feat(tenancy): add Workspace multi-tenant foundation (#2353)

* Document multi-tenant workspace architecture

* Add OSS and commercial workspace boundaries

* docs: redesign multi-tenant workspace architecture

* feat(tenancy): implement workspace isolation

* docs(tenancy): record verification evidence

* docs(tenancy): revise single-instance SaaS topology

* docs(tenancy): refine architecture options

* docs: finalize cloud v2 multi-tenant decisions

* feat(tenancy): establish cloud isolation foundations

* feat(tenancy): harden shared cloud runtime boundaries

* docs(tenancy): record final isolation verification

* fix(tenancy): close isolation and permission gaps

* docs(tenancy): record final isolation verification

* feat(tenancy): connect cloud workspace control plane

* fix(build): install git for pinned SDK

* docs(cloud): update control plane verification

* chore: update multi-tenant SDK pin

* fix(cloud): skip legacy model sync during startup

* test(cloud): preserve minimal model manager fixtures

* fix(cloud): preserve authenticated account context

* fix(cloud): reuse authenticated account for user info

* feat(cloud): complete Workspace settings navigation

* test(web): cover Workspace dropdown menu

* feat(web): place workspace controls in sidebar

* refactor(web): streamline workspace controls

* style(web): format workspace layout test

* fix(cloud): surface runtime and workspace plan status

* fix(plugin): keep runtime identity stable across restarts

* fix(ui): widen and center workspace switcher

* fix(ui): hide roles from workspace switcher

* fix(ui): align workspace switcher with sidebar entries

* feat(workspace): add in-product collaboration and direct Cloud launch

* style: format collaboration changes

* fix(workspace): bind collaboration APIs to tenant UoW

* fix(cloud): preserve Core-owned collaboration state

* test(cloud): require Space identity for invite registration

* feat(cloud): complete secure invitation experience

* style(web): format invitation flows

* fix(cloud): recover box runtime without unscoped skill reload

* feat(oss): enforce invitation account and owner billing flows

* style: format OSS account service

* test(oss): cover invitation logout handoff

* fix(oss): resolve workspace owner in scoped session

* feat(cloud): harden multi-tenant runtime resources

* fix(cloud): bound runtime restart storms

* fix(cloud): eliminate periodic runtime CPU spikes

* fix(cloud): enforce instance capacity ceilings

* fix(cloud): scope public login capability discovery

* fix(cloud): bound tenant maintenance and monitoring work

* fix(runtime): bound tenant resource amplification

* fix(deps): pin green multi-tenant plugin SDK

* fix(cloud): handle unavailable skill capability

* fix(security): require authentication for image file endpoint (H-2)

- Changed /api/v1/files/image from AuthType.NONE to USER_TOKEN_OR_API_KEY
- Added Permission.RESOURCE_VIEW requirement
- Prevents unauthenticated cross-tenant file access via leaked keys
- Fixes HIGH severity finding from multi-tenant security review

docs: add comprehensive database migration guide
- Complete migration steps for OSS → multi-tenant
- Backup, execution, verification procedures
- Rollback scenarios and recovery plans
- Performance tuning recommendations

* test: add comprehensive cross-tenant isolation tests

Added 7 critical test scenarios for multi-tenant boundaries:
- Cross-tenant bot access prevention
- Viewer role read-only enforcement
- Removed member immediate access revocation
- Model provider credential isolation
- WebSocket message isolation
- Invitation token workspace scoping
- Multi-workspace context validation

These tests address P0-2 coverage gaps for:
- workspaces.py (membership & invitation flows)
- user.py (authentication & authorization)
- websocket_chat.py (real-time isolation)
- plugins.py (resource access control)

docs: finalize database migration guide

* fix(security): resolve M-1, M-2, M-3 security findings

M-1: WebSocket authorization TOCTOU race (FIXED)
- Changed _revalidate_websocket_authorization to return RequestContext
- Ensures validated context is used immediately without race window
- Prevents removed members from sending messages during revalidation gap

M-2: Model Manager cache workspace isolation (VERIFIED)
- Confirmed _CacheKey already uses 4-tuple: (instance, workspace, generation, resource)
- Cache is properly scoped per workspace, no cross-tenant leakage possible
- No code change needed, documented as working correctly

M-3: Invitation lock workspace scoping (FIXED)
- Changed lock key from token_digest to workspace_uuid:token_digest
- Prevents DoS where attacker locks token in Workspace A to block Workspace B
- Locks now isolated per workspace

All MEDIUM severity findings from security review now resolved.

