Files
LangBot/src/langbot/pkg/api/http/service/mcp.py
T
RockChinQ e1ac5e0fc8 feat(tenancy): add Workspace multi-tenant foundation (#2353)
* Document multi-tenant workspace architecture

* Add OSS and commercial workspace boundaries

* docs: redesign multi-tenant workspace architecture

* feat(tenancy): implement workspace isolation

* docs(tenancy): record verification evidence

* docs(tenancy): revise single-instance SaaS topology

* docs(tenancy): refine architecture options

* docs: finalize cloud v2 multi-tenant decisions

* feat(tenancy): establish cloud isolation foundations

* feat(tenancy): harden shared cloud runtime boundaries

* docs(tenancy): record final isolation verification

* fix(tenancy): close isolation and permission gaps

* docs(tenancy): record final isolation verification

* feat(tenancy): connect cloud workspace control plane

* fix(build): install git for pinned SDK

* docs(cloud): update control plane verification

* chore: update multi-tenant SDK pin

* fix(cloud): skip legacy model sync during startup

* test(cloud): preserve minimal model manager fixtures

* fix(cloud): preserve authenticated account context

* fix(cloud): reuse authenticated account for user info

* feat(cloud): complete Workspace settings navigation

* test(web): cover Workspace dropdown menu

* feat(web): place workspace controls in sidebar

* refactor(web): streamline workspace controls

* style(web): format workspace layout test

* fix(cloud): surface runtime and workspace plan status

* fix(plugin): keep runtime identity stable across restarts

* fix(ui): widen and center workspace switcher

* fix(ui): hide roles from workspace switcher

* fix(ui): align workspace switcher with sidebar entries

* feat(workspace): add in-product collaboration and direct Cloud launch

* style: format collaboration changes

* fix(workspace): bind collaboration APIs to tenant UoW

* fix(cloud): preserve Core-owned collaboration state

* test(cloud): require Space identity for invite registration

* feat(cloud): complete secure invitation experience

* style(web): format invitation flows

* fix(cloud): recover box runtime without unscoped skill reload

* feat(oss): enforce invitation account and owner billing flows

* style: format OSS account service

* test(oss): cover invitation logout handoff

* fix(oss): resolve workspace owner in scoped session

* feat(cloud): harden multi-tenant runtime resources

* fix(cloud): bound runtime restart storms

* fix(cloud): eliminate periodic runtime CPU spikes

* fix(cloud): enforce instance capacity ceilings

* fix(cloud): scope public login capability discovery

* fix(cloud): bound tenant maintenance and monitoring work

* fix(runtime): bound tenant resource amplification

* fix(deps): pin green multi-tenant plugin SDK

* fix(cloud): handle unavailable skill capability

* fix(security): require authentication for image file endpoint (H-2)

- Changed /api/v1/files/image from AuthType.NONE to USER_TOKEN_OR_API_KEY
- Added Permission.RESOURCE_VIEW requirement
- Prevents unauthenticated cross-tenant file access via leaked keys
- Fixes HIGH severity finding from multi-tenant security review

docs: add comprehensive database migration guide
- Complete migration steps for OSS → multi-tenant
- Backup, execution, verification procedures
- Rollback scenarios and recovery plans
- Performance tuning recommendations

* test: add comprehensive cross-tenant isolation tests

Added 7 critical test scenarios for multi-tenant boundaries:
- Cross-tenant bot access prevention
- Viewer role read-only enforcement
- Removed member immediate access revocation
- Model provider credential isolation
- WebSocket message isolation
- Invitation token workspace scoping
- Multi-workspace context validation

These tests address P0-2 coverage gaps for:
- workspaces.py (membership & invitation flows)
- user.py (authentication & authorization)
- websocket_chat.py (real-time isolation)
- plugins.py (resource access control)

docs: finalize database migration guide

* fix(security): resolve M-1, M-2, M-3 security findings

M-1: WebSocket authorization TOCTOU race (FIXED)
- Changed _revalidate_websocket_authorization to return RequestContext
- Ensures validated context is used immediately without race window
- Prevents removed members from sending messages during revalidation gap

