feat(tenancy): add Workspace multi-tenant foundation (#2353)

* Document multi-tenant workspace architecture

* Add OSS and commercial workspace boundaries

* docs: redesign multi-tenant workspace architecture

* feat(tenancy): implement workspace isolation

* docs(tenancy): record verification evidence

* docs(tenancy): revise single-instance SaaS topology

* docs(tenancy): refine architecture options

* docs: finalize cloud v2 multi-tenant decisions

* feat(tenancy): establish cloud isolation foundations

* feat(tenancy): harden shared cloud runtime boundaries

* docs(tenancy): record final isolation verification

* fix(tenancy): close isolation and permission gaps

* docs(tenancy): record final isolation verification

* feat(tenancy): connect cloud workspace control plane

* fix(build): install git for pinned SDK

* docs(cloud): update control plane verification

* chore: update multi-tenant SDK pin

* fix(cloud): skip legacy model sync during startup

* test(cloud): preserve minimal model manager fixtures

* fix(cloud): preserve authenticated account context

* fix(cloud): reuse authenticated account for user info

* feat(cloud): complete Workspace settings navigation

* test(web): cover Workspace dropdown menu

* feat(web): place workspace controls in sidebar

* refactor(web): streamline workspace controls

* style(web): format workspace layout test

* fix(cloud): surface runtime and workspace plan status

* fix(plugin): keep runtime identity stable across restarts

* fix(ui): widen and center workspace switcher

* fix(ui): hide roles from workspace switcher

* fix(ui): align workspace switcher with sidebar entries

* feat(workspace): add in-product collaboration and direct Cloud launch

* style: format collaboration changes

* fix(workspace): bind collaboration APIs to tenant UoW

* fix(cloud): preserve Core-owned collaboration state

* test(cloud): require Space identity for invite registration

* feat(cloud): complete secure invitation experience

* style(web): format invitation flows

* fix(cloud): recover box runtime without unscoped skill reload

* feat(oss): enforce invitation account and owner billing flows

* style: format OSS account service

* test(oss): cover invitation logout handoff

* fix(oss): resolve workspace owner in scoped session

* feat(cloud): harden multi-tenant runtime resources

* fix(cloud): bound runtime restart storms

* fix(cloud): eliminate periodic runtime CPU spikes

* fix(cloud): enforce instance capacity ceilings

* fix(cloud): scope public login capability discovery

* fix(cloud): bound tenant maintenance and monitoring work

* fix(runtime): bound tenant resource amplification

* fix(deps): pin green multi-tenant plugin SDK

* fix(cloud): handle unavailable skill capability

* fix(security): require authentication for image file endpoint (H-2)

- Changed /api/v1/files/image from AuthType.NONE to USER_TOKEN_OR_API_KEY
- Added Permission.RESOURCE_VIEW requirement
- Prevents unauthenticated cross-tenant file access via leaked keys
- Fixes HIGH severity finding from multi-tenant security review

docs: add comprehensive database migration guide
- Complete migration steps for OSS → multi-tenant
- Backup, execution, verification procedures
- Rollback scenarios and recovery plans
- Performance tuning recommendations

* test: add comprehensive cross-tenant isolation tests

Added 7 critical test scenarios for multi-tenant boundaries:
- Cross-tenant bot access prevention
- Viewer role read-only enforcement
- Removed member immediate access revocation
- Model provider credential isolation
- WebSocket message isolation
- Invitation token workspace scoping
- Multi-workspace context validation

These tests address P0-2 coverage gaps for:
- workspaces.py (membership & invitation flows)
- user.py (authentication & authorization)
- websocket_chat.py (real-time isolation)
- plugins.py (resource access control)

docs: finalize database migration guide

* fix(security): resolve M-1, M-2, M-3 security findings

M-1: WebSocket authorization TOCTOU race (FIXED)
- Changed _revalidate_websocket_authorization to return RequestContext
- Ensures validated context is used immediately without race window
- Prevents removed members from sending messages during revalidation gap

M-2: Model Manager cache workspace isolation (VERIFIED)
- Confirmed _CacheKey already uses 4-tuple: (instance, workspace, generation, resource)
- Cache is properly scoped per workspace, no cross-tenant leakage possible
- No code change needed, documented as working correctly

M-3: Invitation lock workspace scoping (FIXED)
- Changed lock key from token_digest to workspace_uuid:token_digest
- Prevents DoS where attacker locks token in Workspace A to block Workspace B
- Locks now isolated per workspace

All MEDIUM severity findings from security review now resolved.

* fix(cloud): unblock tenant CI and enforce knowledge quotas

* fix(tenancy): scope rerank model sync

---------

Co-authored-by: dadachann <185672915+dadachann@users.noreply.github.com>

tests/unit_tests/telemetry/test_heartbeat.py

@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
 from __future__ import annotations
 
 import json
+from types import SimpleNamespace
 
 import pytest
 from unittest.mock import AsyncMock, Mock
@@ -49,6 +50,7 @@ def make_app():
     # skills
     ap.skill_mgr = Mock()
     ap.skill_mgr.skills = {'a': {}, 'b': {}, 'c': {}}
+    ap.skill_mgr.total_cached_skill_count.return_value = 3
 
     return ap
 
@@ -95,6 +97,35 @@ class TestBuildHeartbeatPayload:
         payload = await heartbeat.build_heartbeat_payload(ap)
         assert payload['features']['pipeline_count'] == -1
 
+    @pytest.mark.asyncio
+    async def test_cloud_counts_loaded_registries_without_tenant_sql(self):
+        heartbeat = get_heartbeat_module()
+        ap = make_app()
+        ap.persistence_mgr.mode = SimpleNamespace(value='cloud_runtime')
+        ap.persistence_mgr.execute_async = AsyncMock(
+            side_effect=AssertionError('Cloud heartbeat must not issue per-tenant COUNTs')
+        )
+        ap.pipeline_mgr = SimpleNamespace(
+            _pipelines_by_key={'pipeline-a': object(), 'pipeline-b': object()},
+        )
+        ap.tool_mgr = SimpleNamespace(
+            mcp_tool_loader=SimpleNamespace(
+                _sessions={'mcp-a': object(), 'mcp-b': object(), 'mcp-c': object()},
+            ),
+        )
+        ap.rag_mgr = SimpleNamespace(
+            knowledge_bases={'kb-a': object()},
+        )
+
+        payload = await heartbeat.build_heartbeat_payload(ap)
+
+        features = payload['features']
+        assert features['pipeline_count'] == 2
+        assert features['mcp_server_count'] == 3
+        assert features['knowledge_base_count'] == 1
+        assert features['bot_count'] == 1
+        ap.persistence_mgr.execute_async.assert_not_awaited()
+
     @pytest.mark.asyncio
     async def test_no_user_content_fields(self):
         """The heartbeat must never carry message content / credentials keys."""