* fix(cloud): unblock tenant CI and enforce knowledge quotas

* fix(tenancy): scope rerank model sync

---------

Co-authored-by: dadachann <185672915+dadachann@users.noreply.github.com>
This commit is contained in:
RockChinQ
2026-07-30 21:43:35 +08:00
committed by GitHub
parent 463b120923
commit e1ac5e0fc8
468 changed files with 78320 additions and 13137 deletions
+312
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,312 @@
from __future__ import annotations
import asyncio
import concurrent.futures
import contextlib
import contextvars
import threading
from collections.abc import Callable
from typing import Any
DEFAULT_MAX_WORKERS = 8
DEFAULT_MAX_PENDING = 128
DEFAULT_MAX_INFLIGHT_PER_SCOPE = 4
HARD_MAX_WORKERS = 64
HARD_MAX_PENDING = 4096
BLOCKING_CLEANUP_SCOPE = 'system:cleanup'
_CLEANUP_RETRY_INITIAL_SECONDS = 0.01
_CLEANUP_RETRY_MAX_SECONDS = 0.25
_blocking_work_scope: contextvars.ContextVar[str | None] = contextvars.ContextVar(
'langbot_blocking_work_scope',
default=None,
)
class BlockingWorkCapacityError(RuntimeError):
"""Raised before unbounded blocking work can enter the executor queue."""
def __init__(self, message: str, *, scope: str | None = None) -> None:
super().__init__(message)
self.scope = scope
@contextlib.contextmanager
def blocking_work_scope(scope: str | None):
"""Attribute blocking submissions to one trusted tenant scope."""
normalized = str(scope).strip() if scope is not None else None
if not normalized:
yield
return
token = _blocking_work_scope.set(normalized)
try:
yield
finally:
_blocking_work_scope.reset(token)
def current_blocking_work_scope() -> str | None:
"""Return the active trusted blocking-work scope, if any."""
return _blocking_work_scope.get()
async def run_blocking_atomic(
fn: Callable[..., Any],
/,
*args: Any,
**kwargs: Any,
) -> Any:
"""Let an admitted filesystem operation finish before propagating cancel."""
task = asyncio.create_task(asyncio.to_thread(fn, *args, **kwargs))
try:
return await asyncio.shield(task)
except asyncio.CancelledError:
await asyncio.gather(task, return_exceptions=True)
raise
async def run_blocking_cleanup(
fn: Callable[..., Any],
/,
*args: Any,
**kwargs: Any,
) -> Any:
"""Wait for bounded executor capacity and complete cleanup atomically."""
retry_delay = _CLEANUP_RETRY_INITIAL_SECONDS
while True:
try:
with blocking_work_scope(BLOCKING_CLEANUP_SCOPE):
return await run_blocking_atomic(fn, *args, **kwargs)
except BlockingWorkCapacityError as exc:
if exc.scope != BLOCKING_CLEANUP_SCOPE:
raise
await asyncio.sleep(retry_delay)
retry_delay = min(
retry_delay * 2,
_CLEANUP_RETRY_MAX_SECONDS,
)
async def run_in_blocking_work_scope(
coro,
scope: str | None,
):
"""Run a coroutine with blocking-work fairness attribution."""
with blocking_work_scope(scope):
return await coro
def _bounded_integer(
value: Any,
*,
name: str,
minimum: int,
maximum: int,
) -> int:
if isinstance(value, bool):
raise ValueError(f'{name} must be an integer')
try:
parsed = int(value)
except (TypeError, ValueError) as exc:
raise ValueError(f'{name} must be an integer') from exc
if parsed < minimum or parsed > maximum:
raise ValueError(f'{name} must be between {minimum} and {maximum}')
return parsed
def _validated_limits(
max_workers: Any,
max_pending: Any,
max_inflight_per_scope: Any | None,
) -> tuple[int, int, int]:
workers = _bounded_integer(
max_workers,
name='blocking_executor.max_workers',
minimum=1,
maximum=HARD_MAX_WORKERS,
)
pending = _bounded_integer(
max_pending,
name='blocking_executor.max_pending',
minimum=0,
maximum=HARD_MAX_PENDING,
)
fair_share = max(1, workers // 2)
scope_limit = (
min(DEFAULT_MAX_INFLIGHT_PER_SCOPE, fair_share)
if max_inflight_per_scope is None
else _bounded_integer(
max_inflight_per_scope,
name='blocking_executor.max_inflight_per_scope',
minimum=1,
maximum=HARD_MAX_PENDING,
)
)
if scope_limit > fair_share:
raise ValueError(f'blocking_executor.max_inflight_per_scope must not exceed half of max_workers ({fair_share})')
return workers, pending, scope_limit
class BoundedThreadPoolExecutor(concurrent.futures.ThreadPoolExecutor):
