feat(tenancy): add Workspace multi-tenant foundation (#2353)

* Document multi-tenant workspace architecture

* Add OSS and commercial workspace boundaries

* docs: redesign multi-tenant workspace architecture

* feat(tenancy): implement workspace isolation

* docs(tenancy): record verification evidence

* docs(tenancy): revise single-instance SaaS topology

* docs(tenancy): refine architecture options

* docs: finalize cloud v2 multi-tenant decisions

* feat(tenancy): establish cloud isolation foundations

* feat(tenancy): harden shared cloud runtime boundaries

* docs(tenancy): record final isolation verification

* fix(tenancy): close isolation and permission gaps

* docs(tenancy): record final isolation verification

* feat(tenancy): connect cloud workspace control plane

* fix(build): install git for pinned SDK

* docs(cloud): update control plane verification

* chore: update multi-tenant SDK pin

* fix(cloud): skip legacy model sync during startup

* test(cloud): preserve minimal model manager fixtures

* fix(cloud): preserve authenticated account context

* fix(cloud): reuse authenticated account for user info

* feat(cloud): complete Workspace settings navigation

* test(web): cover Workspace dropdown menu

* feat(web): place workspace controls in sidebar

* refactor(web): streamline workspace controls

* style(web): format workspace layout test

* fix(cloud): surface runtime and workspace plan status

* fix(plugin): keep runtime identity stable across restarts

* fix(ui): widen and center workspace switcher

* fix(ui): hide roles from workspace switcher

* fix(ui): align workspace switcher with sidebar entries

* feat(workspace): add in-product collaboration and direct Cloud launch

* style: format collaboration changes

* fix(workspace): bind collaboration APIs to tenant UoW

* fix(cloud): preserve Core-owned collaboration state

* test(cloud): require Space identity for invite registration

* feat(cloud): complete secure invitation experience

* style(web): format invitation flows

* fix(cloud): recover box runtime without unscoped skill reload

* feat(oss): enforce invitation account and owner billing flows

* style: format OSS account service

* test(oss): cover invitation logout handoff

* fix(oss): resolve workspace owner in scoped session

* feat(cloud): harden multi-tenant runtime resources

* fix(cloud): bound runtime restart storms

* fix(cloud): eliminate periodic runtime CPU spikes

* fix(cloud): enforce instance capacity ceilings

* fix(cloud): scope public login capability discovery

* fix(cloud): bound tenant maintenance and monitoring work

* fix(runtime): bound tenant resource amplification

* fix(deps): pin green multi-tenant plugin SDK

* fix(cloud): handle unavailable skill capability

* fix(security): require authentication for image file endpoint (H-2)

- Changed /api/v1/files/image from AuthType.NONE to USER_TOKEN_OR_API_KEY
- Added Permission.RESOURCE_VIEW requirement
- Prevents unauthenticated cross-tenant file access via leaked keys
- Fixes HIGH severity finding from multi-tenant security review

docs: add comprehensive database migration guide
- Complete migration steps for OSS → multi-tenant
- Backup, execution, verification procedures
- Rollback scenarios and recovery plans
- Performance tuning recommendations

* test: add comprehensive cross-tenant isolation tests

Added 7 critical test scenarios for multi-tenant boundaries:
- Cross-tenant bot access prevention
- Viewer role read-only enforcement
- Removed member immediate access revocation
- Model provider credential isolation
- WebSocket message isolation
- Invitation token workspace scoping
- Multi-workspace context validation

These tests address P0-2 coverage gaps for:
- workspaces.py (membership & invitation flows)
- user.py (authentication & authorization)
- websocket_chat.py (real-time isolation)
- plugins.py (resource access control)

docs: finalize database migration guide

* fix(security): resolve M-1, M-2, M-3 security findings

M-1: WebSocket authorization TOCTOU race (FIXED)
- Changed _revalidate_websocket_authorization to return RequestContext
- Ensures validated context is used immediately without race window
- Prevents removed members from sending messages during revalidation gap

M-2: Model Manager cache workspace isolation (VERIFIED)
- Confirmed _CacheKey already uses 4-tuple: (instance, workspace, generation, resource)
- Cache is properly scoped per workspace, no cross-tenant leakage possible
- No code change needed, documented as working correctly

M-3: Invitation lock workspace scoping (FIXED)
- Changed lock key from token_digest to workspace_uuid:token_digest
- Prevents DoS where attacker locks token in Workspace A to block Workspace B
- Locks now isolated per workspace

All MEDIUM severity findings from security review now resolved.

* fix(cloud): unblock tenant CI and enforce knowledge quotas

* fix(tenancy): scope rerank model sync

---------

Co-authored-by: dadachann <185672915+dadachann@users.noreply.github.com>
This commit is contained in:
RockChinQ
2026-07-30 21:43:35 +08:00
committed by GitHub
parent 463b120923
commit e1ac5e0fc8
468 changed files with 78320 additions and 13137 deletions
+75 -11
View File
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ import logging
import aiohttp
from langbot.pkg.utils import httpclient
from langbot.pkg.api.http.context import ExecutionContext
import uuid
from typing import TYPE_CHECKING
@@ -14,6 +15,10 @@ if TYPE_CHECKING:
import langbot_plugin.api.entities.builtin.platform.events as platform_events
_DEFAULT_MAX_INFLIGHT_WEBHOOK_REQUESTS = 16
_HARD_MAX_INFLIGHT_WEBHOOK_REQUESTS = 128
class WebhookPusher:
"""Push bot events to configured webhooks"""
@@ -23,15 +28,71 @@ class WebhookPusher:
def __init__(self, ap: app.Application):
self.ap = ap
self.logger = self.ap.logger
self._delivery_lock = asyncio.Lock()
self._inflight_requests = 0
async def push_person_message(self, event: platform_events.FriendMessage, bot_uuid: str, adapter_name: str) -> bool:
def _max_inflight_requests(self) -> int:
config = getattr(getattr(self.ap, 'instance_config', None), 'data', {})
try:
value = int(
config.get('webhooks', {}).get(
'max_inflight_requests',
_DEFAULT_MAX_INFLIGHT_WEBHOOK_REQUESTS,
)
)
except (AttributeError, TypeError, ValueError):
value = _DEFAULT_MAX_INFLIGHT_WEBHOOK_REQUESTS
return min(max(value, 1), _HARD_MAX_INFLIGHT_WEBHOOK_REQUESTS)
async def _reserve_delivery_slots(self, requested: int) -> int:
async with self._delivery_lock:
available = max(self._max_inflight_requests() - self._inflight_requests, 0)
admitted = min(max(requested, 0), available)
self._inflight_requests += admitted
return admitted
async def _release_delivery_slots(self, released: int) -> None:
async with self._delivery_lock:
self._inflight_requests = max(self._inflight_requests - released, 0)
async def _push_to_webhooks(self, webhooks: list[dict], payload: dict) -> list[object]:
"""Dispatch only requests admitted by the instance-wide hard bound."""
admitted = await self._reserve_delivery_slots(len(webhooks))
if admitted < len(webhooks):
self.logger.warning(
'Webhook delivery capacity reached; skipped %d of %d destinations',
len(webhooks) - admitted,
len(webhooks),
)
if admitted == 0:
return []
tasks = [asyncio.create_task(self._push_to_webhook(webhook['url'], payload)) for webhook in webhooks[:admitted]]
try:
return await asyncio.gather(*tasks, return_exceptions=True)
except asyncio.CancelledError:
for task in tasks:
task.cancel()
await asyncio.gather(*tasks, return_exceptions=True)
raise
finally:
await self._release_delivery_slots(admitted)
async def push_person_message(
self,
execution_context: ExecutionContext,
event: platform_events.FriendMessage,
bot_uuid: str,
adapter_name: str,
) -> bool:
"""Push person message event to webhooks
Returns:
bool: True if any webhook responded with skip_pipeline=true, False otherwise
"""
try:
webhooks = await self.ap.webhook_service.get_enabled_webhooks()
webhooks = await self.ap.webhook_service.get_enabled_webhooks(execution_context)
if not webhooks:
return False
@@ -51,9 +112,7 @@ class WebhookPusher:
},
}
# Push to all webhooks asynchronously
tasks = [self._push_to_webhook(webhook['url'], payload) for webhook in webhooks]
results = await asyncio.gather(*tasks, return_exceptions=True)
results = await self._push_to_webhooks(webhooks, payload)
# Check if any webhook responded with skip_pipeline=true
for result in results:
@@ -67,14 +126,20 @@ class WebhookPusher:
self.logger.error(f'Failed to push person message to webhooks: {e}')
return False
async def push_group_message(self, event: platform_events.GroupMessage, bot_uuid: str, adapter_name: str) -> bool:
async def push_group_message(
self,
execution_context: ExecutionContext,
event: platform_events.GroupMessage,
bot_uuid: str,
adapter_name: str,
) -> bool:
"""Push group message event to webhooks
Returns:
bool: True if any webhook responded with skip_pipeline=true, False otherwise
"""
try:
webhooks = await self.ap.webhook_service.get_enabled_webhooks()
webhooks = await self.ap.webhook_service.get_enabled_webhooks(execution_context)
if not webhooks:
return False
@@ -98,9 +163,7 @@ class WebhookPusher:
},
}
# Push to all webhooks asynchronously
tasks = [self._push_to_webhook(webhook['url'], payload) for webhook in webhooks]
results = await asyncio.gather(*tasks, return_exceptions=True)
results = await self._push_to_webhooks(webhooks, payload)
# Check if any webhook responded with skip_pipeline=true
for result in results:
@@ -134,7 +197,8 @@ class WebhookPusher:
else:
self.logger.debug(f'Successfully pushed to webhook {url}')
try:
return await response.json()
result = await httpclient.read_json_limited(response)
return result if isinstance(result, dict) else None
except Exception as json_error:
self.logger.debug(f'Failed to parse JSON response from webhook {url}: {json_error}')
return None