feat(tenancy): add Workspace multi-tenant foundation (#2353)

* Document multi-tenant workspace architecture * Add OSS and commercial workspace boundaries * docs: redesign multi-tenant workspace architecture * feat(tenancy): implement workspace isolation * docs(tenancy): record verification evidence * docs(tenancy): revise single-instance SaaS topology * docs(tenancy): refine architecture options * docs: finalize cloud v2 multi-tenant decisions * feat(tenancy): establish cloud isolation foundations * feat(tenancy): harden shared cloud runtime boundaries * docs(tenancy): record final isolation verification * fix(tenancy): close isolation and permission gaps * docs(tenancy): record final isolation verification * feat(tenancy): connect cloud workspace control plane * fix(build): install git for pinned SDK * docs(cloud): update control plane verification * chore: update multi-tenant SDK pin * fix(cloud): skip legacy model sync during startup * test(cloud): preserve minimal model manager fixtures * fix(cloud): preserve authenticated account context * fix(cloud): reuse authenticated account for user info * feat(cloud): complete Workspace settings navigation * test(web): cover Workspace dropdown menu * feat(web): place workspace controls in sidebar * refactor(web): streamline workspace controls * style(web): format workspace layout test * fix(cloud): surface runtime and workspace plan status * fix(plugin): keep runtime identity stable across restarts * fix(ui): widen and center workspace switcher * fix(ui): hide roles from workspace switcher * fix(ui): align workspace switcher with sidebar entries * feat(workspace): add in-product collaboration and direct Cloud launch * style: format collaboration changes * fix(workspace): bind collaboration APIs to tenant UoW * fix(cloud): preserve Core-owned collaboration state * test(cloud): require Space identity for invite registration * feat(cloud): complete secure invitation experience * style(web): format invitation flows * fix(cloud): recover box runtime without unscoped skill reload * feat(oss): enforce invitation account and owner billing flows * style: format OSS account service * test(oss): cover invitation logout handoff * fix(oss): resolve workspace owner in scoped session * feat(cloud): harden multi-tenant runtime resources * fix(cloud): bound runtime restart storms * fix(cloud): eliminate periodic runtime CPU spikes * fix(cloud): enforce instance capacity ceilings * fix(cloud): scope public login capability discovery * fix(cloud): bound tenant maintenance and monitoring work * fix(runtime): bound tenant resource amplification * fix(deps): pin green multi-tenant plugin SDK * fix(cloud): handle unavailable skill capability * fix(security): require authentication for image file endpoint (H-2) - Changed /api/v1/files/image from AuthType.NONE to USER_TOKEN_OR_API_KEY - Added Permission.RESOURCE_VIEW requirement - Prevents unauthenticated cross-tenant file access via leaked keys - Fixes HIGH severity finding from multi-tenant security review docs: add comprehensive database migration guide - Complete migration steps for OSS → multi-tenant - Backup, execution, verification procedures - Rollback scenarios and recovery plans - Performance tuning recommendations * test: add comprehensive cross-tenant isolation tests Added 7 critical test scenarios for multi-tenant boundaries: - Cross-tenant bot access prevention - Viewer role read-only enforcement - Removed member immediate access revocation - Model provider credential isolation - WebSocket message isolation - Invitation token workspace scoping - Multi-workspace context validation These tests address P0-2 coverage gaps for: - workspaces.py (membership & invitation flows) - user.py (authentication & authorization) - websocket_chat.py (real-time isolation) - plugins.py (resource access control) docs: finalize database migration guide * fix(security): resolve M-1, M-2, M-3 security findings M-1: WebSocket authorization TOCTOU race (FIXED) - Changed _revalidate_websocket_authorization to return RequestContext - Ensures validated context is used immediately without race window - Prevents removed members from sending messages during revalidation gap M-2: Model Manager cache workspace isolation (VERIFIED) - Confirmed _CacheKey already uses 4-tuple: (instance, workspace, generation, resource) - Cache is properly scoped per workspace, no cross-tenant leakage possible - No code change needed, documented as working correctly M-3: Invitation lock workspace scoping (FIXED) - Changed lock key from token_digest to workspace_uuid:token_digest - Prevents DoS where attacker locks token in Workspace A to block Workspace B - Locks now isolated per workspace All MEDIUM severity findings from security review now resolved. * fix(cloud): unblock tenant CI and enforce knowledge quotas * fix(tenancy): scope rerank model sync --------- Co-authored-by: dadachann <185672915+dadachann@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-08-09 12:40:59 +00:00 · 2026-07-30 21:43:35 +08:00
parent 463b120923
commit e1ac5e0fc8
468 changed files with 78320 additions and 13137 deletions
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import asyncio
+import contextvars
+import typing
+
+from ..utils import bounded_executor
+
+
+T = typing.TypeVar('T')
+
+
+def create_detached_task(
+    coro: typing.Coroutine[typing.Any, typing.Any, T],
+    *,
+    loop: asyncio.AbstractEventLoop | None = None,
+    name: str | None = None,
+    after_commit_manager: typing.Any | None = None,
+    workspace_uuid: str | None = None,
+) -> asyncio.Task[T]:
+    """Create a task that inherits no request-local ContextVars.
+
+    A normal ``asyncio.create_task`` copies the caller's context.  That is
+    unsafe for work which outlives an HTTP request because it can copy the
+    request's active database transaction or trusted tenant scope into a
+    different asyncio task. Detached work must receive durable identity such
+    as ``ExecutionContext`` through explicit arguments and establish its own
+    tenant scope or unit of work whenever it accesses persistence.
+    """
+
+    task_loop = loop or asyncio.get_running_loop()
+    gate: asyncio.Future[None] | None = None
+    # Inspect the type so dynamic Mock/AsyncMock attributes do not turn into a
+    # fake gate in lightweight tests or embedders.
+    gate_factory = getattr(type(after_commit_manager), 'create_after_commit_gate', None)
+    if callable(gate_factory):
+        gate = gate_factory(after_commit_manager)
+    task_coro = _wait_for_commit(coro, gate) if gate is not None else coro
+    if workspace_uuid is not None:
+        task_coro = bounded_executor.run_in_blocking_work_scope(
+            task_coro,
+            workspace_uuid,
+        )
+    return task_loop.create_task(task_coro, name=name, context=contextvars.Context())
+
+
+async def _wait_for_commit(
+    coro: typing.Coroutine[typing.Any, typing.Any, T],
+    gate: asyncio.Future[None],
+) -> T:
+    try:
+        await gate
+    except BaseException:
+        coro.close()
+        raise
+    return await coro
+
+
+async def run_in_workspace_uow(
+    ap: typing.Any,
+    workspace_uuid: str,
+    operation: typing.Callable[[], typing.Awaitable[T]],
+) -> T:
+    """Run one short persistence section in a detached Cloud task scope.
+
+    This helper deliberately scopes only the supplied operation.  Callers
+    should not wrap long-running network or runtime work in a database
+    transaction.
+    """
+
+    persistence_mgr = getattr(ap, 'persistence_mgr', None)
+    if persistence_mgr is None:
+        return await operation()
+    cloud_runtime = getattr(getattr(persistence_mgr, 'mode', None), 'value', None) == 'cloud_runtime'
+    if not cloud_runtime:
+        return await operation()
+
+    tenant_uow = getattr(persistence_mgr, 'tenant_uow', None)
+    if not callable(tenant_uow):
+        raise RuntimeError('Detached Cloud tasks require an explicit tenant unit of work')
+    async with tenant_uow(workspace_uuid):
+        return await operation()