"""Thread pool with a hard cap on running plus queued submissions."""
def __init__(
self,
*,
max_workers: int = DEFAULT_MAX_WORKERS,
max_pending: int = DEFAULT_MAX_PENDING,
max_inflight_per_scope: int | None = None,
thread_name_prefix: str = 'langbot-blocking',
) -> None:
max_workers, max_pending, max_inflight_per_scope = _validated_limits(
max_workers,
max_pending,
max_inflight_per_scope,
)
super().__init__(
max_workers=max_workers,
thread_name_prefix=thread_name_prefix,
)
self.max_workers = max_workers
self.max_pending = max_pending
self.max_inflight_per_scope = max_inflight_per_scope
self._capacity = threading.BoundedSemaphore(max_workers + max_pending)
self._stats_lock = threading.Lock()
self._inflight_by_scope: dict[str, int] = {}
self._inflight = 0
self._running = 0
self._submitted_total = 0
self._completed_total = 0
self._rejected_total = 0
self._global_rejected_total = 0
self._scope_rejected_total = 0
def submit(
self,
fn: Callable[..., Any],
/,
*args: Any,
**kwargs: Any,
) -> concurrent.futures.Future:
scope = current_blocking_work_scope()
if not self._capacity.acquire(blocking=False):
with self._stats_lock:
self._rejected_total += 1
self._global_rejected_total += 1
raise BlockingWorkCapacityError(
'Blocking executor capacity reached',
scope=scope,
)
with self._stats_lock:
if scope is not None and self._inflight_by_scope.get(scope, 0) >= self.max_inflight_per_scope:
self._rejected_total += 1
self._scope_rejected_total += 1
self._capacity.release()
raise BlockingWorkCapacityError(
'Workspace blocking executor capacity reached',
scope=scope,
)
self._inflight += 1
self._submitted_total += 1
if scope is not None:
self._inflight_by_scope[scope] = self._inflight_by_scope.get(scope, 0) + 1
def run() -> Any:
with self._stats_lock:
self._running += 1
try:
return fn(*args, **kwargs)
finally:
with self._stats_lock:
self._running -= 1
try:
future = super().submit(run)
except BaseException:
with self._stats_lock:
self._inflight -= 1
self._release_scope_locked(scope)
self._capacity.release()
raise
def complete(_future: concurrent.futures.Future) -> None:
with self._stats_lock:
self._inflight -= 1
self._completed_total += 1
self._release_scope_locked(scope)
self._capacity.release()
future.add_done_callback(complete)
return future
def _release_scope_locked(self, scope: str | None) -> None:
if scope is None:
return
remaining = self._inflight_by_scope.get(scope, 0) - 1
if remaining > 0:
self._inflight_by_scope[scope] = remaining
else:
self._inflight_by_scope.pop(scope, None)
def snapshot(self) -> dict[str, int]:
with self._stats_lock:
inflight = self._inflight
running = self._running
return {
'max_workers': self.max_workers,
'max_pending': self.max_pending,
'max_inflight_per_scope': self.max_inflight_per_scope,
'inflight': inflight,
'running': running,
'pending': max(inflight - running, 0),
'active_scopes': len(self._inflight_by_scope),
'submitted_total': self._submitted_total,
'completed_total': self._completed_total,
'rejected_total': self._rejected_total,
'global_rejected_total': self._global_rejected_total,
'scope_rejected_total': self._scope_rejected_total,
}
def configure_bounded_default_executor(
loop: asyncio.AbstractEventLoop,
*,
max_workers: int = DEFAULT_MAX_WORKERS,
max_pending: int = DEFAULT_MAX_PENDING,
max_inflight_per_scope: int | None = None,
thread_name_prefix: str = 'langbot-blocking',
) -> BoundedThreadPoolExecutor:
"""Install one bounded owner for every ``asyncio.to_thread`` call."""
max_workers, max_pending, max_inflight_per_scope = _validated_limits(
max_workers,
max_pending,
max_inflight_per_scope,
)
existing = getattr(loop, '_default_executor', None)
if isinstance(existing, BoundedThreadPoolExecutor):
if (
existing.max_workers != max_workers
or existing.max_pending != max_pending
or existing.max_inflight_per_scope != max_inflight_per_scope
):
raise RuntimeError('The blocking executor is already configured with different limits')
return existing
if existing is not None:
raise RuntimeError('The event loop default executor was initialized before LangBot resource limits')
executor = BoundedThreadPoolExecutor(
