Files
LangBot/src/langbot/pkg/api/http/service/secrets.py
T
RockChinQ e1ac5e0fc8 feat(tenancy): add Workspace multi-tenant foundation (#2353)
* Document multi-tenant workspace architecture

* Add OSS and commercial workspace boundaries

* docs: redesign multi-tenant workspace architecture

* feat(tenancy): implement workspace isolation

* docs(tenancy): record verification evidence

* docs(tenancy): revise single-instance SaaS topology

* docs(tenancy): refine architecture options

* docs: finalize cloud v2 multi-tenant decisions

* feat(tenancy): establish cloud isolation foundations

* feat(tenancy): harden shared cloud runtime boundaries

* docs(tenancy): record final isolation verification

* fix(tenancy): close isolation and permission gaps

* docs(tenancy): record final isolation verification

* feat(tenancy): connect cloud workspace control plane

* fix(build): install git for pinned SDK

* docs(cloud): update control plane verification

* chore: update multi-tenant SDK pin

* fix(cloud): skip legacy model sync during startup

* test(cloud): preserve minimal model manager fixtures

* fix(cloud): preserve authenticated account context

* fix(cloud): reuse authenticated account for user info

* feat(cloud): complete Workspace settings navigation

* test(web): cover Workspace dropdown menu

* feat(web): place workspace controls in sidebar

* refactor(web): streamline workspace controls

* style(web): format workspace layout test

* fix(cloud): surface runtime and workspace plan status

* fix(plugin): keep runtime identity stable across restarts

* fix(ui): widen and center workspace switcher

* fix(ui): hide roles from workspace switcher

* fix(ui): align workspace switcher with sidebar entries

* feat(workspace): add in-product collaboration and direct Cloud launch

* style: format collaboration changes

* fix(workspace): bind collaboration APIs to tenant UoW

* fix(cloud): preserve Core-owned collaboration state

* test(cloud): require Space identity for invite registration

* feat(cloud): complete secure invitation experience

* style(web): format invitation flows

* fix(cloud): recover box runtime without unscoped skill reload

* feat(oss): enforce invitation account and owner billing flows

* style: format OSS account service

* test(oss): cover invitation logout handoff

* fix(oss): resolve workspace owner in scoped session

* feat(cloud): harden multi-tenant runtime resources

* fix(cloud): bound runtime restart storms

* fix(cloud): eliminate periodic runtime CPU spikes

* fix(cloud): enforce instance capacity ceilings

* fix(cloud): scope public login capability discovery

* fix(cloud): bound tenant maintenance and monitoring work

* fix(runtime): bound tenant resource amplification

* fix(deps): pin green multi-tenant plugin SDK

* fix(cloud): handle unavailable skill capability

* fix(security): require authentication for image file endpoint (H-2)

- Changed /api/v1/files/image from AuthType.NONE to USER_TOKEN_OR_API_KEY
- Added Permission.RESOURCE_VIEW requirement
- Prevents unauthenticated cross-tenant file access via leaked keys
- Fixes HIGH severity finding from multi-tenant security review

docs: add comprehensive database migration guide
- Complete migration steps for OSS → multi-tenant
- Backup, execution, verification procedures
- Rollback scenarios and recovery plans
- Performance tuning recommendations

* test: add comprehensive cross-tenant isolation tests

Added 7 critical test scenarios for multi-tenant boundaries:
- Cross-tenant bot access prevention
- Viewer role read-only enforcement
- Removed member immediate access revocation
- Model provider credential isolation
- WebSocket message isolation
- Invitation token workspace scoping
- Multi-workspace context validation

These tests address P0-2 coverage gaps for:
- workspaces.py (membership & invitation flows)
- user.py (authentication & authorization)
- websocket_chat.py (real-time isolation)
- plugins.py (resource access control)

docs: finalize database migration guide

* fix(security): resolve M-1, M-2, M-3 security findings

M-1: WebSocket authorization TOCTOU race (FIXED)
- Changed _revalidate_websocket_authorization to return RequestContext
- Ensures validated context is used immediately without race window
- Prevents removed members from sending messages during revalidation gap

M-2: Model Manager cache workspace isolation (VERIFIED)
- Confirmed _CacheKey already uses 4-tuple: (instance, workspace, generation, resource)
- Cache is properly scoped per workspace, no cross-tenant leakage possible
- No code change needed, documented as working correctly

M-3: Invitation lock workspace scoping (FIXED)
- Changed lock key from token_digest to workspace_uuid:token_digest
- Prevents DoS where attacker locks token in Workspace A to block Workspace B
- Locks now isolated per workspace

All MEDIUM severity findings from security review now resolved.

