Files
LangBot/src/langbot/pkg/api/http/controller/groups/survey.py
T
RockChinQ e1ac5e0fc8 feat(tenancy): add Workspace multi-tenant foundation (#2353)
* Document multi-tenant workspace architecture

* Add OSS and commercial workspace boundaries

* docs: redesign multi-tenant workspace architecture

* feat(tenancy): implement workspace isolation

* docs(tenancy): record verification evidence

* docs(tenancy): revise single-instance SaaS topology

* docs(tenancy): refine architecture options

* docs: finalize cloud v2 multi-tenant decisions

* feat(tenancy): establish cloud isolation foundations

* feat(tenancy): harden shared cloud runtime boundaries

* docs(tenancy): record final isolation verification

* fix(tenancy): close isolation and permission gaps

* docs(tenancy): record final isolation verification

* feat(tenancy): connect cloud workspace control plane

* fix(build): install git for pinned SDK

* docs(cloud): update control plane verification

* chore: update multi-tenant SDK pin

* fix(cloud): skip legacy model sync during startup

* test(cloud): preserve minimal model manager fixtures

* fix(cloud): preserve authenticated account context

* fix(cloud): reuse authenticated account for user info

* feat(cloud): complete Workspace settings navigation

* test(web): cover Workspace dropdown menu

* feat(web): place workspace controls in sidebar

* refactor(web): streamline workspace controls

* style(web): format workspace layout test

* fix(cloud): surface runtime and workspace plan status

* fix(plugin): keep runtime identity stable across restarts

* fix(ui): widen and center workspace switcher

* fix(ui): hide roles from workspace switcher

* fix(ui): align workspace switcher with sidebar entries

* feat(workspace): add in-product collaboration and direct Cloud launch

* style: format collaboration changes

* fix(workspace): bind collaboration APIs to tenant UoW

* fix(cloud): preserve Core-owned collaboration state

* test(cloud): require Space identity for invite registration

* feat(cloud): complete secure invitation experience

* style(web): format invitation flows

* fix(cloud): recover box runtime without unscoped skill reload

* feat(oss): enforce invitation account and owner billing flows

* style: format OSS account service

* test(oss): cover invitation logout handoff

* fix(oss): resolve workspace owner in scoped session

* feat(cloud): harden multi-tenant runtime resources

* fix(cloud): bound runtime restart storms

* fix(cloud): eliminate periodic runtime CPU spikes

* fix(cloud): enforce instance capacity ceilings

* fix(cloud): scope public login capability discovery

* fix(cloud): bound tenant maintenance and monitoring work

* fix(runtime): bound tenant resource amplification

* fix(deps): pin green multi-tenant plugin SDK

* fix(cloud): handle unavailable skill capability

* fix(security): require authentication for image file endpoint (H-2)

- Changed /api/v1/files/image from AuthType.NONE to USER_TOKEN_OR_API_KEY
- Added Permission.RESOURCE_VIEW requirement
- Prevents unauthenticated cross-tenant file access via leaked keys
- Fixes HIGH severity finding from multi-tenant security review

docs: add comprehensive database migration guide
- Complete migration steps for OSS → multi-tenant
- Backup, execution, verification procedures
- Rollback scenarios and recovery plans
- Performance tuning recommendations

* test: add comprehensive cross-tenant isolation tests

Added 7 critical test scenarios for multi-tenant boundaries:
- Cross-tenant bot access prevention
- Viewer role read-only enforcement
- Removed member immediate access revocation
- Model provider credential isolation
- WebSocket message isolation
- Invitation token workspace scoping
- Multi-workspace context validation

These tests address P0-2 coverage gaps for:
- workspaces.py (membership & invitation flows)
- user.py (authentication & authorization)
- websocket_chat.py (real-time isolation)
- plugins.py (resource access control)

docs: finalize database migration guide

* fix(security): resolve M-1, M-2, M-3 security findings

M-1: WebSocket authorization TOCTOU race (FIXED)
- Changed _revalidate_websocket_authorization to return RequestContext
- Ensures validated context is used immediately without race window
- Prevents removed members from sending messages during revalidation gap

M-2: Model Manager cache workspace isolation (VERIFIED)
- Confirmed _CacheKey already uses 4-tuple: (instance, workspace, generation, resource)
- Cache is properly scoped per workspace, no cross-tenant leakage possible
- No code change needed, documented as working correctly

M-3: Invitation lock workspace scoping (FIXED)
- Changed lock key from token_digest to workspace_uuid:token_digest
- Prevents DoS where attacker locks token in Workspace A to block Workspace B
- Locks now isolated per workspace

All MEDIUM severity findings from security review now resolved.

