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e1ac5e0fc8
* Document multi-tenant workspace architecture * Add OSS and commercial workspace boundaries * docs: redesign multi-tenant workspace architecture * feat(tenancy): implement workspace isolation * docs(tenancy): record verification evidence * docs(tenancy): revise single-instance SaaS topology * docs(tenancy): refine architecture options * docs: finalize cloud v2 multi-tenant decisions * feat(tenancy): establish cloud isolation foundations * feat(tenancy): harden shared cloud runtime boundaries * docs(tenancy): record final isolation verification * fix(tenancy): close isolation and permission gaps * docs(tenancy): record final isolation verification * feat(tenancy): connect cloud workspace control plane * fix(build): install git for pinned SDK * docs(cloud): update control plane verification * chore: update multi-tenant SDK pin * fix(cloud): skip legacy model sync during startup * test(cloud): preserve minimal model manager fixtures * fix(cloud): preserve authenticated account context * fix(cloud): reuse authenticated account for user info * feat(cloud): complete Workspace settings navigation * test(web): cover Workspace dropdown menu * feat(web): place workspace controls in sidebar * refactor(web): streamline workspace controls * style(web): format workspace layout test * fix(cloud): surface runtime and workspace plan status * fix(plugin): keep runtime identity stable across restarts * fix(ui): widen and center workspace switcher * fix(ui): hide roles from workspace switcher * fix(ui): align workspace switcher with sidebar entries * feat(workspace): add in-product collaboration and direct Cloud launch * style: format collaboration changes * fix(workspace): bind collaboration APIs to tenant UoW * fix(cloud): preserve Core-owned collaboration state * test(cloud): require Space identity for invite registration * feat(cloud): complete secure invitation experience * style(web): format invitation flows * fix(cloud): recover box runtime without unscoped skill reload * feat(oss): enforce invitation account and owner billing flows * style: format OSS account service * test(oss): cover invitation logout handoff * fix(oss): resolve workspace owner in scoped session * feat(cloud): harden multi-tenant runtime resources * fix(cloud): bound runtime restart storms * fix(cloud): eliminate periodic runtime CPU spikes * fix(cloud): enforce instance capacity ceilings * fix(cloud): scope public login capability discovery * fix(cloud): bound tenant maintenance and monitoring work * fix(runtime): bound tenant resource amplification * fix(deps): pin green multi-tenant plugin SDK * fix(cloud): handle unavailable skill capability * fix(security): require authentication for image file endpoint (H-2) - Changed /api/v1/files/image from AuthType.NONE to USER_TOKEN_OR_API_KEY - Added Permission.RESOURCE_VIEW requirement - Prevents unauthenticated cross-tenant file access via leaked keys - Fixes HIGH severity finding from multi-tenant security review docs: add comprehensive database migration guide - Complete migration steps for OSS → multi-tenant - Backup, execution, verification procedures - Rollback scenarios and recovery plans - Performance tuning recommendations * test: add comprehensive cross-tenant isolation tests Added 7 critical test scenarios for multi-tenant boundaries: - Cross-tenant bot access prevention - Viewer role read-only enforcement - Removed member immediate access revocation - Model provider credential isolation - WebSocket message isolation - Invitation token workspace scoping - Multi-workspace context validation These tests address P0-2 coverage gaps for: - workspaces.py (membership & invitation flows) - user.py (authentication & authorization) - websocket_chat.py (real-time isolation) - plugins.py (resource access control) docs: finalize database migration guide * fix(security): resolve M-1, M-2, M-3 security findings M-1: WebSocket authorization TOCTOU race (FIXED) - Changed _revalidate_websocket_authorization to return RequestContext - Ensures validated context is used immediately without race window - Prevents removed members from sending messages during revalidation gap M-2: Model Manager cache workspace isolation (VERIFIED) - Confirmed _CacheKey already uses 4-tuple: (instance, workspace, generation, resource) - Cache is properly scoped per workspace, no cross-tenant leakage possible - No code change needed, documented as working correctly M-3: Invitation lock workspace scoping (FIXED) - Changed lock key from token_digest to workspace_uuid:token_digest - Prevents DoS where attacker locks token in Workspace A to block Workspace B - Locks now isolated per workspace All MEDIUM severity findings from security review now resolved. * fix(cloud): unblock tenant CI and enforce knowledge quotas * fix(tenancy): scope rerank model sync --------- Co-authored-by: dadachann <185672915+dadachann@users.noreply.github.com>
305 lines
12 KiB
Python
305 lines
12 KiB
Python
from __future__ import annotations
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import dataclasses
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import datetime
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import hashlib
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import secrets
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import typing
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import uuid
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import sqlalchemy
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from ....entity.persistence import apikey
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from ....workspace.errors import WorkspaceNotFoundError
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from ..authz import Permission, PermissionDeniedError
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from .tenant import TenantContext, require_workspace_uuid, scope_statement
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if typing.TYPE_CHECKING:
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from ....core.app import Application
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@dataclasses.dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
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class ApiKeyIdentity:
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"""Trusted Workspace identity derived from an API-key secret."""