* fix(cloud): unblock tenant CI and enforce knowledge quotas

* fix(tenancy): scope rerank model sync

---------

Co-authored-by: dadachann <185672915+dadachann@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-07-30 21:43:35 +08:00

337 lines
11 KiB
Python

from __future__ import annotations
import copy
import re
from urllib.parse import parse_qsl, urlencode, urlsplit, urlunsplit
SECRET_MASK = '***'
_MISSING_SECRET = object()
_SENSITIVE_NAMES = frozenset(
{
'api_key',
'api_keys',
'apikey',
'apikeys',
'auth',
'authorization',
'cookie',
'credentials',
'database_url',
'dsn',
'header_value',
'key',
'proxy_authorization',
'set_cookie',
'webhook_url',
}
)
_SENSITIVE_TOKENS = frozenset(
{
'apikey',
'credential',
'credentials',
'passwd',
'password',
'secret',
'token',
}
)
_KEY_QUALIFIERS = frozenset(
{
'access',
'api',
'auth',
'bearer',
'client',
'debug',
'encryption',
'private',
'signing',
}
)
_SENSITIVE_URL_QUERY_NAMES = frozenset(
{
'code',
'credential',
'credentials',
'password',
'passwd',
'sig',
'signature',
}
)
def _normalize_key(key: object) -> str:
value = re.sub(r'([a-z0-9])([A-Z])', r'\1_\2', str(key or ''))
return re.sub(r'[^a-zA-Z0-9]+', '_', value).strip('_').lower()
def is_sensitive_key(key: object) -> bool:
"""Return whether a configuration key conventionally carries a secret."""
normalized = _normalize_key(key)
if normalized in _SENSITIVE_NAMES:
return True
tokens = frozenset(token for token in normalized.split('_') if token)
if tokens & _SENSITIVE_TOKENS:
return True
return bool(tokens & {'key', 'keys'}) and bool(tokens & _KEY_QUALIFIERS)
def is_url_key(key: object) -> bool:
"""Return whether a configuration field conventionally carries a URL."""
normalized = _normalize_key(key)
return normalized == 'url' or normalized.endswith('_url')
def _is_sensitive_url_query_key(key: object) -> bool:
normalized = _normalize_key(key)
return (
is_sensitive_key(key) or normalized in _SENSITIVE_URL_QUERY_NAMES or normalized.endswith(('_sig', '_signature'))
)
def _redact_url_string(value: str) -> str:
if not value:
return value
try:
parsed = urlsplit(value)
netloc = parsed.netloc
if '@' in netloc:
_, host = netloc.rsplit('@', 1)
netloc = f'{SECRET_MASK}@{host}'
query = urlencode(
[
(key, SECRET_MASK if _is_sensitive_url_query_key(key) and item else item)
for key, item in parse_qsl(parsed.query, keep_blank_values=True)
],
doseq=True,
safe='*',
)
return urlunsplit((parsed.scheme, netloc, parsed.path, query, parsed.fragment))
except (TypeError, ValueError):
# A malformed URL cannot be safely decomposed, so fail closed.
return SECRET_MASK
def redact_url_secrets(value):
"""Redact URL userinfo and credential-like query values."""
if isinstance(value, str):
return _redact_url_string(value)
if isinstance(value, list):
return [redact_url_secrets(item) for item in value]
if isinstance(value, tuple):
return tuple(redact_url_secrets(item) for item in value)
return copy.deepcopy(value)
def _contains_url_secret_placeholder(value) -> bool:
if isinstance(value, str):
if value == SECRET_MASK:
return True
try:
parsed = urlsplit(value)
if '@' in parsed.netloc and SECRET_MASK in parsed.netloc.rsplit('@', 1)[0]:
return True
return any(
item == SECRET_MASK and _is_sensitive_url_query_key(key)
for key, item in parse_qsl(parsed.query, keep_blank_values=True)
)
except (TypeError, ValueError):
return False
if isinstance(value, (list, tuple)):
return any(_contains_url_secret_placeholder(item) for item in value)
return False
def _restore_url_string(value: str, current_value) -> str:
if value == SECRET_MASK:
if current_value is _MISSING_SECRET:
raise ValueError('Masked URL secret has no existing value')
return copy.deepcopy(current_value)
try:
submitted = urlsplit(value)
except (TypeError, ValueError):
return value
current = None
if isinstance(current_value, str):
try:
current = urlsplit(current_value)
except (TypeError, ValueError):
current = None
netloc = submitted.netloc
if '@' in netloc:
submitted_userinfo, host = netloc.rsplit('@', 1)
if SECRET_MASK in submitted_userinfo:
if current is None or '@' not in current.netloc:
raise ValueError('Masked URL userinfo has no existing value')
current_userinfo, _ = current.netloc.rsplit('@', 1)
netloc = f'{current_userinfo}@{host}'
current_query: dict[str, list[str]] = {}
if current is not None:
for key, item in parse_qsl(current.query, keep_blank_values=True):
current_query.setdefault(_normalize_key(key), []).append(item)
consumed: dict[str, int] = {}
restored_query: list[tuple[str, str]] = []
