feat(tenancy): add Workspace multi-tenant foundation (#2353)

* Document multi-tenant workspace architecture

* Add OSS and commercial workspace boundaries

* docs: redesign multi-tenant workspace architecture

* feat(tenancy): implement workspace isolation

* docs(tenancy): record verification evidence

* docs(tenancy): revise single-instance SaaS topology

* docs(tenancy): refine architecture options

* docs: finalize cloud v2 multi-tenant decisions

* feat(tenancy): establish cloud isolation foundations

* feat(tenancy): harden shared cloud runtime boundaries

* docs(tenancy): record final isolation verification

* fix(tenancy): close isolation and permission gaps

* docs(tenancy): record final isolation verification

* feat(tenancy): connect cloud workspace control plane

* fix(build): install git for pinned SDK

* docs(cloud): update control plane verification

* chore: update multi-tenant SDK pin

* fix(cloud): skip legacy model sync during startup

* test(cloud): preserve minimal model manager fixtures

* fix(cloud): preserve authenticated account context

* fix(cloud): reuse authenticated account for user info

* feat(cloud): complete Workspace settings navigation

* test(web): cover Workspace dropdown menu

* feat(web): place workspace controls in sidebar

* refactor(web): streamline workspace controls

* style(web): format workspace layout test

* fix(cloud): surface runtime and workspace plan status

* fix(plugin): keep runtime identity stable across restarts

* fix(ui): widen and center workspace switcher

* fix(ui): hide roles from workspace switcher

* fix(ui): align workspace switcher with sidebar entries

* feat(workspace): add in-product collaboration and direct Cloud launch

* style: format collaboration changes

* fix(workspace): bind collaboration APIs to tenant UoW

* fix(cloud): preserve Core-owned collaboration state

* test(cloud): require Space identity for invite registration

* feat(cloud): complete secure invitation experience

* style(web): format invitation flows

* fix(cloud): recover box runtime without unscoped skill reload

* feat(oss): enforce invitation account and owner billing flows

* style: format OSS account service

* test(oss): cover invitation logout handoff

* fix(oss): resolve workspace owner in scoped session

* feat(cloud): harden multi-tenant runtime resources

* fix(cloud): bound runtime restart storms

* fix(cloud): eliminate periodic runtime CPU spikes

* fix(cloud): enforce instance capacity ceilings

* fix(cloud): scope public login capability discovery

* fix(cloud): bound tenant maintenance and monitoring work

* fix(runtime): bound tenant resource amplification

* fix(deps): pin green multi-tenant plugin SDK

* fix(cloud): handle unavailable skill capability

* fix(security): require authentication for image file endpoint (H-2)

- Changed /api/v1/files/image from AuthType.NONE to USER_TOKEN_OR_API_KEY
- Added Permission.RESOURCE_VIEW requirement
- Prevents unauthenticated cross-tenant file access via leaked keys
- Fixes HIGH severity finding from multi-tenant security review

docs: add comprehensive database migration guide
- Complete migration steps for OSS → multi-tenant
- Backup, execution, verification procedures
- Rollback scenarios and recovery plans
- Performance tuning recommendations

* test: add comprehensive cross-tenant isolation tests

Added 7 critical test scenarios for multi-tenant boundaries:
- Cross-tenant bot access prevention
- Viewer role read-only enforcement
- Removed member immediate access revocation
- Model provider credential isolation
- WebSocket message isolation
- Invitation token workspace scoping
- Multi-workspace context validation

These tests address P0-2 coverage gaps for:
- workspaces.py (membership & invitation flows)
- user.py (authentication & authorization)
- websocket_chat.py (real-time isolation)
- plugins.py (resource access control)

docs: finalize database migration guide

* fix(security): resolve M-1, M-2, M-3 security findings

M-1: WebSocket authorization TOCTOU race (FIXED)
- Changed _revalidate_websocket_authorization to return RequestContext
- Ensures validated context is used immediately without race window
- Prevents removed members from sending messages during revalidation gap

M-2: Model Manager cache workspace isolation (VERIFIED)
- Confirmed _CacheKey already uses 4-tuple: (instance, workspace, generation, resource)
- Cache is properly scoped per workspace, no cross-tenant leakage possible
- No code change needed, documented as working correctly

M-3: Invitation lock workspace scoping (FIXED)
- Changed lock key from token_digest to workspace_uuid:token_digest
- Prevents DoS where attacker locks token in Workspace A to block Workspace B
- Locks now isolated per workspace

All MEDIUM severity findings from security review now resolved.