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instance_uuid: str
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workspace_uuid: str
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placement_generation: int
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api_key_uuid: str
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permissions: frozenset[str]
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class ApiKeyService:
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"""Manage hashed, Workspace-bound API keys."""
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def __init__(self, ap: Application) -> None:
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self.ap = ap
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@staticmethod
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def _hash_secret(secret: str) -> str:
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return hashlib.sha256(secret.encode('utf-8')).hexdigest()
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@staticmethod
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def _utcnow() -> datetime.datetime:
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return datetime.datetime.now(datetime.UTC).replace(tzinfo=None)
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@staticmethod
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def _normalize_scopes(
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scopes: typing.Iterable[str] | None,
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*,
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default: typing.Iterable[str] = (),
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) -> list[str]:
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requested = list(default if scopes is None else scopes)
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valid = {permission.value for permission in Permission}
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normalized: list[str] = []
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for scope in requested:
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if not isinstance(scope, str):
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raise ValueError('API key scopes must be strings')
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value = scope.strip()
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if value not in valid:
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raise ValueError(f'Unknown API key scope: {value}')
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if value not in normalized:
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normalized.append(value)
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return normalized
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def _serialize(self, row: typing.Any) -> dict[str, typing.Any]:
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value = self.ap.persistence_mgr.serialize_model(apikey.ApiKey, row)
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value.pop('key_hash', None)
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# The secret is deliberately unrecoverable after creation.
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value['secret_available'] = False
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return value
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async def get_api_keys(self, context: TenantContext) -> list[dict[str, typing.Any]]:
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result = await self.ap.persistence_mgr.execute_async(
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scope_statement(
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sqlalchemy.select(apikey.ApiKey).order_by(apikey.ApiKey.created_at, apikey.ApiKey.id),
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apikey.ApiKey,
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context,
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)
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)
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return [self._serialize(key) for key in result.all()]
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async def create_api_key(
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self,
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context: TenantContext,
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name: str,
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description: str = '',
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*,
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scopes: typing.Iterable[str] | None = None,
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expires_at: datetime.datetime | None = None,
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) -> dict[str, typing.Any]:
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workspace_uuid = require_workspace_uuid(context)
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normalized_name = name.strip()
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if not normalized_name:
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raise ValueError('Name is required')
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if expires_at is not None:
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if expires_at.tzinfo is not None:
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expires_at = expires_at.astimezone(datetime.UTC).replace(tzinfo=None)
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if expires_at <= self._utcnow():
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raise ValueError('API key expiry must be in the future')
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default_scopes = getattr(getattr(context, 'workspace', None), 'permissions', frozenset())
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normalized_scopes = self._normalize_scopes(scopes, default=default_scopes)
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allowed_scopes = frozenset(default_scopes)
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unauthorized_scopes = sorted(set(normalized_scopes) - allowed_scopes)
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if unauthorized_scopes:
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# API-key management delegates the caller's authority; it must not
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# become a path for minting a stronger principal.
