The host inspects a package to read manifest.yaml and requirements.txt before the
SDK extracts it. Inspection normalized entry names with only
replace('\\','/').strip('/'), so it accepted names its own extractor rejects
(absolute paths, '..' components, drive letters) and it silently kept the first
member when two normalized to the same path.
There was no traversal write, because the SDK's _extract_verified_zip validates
every member before writing and the host only reads members by ZipInfo. The bug
is the divergence: a package could pass inspection and then fail to install, and
the two rule sets could drift further as either side changes.
Inspection now applies the same rule set as the SDK, via
_normalize_archive_entry_name: reject empty/NUL names, absolute paths, any '..'
component and drive letters; reject a duplicate after normalization. '.' and
empty segments are still collapsed, so './manifest.yaml' and 'components//x.py'
keep working.
Tests: 13 cases covering each rejection, the duplicate, traversal taking
precedence over the duplicate check, and two positive cases (nested/unicode
layout, cosmetic separators).
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <[email protected]>
The SDK binds one transfer root inode (mode 0700) and picks it per profile: a shared worker uses /tmp/lbp-rpc while a host without the profile env fell back to data/temp/lbp, so plugin icons and assets died with 'Invalid file transfer capability'. The host now pins the shared root, and a plugin absent from the resolved Workspace answers 404 instead of 500.
The connector stored only uuid/code/message, so the ops reporter stamped every entry with its own sampling time and a stale failure looked freshly broken on each report. Failures now carry failed_at and the payload publishes it.
The shared Cloud deployment runs one Plugin Runtime for every Workspace, but
nothing reported its health: the instance only exposed two aggregate numbers on
its own health probe, and the per-installation failure registry, the desired
state registry and the reconcile outcome lived in memory with no reader.
Add RuntimeOpsReporter, which every 30 seconds reads the Runtime ``/healthz``
probe over HTTP (derived from ``plugin.runtime_ws_url``), merges it with the
connector's desired-state, failure and reconcile summaries, and posts one
sample to the Space control plane on the existing authenticated direction.
Delivery is best-effort and bounded: a single in-flight request, a ten second
timeout, dropped samples counted in ``runtime_ops`` on the instance health
probe, and a failed probe recorded as a drop so the dashboard shows staleness
instead of grading a stale sample as healthy.
Cloud-only: a non-cloud deployment never enables the reporter, and the channel
is independent of product telemetry so ``space.disable_telemetry`` cannot blind
the ops dashboard.
The certified-archive admission gate treated any declared certificate it could
not resolve as an untrusted archive and rejected the install with
CERTIFIED_PLUGIN_OSS_FORCE_REQUIRED. OSS ships an empty
plugin.certification.trusted_public_keys ring and the marketplace signs every
package with its own issuer key, so all certified marketplace packages (for
example langbot-team/RunnerDemo and langbot-team/LocalAgent) failed at the
'validating plugin package' step before artifact storage.
Admission now distinguishes an unresolvable declaration from a configured trust
decision that fails:
- record certificate_id only when the key_id is actually present in the
configured ring, so an empty ring yields an unresolvable declaration;
- OSS degrades an unresolvable declaration to the existing oss_dev dedicated
profile with CERTIFIED_PLUGIN_OSS_UNTRUSTED_DEDICATED instead of blocking;
- a resolvable declaration that still fails keeps requiring the explicit
administrator force (CERTIFIED_PLUGIN_OSS_FORCE_REQUIRED);
- Cloud stays fail-closed and rejects before storage.
No shared-runtime privilege is granted when the issuer is not trusted, so this
withholds isolation rather than escalating it.
