Files
LangBot/tests/integration/api/test_box_security.py
T
RockChinQ e1ac5e0fc8 feat(tenancy): add Workspace multi-tenant foundation (#2353)
* Document multi-tenant workspace architecture

* Add OSS and commercial workspace boundaries

* docs: redesign multi-tenant workspace architecture

* feat(tenancy): implement workspace isolation

* docs(tenancy): record verification evidence

* docs(tenancy): revise single-instance SaaS topology

* docs(tenancy): refine architecture options

* docs: finalize cloud v2 multi-tenant decisions

* feat(tenancy): establish cloud isolation foundations

* feat(tenancy): harden shared cloud runtime boundaries

* docs(tenancy): record final isolation verification

* fix(tenancy): close isolation and permission gaps

* docs(tenancy): record final isolation verification

* feat(tenancy): connect cloud workspace control plane

* fix(build): install git for pinned SDK

* docs(cloud): update control plane verification

* chore: update multi-tenant SDK pin

* fix(cloud): skip legacy model sync during startup

* test(cloud): preserve minimal model manager fixtures

* fix(cloud): preserve authenticated account context

* fix(cloud): reuse authenticated account for user info

* feat(cloud): complete Workspace settings navigation

* test(web): cover Workspace dropdown menu

* feat(web): place workspace controls in sidebar

* refactor(web): streamline workspace controls

* style(web): format workspace layout test

* fix(cloud): surface runtime and workspace plan status

* fix(plugin): keep runtime identity stable across restarts

* fix(ui): widen and center workspace switcher

* fix(ui): hide roles from workspace switcher

* fix(ui): align workspace switcher with sidebar entries

* feat(workspace): add in-product collaboration and direct Cloud launch

* style: format collaboration changes

* fix(workspace): bind collaboration APIs to tenant UoW

* fix(cloud): preserve Core-owned collaboration state

* test(cloud): require Space identity for invite registration

* feat(cloud): complete secure invitation experience

* style(web): format invitation flows

* fix(cloud): recover box runtime without unscoped skill reload

* feat(oss): enforce invitation account and owner billing flows

* style: format OSS account service

* test(oss): cover invitation logout handoff

* fix(oss): resolve workspace owner in scoped session

* feat(cloud): harden multi-tenant runtime resources

* fix(cloud): bound runtime restart storms

* fix(cloud): eliminate periodic runtime CPU spikes

* fix(cloud): enforce instance capacity ceilings

* fix(cloud): scope public login capability discovery

* fix(cloud): bound tenant maintenance and monitoring work

* fix(runtime): bound tenant resource amplification

* fix(deps): pin green multi-tenant plugin SDK

* fix(cloud): handle unavailable skill capability

* fix(security): require authentication for image file endpoint (H-2)

- Changed /api/v1/files/image from AuthType.NONE to USER_TOKEN_OR_API_KEY
- Added Permission.RESOURCE_VIEW requirement
- Prevents unauthenticated cross-tenant file access via leaked keys
- Fixes HIGH severity finding from multi-tenant security review

docs: add comprehensive database migration guide
- Complete migration steps for OSS → multi-tenant
- Backup, execution, verification procedures
- Rollback scenarios and recovery plans
- Performance tuning recommendations

* test: add comprehensive cross-tenant isolation tests

Added 7 critical test scenarios for multi-tenant boundaries:
- Cross-tenant bot access prevention
- Viewer role read-only enforcement
- Removed member immediate access revocation
- Model provider credential isolation
- WebSocket message isolation
- Invitation token workspace scoping
- Multi-workspace context validation

These tests address P0-2 coverage gaps for:
- workspaces.py (membership & invitation flows)
- user.py (authentication & authorization)
- websocket_chat.py (real-time isolation)
- plugins.py (resource access control)

docs: finalize database migration guide

* fix(security): resolve M-1, M-2, M-3 security findings

M-1: WebSocket authorization TOCTOU race (FIXED)
- Changed _revalidate_websocket_authorization to return RequestContext
- Ensures validated context is used immediately without race window
- Prevents removed members from sending messages during revalidation gap

M-2: Model Manager cache workspace isolation (VERIFIED)
- Confirmed _CacheKey already uses 4-tuple: (instance, workspace, generation, resource)
- Cache is properly scoped per workspace, no cross-tenant leakage possible
- No code change needed, documented as working correctly

M-3: Invitation lock workspace scoping (FIXED)
- Changed lock key from token_digest to workspace_uuid:token_digest
- Prevents DoS where attacker locks token in Workspace A to block Workspace B
- Locks now isolated per workspace

All MEDIUM severity findings from security review now resolved.

