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e1ac5e0fc8
* Document multi-tenant workspace architecture * Add OSS and commercial workspace boundaries * docs: redesign multi-tenant workspace architecture * feat(tenancy): implement workspace isolation * docs(tenancy): record verification evidence * docs(tenancy): revise single-instance SaaS topology * docs(tenancy): refine architecture options * docs: finalize cloud v2 multi-tenant decisions * feat(tenancy): establish cloud isolation foundations * feat(tenancy): harden shared cloud runtime boundaries * docs(tenancy): record final isolation verification * fix(tenancy): close isolation and permission gaps * docs(tenancy): record final isolation verification * feat(tenancy): connect cloud workspace control plane * fix(build): install git for pinned SDK * docs(cloud): update control plane verification * chore: update multi-tenant SDK pin * fix(cloud): skip legacy model sync during startup * test(cloud): preserve minimal model manager fixtures * fix(cloud): preserve authenticated account context * fix(cloud): reuse authenticated account for user info * feat(cloud): complete Workspace settings navigation * test(web): cover Workspace dropdown menu * feat(web): place workspace controls in sidebar * refactor(web): streamline workspace controls * style(web): format workspace layout test * fix(cloud): surface runtime and workspace plan status * fix(plugin): keep runtime identity stable across restarts * fix(ui): widen and center workspace switcher * fix(ui): hide roles from workspace switcher * fix(ui): align workspace switcher with sidebar entries * feat(workspace): add in-product collaboration and direct Cloud launch * style: format collaboration changes * fix(workspace): bind collaboration APIs to tenant UoW * fix(cloud): preserve Core-owned collaboration state * test(cloud): require Space identity for invite registration * feat(cloud): complete secure invitation experience * style(web): format invitation flows * fix(cloud): recover box runtime without unscoped skill reload * feat(oss): enforce invitation account and owner billing flows * style: format OSS account service * test(oss): cover invitation logout handoff * fix(oss): resolve workspace owner in scoped session * feat(cloud): harden multi-tenant runtime resources * fix(cloud): bound runtime restart storms * fix(cloud): eliminate periodic runtime CPU spikes * fix(cloud): enforce instance capacity ceilings * fix(cloud): scope public login capability discovery * fix(cloud): bound tenant maintenance and monitoring work * fix(runtime): bound tenant resource amplification * fix(deps): pin green multi-tenant plugin SDK * fix(cloud): handle unavailable skill capability * fix(security): require authentication for image file endpoint (H-2) - Changed /api/v1/files/image from AuthType.NONE to USER_TOKEN_OR_API_KEY - Added Permission.RESOURCE_VIEW requirement - Prevents unauthenticated cross-tenant file access via leaked keys - Fixes HIGH severity finding from multi-tenant security review docs: add comprehensive database migration guide - Complete migration steps for OSS → multi-tenant - Backup, execution, verification procedures - Rollback scenarios and recovery plans - Performance tuning recommendations * test: add comprehensive cross-tenant isolation tests Added 7 critical test scenarios for multi-tenant boundaries: - Cross-tenant bot access prevention - Viewer role read-only enforcement - Removed member immediate access revocation - Model provider credential isolation - WebSocket message isolation - Invitation token workspace scoping - Multi-workspace context validation These tests address P0-2 coverage gaps for: - workspaces.py (membership & invitation flows) - user.py (authentication & authorization) - websocket_chat.py (real-time isolation) - plugins.py (resource access control) docs: finalize database migration guide * fix(security): resolve M-1, M-2, M-3 security findings M-1: WebSocket authorization TOCTOU race (FIXED) - Changed _revalidate_websocket_authorization to return RequestContext - Ensures validated context is used immediately without race window - Prevents removed members from sending messages during revalidation gap M-2: Model Manager cache workspace isolation (VERIFIED) - Confirmed _CacheKey already uses 4-tuple: (instance, workspace, generation, resource) - Cache is properly scoped per workspace, no cross-tenant leakage possible - No code change needed, documented as working correctly M-3: Invitation lock workspace scoping (FIXED) - Changed lock key from token_digest to workspace_uuid:token_digest - Prevents DoS where attacker locks token in Workspace A to block Workspace B - Locks now isolated per workspace All MEDIUM severity findings from security review now resolved. * fix(cloud): unblock tenant CI and enforce knowledge quotas * fix(tenancy): scope rerank model sync --------- Co-authored-by: dadachann <185672915+dadachann@users.noreply.github.com>
337 lines
11 KiB
Python
337 lines
11 KiB
Python
from __future__ import annotations
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import copy
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import re
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from urllib.parse import parse_qsl, urlencode, urlsplit, urlunsplit
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SECRET_MASK = '***'
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_MISSING_SECRET = object()
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_SENSITIVE_NAMES = frozenset(
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{
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'api_key',
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'api_keys',
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'apikey',
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'apikeys',
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'auth',
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'authorization',
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'cookie',
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'credentials',
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'database_url',
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'dsn',
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'header_value',
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'key',
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'proxy_authorization',
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'set_cookie',
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'webhook_url',
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}
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)
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_SENSITIVE_TOKENS = frozenset(
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{
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'apikey',
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'credential',
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'credentials',
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'passwd',
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'password',
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'secret',
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'token',
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}
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)
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_KEY_QUALIFIERS = frozenset(
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{
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'access',
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'api',
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'auth',
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'bearer',
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'client',
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'debug',
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'encryption',
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'private',
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'signing',
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}
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)
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_SENSITIVE_URL_QUERY_NAMES = frozenset(
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{
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'code',
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'credential',
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'credentials',
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'password',
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'passwd',
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'sig',
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'signature',
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}
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)
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def _normalize_key(key: object) -> str:
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value = re.sub(r'([a-z0-9])([A-Z])', r'\1_\2', str(key or ''))
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return re.sub(r'[^a-zA-Z0-9]+', '_', value).strip('_').lower()
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def is_sensitive_key(key: object) -> bool:
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"""Return whether a configuration key conventionally carries a secret."""