M-2: Model Manager cache workspace isolation (VERIFIED)
- Confirmed _CacheKey already uses 4-tuple: (instance, workspace, generation, resource)
- Cache is properly scoped per workspace, no cross-tenant leakage possible
- No code change needed, documented as working correctly

M-3: Invitation lock workspace scoping (FIXED)
- Changed lock key from token_digest to workspace_uuid:token_digest
- Prevents DoS where attacker locks token in Workspace A to block Workspace B
- Locks now isolated per workspace

All MEDIUM severity findings from security review now resolved.

* fix(cloud): unblock tenant CI and enforce knowledge quotas

* fix(tenancy): scope rerank model sync

---------

Co-authored-by: dadachann <185672915+dadachann@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-07-30 21:43:35 +08:00

524 lines
22 KiB
Python

from __future__ import annotations
import copy
import re
import uuid
import sqlalchemy
from ....core import app, taskmgr
from ....core.task_boundary import create_detached_task
from ....entity.persistence import mcp as persistence_mcp
from ....entity.persistence import plugin as persistence_plugin
from ....provider.tools.loaders.mcp import MCPSessionStatus, RuntimeMCPSession
from ....provider.tools.loaders.mcp_policy import require_stdio_mcp_enabled
from ....workspace.errors import WorkspaceNotFoundError
from ..context import ExecutionContext
from .secrets import is_url_key, redact_url_secrets, restore_url_secret_placeholders
from .tenant import TenantContext, require_workspace_uuid, scope_statement
_SECRET_MASK = '***'
_MISSING_SECRET = object()
_SENSITIVE_CONFIG_NAMES = frozenset(
{
'api_key',
'apikey',
'auth',
'authorization',
'cookie',
'credentials',
'database_url',
'dsn',
'key',
'proxy_authorization',
'set_cookie',
}
)
_SENSITIVE_CONFIG_TOKENS = frozenset(
{
'credential',
'credentials',
'passwd',
'password',
'secret',
'token',
}
)
_SENSITIVE_KEY_QUALIFIERS = frozenset(
{
'access',
'api',
'auth',
'bearer',
'client',
'debug',
'encryption',
'private',
'signing',
}
)
def _normalize_config_key(key: object) -> str:
value = re.sub(r'([a-z0-9])([A-Z])', r'\1_\2', str(key or ''))
return re.sub(r'[^a-zA-Z0-9]+', '_', value).strip('_').lower()
def _is_sensitive_config_key(key: object) -> bool:
normalized = _normalize_config_key(key)
if normalized in _SENSITIVE_CONFIG_NAMES:
return True
tokens = frozenset(token for token in normalized.split('_') if token)
if tokens & _SENSITIVE_CONFIG_TOKENS:
return True
return 'key' in tokens and bool(tokens & _SENSITIVE_KEY_QUALIFIERS)
def _mask_secret_structure(value):
if isinstance(value, dict):
return {key: _mask_secret_structure(item) for key, item in value.items()}
if isinstance(value, list):
return [_mask_secret_structure(item) for item in value]
if isinstance(value, tuple):
return tuple(_mask_secret_structure(item) for item in value)
if value is None or value == '':
return value
return _SECRET_MASK
def redact_mcp_secrets(value):
"""Return a recursively redacted copy of MCP configuration data."""
if isinstance(value, dict):
return {
key: (
_mask_secret_structure(item)
if _is_sensitive_config_key(key)
else redact_url_secrets(item)
if is_url_key(key)
else redact_mcp_secrets(item)
)
for key, item in value.items()
}
if isinstance(value, list):
return [redact_mcp_secrets(item) for item in value]
if isinstance(value, tuple):
return tuple(redact_mcp_secrets(item) for item in value)
return value
def restore_mcp_secret_placeholders(value, current_value=_MISSING_SECRET, *, sensitive: bool = False):
"""Restore masked leaves from the current MCP config before a write."""
if sensitive and value == _SECRET_MASK:
if current_value is _MISSING_SECRET:
raise ValueError('Masked MCP secret has no existing value')
return copy.deepcopy(current_value)