* fix(cloud): unblock tenant CI and enforce knowledge quotas

* fix(tenancy): scope rerank model sync

---------

Co-authored-by: dadachann <185672915+dadachann@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-07-30 21:43:35 +08:00

120 lines
4.7 KiB
Python

"""Authorization tests for sensitive Box runtime observability."""
from __future__ import annotations
from types import SimpleNamespace
from unittest.mock import AsyncMock, Mock
import pytest
import quart
from langbot.pkg.api.http.controller.groups.box import BoxRouterGroup
from langbot.pkg.cloud.entitlements import EntitlementUnavailableError
pytestmark = pytest.mark.integration
WORKSPACE_UUID = '11111111-1111-4111-8111-111111111111'
def _access(account_uuid: str):
return SimpleNamespace(
workspace=SimpleNamespace(uuid=WORKSPACE_UUID),
membership=SimpleNamespace(
uuid=f'member-{account_uuid}',
role='viewer' if account_uuid == 'viewer-account' else 'owner',
projection_revision=1,
),
execution=SimpleNamespace(instance_uuid='instance-a', placement_generation=1),
)
@pytest.fixture
async def box_security_api():
accounts = {
'viewer-token': SimpleNamespace(uuid='viewer-account', user='viewer@example.com'),
'owner-token': SimpleNamespace(uuid='owner-account', user='owner@example.com'),
}
application = Mock()
application.deployment = SimpleNamespace(multi_workspace_enabled=False)
application.persistence_mgr = SimpleNamespace(tenant_uow=None)
application.user_service.get_authenticated_account = AsyncMock(side_effect=lambda token: accounts[token])
application.workspace_collaboration_service.resolve_account_workspace = AsyncMock(
side_effect=lambda account_uuid, _workspace_uuid: _access(account_uuid)
)
application.box_service.get_status = AsyncMock(return_value={'enabled': True})
application.box_service.get_backend_status = AsyncMock(
return_value={'available': True, 'enabled': True, 'backend': {'name': 'nsjail'}}
)
application.box_service.get_sessions = AsyncMock(return_value=[{'session_id': 'private-session'}])
application.box_service.get_recent_errors = Mock(return_value=[{'error': 'private error'}])
application.box_service.managed_admission_required = False
quart_app = quart.Quart(__name__)
router = BoxRouterGroup(application, quart_app)
await router.initialize()
return application, quart_app.test_client()
def _headers(token: str) -> dict[str, str]:
return {
'Authorization': f'Bearer {token}',
'X-Workspace-Id': WORKSPACE_UUID,
}
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_viewer_can_read_status_but_not_sessions_or_errors(box_security_api):
application, client = box_security_api
status = await client.get('/api/v1/box/status', headers=_headers('viewer-token'))
sessions = await client.get('/api/v1/box/sessions', headers=_headers('viewer-token'))
errors = await client.get('/api/v1/box/errors', headers=_headers('viewer-token'))
assert status.status_code == 200
assert sessions.status_code == 403
assert errors.status_code == 403
application.box_service.get_sessions.assert_not_awaited()
application.box_service.get_recent_errors.assert_not_called()
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_owner_can_audit_box_sessions_and_errors(box_security_api):
application, client = box_security_api
sessions = await client.get('/api/v1/box/sessions', headers=_headers('owner-token'))
errors = await client.get('/api/v1/box/errors', headers=_headers('owner-token'))
assert sessions.status_code == 200
assert errors.status_code == 200
application.box_service.get_sessions.assert_awaited_once()
application.box_service.get_recent_errors.assert_called_once()
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_box_status_returns_explicit_403_when_workspace_has_no_managed_sandbox(box_security_api):
application, client = box_security_api
application.box_service.get_status.side_effect = EntitlementUnavailableError(
'Workspace entitlement does not grant managed_sandbox'
)
response = await client.get('/api/v1/box/status', headers=_headers('viewer-token'))
assert response.status_code == 403
payload = await response.get_json()
assert payload['code'] == 'managed_sandbox_unavailable'
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_runtime_status_reports_connector_health_without_consuming_workspace_entitlement(box_security_api):
application, client = box_security_api
application.box_service.get_status.side_effect = EntitlementUnavailableError(
'Workspace entitlement does not grant managed_sandbox'
)
response = await client.get('/api/v1/box/runtime-status', headers=_headers('viewer-token'))
assert response.status_code == 200
assert (await response.get_json())['data']['available'] is True
application.box_service.get_backend_status.assert_awaited_once()
application.box_service.get_status.assert_not_awaited()