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normalized = _normalize_key(key)
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if normalized in _SENSITIVE_NAMES:
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return True
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tokens = frozenset(token for token in normalized.split('_') if token)
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if tokens & _SENSITIVE_TOKENS:
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return True
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return bool(tokens & {'key', 'keys'}) and bool(tokens & _KEY_QUALIFIERS)
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def is_url_key(key: object) -> bool:
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"""Return whether a configuration field conventionally carries a URL."""
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normalized = _normalize_key(key)
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return normalized == 'url' or normalized.endswith('_url')
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def _is_sensitive_url_query_key(key: object) -> bool:
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normalized = _normalize_key(key)
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return (
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is_sensitive_key(key) or normalized in _SENSITIVE_URL_QUERY_NAMES or normalized.endswith(('_sig', '_signature'))
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)
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def _redact_url_string(value: str) -> str:
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if not value:
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return value
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try:
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parsed = urlsplit(value)
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netloc = parsed.netloc
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if '@' in netloc:
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_, host = netloc.rsplit('@', 1)
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netloc = f'{SECRET_MASK}@{host}'
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query = urlencode(
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[
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(key, SECRET_MASK if _is_sensitive_url_query_key(key) and item else item)
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for key, item in parse_qsl(parsed.query, keep_blank_values=True)
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],
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doseq=True,
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safe='*',
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)
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return urlunsplit((parsed.scheme, netloc, parsed.path, query, parsed.fragment))
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except (TypeError, ValueError):
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# A malformed URL cannot be safely decomposed, so fail closed.
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return SECRET_MASK
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def redact_url_secrets(value):
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"""Redact URL userinfo and credential-like query values."""
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if isinstance(value, str):
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return _redact_url_string(value)
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if isinstance(value, list):
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return [redact_url_secrets(item) for item in value]
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if isinstance(value, tuple):
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return tuple(redact_url_secrets(item) for item in value)
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return copy.deepcopy(value)
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def _contains_url_secret_placeholder(value) -> bool:
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if isinstance(value, str):
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if value == SECRET_MASK:
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return True
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try:
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parsed = urlsplit(value)
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if '@' in parsed.netloc and SECRET_MASK in parsed.netloc.rsplit('@', 1)[0]:
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return True
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return any(
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item == SECRET_MASK and _is_sensitive_url_query_key(key)
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for key, item in parse_qsl(parsed.query, keep_blank_values=True)
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)
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except (TypeError, ValueError):
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return False
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if isinstance(value, (list, tuple)):
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return any(_contains_url_secret_placeholder(item) for item in value)
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return False
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def _restore_url_string(value: str, current_value) -> str:
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if value == SECRET_MASK:
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if current_value is _MISSING_SECRET:
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raise ValueError('Masked URL secret has no existing value')
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return copy.deepcopy(current_value)
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try:
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submitted = urlsplit(value)
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except (TypeError, ValueError):
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return value
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current = None
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if isinstance(current_value, str):
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try:
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current = urlsplit(current_value)
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except (TypeError, ValueError):
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current = None
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netloc = submitted.netloc
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if '@' in netloc:
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submitted_userinfo, host = netloc.rsplit('@', 1)
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if SECRET_MASK in submitted_userinfo:
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if current is None or '@' not in current.netloc:
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raise ValueError('Masked URL userinfo has no existing value')
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current_userinfo, _ = current.netloc.rsplit('@', 1)
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netloc = f'{current_userinfo}@{host}'
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current_query: dict[str, list[str]] = {}
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if current is not None:
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for key, item in parse_qsl(current.query, keep_blank_values=True):
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current_query.setdefault(_normalize_key(key), []).append(item)
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consumed: dict[str, int] = {}
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restored_query: list[tuple[str, str]] = []
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for key, item in parse_qsl(submitted.query, keep_blank_values=True):
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normalized = _normalize_key(key)
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if item == SECRET_MASK and _is_sensitive_url_query_key(key):
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index = consumed.get(normalized, 0)
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candidates = current_query.get(normalized, [])
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if index >= len(candidates):
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raise ValueError('Masked URL query secret has no existing value')
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item = candidates[index]
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consumed[normalized] = index + 1
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restored_query.append((key, item))
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return urlunsplit(
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(
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submitted.scheme,
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netloc,
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submitted.path,
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urlencode(restored_query, doseq=True, safe='*'),
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submitted.fragment,
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)
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)
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def restore_url_secret_placeholders(value, current_value=_MISSING_SECRET):
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"""Restore URL placeholders from the corresponding persisted URL."""