max_workers=max_workers,
max_pending=max_pending,
max_inflight_per_scope=max_inflight_per_scope,
thread_name_prefix=thread_name_prefix,
)
loop.set_default_executor(executor)
return executor
@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
from __future__ import annotations
import asyncio
import contextlib
import math
from collections import deque
DEFAULT_SAMPLE_INTERVAL_SECONDS = 1.0
DEFAULT_RECENT_SAMPLE_COUNT = 120
class EventLoopLagMonitor:
"""Measure event-loop scheduling delay with fixed, bounded state."""
def __init__(
self,
*,
sample_interval_seconds: float = DEFAULT_SAMPLE_INTERVAL_SECONDS,
recent_sample_count: int = DEFAULT_RECENT_SAMPLE_COUNT,
) -> None:
interval = float(sample_interval_seconds)
if not math.isfinite(interval) or interval <= 0:
raise ValueError('sample_interval_seconds must be greater than zero')
sample_count = int(recent_sample_count)
if sample_count < 2 or sample_count > 3600:
raise ValueError('recent_sample_count must be between 2 and 3600')
self.sample_interval_seconds = interval
self.recent_sample_count = sample_count
self._recent_lag_ms: deque[float] = deque(maxlen=sample_count)
self._samples_total = 0
self._max_lag_ms = 0.0
self._last_lag_ms = 0.0
self._task: asyncio.Task[None] | None = None
@property
def running(self) -> bool:
return self._task is not None and not self._task.done()
def start(self) -> None:
"""Start sampling on the current event loop; repeated calls are safe."""
if self.running:
return
self._task = asyncio.create_task(
self._run(),
name='event-loop-lag-monitor',
)
async def stop(self) -> None:
"""Cancel and await the owned sampler task."""
task = self._task
self._task = None
if task is None:
return
task.cancel()
with contextlib.suppress(asyncio.CancelledError):
await task
async def _run(self) -> None:
loop = asyncio.get_running_loop()
expected_at = loop.time() + self.sample_interval_seconds
while True:
await asyncio.sleep(max(expected_at - loop.time(), 0.0))
observed_at = loop.time()
self._record_lag_seconds(max(observed_at - expected_at, 0.0))
# One observation captures a long stall; do not replay every
# missed interval in a tight loop after the scheduler recovers.
expected_at = observed_at + self.sample_interval_seconds
def _record_lag_seconds(self, lag_seconds: float) -> None:
lag_ms = max(float(lag_seconds), 0.0) * 1000
self._last_lag_ms = lag_ms
self._max_lag_ms = max(self._max_lag_ms, lag_ms)
self._recent_lag_ms.append(lag_ms)
self._samples_total += 1
def snapshot(self) -> dict[str, int | float | bool]:
"""Return aggregate metrics without exposing task or tenant state."""
recent = sorted(self._recent_lag_ms)
if recent:
p95_index = max(math.ceil(len(recent) * 0.95) - 1, 0)
recent_p95_ms = recent[p95_index]
recent_max_ms = recent[-1]
else:
recent_p95_ms = 0.0
recent_max_ms = 0.0
return {
'running': self.running,
'samples_total': self._samples_total,
'last_lag_ms': self._last_lag_ms,
'recent_p95_lag_ms': recent_p95_ms,
'recent_max_lag_ms': recent_max_ms,
'max_lag_ms': self._max_lag_ms,
}
+140 -1
View File
@@ -11,9 +11,76 @@ reuses the same underlying SSL context and connection pool.
from __future__ import annotations
import asyncio
import inspect
import json
import typing
import aiohttp
import httpx
_sessions: dict[str, aiohttp.ClientSession] = {}
DEFAULT_REMOTE_BODY_LIMIT = 10 * 1024 * 1024
class RemoteResponseTooLargeError(ValueError):
"""Raised before an untrusted remote response can exhaust process memory."""
class _LimitedHTTPXAsyncByteStream(httpx.AsyncByteStream):
def __init__(self, inner: httpx.AsyncByteStream, max_bytes: int) -> None:
self._inner = inner
self._max_bytes = max_bytes
self._read_bytes = 0
async def __aiter__(self):
try:
async for chunk in self._inner:
self._read_bytes += len(chunk)
if self._read_bytes > self._max_bytes:
raise RemoteResponseTooLargeError(f'Remote response exceeds the {self._max_bytes}-byte limit')
yield chunk
except BaseException:
# HTTPX only closes a response after normal stream exhaustion. If
# this limiter raises (or its consumer is cancelled), explicitly
# release the underlying connection before propagating the original
# failure so persistent clients cannot accumulate stranded streams.
try:
await self._inner.aclose()
except BaseException:
pass
raise
async def aclose(self) -> None:
await self._inner.aclose()
def httpx_response_limit_hooks(
max_bytes: int = DEFAULT_REMOTE_BODY_LIMIT,
) -> dict[str, list]:
"""Return hooks that cap HTTPX bodies before its automatic buffering."""
max_bytes = max(int(max_bytes), 1)
async def limit_response(response: httpx.Response) -> None:
content_length = response.headers.get('Content-Length')
if content_length is not None:
try:
declared_size = int(content_length)
except (TypeError, ValueError):
declared_size = None
if declared_size is not None and declared_size > max_bytes:
await response.aclose()
raise RemoteResponseTooLargeError(f'Remote response exceeds the {max_bytes}-byte limit')
if response.is_stream_consumed:
if len(response.content) > max_bytes:
await response.aclose()
raise RemoteResponseTooLargeError(f'Remote response exceeds the {max_bytes}-byte limit')
return
response.stream = _LimitedHTTPXAsyncByteStream(response.stream, max_bytes)
return {'response': [limit_response]}
def get_session(*, trust_env: bool = False) -> aiohttp.ClientSession:
@@ -29,7 +96,13 @@ def get_session(*, trust_env: bool = False) -> aiohttp.ClientSession:
session = _sessions.get(key)
if session is None or session.closed:
session = aiohttp.ClientSession(trust_env=trust_env)
# Shared transport pools must never share upstream cookie state across
# Workspace-scoped requests. Callers that need a stateful cookie jar
# must own a dedicated session instead of using this global pool.
session = aiohttp.ClientSession(
trust_env=trust_env,
cookie_jar=aiohttp.DummyCookieJar(),
)
_sessions[key] = session
return session
@@ -41,3 +114,69 @@ async def close_all():
if not session.closed:
await session.close()
_sessions.clear()
async def read_limited(
response: aiohttp.ClientResponse,
*,
max_bytes: int = DEFAULT_REMOTE_BODY_LIMIT,
) -> bytes:
"""Read an HTTP response incrementally with a strict byte limit."""
max_bytes = max(int(max_bytes), 1)
content_length = response.headers.get('Content-Length')
if content_length is not None:
try:
declared_size = int(content_length)
except (TypeError, ValueError):
declared_size = None
if declared_size is not None and declared_size > max_bytes:
raise RemoteResponseTooLargeError(f'Remote response exceeds the {max_bytes}-byte limit')
body = bytearray()
async for chunk in response.content.iter_chunked(64 * 1024):
body.extend(chunk)
if len(body) > max_bytes:
raise RemoteResponseTooLargeError(f'Remote response exceeds the {max_bytes}-byte limit')
return bytes(body)
async def read_text_limited(
response: aiohttp.ClientResponse,
*,
max_bytes: int = DEFAULT_REMOTE_BODY_LIMIT,
) -> str:
body = await read_limited(response, max_bytes=max_bytes)
return body.decode(response.charset or 'utf-8', errors='replace')
async def read_json_limited(
response: aiohttp.ClientResponse,
*,
max_bytes: int = DEFAULT_REMOTE_BODY_LIMIT,
) -> typing.Any:
body = await read_limited(response, max_bytes=max_bytes)
return await asyncio.to_thread(json.loads, body)
async def parse_json_response(response: typing.Any) -> typing.Any:
"""Parse an already bounded HTTP response without blocking the event loop."""
parsed = await asyncio.to_thread(response.json)
if inspect.isawaitable(parsed):
parsed = await parsed
return parsed
async def response_text(
response: typing.Any,
*,
max_chars: int = 4096,
) -> str:
"""Decode an already bounded response body off-loop and cap diagnostics."""
text = await asyncio.to_thread(lambda: str(response.text))
max_chars = max(int(max_chars), 1)
if len(text) <= max_chars:
return text
return f'{text[:max_chars]}... [truncated]'
+62 -27
View File
@@ -8,10 +8,46 @@ import aiohttp
from langbot.pkg.utils import httpclient
import PIL.Image
import httpx
import asyncio
_INSECURE_SSL_CONTEXT = ssl.SSLContext(ssl.PROTOCOL_TLS_CLIENT)
_INSECURE_SSL_CONTEXT.check_hostname = False
_INSECURE_SSL_CONTEXT.verify_mode = ssl.CERT_NONE
DEFAULT_BASE64_MEDIA_LIMIT = 10 * 1024 * 1024
def _detect_image_format(file_bytes: bytes) -> str:
with PIL.Image.open(io.BytesIO(file_bytes)) as image:
return str(image.format or 'jpeg').lower()
def _decode_base64_limited(value: str, max_bytes: int) -> bytes:
max_bytes = max(int(max_bytes), 1)
max_encoded_chars = 4 * ((max_bytes + 2) // 3) + 4
if len(value) > max_encoded_chars:
raise ValueError(f'Base64 media exceeds the {max_bytes}-byte limit')
decoded = base64.b64decode(value)
if len(decoded) > max_bytes:
raise ValueError(f'Base64 media exceeds the {max_bytes}-byte limit')
return decoded
async def decode_base64_limited(
value: str,
*,
max_bytes: int = DEFAULT_BASE64_MEDIA_LIMIT,
) -> bytes:
"""Decode bounded media outside the event loop."""
return await asyncio.to_thread(_decode_base64_limited, value, max_bytes)
async def encode_base64(data: bytes) -> str:
"""Encode a bounded byte payload outside the event loop."""
return (await asyncio.to_thread(base64.b64encode, data)).decode('utf-8')
async def get_gewechat_image_base64(
gewechat_url: str,
@@ -59,10 +95,10 @@ async def get_gewechat_image_base64(
timeout=timeout,
) as response:
if response.status != 200:
# print(response)
raise Exception(f'获取gewechat图片下载失败: {await response.text()}')
error = await httpclient.read_text_limited(response)
raise Exception(f'获取gewechat图片下载失败: {error}')
resp_data = await response.json()
resp_data = await httpclient.read_json_limited(response)
if resp_data.get('ret') != 200:
raise Exception(f'获取gewechat图片下载链接失败: {resp_data}')
@@ -80,9 +116,10 @@ async def get_gewechat_image_base64(
try:
async with session.get(download_url) as img_response:
if img_response.status != 200:
raise Exception(f'下载图片失败: {await img_response.text()}, URL: {download_url}')
error = await httpclient.read_text_limited(img_response)
raise Exception(f'下载图片失败: {error}, URL: {download_url}')
image_data = await img_response.read()
image_data = await httpclient.read_limited(img_response)
content_type = img_response.headers.get('Content-Type', '')
if content_type:
@@ -90,7 +127,7 @@ async def get_gewechat_image_base64(
else:
image_format = file_url.split('.')[-1]
base64_str = base64.b64encode(image_data).decode('utf-8')
base64_str = await encode_base64(image_data)
return base64_str, image_format
except asyncio.TimeoutError:
@@ -113,16 +150,13 @@ async def get_wecom_image_base64(pic_url: str) -> tuple[str, str]:
raise Exception(f'Failed to download image: {response.status}')
# 读取图片数据
image_data = await response.read()
image_data = await httpclient.read_limited(response)
# 获取图片格式
content_type = response.headers.get('Content-Type', '')
image_format = content_type.split('/')[-1] # 例如 'image/jpeg' -> 'jpeg'
# 转换为 base64
import base64
image_base64 = base64.b64encode(image_data).decode('utf-8')
image_base64 = await encode_base64(image_data)
return image_base64, image_format
@@ -132,11 +166,11 @@ async def get_qq_official_image_base64(pic_url: str, content_type: str) -> tuple
下载QQ官方图片,
并且转换为base64格式
"""
async with httpx.AsyncClient() as client:
response = await client.get(pic_url)
response.raise_for_status() # 确保请求成功
image_data = response.content
base64_data = base64.b64encode(image_data).decode('utf-8')
session = httpclient.get_session()
async with session.get(pic_url) as response:
response.raise_for_status()
image_data = await httpclient.read_limited(response)
base64_data = await encode_base64(image_data)
return f'data:{content_type};base64,{base64_data}'
@@ -153,19 +187,20 @@ async def get_qq_image_bytes(image_url: str, query: dict = {}) -> tuple[bytes, s
"""[弃用]获取QQ图片的bytes"""
image_url, query_in_url = get_qq_image_downloadable_url(image_url)
query = {**query, **query_in_url}
ssl_context = ssl.create_default_context()
ssl_context.check_hostname = False
ssl_context.verify_mode = ssl.CERT_NONE
session = httpclient.get_session()
async with session.get(image_url, params=query, ssl=ssl_context, timeout=aiohttp.ClientTimeout(total=30.0)) as resp:
async with session.get(
image_url,
params=query,
ssl=_INSECURE_SSL_CONTEXT,
timeout=aiohttp.ClientTimeout(total=30.0),
) as resp:
resp.raise_for_status()
file_bytes = await resp.read()
file_bytes = await httpclient.read_limited(resp)
content_type = resp.headers.get('Content-Type')
if not content_type:
image_format = 'jpeg'
elif not content_type.startswith('image/'):
pil_img = PIL.Image.open(io.BytesIO(file_bytes))
image_format = pil_img.format.lower()
image_format = await asyncio.to_thread(_detect_image_format, file_bytes)
else:
image_format = content_type.split('/')[-1]
return file_bytes, image_format
@@ -187,7 +222,7 @@ async def qq_image_url_to_base64(image_url: str) -> typing.Tuple[str, str]:
file_bytes, image_format = await get_qq_image_bytes(image_url, query)
base64_str = base64.b64encode(file_bytes).decode()
base64_str = await encode_base64(file_bytes)
return base64_str, image_format
@@ -209,8 +244,8 @@ async def get_slack_image_to_base64(pic_url: str, bot_token: str):
session = httpclient.get_session()
async with session.get(pic_url, headers=headers) as resp:
mime_type = resp.headers.get('Content-Type', 'application/octet-stream')
file_bytes = await resp.read()
base64_str = base64.b64encode(file_bytes).decode('utf-8')
file_bytes = await httpclient.read_limited(resp)
base64_str = await encode_base64(file_bytes)
return f'data:{mime_type};base64,{base64_str}'
except Exception as e:
raise (e)
+5
View File
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ from __future__ import annotations
LOG_PAGE_SIZE = 20
MAX_CACHED_PAGES = 10
MAX_LOG_LINE_CHARS = 20000
class LogPage:
@@ -40,6 +41,10 @@ class LogCache:
def add_log(self, log: str):
"""添加日志"""
log = str(log)
if len(log) > MAX_LOG_LINE_CHARS:
marker = '\n[log truncated]'
log = log[: MAX_LOG_LINE_CHARS - len(marker)] + marker
if self.log_pages[-1].add_log(log):
self.log_pages.append(LogPage(number=self.log_pages[-1].number + 1))
+7 -1
View File
@@ -31,7 +31,11 @@ class ManagedRuntimeConnector:
self._lifecycle_lock = asyncio.Lock()
self._closing = False
async def _start_runtime_subprocess(self, *args: str) -> None:
async def _start_runtime_subprocess(
self,
*args: str,
env_overrides: dict[str, str] | None = None,
) -> None:
"""Launch a local runtime as a subprocess of the current Python interpreter.
If a subprocess is already running (no *returncode* yet), this is a no-op.
@@ -41,6 +45,8 @@ class ManagedRuntimeConnector:
python_path = sys.executable
env = os.environ.copy()
if env_overrides:
env.update(env_overrides)
self.runtime_subprocess = await asyncio.create_subprocess_exec(
python_path,
*args,
+177
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,177 @@
from __future__ import annotations
import asyncio
import time
from collections.abc import Sequence
import regex
MAX_PATTERN_COUNT = 64
MAX_PATTERN_CHARS = 1024
MAX_INPUT_CHARS = 1024 * 1024
MAX_REPLACEMENT_CHARS = 64
MAX_MASKED_OUTPUT_CHARS = 2 * 1024 * 1024
DEFAULT_OPERATION_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = 0.05
class SafeRegexError(ValueError):
"""Base class for rejected, invalid, or timed-out tenant regex work."""
class SafeRegexLimitError(SafeRegexError):
"""Raised when a regex operation exceeds a deterministic resource limit."""
class SafeRegexTimeoutError(SafeRegexError):
"""Raised when the regex engine exhausts the operation CPU budget."""
def _validate_patterns(patterns: Sequence[str]) -> tuple[str, ...]:
normalized = tuple(patterns)
if len(normalized) > MAX_PATTERN_COUNT:
raise SafeRegexLimitError(f'At most {MAX_PATTERN_COUNT} regex patterns are allowed')
for pattern in normalized:
if not isinstance(pattern, str):
raise SafeRegexError('Regex patterns must be strings')
if len(pattern) > MAX_PATTERN_CHARS:
raise SafeRegexLimitError(f'Regex patterns may contain at most {MAX_PATTERN_CHARS} characters')
return normalized
def _validate_input(value: str) -> None:
if not isinstance(value, str):
raise SafeRegexError('Regex input must be a string')
if len(value) > MAX_INPUT_CHARS:
raise SafeRegexLimitError(f'Regex input may contain at most {MAX_INPUT_CHARS} characters')
def _remaining_seconds(deadline: float) -> float:
remaining = deadline - time.monotonic()
if remaining <= 0:
raise SafeRegexTimeoutError('Regex operation timed out')
return remaining