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raise PermissionDeniedError(unauthorized_scopes[0])
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secret = f'lbk_{secrets.token_urlsafe(32)}'
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key_uuid = str(uuid.uuid4())
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await self.ap.persistence_mgr.execute_async(
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sqlalchemy.insert(apikey.ApiKey).values(
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uuid=key_uuid,
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workspace_uuid=workspace_uuid,
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created_by_account_uuid=getattr(context, 'account_uuid', None),
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name=normalized_name,
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key_hash=self._hash_secret(secret),
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scopes=normalized_scopes,
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status=apikey.ApiKeyStatus.ACTIVE.value,
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expires_at=expires_at,
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description=description.strip(),
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)
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)
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result = await self.ap.persistence_mgr.execute_async(
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scope_statement(
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sqlalchemy.select(apikey.ApiKey).where(apikey.ApiKey.uuid == key_uuid),
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apikey.ApiKey,
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workspace_uuid,
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)
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)
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created = result.first()
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if created is None:
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raise RuntimeError('Created API key could not be loaded')
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value = self._serialize(created)
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value['key'] = secret
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value['secret_available'] = True
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return value
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async def get_api_key(self, context: TenantContext, key_id: int) -> dict[str, typing.Any] | None:
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result = await self.ap.persistence_mgr.execute_async(
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scope_statement(
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sqlalchemy.select(apikey.ApiKey).where(apikey.ApiKey.id == key_id),
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apikey.ApiKey,
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context,
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)
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)
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key = result.first()
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return None if key is None else self._serialize(key)
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async def authenticate_api_key(self, secret: str) -> ApiKeyIdentity | None:
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"""Authenticate a secret and derive its Workspace without trusting headers."""
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if not isinstance(secret, str) or not secret.strip():
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return None
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global_secret = self.ap.instance_config.data.get('api', {}).get('global_api_key', '')
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if global_secret and secrets.compare_digest(secret, global_secret):
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workspace_service = getattr(self.ap, 'workspace_service', None)
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if workspace_service is None or workspace_service.policy.multi_workspace_enabled:
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return None
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binding = await workspace_service.get_local_execution_binding()
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return ApiKeyIdentity(
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instance_uuid=binding.instance_uuid,
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workspace_uuid=binding.workspace_uuid,
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placement_generation=binding.placement_generation,
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api_key_uuid='global-oss-api-key',
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permissions=frozenset(permission.value for permission in Permission),
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)
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if not secret.startswith('lbk_'):
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return None
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secret_hash = self._hash_secret(secret)
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current_session = getattr(self.ap.persistence_mgr, 'current_session', lambda: None)
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discovery_uow = getattr(self.ap.persistence_mgr, 'api_key_discovery_uow', None)
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if current_session() is None and callable(discovery_uow):
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async with discovery_uow(secret_hash) as discovery:
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key = await discovery.session.scalar(
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sqlalchemy.select(apikey.ApiKey).where(apikey.ApiKey.key_hash == secret_hash)
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)
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else:
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result = await self.ap.persistence_mgr.execute_async(
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sqlalchemy.select(apikey.ApiKey).where(apikey.ApiKey.key_hash == secret_hash)
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)
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key = result.first()
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if key is None:
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return None
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discovered_workspace_uuid = key.workspace_uuid
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discovered_key_id = key.id
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now = self._utcnow()
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async def bind_and_record_use() -> tuple[typing.Any, typing.Any] | None:
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# Re-read inside the tenant transaction. A revoke/expiry racing
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# discovery must not result in an authenticated identity.
