Address the migration and formatting failures reported on the TOTP branch.
Migrations
- Register totp_credentials and totp_recovery_codes in
_ALEMBIC_TENANT_TABLES. On a legacy PostgreSQL install these two tables
reference users.uuid, which only exists after 0009, so create_all() must
not run ahead of Alembic the way it did for the other tenant tables.
Without this the PostgreSQL migration test failed with
"column uuid referenced in foreign key constraint does not exist".
Tests
- Resolve the Alembic head dynamically in the RAG document identity
regression instead of pinning 0025_rag_document_identity. The TOTP and
RAG branches now meet at a merge revision, so the pinned value was no
longer the head. This matches the convention already used by
test_migrations_postgres.
Formatting
- Apply ruff format to the new backend modules and prettier to the locale
files and TOTP components, so the lint jobs pass.
Add a per-Account time-based one-time password (TOTP) second sign-in
factor, plus the owner/admin tooling needed to operate it.
Backend
- TotpService: enrolment, constant-time verification with a +/- one step
drift window, single-use recovery codes and disablement.
* shared secret is only ever persisted as a Fernet token whose key is
derived (HKDF-SHA256) from the instance JWT secret and gated by a
key_version epoch;
* recovery codes are only ever persisted as salted
PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256 digests (600k iterations) and are single-use;
* the consumed counter advances monotonically so a captured code cannot
be replayed inside the same time window.
- New persistence entities and alembic migrations for credentials and
recovery codes.
- Login second-factor challenge, bound to the Account that passed the
password step.
- Owner/admin oversight endpoints to inspect and re-bind the second
factor of any Account.
Frontend
- Account settings panel for enrolling, managing, re-binding and
disabling the second factor.
- Login second-factor step and the matching client methods.
- Strings for all eight locales.
The shared secret never crosses the API boundary: enrolment returns a
server-rendered QR code (as a data: URL) and the plaintext secret is
discarded as soon as the image is produced.