2 Commits

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
RockChinQ	e1ac5e0fc8	feat(tenancy): add Workspace multi-tenant foundation (#2353) ... * Document multi-tenant workspace architecture * Add OSS and commercial workspace boundaries * docs: redesign multi-tenant workspace architecture * feat(tenancy): implement workspace isolation * docs(tenancy): record verification evidence * docs(tenancy): revise single-instance SaaS topology * docs(tenancy): refine architecture options * docs: finalize cloud v2 multi-tenant decisions * feat(tenancy): establish cloud isolation foundations * feat(tenancy): harden shared cloud runtime boundaries * docs(tenancy): record final isolation verification * fix(tenancy): close isolation and permission gaps * docs(tenancy): record final isolation verification * feat(tenancy): connect cloud workspace control plane * fix(build): install git for pinned SDK * docs(cloud): update control plane verification * chore: update multi-tenant SDK pin * fix(cloud): skip legacy model sync during startup * test(cloud): preserve minimal model manager fixtures * fix(cloud): preserve authenticated account context * fix(cloud): reuse authenticated account for user info * feat(cloud): complete Workspace settings navigation * test(web): cover Workspace dropdown menu * feat(web): place workspace controls in sidebar * refactor(web): streamline workspace controls * style(web): format workspace layout test * fix(cloud): surface runtime and workspace plan status * fix(plugin): keep runtime identity stable across restarts * fix(ui): widen and center workspace switcher * fix(ui): hide roles from workspace switcher * fix(ui): align workspace switcher with sidebar entries * feat(workspace): add in-product collaboration and direct Cloud launch * style: format collaboration changes * fix(workspace): bind collaboration APIs to tenant UoW * fix(cloud): preserve Core-owned collaboration state * test(cloud): require Space identity for invite registration * feat(cloud): complete secure invitation experience * style(web): format invitation flows * fix(cloud): recover box runtime without unscoped skill reload * feat(oss): enforce invitation account and owner billing flows * style: format OSS account service * test(oss): cover invitation logout handoff * fix(oss): resolve workspace owner in scoped session * feat(cloud): harden multi-tenant runtime resources * fix(cloud): bound runtime restart storms * fix(cloud): eliminate periodic runtime CPU spikes * fix(cloud): enforce instance capacity ceilings * fix(cloud): scope public login capability discovery * fix(cloud): bound tenant maintenance and monitoring work * fix(runtime): bound tenant resource amplification * fix(deps): pin green multi-tenant plugin SDK * fix(cloud): handle unavailable skill capability * fix(security): require authentication for image file endpoint (H-2) - Changed /api/v1/files/image from AuthType.NONE to USER_TOKEN_OR_API_KEY - Added Permission.RESOURCE_VIEW requirement - Prevents unauthenticated cross-tenant file access via leaked keys - Fixes HIGH severity finding from multi-tenant security review docs: add comprehensive database migration guide - Complete migration steps for OSS → multi-tenant - Backup, execution, verification procedures - Rollback scenarios and recovery plans - Performance tuning recommendations * test: add comprehensive cross-tenant isolation tests Added 7 critical test scenarios for multi-tenant boundaries: - Cross-tenant bot access prevention - Viewer role read-only enforcement - Removed member immediate access revocation - Model provider credential isolation - WebSocket message isolation - Invitation token workspace scoping - Multi-workspace context validation These tests address P0-2 coverage gaps for: - workspaces.py (membership & invitation flows) - user.py (authentication & authorization) - websocket_chat.py (real-time isolation) - plugins.py (resource access control) docs: finalize database migration guide * fix(security): resolve M-1, M-2, M-3 security findings M-1: WebSocket authorization TOCTOU race (FIXED) - Changed _revalidate_websocket_authorization to return RequestContext - Ensures validated context is used immediately without race window - Prevents removed members from sending messages during revalidation gap M-2: Model Manager cache workspace isolation (VERIFIED) - Confirmed _CacheKey already uses 4-tuple: (instance, workspace, generation, resource) - Cache is properly scoped per workspace, no cross-tenant leakage possible - No code change needed, documented as working correctly M-3: Invitation lock workspace scoping (FIXED) - Changed lock key from token_digest to workspace_uuid:token_digest - Prevents DoS where attacker locks token in Workspace A to block Workspace B - Locks now isolated per workspace All MEDIUM severity findings from security review now resolved. * fix(cloud): unblock tenant CI and enforce knowledge quotas * fix(tenancy): scope rerank model sync --------- Co-authored-by: dadachann <185672915+dadachann@users.noreply.github.com>	2026-07-30 21:43:35 +08:00
Junyan Chin	a1e6eccdeb	feat(box): bidirectional attachment transfer for sandbox (#2257) ... * feat(box): bidirectional attachment transfer for sandbox Materialize inbound attachments into the sandbox workspace so agents can process user-sent files, and collect agent-produced files from the outbox to attach them back to the reply. - box(service): add materialize_inbound_attachments / collect_outbound attachments. Prefer direct host-filesystem read/write on the bind-mounted workspace (no size limit), falling back to chunked exec only for non-shared backends (e2b/remote). Clear per-query inbox/outbox dirs at turn start to avoid query_id-reuse collisions. - provider(localagent): inject inbound attachment descriptors into the sandbox and append a system note telling the agent the inbox/outbox paths. - pipeline(wrapper): collect outbox files on the final stream chunk and append them as attachment components to the response chain. - web(debug-dialog): render File components with a download link when base64/url is present; add base64/path fields to the File entity. - tests: cover inbound/outbound, large-file transfer without truncation, and stale-dir clearing (86 passing). * feat(box): support voice/file attachment round-trip end-to-end Extends the bidirectional attachment transfer to audio and arbitrary files through the real webchat UI, and fixes the model-payload errors that non-image attachments triggered. - platform(websocket_adapter): resolve Voice/File component storage keys to base64 (previously only Image), so audio/documents reach the sandbox inbox. - web(debug-dialog): accept audio/* and any file in the uploader (was image-only), classify by mimetype, upload Voice/File via the documents endpoint, and render non-image staged attachments as a chip. - provider(litellmchat): drop non-image file parts (file_base64 / file_url) when building the OpenAI/LiteLLM payload. These come from Voice/File attachments — including ones replayed from conversation history — and the agent reads their bytes from the sandbox, not the model. Without this the provider rejects the request: 'invalid content type=file_base64'. - provider(localagent): also strip those parts from the current user message alongside the sandbox-path note (model-facing clarity; the requester is the real safety net for history). - tests: cover the requester strip/keep behavior (file dropped, image kept and reshaped to image_url, mixed history, plain-string content). * test(box): cover inbound/outbound attachment helpers; fix ruff format - ruff format localagent.py (CI ruff format --check was failing) - add unit tests for ResponseWrapper outbound-attachment helpers (wrapper.py 78%->98%) - add unit tests for LocalAgentRunner._inject_inbound_attachments - add unit tests for WebSocketAdapter._process_image_components (0%->covered) Lifts PR patch coverage from 68.97% to ~88% (>75% target).	2026-06-18 21:40:31 +08:00