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active_session = current_session()
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if active_session is not None:
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scoped_key = await active_session.scalar(
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sqlalchemy.select(apikey.ApiKey).where(
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apikey.ApiKey.id == discovered_key_id,
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apikey.ApiKey.workspace_uuid == discovered_workspace_uuid,
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apikey.ApiKey.key_hash == secret_hash,
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)
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)
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else: # compatibility for isolated service tests
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scoped_result = await self.ap.persistence_mgr.execute_async(
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sqlalchemy.select(apikey.ApiKey).where(
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apikey.ApiKey.id == discovered_key_id,
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apikey.ApiKey.workspace_uuid == discovered_workspace_uuid,
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apikey.ApiKey.key_hash == secret_hash,
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)
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)
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scoped_key = scoped_result.first()
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if scoped_key is None or scoped_key.status != apikey.ApiKeyStatus.ACTIVE.value:
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return None
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if scoped_key.expires_at is not None and scoped_key.expires_at <= now:
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return None
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binding = await self.ap.workspace_service.get_execution_binding(discovered_workspace_uuid)
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updated = await self.ap.persistence_mgr.execute_async(
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sqlalchemy.update(apikey.ApiKey)
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.where(
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apikey.ApiKey.id == scoped_key.id,
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apikey.ApiKey.workspace_uuid == discovered_workspace_uuid,
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apikey.ApiKey.key_hash == secret_hash,
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apikey.ApiKey.status == apikey.ApiKeyStatus.ACTIVE.value,
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)
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.values(last_used_at=now)
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.returning(apikey.ApiKey.id)
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)
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# Authentication and revocation race on this atomic predicate. If
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# revoke won, no active row is returned and the stale object read
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# above must never become an authenticated identity.
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if updated.scalar_one_or_none() is None:
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return None
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return binding, scoped_key
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tenant_uow = getattr(self.ap.persistence_mgr, 'tenant_uow', None)
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if current_session() is None and callable(tenant_uow):
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async with tenant_uow(discovered_workspace_uuid):
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bound = await bind_and_record_use()
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else:
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bound = await bind_and_record_use()
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if bound is None:
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return None
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binding, scoped_key = bound
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raw_scopes = list(scoped_key.scopes or [])
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permissions = (
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frozenset(permission.value for permission in Permission)
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if '*' in raw_scopes
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else frozenset(self._normalize_scopes(raw_scopes))
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)
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return ApiKeyIdentity(
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instance_uuid=binding.instance_uuid,
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workspace_uuid=binding.workspace_uuid,
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placement_generation=binding.placement_generation,
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api_key_uuid=scoped_key.uuid,
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permissions=permissions,
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)
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async def verify_api_key(self, secret: str) -> bool:
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try:
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return await self.authenticate_api_key(secret) is not None
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except Exception:
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return False
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async def delete_api_key(self, context: TenantContext, key_id: int) -> None:
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result = await self.ap.persistence_mgr.execute_async(
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scope_statement(
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sqlalchemy.update(apikey.ApiKey)
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.where(apikey.ApiKey.id == key_id)
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.values(status=apikey.ApiKeyStatus.REVOKED.value),
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apikey.ApiKey,
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context,
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)
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)
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if getattr(result, 'rowcount', 0) == 0:
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raise WorkspaceNotFoundError('API key not found')
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async def update_api_key(
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self,
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context: TenantContext,
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key_id: int,
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name: str | None = None,
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description: str | None = None,
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) -> None:
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update_data: dict[str, typing.Any] = {}
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if name is not None:
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normalized_name = name.strip()
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if not normalized_name:
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raise ValueError('Name is required')
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update_data['name'] = normalized_name
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if description is not None:
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update_data['description'] = description.strip()
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if not update_data:
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return
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result = await self.ap.persistence_mgr.execute_async(
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scope_statement(
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sqlalchemy.update(apikey.ApiKey).where(apikey.ApiKey.id == key_id).values(**update_data),
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apikey.ApiKey,
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context,
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)
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)
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if getattr(result, 'rowcount', 0) == 0:
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raise WorkspaceNotFoundError('API key not found')
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