if isinstance(value, dict):
current_mapping = current_value if isinstance(current_value, dict) else {}
return {
key: (
restore_url_secret_placeholders(
item,
current_mapping.get(key, _MISSING_SECRET),
)
if not sensitive and not _is_sensitive_config_key(key) and is_url_key(key)
else restore_mcp_secret_placeholders(
item,
current_mapping.get(key, _MISSING_SECRET),
sensitive=sensitive or _is_sensitive_config_key(key),
)
)
for key, item in value.items()
}
if isinstance(value, list):
current_items = current_value if isinstance(current_value, (list, tuple)) else ()
return [
restore_mcp_secret_placeholders(
item,
current_items[index] if index < len(current_items) else _MISSING_SECRET,
sensitive=sensitive,
)
for index, item in enumerate(value)
]
if isinstance(value, tuple):
current_items = current_value if isinstance(current_value, (list, tuple)) else ()
return tuple(
restore_mcp_secret_placeholders(
item,
current_items[index] if index < len(current_items) else _MISSING_SECRET,
sensitive=sensitive,
)
for index, item in enumerate(value)
)
return value
class MCPService:
"""Workspace-scoped MCP configuration and runtime facade."""
ap: app.Application
def __init__(self, ap: app.Application) -> None:
self.ap = ap
async def _execution_context(self, context: TenantContext) -> ExecutionContext:
workspace_uuid = require_workspace_uuid(context)
instance_uuid = str(getattr(context, 'instance_uuid', '') or '').strip()
generation = getattr(context, 'placement_generation', None)
if not instance_uuid or not isinstance(generation, int) or isinstance(generation, bool) or generation <= 0:
raise ValueError('MCP operations require an explicit fenced execution context')
binding = await self.ap.workspace_service.get_execution_binding(
workspace_uuid,
expected_generation=generation,
)
if binding.instance_uuid != instance_uuid:
raise ValueError('MCP execution context belongs to another LangBot instance')
return ExecutionContext(
instance_uuid=instance_uuid,
workspace_uuid=workspace_uuid,
placement_generation=generation,
bot_uuid=getattr(context, 'bot_uuid', None),
pipeline_uuid=getattr(context, 'pipeline_uuid', None),
query_uuid=getattr(context, 'query_uuid', None),
)
async def get_runtime_info(self, context: TenantContext, server_name: str) -> dict | None:
execution_context = await self._execution_context(context)
session = self.ap.tool_mgr.mcp_tool_loader.get_session(execution_context, server_name)
return session.get_runtime_info_dict() if session else None
async def get_mcp_servers(self, context: TenantContext, contain_runtime_info: bool = False) -> list[dict]:
execution_context = await self._execution_context(context)
result = await self.ap.persistence_mgr.execute_async(
scope_statement(sqlalchemy.select(persistence_mcp.MCPServer), persistence_mcp.MCPServer, context)
)
serialized_servers = [
redact_mcp_secrets(self.ap.persistence_mgr.serialize_model(persistence_mcp.MCPServer, server))
for server in result.all()
]
if contain_runtime_info:
for server in serialized_servers:
session = self.ap.tool_mgr.mcp_tool_loader.get_session(execution_context, server['name'])
server['runtime_info'] = session.get_runtime_info_dict() if session else None
return serialized_servers
async def create_mcp_server(self, context: TenantContext, server_data: dict) -> str:
execution_context = await self._execution_context(context)
workspace_uuid = execution_context.workspace_uuid
# This gate is independent of Box availability. Cloud v2 disables
# stdio MCP even though Box Runtime itself remains available.
require_stdio_mcp_enabled(self.ap, server_data)
limitation = self.ap.instance_config.data.get('system', {}).get('limitation', {})
max_extensions = limitation.get('max_extensions', -1)
if max_extensions >= 0:
mcp_count_result = await self.ap.persistence_mgr.execute_async(