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if isinstance(value, str):
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return _restore_url_string(value, current_value)
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if isinstance(value, list):
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current_items = current_value if isinstance(current_value, (list, tuple)) else ()
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return [
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restore_url_secret_placeholders(
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item,
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current_items[index] if index < len(current_items) else _MISSING_SECRET,
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)
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for index, item in enumerate(value)
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]
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if isinstance(value, tuple):
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current_items = current_value if isinstance(current_value, (list, tuple)) else ()
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return tuple(
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restore_url_secret_placeholders(
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item,
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current_items[index] if index < len(current_items) else _MISSING_SECRET,
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)
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for index, item in enumerate(value)
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)
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return copy.deepcopy(value)
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def mask_secret_value(value):
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"""Return a shape-preserving copy whose non-empty leaves are masked."""
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if isinstance(value, dict):
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return {key: mask_secret_value(item) for key, item in value.items()}
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if isinstance(value, list):
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return [mask_secret_value(item) for item in value]
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if isinstance(value, tuple):
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return tuple(mask_secret_value(item) for item in value)
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if value is None or value == '':
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return value
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return SECRET_MASK
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def redact_secrets(value):
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"""Return a recursively redacted copy without mutating the source value."""
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if isinstance(value, dict):
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return {
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key: (
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mask_secret_value(item)
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if is_sensitive_key(key)
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else redact_url_secrets(item)
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if is_url_key(key)
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else redact_secrets(item)
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)
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for key, item in value.items()
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}
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if isinstance(value, list):
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return [redact_secrets(item) for item in value]
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if isinstance(value, tuple):
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return tuple(redact_secrets(item) for item in value)
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return copy.deepcopy(value)
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def restore_secret_placeholders(value, current_value=_MISSING_SECRET, *, sensitive: bool = False):
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"""Restore masked leaves from existing data before a management write.
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``***`` is a reserved placeholder only inside a sensitive field. A masked
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leaf without an existing counterpart is rejected so it can never become a
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persisted credential. Empty values and explicit replacements pass through.
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"""
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if sensitive and value == SECRET_MASK:
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if current_value is _MISSING_SECRET:
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raise ValueError('Masked secret has no existing value')
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return copy.deepcopy(current_value)
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if isinstance(value, dict):
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current_mapping = current_value if isinstance(current_value, dict) else {}
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return {
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key: (
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restore_url_secret_placeholders(
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item,
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current_mapping.get(key, _MISSING_SECRET),
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)
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if not sensitive and not is_sensitive_key(key) and is_url_key(key)
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else restore_secret_placeholders(
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item,
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current_mapping.get(key, _MISSING_SECRET),
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sensitive=sensitive or is_sensitive_key(key),
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)
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)
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for key, item in value.items()
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}
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if isinstance(value, list):
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current_items = current_value if isinstance(current_value, (list, tuple)) else ()
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return [
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restore_secret_placeholders(
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item,
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current_items[index] if index < len(current_items) else _MISSING_SECRET,
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sensitive=sensitive,
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)
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for index, item in enumerate(value)
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]
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if isinstance(value, tuple):
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current_items = current_value if isinstance(current_value, (list, tuple)) else ()
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return tuple(
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restore_secret_placeholders(
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item,
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current_items[index] if index < len(current_items) else _MISSING_SECRET,
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sensitive=sensitive,
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)
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for index, item in enumerate(value)
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)
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return copy.deepcopy(value)
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def contains_secret_placeholder(value, *, sensitive: bool = False) -> bool:
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"""Return whether ``value`` contains a meaningful masked secret leaf."""
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if sensitive and value == SECRET_MASK:
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return True
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if isinstance(value, dict):
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return any(
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(
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_contains_url_secret_placeholder(item)
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if not sensitive and not is_sensitive_key(key) and is_url_key(key)
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else contains_secret_placeholder(item, sensitive=sensitive or is_sensitive_key(key))
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)
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for key, item in value.items()
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)
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if isinstance(value, (list, tuple)):
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return any(contains_secret_placeholder(item, sensitive=sensitive) for item in value)
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return False
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