feat(tenancy): add Workspace multi-tenant foundation (#2353)

* Document multi-tenant workspace architecture

* Add OSS and commercial workspace boundaries

* docs: redesign multi-tenant workspace architecture

* feat(tenancy): implement workspace isolation

* docs(tenancy): record verification evidence

* docs(tenancy): revise single-instance SaaS topology

* docs(tenancy): refine architecture options

* docs: finalize cloud v2 multi-tenant decisions

* feat(tenancy): establish cloud isolation foundations

* feat(tenancy): harden shared cloud runtime boundaries

* docs(tenancy): record final isolation verification

* fix(tenancy): close isolation and permission gaps

* docs(tenancy): record final isolation verification

* feat(tenancy): connect cloud workspace control plane

* fix(build): install git for pinned SDK

* docs(cloud): update control plane verification

* chore: update multi-tenant SDK pin

* fix(cloud): skip legacy model sync during startup

* test(cloud): preserve minimal model manager fixtures

* fix(cloud): preserve authenticated account context

* fix(cloud): reuse authenticated account for user info

* feat(cloud): complete Workspace settings navigation

* test(web): cover Workspace dropdown menu

* feat(web): place workspace controls in sidebar

* refactor(web): streamline workspace controls

* style(web): format workspace layout test

* fix(cloud): surface runtime and workspace plan status

* fix(plugin): keep runtime identity stable across restarts

* fix(ui): widen and center workspace switcher

* fix(ui): hide roles from workspace switcher

* fix(ui): align workspace switcher with sidebar entries

* feat(workspace): add in-product collaboration and direct Cloud launch

* style: format collaboration changes

* fix(workspace): bind collaboration APIs to tenant UoW

* fix(cloud): preserve Core-owned collaboration state

* test(cloud): require Space identity for invite registration

* feat(cloud): complete secure invitation experience

* style(web): format invitation flows

* fix(cloud): recover box runtime without unscoped skill reload

* feat(oss): enforce invitation account and owner billing flows

* style: format OSS account service

* test(oss): cover invitation logout handoff

* fix(oss): resolve workspace owner in scoped session

* feat(cloud): harden multi-tenant runtime resources

* fix(cloud): bound runtime restart storms

* fix(cloud): eliminate periodic runtime CPU spikes

* fix(cloud): enforce instance capacity ceilings

* fix(cloud): scope public login capability discovery

* fix(cloud): bound tenant maintenance and monitoring work

* fix(runtime): bound tenant resource amplification

* fix(deps): pin green multi-tenant plugin SDK

* fix(cloud): handle unavailable skill capability

* fix(security): require authentication for image file endpoint (H-2)

- Changed /api/v1/files/image from AuthType.NONE to USER_TOKEN_OR_API_KEY
- Added Permission.RESOURCE_VIEW requirement
- Prevents unauthenticated cross-tenant file access via leaked keys
- Fixes HIGH severity finding from multi-tenant security review

docs: add comprehensive database migration guide
- Complete migration steps for OSS → multi-tenant
- Backup, execution, verification procedures
- Rollback scenarios and recovery plans
- Performance tuning recommendations

* test: add comprehensive cross-tenant isolation tests

Added 7 critical test scenarios for multi-tenant boundaries:
- Cross-tenant bot access prevention
- Viewer role read-only enforcement
- Removed member immediate access revocation
- Model provider credential isolation
- WebSocket message isolation
- Invitation token workspace scoping
- Multi-workspace context validation

These tests address P0-2 coverage gaps for:
- workspaces.py (membership & invitation flows)
- user.py (authentication & authorization)
- websocket_chat.py (real-time isolation)
- plugins.py (resource access control)

docs: finalize database migration guide

* fix(security): resolve M-1, M-2, M-3 security findings

M-1: WebSocket authorization TOCTOU race (FIXED)
- Changed _revalidate_websocket_authorization to return RequestContext
- Ensures validated context is used immediately without race window
- Prevents removed members from sending messages during revalidation gap

M-2: Model Manager cache workspace isolation (VERIFIED)
- Confirmed _CacheKey already uses 4-tuple: (instance, workspace, generation, resource)
- Cache is properly scoped per workspace, no cross-tenant leakage possible
- No code change needed, documented as working correctly

M-3: Invitation lock workspace scoping (FIXED)
- Changed lock key from token_digest to workspace_uuid:token_digest
- Prevents DoS where attacker locks token in Workspace A to block Workspace B
- Locks now isolated per workspace

All MEDIUM severity findings from security review now resolved.

* fix(cloud): unblock tenant CI and enforce knowledge quotas

* fix(tenancy): scope rerank model sync

---------

Co-authored-by: dadachann <185672915+dadachann@users.noreply.github.com>
This commit is contained in:
RockChinQ
2026-07-30 21:43:35 +08:00
committed by GitHub
parent 463b120923
commit e1ac5e0fc8
468 changed files with 78320 additions and 13137 deletions
+6
View File
@@ -346,10 +346,16 @@ export interface ApiRespSystemInfo {
debug: boolean;
version: string;
edition: string;
/** Independent instance-level gate for local stdio MCP transports. */
mcp_stdio_enabled: boolean;
cloud_service_url: string;
enable_marketplace: boolean;
allow_modify_login_info: boolean;
disable_models_service: boolean;
invitation_delivery?: {
enabled: boolean;
provider: 'resend' | 'smtp' | null;
};
limitation: SystemLimitation;
/** Public outbound IPs of the deployment (``system.outbound_ips`` in
* config.yaml). Shown on adapter config forms whose platform requires
+66
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@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
export type WorkspaceRole =
| 'owner'
| 'admin'
| 'developer'
| 'operator'
| 'viewer';
export interface Workspace {
uuid: string;
instance_uuid: string;
name: string;
slug: string;
type: 'personal' | 'team';
status: 'provisioning' | 'active' | 'suspended' | 'archived' | 'deleted';
source: 'local' | 'cloud_projection';
}
export interface WorkspaceMembership {
uuid: string;
workspace_uuid: string;
account_uuid: string;
email: string;
role: WorkspaceRole;
status: 'active' | 'disabled' | 'removed';
joined_at: string | null;
created_at: string;
}
export interface CurrentWorkspace {
workspace: Workspace;
membership: WorkspaceMembership;
permissions: string[];
placement_generation: number;
/** Signed Cloud display metadata; never used for client-side authorization. */
plan_name?: string | null;
}
export interface WorkspaceSpaceBilling {
credits: number | null;
owner_space_bound: boolean;
is_workspace_owner: boolean;
}
/** Account-scoped Workspace entry returned before a Workspace is selected. */
export type WorkspaceBootstrapEntry = CurrentWorkspace;
export interface WorkspaceBootstrapResponse {
workspaces: WorkspaceBootstrapEntry[];
}
export interface WorkspaceInvitation {
uuid: string;
workspace_uuid: string;
normalized_email: string;
role: Exclude<WorkspaceRole, 'owner'>;
status: 'pending' | 'accepted' | 'revoked' | 'expired';
expires_at: string;
created_at: string;
}
export type WorkspaceInvitationDeliveryStatus = 'sent' | 'link_only' | 'failed';
export interface WorkspaceInvitationDelivery {
status: WorkspaceInvitationDeliveryStatus;
provider: 'resend' | 'smtp' | null;
}