feat(tenancy): add Workspace multi-tenant foundation (#2353)

* Document multi-tenant workspace architecture

* Add OSS and commercial workspace boundaries

* docs: redesign multi-tenant workspace architecture

* feat(tenancy): implement workspace isolation

* docs(tenancy): record verification evidence

* docs(tenancy): revise single-instance SaaS topology

* docs(tenancy): refine architecture options

* docs: finalize cloud v2 multi-tenant decisions

* feat(tenancy): establish cloud isolation foundations

* feat(tenancy): harden shared cloud runtime boundaries

* docs(tenancy): record final isolation verification

* fix(tenancy): close isolation and permission gaps

* docs(tenancy): record final isolation verification

* feat(tenancy): connect cloud workspace control plane

* fix(build): install git for pinned SDK

* docs(cloud): update control plane verification

* chore: update multi-tenant SDK pin

* fix(cloud): skip legacy model sync during startup

* test(cloud): preserve minimal model manager fixtures

* fix(cloud): preserve authenticated account context

* fix(cloud): reuse authenticated account for user info

* feat(cloud): complete Workspace settings navigation

* test(web): cover Workspace dropdown menu

* feat(web): place workspace controls in sidebar

* refactor(web): streamline workspace controls

* style(web): format workspace layout test

* fix(cloud): surface runtime and workspace plan status

* fix(plugin): keep runtime identity stable across restarts

* fix(ui): widen and center workspace switcher

* fix(ui): hide roles from workspace switcher

* fix(ui): align workspace switcher with sidebar entries

* feat(workspace): add in-product collaboration and direct Cloud launch

* style: format collaboration changes

* fix(workspace): bind collaboration APIs to tenant UoW

* fix(cloud): preserve Core-owned collaboration state

* test(cloud): require Space identity for invite registration

* feat(cloud): complete secure invitation experience

* style(web): format invitation flows

* fix(cloud): recover box runtime without unscoped skill reload

* feat(oss): enforce invitation account and owner billing flows

* style: format OSS account service

* test(oss): cover invitation logout handoff

* fix(oss): resolve workspace owner in scoped session

* feat(cloud): harden multi-tenant runtime resources

* fix(cloud): bound runtime restart storms

* fix(cloud): eliminate periodic runtime CPU spikes

* fix(cloud): enforce instance capacity ceilings

* fix(cloud): scope public login capability discovery

* fix(cloud): bound tenant maintenance and monitoring work

* fix(runtime): bound tenant resource amplification

* fix(deps): pin green multi-tenant plugin SDK

* fix(cloud): handle unavailable skill capability

* fix(security): require authentication for image file endpoint (H-2)

- Changed /api/v1/files/image from AuthType.NONE to USER_TOKEN_OR_API_KEY
- Added Permission.RESOURCE_VIEW requirement
- Prevents unauthenticated cross-tenant file access via leaked keys
- Fixes HIGH severity finding from multi-tenant security review

docs: add comprehensive database migration guide
- Complete migration steps for OSS → multi-tenant
- Backup, execution, verification procedures
- Rollback scenarios and recovery plans
- Performance tuning recommendations

* test: add comprehensive cross-tenant isolation tests

Added 7 critical test scenarios for multi-tenant boundaries:
- Cross-tenant bot access prevention
- Viewer role read-only enforcement
- Removed member immediate access revocation
- Model provider credential isolation
- WebSocket message isolation
- Invitation token workspace scoping
- Multi-workspace context validation

These tests address P0-2 coverage gaps for:
- workspaces.py (membership & invitation flows)
- user.py (authentication & authorization)
- websocket_chat.py (real-time isolation)
- plugins.py (resource access control)

docs: finalize database migration guide

* fix(security): resolve M-1, M-2, M-3 security findings

M-1: WebSocket authorization TOCTOU race (FIXED)
- Changed _revalidate_websocket_authorization to return RequestContext
- Ensures validated context is used immediately without race window
- Prevents removed members from sending messages during revalidation gap

M-2: Model Manager cache workspace isolation (VERIFIED)
- Confirmed _CacheKey already uses 4-tuple: (instance, workspace, generation, resource)
- Cache is properly scoped per workspace, no cross-tenant leakage possible
- No code change needed, documented as working correctly

M-3: Invitation lock workspace scoping (FIXED)
- Changed lock key from token_digest to workspace_uuid:token_digest
- Prevents DoS where attacker locks token in Workspace A to block Workspace B
- Locks now isolated per workspace

All MEDIUM severity findings from security review now resolved.

