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* Document multi-tenant workspace architecture * Add OSS and commercial workspace boundaries * docs: redesign multi-tenant workspace architecture * feat(tenancy): implement workspace isolation * docs(tenancy): record verification evidence * docs(tenancy): revise single-instance SaaS topology * docs(tenancy): refine architecture options * docs: finalize cloud v2 multi-tenant decisions * feat(tenancy): establish cloud isolation foundations * feat(tenancy): harden shared cloud runtime boundaries * docs(tenancy): record final isolation verification * fix(tenancy): close isolation and permission gaps * docs(tenancy): record final isolation verification * feat(tenancy): connect cloud workspace control plane * fix(build): install git for pinned SDK * docs(cloud): update control plane verification * chore: update multi-tenant SDK pin * fix(cloud): skip legacy model sync during startup * test(cloud): preserve minimal model manager fixtures * fix(cloud): preserve authenticated account context * fix(cloud): reuse authenticated account for user info * feat(cloud): complete Workspace settings navigation * test(web): cover Workspace dropdown menu * feat(web): place workspace controls in sidebar * refactor(web): streamline workspace controls * style(web): format workspace layout test * fix(cloud): surface runtime and workspace plan status * fix(plugin): keep runtime identity stable across restarts * fix(ui): widen and center workspace switcher * fix(ui): hide roles from workspace switcher * fix(ui): align workspace switcher with sidebar entries * feat(workspace): add in-product collaboration and direct Cloud launch * style: format collaboration changes * fix(workspace): bind collaboration APIs to tenant UoW * fix(cloud): preserve Core-owned collaboration state * test(cloud): require Space identity for invite registration * feat(cloud): complete secure invitation experience * style(web): format invitation flows * fix(cloud): recover box runtime without unscoped skill reload * feat(oss): enforce invitation account and owner billing flows * style: format OSS account service * test(oss): cover invitation logout handoff * fix(oss): resolve workspace owner in scoped session * feat(cloud): harden multi-tenant runtime resources * fix(cloud): bound runtime restart storms * fix(cloud): eliminate periodic runtime CPU spikes * fix(cloud): enforce instance capacity ceilings * fix(cloud): scope public login capability discovery * fix(cloud): bound tenant maintenance and monitoring work * fix(runtime): bound tenant resource amplification * fix(deps): pin green multi-tenant plugin SDK * fix(cloud): handle unavailable skill capability * fix(security): require authentication for image file endpoint (H-2) - Changed /api/v1/files/image from AuthType.NONE to USER_TOKEN_OR_API_KEY - Added Permission.RESOURCE_VIEW requirement - Prevents unauthenticated cross-tenant file access via leaked keys - Fixes HIGH severity finding from multi-tenant security review docs: add comprehensive database migration guide - Complete migration steps for OSS → multi-tenant - Backup, execution, verification procedures - Rollback scenarios and recovery plans - Performance tuning recommendations * test: add comprehensive cross-tenant isolation tests Added 7 critical test scenarios for multi-tenant boundaries: - Cross-tenant bot access prevention - Viewer role read-only enforcement - Removed member immediate access revocation - Model provider credential isolation - WebSocket message isolation - Invitation token workspace scoping - Multi-workspace context validation These tests address P0-2 coverage gaps for: - workspaces.py (membership & invitation flows) - user.py (authentication & authorization) - websocket_chat.py (real-time isolation) - plugins.py (resource access control) docs: finalize database migration guide * fix(security): resolve M-1, M-2, M-3 security findings M-1: WebSocket authorization TOCTOU race (FIXED) - Changed _revalidate_websocket_authorization to return RequestContext - Ensures validated context is used immediately without race window - Prevents removed members from sending messages during revalidation gap M-2: Model Manager cache workspace isolation (VERIFIED) - Confirmed _CacheKey already uses 4-tuple: (instance, workspace, generation, resource) - Cache is properly scoped per workspace, no cross-tenant leakage possible - No code change needed, documented as working correctly M-3: Invitation lock workspace scoping (FIXED) - Changed lock key from token_digest to workspace_uuid:token_digest - Prevents DoS where attacker locks token in Workspace A to block Workspace B - Locks now isolated per workspace All MEDIUM severity findings from security review now resolved. * fix(cloud): unblock tenant CI and enforce knowledge quotas * fix(tenancy): scope rerank model sync --------- Co-authored-by: dadachann <[email protected]>
98 lines
3.7 KiB
Python
98 lines
3.7 KiB
Python
from __future__ import annotations
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import re
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from typing import Any
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from urllib.parse import unquote, urlparse
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_GITHUB_OWNER_PATTERN = re.compile(r'^[A-Za-z0-9](?:[A-Za-z0-9-]{0,38})$')
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_GITHUB_REPO_PATTERN = re.compile(r'^[A-Za-z0-9._-]{1,100}$')
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def _positive_github_id(value: object, field_name: str) -> int:
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if isinstance(value, bool):
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raise ValueError(f'{field_name} must be a positive GitHub identifier')
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try:
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identifier = int(value)
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except (TypeError, ValueError) as exc:
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raise ValueError(f'{field_name} must be a positive GitHub identifier') from exc
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if identifier <= 0 or str(value).strip() != str(identifier):
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raise ValueError(f'{field_name} must be a positive GitHub identifier')