for key, item in parse_qsl(submitted.query, keep_blank_values=True):
normalized = _normalize_key(key)
if item == SECRET_MASK and _is_sensitive_url_query_key(key):
index = consumed.get(normalized, 0)
candidates = current_query.get(normalized, [])
if index >= len(candidates):
raise ValueError('Masked URL query secret has no existing value')
item = candidates[index]
consumed[normalized] = index + 1
restored_query.append((key, item))
return urlunsplit(
(
submitted.scheme,
netloc,
submitted.path,
urlencode(restored_query, doseq=True, safe='*'),
submitted.fragment,
)
)
def restore_url_secret_placeholders(value, current_value=_MISSING_SECRET):
"""Restore URL placeholders from the corresponding persisted URL."""
if isinstance(value, str):
return _restore_url_string(value, current_value)
if isinstance(value, list):
current_items = current_value if isinstance(current_value, (list, tuple)) else ()
return [
restore_url_secret_placeholders(
item,
current_items[index] if index < len(current_items) else _MISSING_SECRET,
)
for index, item in enumerate(value)
]
if isinstance(value, tuple):
current_items = current_value if isinstance(current_value, (list, tuple)) else ()
return tuple(
restore_url_secret_placeholders(
item,
current_items[index] if index < len(current_items) else _MISSING_SECRET,
)
for index, item in enumerate(value)
)
return copy.deepcopy(value)
def mask_secret_value(value):
"""Return a shape-preserving copy whose non-empty leaves are masked."""
if isinstance(value, dict):
return {key: mask_secret_value(item) for key, item in value.items()}
if isinstance(value, list):
return [mask_secret_value(item) for item in value]
if isinstance(value, tuple):
return tuple(mask_secret_value(item) for item in value)
if value is None or value == '':
return value
return SECRET_MASK
def redact_secrets(value):
"""Return a recursively redacted copy without mutating the source value."""
if isinstance(value, dict):
return {
key: (
mask_secret_value(item)
if is_sensitive_key(key)
else redact_url_secrets(item)
if is_url_key(key)
else redact_secrets(item)
)
for key, item in value.items()
}
if isinstance(value, list):
return [redact_secrets(item) for item in value]
if isinstance(value, tuple):
return tuple(redact_secrets(item) for item in value)
return copy.deepcopy(value)
def restore_secret_placeholders(value, current_value=_MISSING_SECRET, *, sensitive: bool = False):
"""Restore masked leaves from existing data before a management write.
``***`` is a reserved placeholder only inside a sensitive field. A masked
leaf without an existing counterpart is rejected so it can never become a
persisted credential. Empty values and explicit replacements pass through.
"""
if sensitive and value == SECRET_MASK:
if current_value is _MISSING_SECRET:
raise ValueError('Masked secret has no existing value')
return copy.deepcopy(current_value)
if isinstance(value, dict):
current_mapping = current_value if isinstance(current_value, dict) else {}
return {
key: (
restore_url_secret_placeholders(
item,
current_mapping.get(key, _MISSING_SECRET),
)
if not sensitive and not is_sensitive_key(key) and is_url_key(key)
else restore_secret_placeholders(
item,
current_mapping.get(key, _MISSING_SECRET),
sensitive=sensitive or is_sensitive_key(key),
)
)
for key, item in value.items()
}
if isinstance(value, list):
current_items = current_value if isinstance(current_value, (list, tuple)) else ()
return [
restore_secret_placeholders(
item,
current_items[index] if index < len(current_items) else _MISSING_SECRET,
sensitive=sensitive,
)
for index, item in enumerate(value)
]
if isinstance(value, tuple):
current_items = current_value if isinstance(current_value, (list, tuple)) else ()
return tuple(
restore_secret_placeholders(
item,
current_items[index] if index < len(current_items) else _MISSING_SECRET,
sensitive=sensitive,
)
for index, item in enumerate(value)
)
return copy.deepcopy(value)
def contains_secret_placeholder(value, *, sensitive: bool = False) -> bool:
"""Return whether ``value`` contains a meaningful masked secret leaf."""
if sensitive and value == SECRET_MASK:
return True
if isinstance(value, dict):
return any(
(
_contains_url_secret_placeholder(item)
if not sensitive and not is_sensitive_key(key) and is_url_key(key)
else contains_secret_placeholder(item, sensitive=sensitive or is_sensitive_key(key))
)
for key, item in value.items()
)
if isinstance(value, (list, tuple)):
return any(contains_secret_placeholder(item, sensitive=sensitive) for item in value)
return False