feat(tenancy): add Workspace multi-tenant foundation (#2353)

* Document multi-tenant workspace architecture

* Add OSS and commercial workspace boundaries

* docs: redesign multi-tenant workspace architecture

* feat(tenancy): implement workspace isolation

* docs(tenancy): record verification evidence

* docs(tenancy): revise single-instance SaaS topology

* docs(tenancy): refine architecture options

* docs: finalize cloud v2 multi-tenant decisions

* feat(tenancy): establish cloud isolation foundations

* feat(tenancy): harden shared cloud runtime boundaries

* docs(tenancy): record final isolation verification

* fix(tenancy): close isolation and permission gaps

* docs(tenancy): record final isolation verification

* feat(tenancy): connect cloud workspace control plane

* fix(build): install git for pinned SDK

* docs(cloud): update control plane verification

* chore: update multi-tenant SDK pin

* fix(cloud): skip legacy model sync during startup

* test(cloud): preserve minimal model manager fixtures

* fix(cloud): preserve authenticated account context

* fix(cloud): reuse authenticated account for user info

* feat(cloud): complete Workspace settings navigation

* test(web): cover Workspace dropdown menu

* feat(web): place workspace controls in sidebar

* refactor(web): streamline workspace controls

* style(web): format workspace layout test

* fix(cloud): surface runtime and workspace plan status

* fix(plugin): keep runtime identity stable across restarts

* fix(ui): widen and center workspace switcher

* fix(ui): hide roles from workspace switcher

* fix(ui): align workspace switcher with sidebar entries

* feat(workspace): add in-product collaboration and direct Cloud launch

* style: format collaboration changes

* fix(workspace): bind collaboration APIs to tenant UoW

* fix(cloud): preserve Core-owned collaboration state

* test(cloud): require Space identity for invite registration

* feat(cloud): complete secure invitation experience

* style(web): format invitation flows

* fix(cloud): recover box runtime without unscoped skill reload

* feat(oss): enforce invitation account and owner billing flows

* style: format OSS account service

* test(oss): cover invitation logout handoff

* fix(oss): resolve workspace owner in scoped session

* feat(cloud): harden multi-tenant runtime resources

* fix(cloud): bound runtime restart storms

* fix(cloud): eliminate periodic runtime CPU spikes

* fix(cloud): enforce instance capacity ceilings

* fix(cloud): scope public login capability discovery

* fix(cloud): bound tenant maintenance and monitoring work

* fix(runtime): bound tenant resource amplification

* fix(deps): pin green multi-tenant plugin SDK

* fix(cloud): handle unavailable skill capability

* fix(security): require authentication for image file endpoint (H-2)

- Changed /api/v1/files/image from AuthType.NONE to USER_TOKEN_OR_API_KEY
- Added Permission.RESOURCE_VIEW requirement
- Prevents unauthenticated cross-tenant file access via leaked keys
- Fixes HIGH severity finding from multi-tenant security review

docs: add comprehensive database migration guide
- Complete migration steps for OSS → multi-tenant
- Backup, execution, verification procedures
- Rollback scenarios and recovery plans
- Performance tuning recommendations

* test: add comprehensive cross-tenant isolation tests

Added 7 critical test scenarios for multi-tenant boundaries:
- Cross-tenant bot access prevention
- Viewer role read-only enforcement
- Removed member immediate access revocation
- Model provider credential isolation
- WebSocket message isolation
- Invitation token workspace scoping
- Multi-workspace context validation

These tests address P0-2 coverage gaps for:
- workspaces.py (membership & invitation flows)
- user.py (authentication & authorization)
- websocket_chat.py (real-time isolation)
- plugins.py (resource access control)

docs: finalize database migration guide

* fix(security): resolve M-1, M-2, M-3 security findings

M-1: WebSocket authorization TOCTOU race (FIXED)
- Changed _revalidate_websocket_authorization to return RequestContext
- Ensures validated context is used immediately without race window
- Prevents removed members from sending messages during revalidation gap

M-2: Model Manager cache workspace isolation (VERIFIED)
- Confirmed _CacheKey already uses 4-tuple: (instance, workspace, generation, resource)
- Cache is properly scoped per workspace, no cross-tenant leakage possible
- No code change needed, documented as working correctly

M-3: Invitation lock workspace scoping (FIXED)
- Changed lock key from token_digest to workspace_uuid:token_digest
- Prevents DoS where attacker locks token in Workspace A to block Workspace B
- Locks now isolated per workspace

All MEDIUM severity findings from security review now resolved.

* fix(cloud): unblock tenant CI and enforce knowledge quotas

* fix(tenancy): scope rerank model sync

---------

Co-authored-by: dadachann <185672915+dadachann@users.noreply.github.com>

web/src/app/infra/http/BaseHttpClient.ts

@@ -4,6 +4,12 @@ import axios, {
   AxiosResponse,
   AxiosError,
 } from 'axios';
+import {
+  clearActiveWorkspaceUuid,
+  getActiveWorkspaceUuid,
+} from './workspaceContext';
+import { setCurrentWorkspaceSnapshot } from './currentWorkspaceStore';
+import { clearWorkspaceBootstrapSnapshot } from './workspaceBootstrapStore';
 
 type JSONValue = string | number | boolean | JSONObject | JSONArray | null;
 interface JSONObject {
@@ -21,6 +27,8 @@ export interface ResponseData<T = unknown> {
 export interface RequestConfig extends AxiosRequestConfig {
   isSSR?: boolean; // 服务端渲染标识
   retry?: number; // 重试次数
+  /** Account-scoped endpoints must not receive a stale Workspace selector. */
+  skipWorkspace?: boolean;
 }
 
 /**
@@ -77,6 +85,17 @@ export abstract class BaseHttpClient {
           if (session) {
             config.headers.Authorization = `Bearer ${session}`;
           }
+
+          const requestConfig = config as RequestConfig;
+          const workspaceUuid = getActiveWorkspaceUuid();
+          if (requestConfig.skipWorkspace) {
+            delete config.headers['X-Workspace-Id'];
+            delete config.headers['x-workspace-id'];
+          } else if (workspaceUuid) {
+            config.headers['X-Workspace-Id'] = workspaceUuid;
+          }
+
+          delete requestConfig.skipWorkspace;
         }
 
         return config;
@@ -99,6 +118,10 @@ export abstract class BaseHttpClient {
             case 401:
               if (typeof window !== 'undefined') {
                 localStorage.removeItem('token');
+                localStorage.removeItem('userEmail');
+                clearActiveWorkspaceUuid();
+                setCurrentWorkspaceSnapshot(null);
+                clearWorkspaceBootstrapSnapshot();
                 if (!error.request.responseURL.includes('/check-token')) {
                   window.location.href = '/login';
                 }
@@ -187,6 +210,14 @@ export abstract class BaseHttpClient {
     return this.request<T>({ method: 'put', url, data, ...config });
   }
 
+  public patch<T = unknown>(
+    url: string,
+    data?: object,
+    config?: RequestConfig,
+  ): Promise<T> {
+    return this.request<T>({ method: 'patch', url, data, ...config });
+  }
+
   public delete<T = unknown>(url: string, config?: RequestConfig): Promise<T> {
     return this.request<T>({ method: 'delete', url, ...config });
   }