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return identifier
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def validate_github_release_asset_url(
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asset_url: object,
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*,
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owner: str,
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repo: str,
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release_tag: str,
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) -> str:
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"""Accept only a GitHub browser release URL tied to the requested release."""
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normalized_url = str(asset_url or '').strip()
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parsed = urlparse(normalized_url)
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try:
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port = parsed.port
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except ValueError as exc:
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raise ValueError('asset_url has an invalid port') from exc
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if (
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parsed.scheme != 'https'
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or (parsed.hostname or '').lower() != 'github.com'
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or parsed.username is not None
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or parsed.password is not None
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or port not in {None, 443}
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or parsed.fragment
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):
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raise ValueError('asset_url must be an HTTPS GitHub release asset URL')
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decoded_path = unquote(parsed.path)
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expected_prefix = f'/{owner}/{repo}/releases/download/{release_tag}/'
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if not decoded_path.casefold().startswith(
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f'/{owner}/{repo}/releases/download/'.casefold()
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) or not decoded_path.startswith(expected_prefix):
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raise ValueError('asset_url does not match the requested GitHub release')
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if decoded_path == expected_prefix or decoded_path.endswith('/'):
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raise ValueError('asset_url must identify a GitHub release asset')
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return normalized_url
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def validate_github_plugin_install_info(install_info: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
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"""Normalize a GitHub install request without trusting a tenant-provided URL."""
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owner = str(install_info.get('owner') or '').strip()
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repo = str(install_info.get('repo') or '').strip()
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release_tag = str(install_info.get('release_tag') or '').strip()
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if _GITHUB_OWNER_PATTERN.fullmatch(owner) is None:
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raise ValueError('owner must be a valid GitHub repository owner')
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if _GITHUB_REPO_PATTERN.fullmatch(repo) is None:
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raise ValueError('repo must be a valid GitHub repository name')
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if not release_tag or '\x00' in release_tag or len(release_tag) > 255:
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raise ValueError('release_tag must identify a GitHub release')
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release_id_value = install_info.get('release_id')
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asset_id_value = install_info.get('asset_id')
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normalized = dict(install_info)
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normalized.update(
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{
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'owner': owner,
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'repo': repo,
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'release_tag': release_tag,
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'github_url': f'https://github.com/{owner}/{repo}',
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}
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)
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if release_id_value is not None or asset_id_value is not None:
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if release_id_value is None or asset_id_value is None:
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raise ValueError('release_id and asset_id must be provided together')
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normalized['release_id'] = _positive_github_id(release_id_value, 'release_id')
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normalized['asset_id'] = _positive_github_id(asset_id_value, 'asset_id')
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normalized.pop('asset_url', None)
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return normalized
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normalized['asset_url'] = validate_github_release_asset_url(
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install_info.get('asset_url'),
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owner=owner,
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repo=repo,
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release_tag=release_tag,
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)
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return normalized
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