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https://github.com/langbot-app/LangBot.git
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e1ac5e0fc8
* Document multi-tenant workspace architecture * Add OSS and commercial workspace boundaries * docs: redesign multi-tenant workspace architecture * feat(tenancy): implement workspace isolation * docs(tenancy): record verification evidence * docs(tenancy): revise single-instance SaaS topology * docs(tenancy): refine architecture options * docs: finalize cloud v2 multi-tenant decisions * feat(tenancy): establish cloud isolation foundations * feat(tenancy): harden shared cloud runtime boundaries * docs(tenancy): record final isolation verification * fix(tenancy): close isolation and permission gaps * docs(tenancy): record final isolation verification * feat(tenancy): connect cloud workspace control plane * fix(build): install git for pinned SDK * docs(cloud): update control plane verification * chore: update multi-tenant SDK pin * fix(cloud): skip legacy model sync during startup * test(cloud): preserve minimal model manager fixtures * fix(cloud): preserve authenticated account context * fix(cloud): reuse authenticated account for user info * feat(cloud): complete Workspace settings navigation * test(web): cover Workspace dropdown menu * feat(web): place workspace controls in sidebar * refactor(web): streamline workspace controls * style(web): format workspace layout test * fix(cloud): surface runtime and workspace plan status * fix(plugin): keep runtime identity stable across restarts * fix(ui): widen and center workspace switcher * fix(ui): hide roles from workspace switcher * fix(ui): align workspace switcher with sidebar entries * feat(workspace): add in-product collaboration and direct Cloud launch * style: format collaboration changes * fix(workspace): bind collaboration APIs to tenant UoW * fix(cloud): preserve Core-owned collaboration state * test(cloud): require Space identity for invite registration * feat(cloud): complete secure invitation experience * style(web): format invitation flows * fix(cloud): recover box runtime without unscoped skill reload * feat(oss): enforce invitation account and owner billing flows * style: format OSS account service * test(oss): cover invitation logout handoff * fix(oss): resolve workspace owner in scoped session * feat(cloud): harden multi-tenant runtime resources * fix(cloud): bound runtime restart storms * fix(cloud): eliminate periodic runtime CPU spikes * fix(cloud): enforce instance capacity ceilings * fix(cloud): scope public login capability discovery * fix(cloud): bound tenant maintenance and monitoring work * fix(runtime): bound tenant resource amplification * fix(deps): pin green multi-tenant plugin SDK * fix(cloud): handle unavailable skill capability * fix(security): require authentication for image file endpoint (H-2) - Changed /api/v1/files/image from AuthType.NONE to USER_TOKEN_OR_API_KEY - Added Permission.RESOURCE_VIEW requirement - Prevents unauthenticated cross-tenant file access via leaked keys - Fixes HIGH severity finding from multi-tenant security review docs: add comprehensive database migration guide - Complete migration steps for OSS → multi-tenant - Backup, execution, verification procedures - Rollback scenarios and recovery plans - Performance tuning recommendations * test: add comprehensive cross-tenant isolation tests Added 7 critical test scenarios for multi-tenant boundaries: - Cross-tenant bot access prevention - Viewer role read-only enforcement - Removed member immediate access revocation - Model provider credential isolation - WebSocket message isolation - Invitation token workspace scoping - Multi-workspace context validation These tests address P0-2 coverage gaps for: - workspaces.py (membership & invitation flows) - user.py (authentication & authorization) - websocket_chat.py (real-time isolation) - plugins.py (resource access control) docs: finalize database migration guide * fix(security): resolve M-1, M-2, M-3 security findings M-1: WebSocket authorization TOCTOU race (FIXED) - Changed _revalidate_websocket_authorization to return RequestContext - Ensures validated context is used immediately without race window - Prevents removed members from sending messages during revalidation gap M-2: Model Manager cache workspace isolation (VERIFIED) - Confirmed _CacheKey already uses 4-tuple: (instance, workspace, generation, resource) - Cache is properly scoped per workspace, no cross-tenant leakage possible - No code change needed, documented as working correctly M-3: Invitation lock workspace scoping (FIXED) - Changed lock key from token_digest to workspace_uuid:token_digest - Prevents DoS where attacker locks token in Workspace A to block Workspace B - Locks now isolated per workspace All MEDIUM severity findings from security review now resolved. * fix(cloud): unblock tenant CI and enforce knowledge quotas * fix(tenancy): scope rerank model sync --------- Co-authored-by: dadachann <185672915+dadachann@users.noreply.github.com>
100 lines
2.9 KiB
Python
100 lines
2.9 KiB
Python
from __future__ import annotations
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import asyncio
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import logging
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from types import SimpleNamespace
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from unittest.mock import AsyncMock
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import pytest
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from langbot.pkg.platform.webhook_pusher import WebhookPusher
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pytestmark = pytest.mark.asyncio
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def _application(max_inflight_requests: object) -> SimpleNamespace:
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return SimpleNamespace(
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instance_config=SimpleNamespace(
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data={
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'webhooks': {
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'max_inflight_requests': max_inflight_requests,
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}
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}
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),
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logger=logging.getLogger(__name__),
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)
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async def test_delivery_admission_never_queues_above_instance_limit():
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pusher = WebhookPusher(_application(2))
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release = asyncio.Event()
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both_started = asyncio.Event()
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calls = 0
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active = 0
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peak_active = 0
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async def fake_push(url: str, payload: dict) -> dict:
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nonlocal calls, active, peak_active
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calls += 1
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active += 1
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peak_active = max(peak_active, active)
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if active == 2:
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both_started.set()
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try:
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await release.wait()
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return {'url': url}
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finally:
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active -= 1
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pusher._push_to_webhook = fake_push
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webhooks = [{'url': f'https://example.invalid/{index}'} for index in range(5)]
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first_delivery = asyncio.create_task(pusher._push_to_webhooks(webhooks, {}))
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await asyncio.wait_for(both_started.wait(), timeout=1)
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second_results = await pusher._push_to_webhooks(webhooks, {})
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release.set()
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first_results = await first_delivery
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assert len(first_results) == 2
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assert second_results == []
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assert calls == 2
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assert peak_active == 2
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assert pusher._inflight_requests == 0
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async def test_cancelled_delivery_reaps_children_and_releases_slots():
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pusher = WebhookPusher(_application(1))
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started = asyncio.Event()
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never = asyncio.Event()
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async def blocking_push(url: str, payload: dict) -> dict:
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started.set()
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await never.wait()
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return {}
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pusher._push_to_webhook = blocking_push
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delivery = asyncio.create_task(
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pusher._push_to_webhooks([{'url': 'https://example.invalid'}], {}),
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)
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await asyncio.wait_for(started.wait(), timeout=1)
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delivery.cancel()
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with pytest.raises(asyncio.CancelledError):
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await delivery
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assert pusher._inflight_requests == 0
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pusher._push_to_webhook = AsyncMock(return_value={})
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assert await pusher._push_to_webhooks([{'url': 'https://example.invalid'}], {}) == [{}]
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async def test_max_inflight_requests_clamps_config():
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pusher = WebhookPusher(_application(999999))
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assert pusher._max_inflight_requests() == 128
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pusher.ap.instance_config.data['webhooks']['max_inflight_requests'] = 0
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assert pusher._max_inflight_requests() == 1
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pusher.ap.instance_config.data['webhooks']['max_inflight_requests'] = 'invalid'
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assert pusher._max_inflight_requests() == 16
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