sqlalchemy.select(sqlalchemy.func.count(persistence_mcp.MCPServer.uuid)).where(
persistence_mcp.MCPServer.workspace_uuid == workspace_uuid
)
)
plugin_count_result = await self.ap.persistence_mgr.execute_async(
sqlalchemy.select(sqlalchemy.func.count())
.select_from(persistence_plugin.PluginSetting)
.where(persistence_plugin.PluginSetting.workspace_uuid == workspace_uuid)
)
if (mcp_count_result.scalar() or 0) + (plugin_count_result.scalar() or 0) >= max_extensions:
raise ValueError(f'Maximum number of extensions ({max_extensions}) reached')
payload = dict(server_data)
payload.pop('workspace_uuid', None)
server_name = str(payload.get('name') or '').strip()
if not server_name:
raise ValueError('MCP server name is required')
payload['name'] = server_name
payload['workspace_uuid'] = workspace_uuid
payload['uuid'] = str(uuid.uuid4())
existing_result = await self.ap.persistence_mgr.execute_async(
sqlalchemy.select(persistence_mcp.MCPServer).where(
persistence_mcp.MCPServer.workspace_uuid == workspace_uuid,
persistence_mcp.MCPServer.name == server_name,
)
)
if existing_result.first() is not None:
raise ValueError(f'MCP server already exists: {server_name}')
await self.ap.persistence_mgr.execute_async(sqlalchemy.insert(persistence_mcp.MCPServer).values(payload))
created = await self._get_mcp_server_by_uuid_raw(execution_context, payload['uuid'])
if created and self.ap.tool_mgr.mcp_tool_loader:
task = create_detached_task(
self.ap.tool_mgr.mcp_tool_loader.host_mcp_server(execution_context, created),
after_commit_manager=self.ap.persistence_mgr,
workspace_uuid=execution_context.workspace_uuid,
)
tracker = getattr(
self.ap.tool_mgr.mcp_tool_loader,
'track_hosted_task',
None,
)
if callable(tracker):
tracker(task, execution_context)
else:
self.ap.tool_mgr.mcp_tool_loader._hosted_mcp_tasks.append(task)
return payload['uuid']
async def get_mcp_server_by_uuid(self, context: TenantContext, server_uuid: str) -> dict | None:
execution_context = await self._execution_context(context)
server_data = await self._get_mcp_server_by_uuid_raw(execution_context, server_uuid)
return redact_mcp_secrets(server_data) if server_data is not None else None
async def _get_mcp_server_by_uuid_raw(
self,
execution_context: ExecutionContext,
server_uuid: str,
) -> dict | None:
result = await self.ap.persistence_mgr.execute_async(
scope_statement(
sqlalchemy.select(persistence_mcp.MCPServer).where(persistence_mcp.MCPServer.uuid == server_uuid),
persistence_mcp.MCPServer,
execution_context,
)
)
server = result.first()
return self.ap.persistence_mgr.serialize_model(persistence_mcp.MCPServer, server) if server else None
async def get_mcp_server_by_name(self, context: TenantContext, server_name: str) -> dict | None:
execution_context = await self._execution_context(context)
server_data = await self._get_mcp_server_by_name_raw(execution_context, server_name)
if server_data is None:
return None
session = self.ap.tool_mgr.mcp_tool_loader.get_session(execution_context, server_name)
response_data = {
**server_data,
'runtime_info': session.get_runtime_info_dict() if session else None,
}
return redact_mcp_secrets(response_data)
async def _get_mcp_server_by_name_raw(
self,
execution_context: ExecutionContext,
server_name: str,
) -> dict | None:
result = await self.ap.persistence_mgr.execute_async(
scope_statement(
sqlalchemy.select(persistence_mcp.MCPServer).where(persistence_mcp.MCPServer.name == server_name),
persistence_mcp.MCPServer,
execution_context,
)
)
server = result.first()
if server is None:
return None
return self.ap.persistence_mgr.serialize_model(persistence_mcp.MCPServer, server)
async def update_mcp_server(self, context: TenantContext, server_uuid: str, server_data: dict) -> None:
execution_context = await self._execution_context(context)
old_server = await self._get_mcp_server_by_uuid_raw(execution_context, server_uuid)
if old_server is None:
raise WorkspaceNotFoundError('MCP server not found')
payload = dict(server_data)
payload.pop('uuid', None)
payload.pop('workspace_uuid', None)
payload = restore_mcp_secret_placeholders(payload, old_server)
if 'name' in payload:
payload['name'] = str(payload['name'] or '').strip()
if not payload['name']:
raise ValueError('MCP server name is required')
duplicate = await self._get_mcp_server_by_name_raw(execution_context, payload['name'])
if duplicate is not None and duplicate['uuid'] != server_uuid:
raise ValueError(f'MCP server already exists: {payload["name"]}')
effective_server = {**old_server, **payload}
# Existing disabled rows remain readable/deletable. Switching away
# from stdio or explicitly disabling one is also allowed, but an
# update may never leave a disabled stdio server enabled.
if bool(effective_server.get('enable', True)):
require_stdio_mcp_enabled(self.ap, effective_server)
result = await self.ap.persistence_mgr.execute_async(
scope_statement(
sqlalchemy.update(persistence_mcp.MCPServer)
.where(persistence_mcp.MCPServer.uuid == server_uuid)
.values(payload),
persistence_mcp.MCPServer,
execution_context,
)
)
if getattr(result, 'rowcount', None) == 0:
raise WorkspaceNotFoundError('MCP server not found')
loader = self.ap.tool_mgr.mcp_tool_loader
if loader is None:
return
old_name = old_server['name']
old_enable = bool(old_server['enable'])
updated = await self._get_mcp_server_by_uuid_raw(execution_context, server_uuid)
if updated is None:
raise WorkspaceNotFoundError('MCP server not found')
new_enable = bool(updated['enable'])
if old_enable and loader.has_session(execution_context, old_name):
await loader.remove_mcp_server(execution_context, old_name)
if new_enable:
task = create_detached_task(
loader.host_mcp_server(execution_context, updated),
after_commit_manager=self.ap.persistence_mgr,
workspace_uuid=execution_context.workspace_uuid,
)
tracker = getattr(loader, 'track_hosted_task', None)
if callable(tracker):
tracker(task, execution_context)
else:
loader._hosted_mcp_tasks.append(task)
async def delete_mcp_server(self, context: TenantContext, server_uuid: str) -> None:
execution_context = await self._execution_context(context)
server = await self._get_mcp_server_by_uuid_raw(execution_context, server_uuid)
if server is None:
raise WorkspaceNotFoundError('MCP server not found')
result = await self.ap.persistence_mgr.execute_async(
scope_statement(
sqlalchemy.delete(persistence_mcp.MCPServer).where(persistence_mcp.MCPServer.uuid == server_uuid),
persistence_mcp.MCPServer,
execution_context,
)
)
if getattr(result, 'rowcount', None) == 0:
raise WorkspaceNotFoundError('MCP server not found')
loader = self.ap.tool_mgr.mcp_tool_loader
if loader and loader.has_session(execution_context, server['name']):
await loader.remove_mcp_server(execution_context, server['name'])
async def _require_server(self, context: TenantContext, server_name: str) -> tuple[ExecutionContext, dict]:
execution_context = await self._execution_context(context)
server = await self._get_mcp_server_by_name_raw(execution_context, server_name)
if server is None:
raise WorkspaceNotFoundError('MCP server not found')
return execution_context, server
async def get_mcp_server_resources(self, context: TenantContext, server_name: str) -> list[dict]:
execution_context, _ = await self._require_server(context, server_name)
return await self.ap.tool_mgr.mcp_tool_loader.get_resources(execution_context, server_name)
async def get_mcp_server_resource_templates(self, context: TenantContext, server_name: str) -> list[dict]:
execution_context, _ = await self._require_server(context, server_name)