* fix(cloud): unblock tenant CI and enforce knowledge quotas

* fix(tenancy): scope rerank model sync

---------

Co-authored-by: dadachann <185672915+dadachann@users.noreply.github.com>
This commit is contained in:
RockChinQ
2026-07-30 21:43:35 +08:00
committed by GitHub
parent 463b120923
commit e1ac5e0fc8
468 changed files with 78320 additions and 13137 deletions
+42 -18
View File
@@ -126,24 +126,30 @@ def should_prepare_python_env(host_path: str | None) -> bool:
return bool(list_python_manifest_files(normalized_root))
def wrap_python_command_with_env(command: str, *, mount_path: str = '/workspace') -> str:
def wrap_python_command_with_env(
command: str,
*,
mount_path: str = '/workspace',
state_path: str | None = None,
) -> str:
"""Wrap a command with a reusable sandbox-local Python env bootstrap.
This is the generic "workspace is a Python project" path used by mutable
workspaces such as skills. Read-only installation strategies stay in the
higher-level caller because they are application policy, not workspace
semantics.
``mount_path`` is always the source tree used for manifest hashing and
installation. ``state_path`` may point at a separate writable directory
for read-only source mounts; when omitted, legacy mutable-workspace behavior
stores the environment beside the source.
"""
writable_state_path = state_path or mount_path
bootstrap = textwrap.dedent(
f"""
set -e
_LB_VENV_DIR="{mount_path}/.venv"
_LB_META_DIR="{mount_path}/.langbot"
_LB_VENV_DIR="{writable_state_path}/.venv"
_LB_META_DIR="{writable_state_path}/.langbot"
_LB_META_FILE="$_LB_META_DIR/python-env.json"
_LB_LOCK_DIR="$_LB_META_DIR/python-env.lock"
_LB_TMP_DIR="{mount_path}/.tmp"
_LB_PIP_CACHE_DIR="{mount_path}/.cache/pip"
_LB_TMP_DIR="{writable_state_path}/.tmp"
_LB_PIP_CACHE_DIR="{writable_state_path}/.cache/pip"
mkdir -p "$_LB_META_DIR" "$_LB_TMP_DIR" "$_LB_PIP_CACHE_DIR"
_LB_SYSTEM_PYTHON="$(command -v python3 || command -v python || true)"
@@ -165,17 +171,23 @@ def wrap_python_command_with_env(command: str, *, mount_path: str = '/workspace'
import sys
root = "{mount_path}"
max_manifest_bytes = 10 * 1024 * 1024
digest = hashlib.sha256()
manifest_files = []
for rel in ("requirements.txt", "pyproject.toml", "setup.py", "setup.cfg"):
path = os.path.join(root, rel)
if not os.path.isfile(path):
continue
if os.path.getsize(path) > max_manifest_bytes:
raise RuntimeError(
f"Python project manifest exceeds {{max_manifest_bytes}} bytes: {{rel}}"
)
manifest_files.append(rel)
with open(path, "rb") as handle:
digest.update(rel.encode("utf-8"))
digest.update(b"\\0")
digest.update(handle.read())
while chunk := handle.read(1024 * 1024):
digest.update(chunk)
digest.update(b"\\0")
print(
@@ -274,6 +286,7 @@ class BoxWorkspaceSession:
def __init__(
self,
box_service,
execution_context,
session_id: str,
*,
host_path: str | None = None,
@@ -290,6 +303,7 @@ class BoxWorkspaceSession:
persistent: bool = False,
):
self.box_service = box_service
self.execution_context = execution_context
self.session_id = session_id
self.host_path = host_path
self.host_path_mode = host_path_mode
@@ -363,7 +377,7 @@ class BoxWorkspaceSession:
timeout_sec: int | None = None,
):
payload = self.build_exec_payload(cmd, workdir=workdir, env=env, timeout_sec=timeout_sec)
return await self.box_service.client.execute(self.box_service.build_spec(payload))
return await self.box_service.execute_in_context(self.execution_context, payload)
async def execute_for_query(
self,
@@ -378,7 +392,7 @@ class BoxWorkspaceSession:
return await self.box_service.execute_spec_payload(payload, query)
async def create_session(self):
return await self.box_service.create_session(self.build_session_payload())
return await self.box_service.create_session(self.execution_context, self.build_session_payload())
def build_process_payload(
self,
@@ -415,16 +429,26 @@ class BoxWorkspaceSession:
):
payload = self.build_process_payload(command, args, env=env, cwd=cwd)
payload['process_id'] = process_id
return await self.box_service.start_managed_process(self.session_id, payload)
return await self.box_service.start_managed_process(self.execution_context, self.session_id, payload)
async def get_managed_process(self, process_id: str = 'default'):
return await self.box_service.get_managed_process(self.session_id, process_id)
return await self.box_service.get_managed_process(self.execution_context, self.session_id, process_id)
async def stop_managed_process(self, process_id: str = 'default') -> None:
await self.box_service.stop_managed_process(self.session_id, process_id)
await self.box_service.stop_managed_process(self.execution_context, self.session_id, process_id)
def get_managed_process_websocket_url(self, process_id: str = 'default') -> str:
return self.box_service.get_managed_process_websocket_url(self.session_id, process_id)
async def get_managed_process_websocket_connection(
self,
process_id: str = 'default',
) -> tuple[str, dict[str, str]]:
return await self.box_service.get_managed_process_websocket_connection(
self.execution_context,
self.session_id,
process_id,
)
async def cleanup(self) -> None:
await self.box_service.client.delete_session(self.session_id)
await self.box_service.client.delete_session(
self.session_id,
action_context=self.box_service._action_context(self.execution_context),
)