* fix(cloud): unblock tenant CI and enforce knowledge quotas

* fix(tenancy): scope rerank model sync

---------

Co-authored-by: dadachann <185672915+dadachann@users.noreply.github.com>
This commit is contained in:
RockChinQ
2026-07-30 21:43:35 +08:00
committed by GitHub
parent 463b120923
commit e1ac5e0fc8
468 changed files with 78320 additions and 13137 deletions
@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
from __future__ import annotations
from types import SimpleNamespace
from unittest.mock import AsyncMock
import pytest
from langbot.pkg.workspace.invitation_delivery import (
InvitationDeliveryResult,
InvitationDeliveryService,
)
pytestmark = pytest.mark.asyncio
def _app(config: dict) -> SimpleNamespace:
return SimpleNamespace(
instance_config=SimpleNamespace(data=config),
logger=SimpleNamespace(warning=lambda *args, **kwargs: None),
)
async def test_link_only_delivery_builds_public_web_link_without_secret_capability():
service = InvitationDeliveryService(
_app(
{
'api': {
'webui_url': 'https://public.langbot.example/',
'webhook_prefix': 'http://internal:5300',
}
}
)
)
assert service.build_invitation_link('lbi_secret') == (
'https://public.langbot.example/invitations/accept#token=lbi_secret'
)
assert service.capability() == {'enabled': False, 'provider': None}
result = await service.deliver_invitation(
recipient_email='member@example.com',
workspace_name='Workspace',
invitation_link='https://public.langbot.example/invitations/accept#token=lbi_secret',
)
assert result == InvitationDeliveryResult(status='link_only', provider=None)
async def test_configured_provider_failure_returns_failed_without_raising():
service = InvitationDeliveryService(
_app(
{
'workspace': {
'invitations': {
'email': {
'provider': 'resend',
'from': 'LangBot <noreply@example.com>',
'resend': {'api_key': 'resend-secret'},
}
}
}
}
)
)
service._send_resend = AsyncMock(return_value=False)
assert service.capability() == {'enabled': True, 'provider': 'resend'}
result = await service.deliver_invitation(
recipient_email='member@example.com',
workspace_name='Workspace',
invitation_link='https://public.langbot.example/invitations/accept#token=lbi_secret',
)
assert result == InvitationDeliveryResult(status='failed', provider='resend')
service._send_resend.assert_awaited_once()
async def test_environment_mapping_enables_provider_without_leaking_secret(monkeypatch):
monkeypatch.setenv('WORKSPACE__INVITATIONS__PUBLIC_WEB_URL', 'https://env.langbot.example/')
monkeypatch.setenv('WORKSPACE__INVITATIONS__EMAIL__PROVIDER', 'smtp')
monkeypatch.setenv('WORKSPACE__INVITATIONS__EMAIL__FROM', 'LangBot <noreply@example.com>')
monkeypatch.setenv('WORKSPACE__INVITATIONS__EMAIL__SMTP__HOST', 'smtp.example.com')
monkeypatch.setenv('WORKSPACE__INVITATIONS__EMAIL__SMTP__PASSWORD', 'smtp-secret')
service = InvitationDeliveryService(_app({'api': {'webui_url': 'https://config.example'}}))
assert service.build_invitation_link('lbi_secret') == (
'https://env.langbot.example/invitations/accept#token=lbi_secret'
)
assert service.capability() == {'enabled': True, 'provider': 'smtp'}
async def test_cloud_invitation_email_has_branded_html_plain_fallback_and_expiry_copy():
service = InvitationDeliveryService(_app({}))
link = 'https://cloud.langbot.app/invitations/accept#token=lbi_secret&next=<unsafe>'
text = service._plain_text('Research & Development', link)
html = service._html('Research & Development', link)
assert 'LangBot Cloud' in text
assert 'Research & Development' in text
assert '7 days' in text
assert link in text
assert 'Accept invitation' in html
assert 'Research &amp; Development' in html
assert 'expires in 7 days' in html
assert 'lbi_secret&amp;next=&lt;unsafe&gt;' in html