feat(tenancy): add Workspace multi-tenant foundation (#2353)

* Document multi-tenant workspace architecture * Add OSS and commercial workspace boundaries * docs: redesign multi-tenant workspace architecture * feat(tenancy): implement workspace isolation * docs(tenancy): record verification evidence * docs(tenancy): revise single-instance SaaS topology * docs(tenancy): refine architecture options * docs: finalize cloud v2 multi-tenant decisions * feat(tenancy): establish cloud isolation foundations * feat(tenancy): harden shared cloud runtime boundaries * docs(tenancy): record final isolation verification * fix(tenancy): close isolation and permission gaps * docs(tenancy): record final isolation verification * feat(tenancy): connect cloud workspace control plane * fix(build): install git for pinned SDK * docs(cloud): update control plane verification * chore: update multi-tenant SDK pin * fix(cloud): skip legacy model sync during startup * test(cloud): preserve minimal model manager fixtures * fix(cloud): preserve authenticated account context * fix(cloud): reuse authenticated account for user info * feat(cloud): complete Workspace settings navigation * test(web): cover Workspace dropdown menu * feat(web): place workspace controls in sidebar * refactor(web): streamline workspace controls * style(web): format workspace layout test * fix(cloud): surface runtime and workspace plan status * fix(plugin): keep runtime identity stable across restarts * fix(ui): widen and center workspace switcher * fix(ui): hide roles from workspace switcher * fix(ui): align workspace switcher with sidebar entries * feat(workspace): add in-product collaboration and direct Cloud launch * style: format collaboration changes * fix(workspace): bind collaboration APIs to tenant UoW * fix(cloud): preserve Core-owned collaboration state * test(cloud): require Space identity for invite registration * feat(cloud): complete secure invitation experience * style(web): format invitation flows * fix(cloud): recover box runtime without unscoped skill reload * feat(oss): enforce invitation account and owner billing flows * style: format OSS account service * test(oss): cover invitation logout handoff * fix(oss): resolve workspace owner in scoped session * feat(cloud): harden multi-tenant runtime resources * fix(cloud): bound runtime restart storms * fix(cloud): eliminate periodic runtime CPU spikes * fix(cloud): enforce instance capacity ceilings * fix(cloud): scope public login capability discovery * fix(cloud): bound tenant maintenance and monitoring work * fix(runtime): bound tenant resource amplification * fix(deps): pin green multi-tenant plugin SDK * fix(cloud): handle unavailable skill capability * fix(security): require authentication for image file endpoint (H-2) - Changed /api/v1/files/image from AuthType.NONE to USER_TOKEN_OR_API_KEY - Added Permission.RESOURCE_VIEW requirement - Prevents unauthenticated cross-tenant file access via leaked keys - Fixes HIGH severity finding from multi-tenant security review docs: add comprehensive database migration guide - Complete migration steps for OSS → multi-tenant - Backup, execution, verification procedures - Rollback scenarios and recovery plans - Performance tuning recommendations * test: add comprehensive cross-tenant isolation tests Added 7 critical test scenarios for multi-tenant boundaries: - Cross-tenant bot access prevention - Viewer role read-only enforcement - Removed member immediate access revocation - Model provider credential isolation - WebSocket message isolation - Invitation token workspace scoping - Multi-workspace context validation These tests address P0-2 coverage gaps for: - workspaces.py (membership & invitation flows) - user.py (authentication & authorization) - websocket_chat.py (real-time isolation) - plugins.py (resource access control) docs: finalize database migration guide * fix(security): resolve M-1, M-2, M-3 security findings M-1: WebSocket authorization TOCTOU race (FIXED) - Changed _revalidate_websocket_authorization to return RequestContext - Ensures validated context is used immediately without race window - Prevents removed members from sending messages during revalidation gap M-2: Model Manager cache workspace isolation (VERIFIED) - Confirmed _CacheKey already uses 4-tuple: (instance, workspace, generation, resource) - Cache is properly scoped per workspace, no cross-tenant leakage possible - No code change needed, documented as working correctly M-3: Invitation lock workspace scoping (FIXED) - Changed lock key from token_digest to workspace_uuid:token_digest - Prevents DoS where attacker locks token in Workspace A to block Workspace B - Locks now isolated per workspace All MEDIUM severity findings from security review now resolved. * fix(cloud): unblock tenant CI and enforce knowledge quotas * fix(tenancy): scope rerank model sync --------- Co-authored-by: dadachann <185672915+dadachann@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-08-09 04:40:57 +00:00 · 2026-07-30 21:43:35 +08:00
parent 463b120923
commit e1ac5e0fc8
468 changed files with 78320 additions and 13137 deletions
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import asyncio
+from types import SimpleNamespace
+from unittest.mock import AsyncMock, Mock
+
+import pytest
+import quart
+from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import create_async_engine
+
+from langbot.pkg.api.http.controller import group
+from langbot.pkg.persistence.mgr import PersistenceManager, PersistenceMode
+
+
+pytestmark = pytest.mark.asyncio
+
+
+async def test_authenticated_route_does_not_hold_database_session_during_external_wait():
+    entered = asyncio.Event()
+    release = asyncio.Event()
+    observations: list[bool] = []
+    engine = create_async_engine('sqlite+aiosqlite:///:memory:')
+    persistence = PersistenceManager(object(), mode=PersistenceMode.CLOUD_RUNTIME)
+    persistence.db = SimpleNamespace(get_engine=lambda: engine)
+
+    class BlockingRouter(group.RouterGroup):
+        name = 'blocking-route-test'
+        path = '/blocking-route-test'
+
+        async def initialize(self) -> None:
+            @self.route('', methods=['GET'], auth_type=group.AuthType.USER_TOKEN)
+            async def _():
+                observations.append(persistence.current_session() is None)
+                entered.set()
+                await release.wait()
+                observations.append(persistence.current_session() is None)
+                return self.success(data={})
+
+    account = SimpleNamespace(uuid='account-a', user='owner@example.com')
+    access = SimpleNamespace(
+        execution=SimpleNamespace(instance_uuid='instance-a', placement_generation=1),
+        workspace=SimpleNamespace(uuid='workspace-a'),
+        membership=SimpleNamespace(uuid='membership-a', role='owner', projection_revision=1),
+    )
+    application = SimpleNamespace(
+        persistence_mgr=persistence,
+        deployment=SimpleNamespace(multi_workspace_enabled=False),
+        user_service=SimpleNamespace(get_authenticated_account=AsyncMock(return_value=account)),
+        workspace_collaboration_service=SimpleNamespace(resolve_account_workspace=AsyncMock(return_value=access)),
+        logger=Mock(),
+    )
+    quart_app = quart.Quart(__name__)
+    await BlockingRouter(application, quart_app).initialize()
+    client = quart_app.test_client()
+
+    request = asyncio.create_task(
+        client.get(
+            '/blocking-route-test',
+            headers={'Authorization': 'Bearer token', 'X-Workspace-Id': 'workspace-a'},
+        )
+    )
+    try:
+        await entered.wait()
+        assert observations == [True]
+        release.set()
+        response = await request
+        assert response.status_code == 200
+        assert observations == [True, True]
+    finally:
+        release.set()
+        if not request.done():
+            await request
+        await engine.dispose()