def _compile(pattern: str):
try:
return regex.compile(pattern)
except regex.error as exc:
raise SafeRegexError(f'Invalid regex: {exc}') from exc
def _matches_any_sync(
patterns: Sequence[str],
value: str,
*,
mode: str,
timeout_seconds: float,
) -> bool:
normalized_patterns = _validate_patterns(patterns)
_validate_input(value)
if mode not in {'match', 'search'}:
raise ValueError(f'Unsupported safe regex mode: {mode}')
deadline = time.monotonic() + timeout_seconds
try:
for pattern in normalized_patterns:
compiled = _compile(pattern)
matcher = compiled.match if mode == 'match' else compiled.search
if matcher(
value,
timeout=_remaining_seconds(deadline),
concurrent=True,
):
return True
except TimeoutError as exc:
raise SafeRegexTimeoutError('Regex operation timed out') from exc
return False
async def matches_any(
patterns: Sequence[str],
value: str,
*,
mode: str = 'search',
timeout_seconds: float = DEFAULT_OPERATION_TIMEOUT_SECONDS,
) -> bool:
"""Match untrusted patterns without blocking the shared event loop."""
if timeout_seconds <= 0:
raise ValueError('timeout_seconds must be positive')
return await asyncio.to_thread(
_matches_any_sync,
patterns,
value,
mode=mode,
timeout_seconds=timeout_seconds,
)
def _mask_patterns_sync(
patterns: Sequence[str],
value: str,
*,
mask: str,
mask_word: str,
timeout_seconds: float,
) -> tuple[bool, str]:
normalized_patterns = _validate_patterns(patterns)
_validate_input(value)
if len(mask) > MAX_REPLACEMENT_CHARS or len(mask_word) > MAX_REPLACEMENT_CHARS:
raise SafeRegexLimitError(f'Regex replacements may contain at most {MAX_REPLACEMENT_CHARS} characters')
# Reject amplification before invoking a replacement callback. This is
# deliberately conservative: a hostile replacement must not allocate tens
# of megabytes before the post-operation output check can run.
replacement_width = len(mask_word) if mask_word else len(mask)
if replacement_width * max(1, len(value)) > MAX_MASKED_OUTPUT_CHARS:
raise SafeRegexLimitError('Regex replacement could exceed the masked output limit')
deadline = time.monotonic() + timeout_seconds
found = False
current = value
def replace(match) -> str:
nonlocal found
found = True
if mask_word:
return mask_word
return mask * len(match.group(0))
try:
for pattern in normalized_patterns:
compiled = _compile(pattern)
current = compiled.sub(
replace,
current,
timeout=_remaining_seconds(deadline),
concurrent=True,
)
if len(current) > MAX_MASKED_OUTPUT_CHARS:
raise SafeRegexLimitError('Regex replacement exceeded the masked output limit')
except TimeoutError as exc:
raise SafeRegexTimeoutError('Regex operation timed out') from exc
return found, current
async def mask_patterns(
patterns: Sequence[str],
value: str,
*,
mask: str,
mask_word: str,
timeout_seconds: float = DEFAULT_OPERATION_TIMEOUT_SECONDS,
) -> tuple[bool, str]:
"""Apply untrusted masking patterns with bounded CPU and output growth."""
if timeout_seconds <= 0:
raise ValueError('timeout_seconds must be positive')
return await asyncio.to_thread(
_mask_patterns_sync,
patterns,
value,
mask=mask,
mask_word=mask_word,
timeout_seconds=timeout_seconds,
)
+6 -4
View File
@@ -1,12 +1,13 @@
from __future__ import annotations
import asyncio
import typing
import logging
import requests
from ..core import app
from . import constants
from . import constants, httpclient
class VersionManager:
@@ -26,13 +27,14 @@ class VersionManager:
async def get_release_list(self) -> list:
"""Fetch release list from Space API (cached GitHub releases)."""
try:
rls_list_resp = requests.get(
url='https://space.langbot.app/api/v1/dist/info/releases',
rls_list_resp = await asyncio.to_thread(
requests.get,
'https://space.langbot.app/api/v1/dist/info/releases',
proxies=self.ap.proxy_mgr.get_forward_proxies(),
timeout=10,
)
rls_list_resp.raise_for_status()
resp_json = rls_list_resp.json()
resp_json = await httpclient.parse_json_response(rls_list_resp)
if resp_json.get('code') == 0 and isinstance(resp_json.get('data'), list):
return resp_json['data']
self.ap.logger.warning(f'Failed to fetch release list: unexpected response: {resp_json.get("msg", "")}')