return await self.ap.tool_mgr.mcp_tool_loader.get_resource_templates(execution_context, server_name)
async def read_mcp_server_resource_envelope(
self,
context: TenantContext,
server_name: str,
uri: str,
*,
max_bytes: int | None = None,
include_blob: bool = False,
) -> dict:
execution_context, _ = await self._require_server(context, server_name)
kwargs = {'include_blob': include_blob, 'source': 'ui_preview'}
if max_bytes is not None:
kwargs['max_bytes'] = max_bytes
return await self.ap.tool_mgr.mcp_tool_loader.read_resource_envelope(
execution_context,
server_name,
uri,
**kwargs,
)
async def read_mcp_server_resource(self, context: TenantContext, server_name: str, uri: str) -> list[dict]:
execution_context, _ = await self._require_server(context, server_name)
return await self.ap.tool_mgr.mcp_tool_loader.read_resource(execution_context, server_name, uri)
async def test_mcp_server(self, context: TenantContext, server_name: str, server_data: dict) -> int:
execution_context = await self._execution_context(context)
runtime_mcp_session: RuntimeMCPSession | None = None
test_session: RuntimeMCPSession | None = None
ctx = taskmgr.TaskContext.new()
if server_name != '_':
_, persisted_server = await self._require_server(execution_context, server_name)
require_stdio_mcp_enabled(self.ap, persisted_server)
runtime_mcp_session = self.ap.tool_mgr.mcp_tool_loader.get_session(execution_context, server_name)
if runtime_mcp_session is None:
raise WorkspaceNotFoundError('MCP server not found')
persisted_session = runtime_mcp_session
async def _refresh_and_report() -> None:
needs_start = persisted_session.status == MCPSessionStatus.ERROR or persisted_session.session is None
if needs_start:
await persisted_session.start()
else:
try:
await persisted_session.refresh()
except Exception:
await persisted_session.start()
ctx.metadata['runtime_info'] = persisted_session.get_runtime_info_dict()
coroutine = _refresh_and_report()
else:
payload = dict(server_data)
payload.pop('workspace_uuid', None)
payload['workspace_uuid'] = execution_context.workspace_uuid
require_stdio_mcp_enabled(self.ap, payload)
runtime_mcp_session = await self.ap.tool_mgr.mcp_tool_loader.load_mcp_server(
execution_context,
payload,
)
test_session = runtime_mcp_session
async def _run_and_cleanup() -> None:
try:
await test_session.start()
ctx.metadata['runtime_info'] = test_session.get_runtime_info_dict()
finally:
try:
await test_session.shutdown()
except Exception as exc:
self.ap.logger.warning(
f'Failed to tear down transient MCP test session '
f'{test_session.server_name}: {type(exc).__name__}: {exc}'
)
coroutine = _run_and_cleanup()
try:
wrapper = self.ap.task_mgr.create_user_task(
coroutine,
kind='mcp-operation',
name=f'mcp-test-{execution_context.workspace_uuid}-{server_name}',
label=f'Testing MCP server {server_name}',
context=ctx,
instance_uuid=execution_context.instance_uuid,
workspace_uuid=execution_context.workspace_uuid,
placement_generation=execution_context.placement_generation,
)
except taskmgr.TaskCapacityError:
if test_session is not None:
try:
await test_session.shutdown()
except Exception as exc:
self.ap.logger.warning(
f'Failed to tear down rejected transient MCP test session '
f'{test_session.server_name}: {type(exc).__name__}: {exc}'
)
raise
return wrapper.id
async def get_mcp_server_logs(
self,
context: TenantContext,
server_name: str,
limit: int = 200,
level: str | None = None,
) -> list[dict]:
execution_context, _ = await self._require_server(context, server_name)
session = self.ap.tool_mgr.mcp_tool_loader.get_session(execution_context, server_name)
if not session:
return []
logs = list(session._log_buffer)
if level:
logs = [log for log in logs if log.get('level') == level]
return logs[-limit:]