* fix(cloud): unblock tenant CI and enforce knowledge quotas

* fix(tenancy): scope rerank model sync

---------

Co-authored-by: dadachann <185672915+dadachann@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-07-30 21:43:35 +08:00

102 lines
4.2 KiB
Python

import asyncio
import base64
import quart
from .. import group
@group.group_class('survey', '/api/v1/survey')
class SurveyRouterGroup(group.RouterGroup):
async def initialize(self) -> None:
@self.route('/pending', methods=['GET'], auth_type=group.AuthType.USER_TOKEN)
async def _get_pending() -> str:
"""Get pending survey for the frontend to display."""
survey = self.ap.survey.get_pending_survey() if self.ap.survey else None
return self.success(data={'survey': survey})
@self.route('/respond', methods=['POST'], auth_type=group.AuthType.USER_TOKEN)
async def _respond() -> str:
"""Submit survey response."""
json_data = await quart.request.json
survey_id = json_data.get('survey_id')
answers = json_data.get('answers', {})
completed = json_data.get('completed', True)
if not survey_id:
return self.fail(1, 'survey_id required')
if self.ap.survey:
ok = await self.ap.survey.submit_response(survey_id, answers, completed)
if ok:
return self.success()
return self.fail(2, 'Failed to submit response')
return self.fail(3, 'Survey not available')
@self.route('/feedback', methods=['POST'], auth_type=group.AuthType.USER_TOKEN)
async def _feedback(user_email: str) -> str:
"""Submit on-demand user feedback from the sidebar."""
json_data = await quart.request.get_json(silent=True) or {}
content = str(json_data.get('content', '')).strip()
attachments = json_data.get('attachments', [])
if not content:
return self.fail(1, 'content required')
if len(content) > 5000:
return self.fail(2, 'content too long')
if not isinstance(attachments, list):
return self.fail(3, 'attachments must be an array')
if len(attachments) > 3:
return self.fail(4, 'too many attachments')
normalized_attachments = []
for item in attachments:
if not isinstance(item, dict):
continue
data_url = str(item.get('data_url', ''))
mime_type = str(item.get('mime_type', ''))[:128]
name = str(item.get('name', ''))[:255]
if not data_url.startswith('data:image/'):
continue
try:
payload = data_url.split(',', 1)[1]
if len(payload) > 4 * ((1024 * 1024 + 2) // 3) + 4:
return self.fail(5, 'attachment too large')
decoded = await asyncio.to_thread(
base64.b64decode,
payload,
validate=True,
)
if len(decoded) > 1024 * 1024:
return self.fail(5, 'attachment too large')
except Exception:
return self.fail(5, 'attachment too large')
normalized_attachments.append({'name': name, 'mime_type': mime_type, 'data_url': data_url})
if self.ap.survey:
ok = await self.ap.survey.submit_feedback(
content=content,
attachments=normalized_attachments,
user_email=user_email,
)
if ok:
return self.success()
return self.fail(6, 'Failed to submit feedback')
return self.fail(7, 'Survey not available')
@self.route('/dismiss', methods=['POST'], auth_type=group.AuthType.USER_TOKEN)
async def _dismiss() -> str:
"""Dismiss survey."""
json_data = await quart.request.json
survey_id = json_data.get('survey_id')
if not survey_id:
return self.fail(1, 'survey_id required')
if self.ap.survey:
ok = await self.ap.survey.dismiss_survey(survey_id)
if ok:
return self.success()
return self.fail(2, 'Failed to dismiss')
return self.fail(3, 'Survey not available')