feat(tenancy): add Workspace multi-tenant foundation (#2353)

* Document multi-tenant workspace architecture

* Add OSS and commercial workspace boundaries

* docs: redesign multi-tenant workspace architecture

* feat(tenancy): implement workspace isolation

* docs(tenancy): record verification evidence

* docs(tenancy): revise single-instance SaaS topology

* docs(tenancy): refine architecture options

* docs: finalize cloud v2 multi-tenant decisions

* feat(tenancy): establish cloud isolation foundations

* feat(tenancy): harden shared cloud runtime boundaries

* docs(tenancy): record final isolation verification

* fix(tenancy): close isolation and permission gaps

* docs(tenancy): record final isolation verification

* feat(tenancy): connect cloud workspace control plane

* fix(build): install git for pinned SDK

* docs(cloud): update control plane verification

* chore: update multi-tenant SDK pin

* fix(cloud): skip legacy model sync during startup

* test(cloud): preserve minimal model manager fixtures

* fix(cloud): preserve authenticated account context

* fix(cloud): reuse authenticated account for user info

* feat(cloud): complete Workspace settings navigation

* test(web): cover Workspace dropdown menu

* feat(web): place workspace controls in sidebar

* refactor(web): streamline workspace controls

* style(web): format workspace layout test

* fix(cloud): surface runtime and workspace plan status

* fix(plugin): keep runtime identity stable across restarts

* fix(ui): widen and center workspace switcher

* fix(ui): hide roles from workspace switcher

* fix(ui): align workspace switcher with sidebar entries

* feat(workspace): add in-product collaboration and direct Cloud launch

* style: format collaboration changes

* fix(workspace): bind collaboration APIs to tenant UoW

* fix(cloud): preserve Core-owned collaboration state

* test(cloud): require Space identity for invite registration

* feat(cloud): complete secure invitation experience

* style(web): format invitation flows

* fix(cloud): recover box runtime without unscoped skill reload

* feat(oss): enforce invitation account and owner billing flows

* style: format OSS account service

* test(oss): cover invitation logout handoff

* fix(oss): resolve workspace owner in scoped session

* feat(cloud): harden multi-tenant runtime resources

* fix(cloud): bound runtime restart storms

* fix(cloud): eliminate periodic runtime CPU spikes

* fix(cloud): enforce instance capacity ceilings

* fix(cloud): scope public login capability discovery

* fix(cloud): bound tenant maintenance and monitoring work

* fix(runtime): bound tenant resource amplification

* fix(deps): pin green multi-tenant plugin SDK

* fix(cloud): handle unavailable skill capability

* fix(security): require authentication for image file endpoint (H-2)

- Changed /api/v1/files/image from AuthType.NONE to USER_TOKEN_OR_API_KEY
- Added Permission.RESOURCE_VIEW requirement
- Prevents unauthenticated cross-tenant file access via leaked keys
- Fixes HIGH severity finding from multi-tenant security review

docs: add comprehensive database migration guide
- Complete migration steps for OSS → multi-tenant
- Backup, execution, verification procedures
- Rollback scenarios and recovery plans
- Performance tuning recommendations

* test: add comprehensive cross-tenant isolation tests

Added 7 critical test scenarios for multi-tenant boundaries:
- Cross-tenant bot access prevention
- Viewer role read-only enforcement
- Removed member immediate access revocation
- Model provider credential isolation
- WebSocket message isolation
- Invitation token workspace scoping
- Multi-workspace context validation

These tests address P0-2 coverage gaps for:
- workspaces.py (membership & invitation flows)
- user.py (authentication & authorization)
- websocket_chat.py (real-time isolation)
- plugins.py (resource access control)

docs: finalize database migration guide

* fix(security): resolve M-1, M-2, M-3 security findings

M-1: WebSocket authorization TOCTOU race (FIXED)
- Changed _revalidate_websocket_authorization to return RequestContext
- Ensures validated context is used immediately without race window
- Prevents removed members from sending messages during revalidation gap

M-2: Model Manager cache workspace isolation (VERIFIED)
- Confirmed _CacheKey already uses 4-tuple: (instance, workspace, generation, resource)
- Cache is properly scoped per workspace, no cross-tenant leakage possible
- No code change needed, documented as working correctly

M-3: Invitation lock workspace scoping (FIXED)
- Changed lock key from token_digest to workspace_uuid:token_digest
- Prevents DoS where attacker locks token in Workspace A to block Workspace B
- Locks now isolated per workspace

All MEDIUM severity findings from security review now resolved.

* fix(cloud): unblock tenant CI and enforce knowledge quotas

* fix(tenancy): scope rerank model sync

---------

Co-authored-by: dadachann <185672915+dadachann@users.noreply.github.com>

tests/integration/api/test_smoke.py

@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ def fake_api_app():
             'api': {'port': 5300},
             'plugin': {'enable_marketplace': True},
             'space': {'url': 'https://space.langbot.app'},
-            'system': {'allow_modify_login_info': True, 'limitation': {}},
+            'system': {'allow_modify_login_info': True, 'recovery_key': 'recovery-secret', 'limitation': {}},
         }
     )
 
@@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ class TestHealthEndpoint:
 
         assert response.status_code == 200
         data = await response.get_json()
-        assert data == {'code': 0, 'msg': 'ok'}
+        assert data == {'code': 0, 'msg': 'ok', 'resources': {}}
 
     @pytest.mark.asyncio
     async def test_healthz_no_auth_required(self, quart_test_client):
@@ -288,6 +288,47 @@ class TestUserInitEndpoint:
         assert data['msg'] == 'ok'
         assert data['data']['initialized'] is False
 
+    @pytest.mark.asyncio
+    async def test_account_info_exposes_instance_capabilities_not_first_account(self, quart_test_client, fake_api_app):
+        fake_api_app.user_service.is_initialized.return_value = True
+        fake_api_app.user_service.get_login_capabilities = AsyncMock(
+            return_value={'password_login_enabled': True, 'space_login_enabled': False}
+        )
+        fake_api_app.user_service.get_first_user = AsyncMock(
+            side_effect=AssertionError('public login bootstrap must not inspect an account')
+        )
+
+        response = await quart_test_client.get('/api/v1/user/account-info')
+
+        assert response.status_code == 200
+        data = await response.get_json()
+        assert data['data'] == {
+            'initialized': True,
+            'password_login_enabled': True,
+            'space_login_enabled': False,
+        }
+        fake_api_app.user_service.get_login_capabilities.assert_awaited_once_with()
+        fake_api_app.user_service.get_first_user.assert_not_awaited()
+
+    @pytest.mark.asyncio
+    async def test_recovery_key_resets_any_existing_account(self, quart_test_client, fake_api_app, monkeypatch):
+        fake_api_app.user_service.is_initialized.return_value = True
+        fake_api_app.user_service.get_user_by_email.return_value = Mock(user='member@example.com')
+        fake_api_app.user_service.reset_password = AsyncMock()
+        monkeypatch.setattr('langbot.pkg.api.http.controller.groups.user.asyncio.sleep', AsyncMock())
+
+        response = await quart_test_client.post(
+            '/api/v1/user/reset-password',
+            json={
+                'user': 'member@example.com',
+                'recovery_key': 'recovery-secret',
+                'new_password': 'new-member-password',
+            },
+        )
+
+        assert response.status_code == 200
+        fake_api_app.user_service.reset_password.assert_awaited_once_with('member@example.com', 'new-member-password')
+
 
 @pytest.mark.usefixtures('mock_circular_import_chain')
 class TestRealImports: