_urlsafe(48)
try:
self._control_token = validate_control_token(self._control_token)
except ValueError as exc:
raise BoxRuntimeUnavailableError(
f'{BOX_CONTROL_TOKEN_ENV} must be configured with a strong shared secret for an external Box runtime'
) from exc
return self._control_token
def get_control_headers(self) -> dict[str, str]:
"""Headers for the instance-authenticated RPC control handshake."""
self._ensure_control_token(allow_generate=False)
return {
BOX_CONTROL_TOKEN_HEADER: self._control_token,
BOX_INSTANCE_HEADER: self._trusted_instance_uuid,
}
def get_relay_headers(
self,
action_context: ActionContext,
) -> dict[str, str]:
"""Return authenticated, placement-scoped relay handshake headers."""
context = ActionContext.model_validate(action_context).without_installation()
if context.instance_uuid != self._trusted_instance_uuid:
raise BoxRuntimeUnavailableError('Box relay context belongs to another LangBot instance')
return {
**self.get_control_headers(),
BOX_WORKSPACE_HEADER: context.workspace_uuid,
BOX_PLACEMENT_GENERATION_HEADER: str(context.placement_generation),
}
def _make_connection_callback(
self,
transport_name: str,