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RockChinQ
e1ac5e0fc8
* Document multi-tenant workspace architecture * Add OSS and commercial workspace boundaries * docs: redesign multi-tenant workspace architecture * feat(tenancy): implement workspace isolation * docs(tenancy): record verification evidence * docs(tenancy): revise single-instance SaaS topology * docs(tenancy): refine architecture options * docs: finalize cloud v2 multi-tenant decisions * feat(tenancy): establish cloud isolation foundations * feat(tenancy): harden shared cloud runtime boundaries * docs(tenancy): record final isolation verification * fix(tenancy): close isolation and permission gaps * docs(tenancy): record final isolation verification * feat(tenancy): connect cloud workspace control plane * fix(build): install git for pinned SDK * docs(cloud): update control plane verification * chore: update multi-tenant SDK pin * fix(cloud): skip legacy model sync during startup * test(cloud): preserve minimal model manager fixtures * fix(cloud): preserve authenticated account context * fix(cloud): reuse authenticated account for user info * feat(cloud): complete Workspace settings navigation * test(web): cover Workspace dropdown menu * feat(web): place workspace controls in sidebar * refactor(web): streamline workspace controls * style(web): format workspace layout test * fix(cloud): surface runtime and workspace plan status * fix(plugin): keep runtime identity stable across restarts * fix(ui): widen and center workspace switcher * fix(ui): hide roles from workspace switcher * fix(ui): align workspace switcher with sidebar entries * feat(workspace): add in-product collaboration and direct Cloud launch * style: format collaboration changes * fix(workspace): bind collaboration APIs to tenant UoW * fix(cloud): preserve Core-owned collaboration state * test(cloud): require Space identity for invite registration * feat(cloud): complete secure invitation experience * style(web): format invitation flows * fix(cloud): recover box runtime without unscoped skill reload * feat(oss): enforce invitation account and owner billing flows * style: format OSS account service * test(oss): cover invitation logout handoff * fix(oss): resolve workspace owner in scoped session * feat(cloud): harden multi-tenant runtime resources * fix(cloud): bound runtime restart storms * fix(cloud): eliminate periodic runtime CPU spikes * fix(cloud): enforce instance capacity ceilings * fix(cloud): scope public login capability discovery * fix(cloud): bound tenant maintenance and monitoring work * fix(runtime): bound tenant resource amplification * fix(deps): pin green multi-tenant plugin SDK * fix(cloud): handle unavailable skill capability * fix(security): require authentication for image file endpoint (H-2) - Changed /api/v1/files/image from AuthType.NONE to USER_TOKEN_OR_API_KEY - Added Permission.RESOURCE_VIEW requirement - Prevents unauthenticated cross-tenant file access via leaked keys - Fixes HIGH severity finding from multi-tenant security review docs: add comprehensive database migration guide - Complete migration steps for OSS → multi-tenant - Backup, execution, verification procedures - Rollback scenarios and recovery plans - Performance tuning recommendations * test: add comprehensive cross-tenant isolation tests Added 7 critical test scenarios for multi-tenant boundaries: - Cross-tenant bot access prevention - Viewer role read-only enforcement - Removed member immediate access revocation - Model provider credential isolation - WebSocket message isolation - Invitation token workspace scoping - Multi-workspace context validation These tests address P0-2 coverage gaps for: - workspaces.py (membership & invitation flows) - user.py (authentication & authorization) - websocket_chat.py (real-time isolation) - plugins.py (resource access control) docs: finalize database migration guide * fix(security): resolve M-1, M-2, M-3 security findings M-1: WebSocket authorization TOCTOU race (FIXED) - Changed _revalidate_websocket_authorization to return RequestContext - Ensures validated context is used immediately without race window - Prevents removed members from sending messages during revalidation gap M-2: Model Manager cache workspace isolation (VERIFIED) - Confirmed _CacheKey already uses 4-tuple: (instance, workspace, generation, resource) - Cache is properly scoped per workspace, no cross-tenant leakage possible - No code change needed, documented as working correctly M-3: Invitation lock workspace scoping (FIXED) - Changed lock key from token_digest to workspace_uuid:token_digest - Prevents DoS where attacker locks token in Workspace A to block Workspace B - Locks now isolated per workspace All MEDIUM severity findings from security review now resolved. * fix(cloud): unblock tenant CI and enforce knowledge quotas * fix(tenancy): scope rerank model sync --------- Co-authored-by: dadachann <185672915+dadachann@users.noreply.github.com>
75 lines
2.8 KiB
Python
75 lines
2.8 KiB
Python
from langbot.pkg.api.http import authz
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from langbot.pkg.api.http.context import PrincipalContext, PrincipalType, RequestContext, WorkspaceContext
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def _context(role: authz.WorkspaceRole) -> RequestContext:
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return RequestContext(
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instance_uuid='instance-test',
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placement_generation=1,
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request_id='request-test',
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auth_type='user-token',
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principal=PrincipalContext(
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principal_type=PrincipalType.ACCOUNT,
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account_uuid='account-test',
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),
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workspace=WorkspaceContext(
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workspace_uuid='workspace-test',
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membership_uuid='membership-test',
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role=role.value,
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permissions=authz.permissions_for_role(role),
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),
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)
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def test_owner_has_every_fixed_permission():
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ctx = _context(authz.WorkspaceRole.OWNER)
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assert ctx.workspace.permissions == frozenset(permission.value for permission in authz.Permission)
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def test_admin_cannot_transfer_owner_delete_workspace_or_link_billing():
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ctx = _context(authz.WorkspaceRole.ADMIN)
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assert not authz.has_permission(ctx, authz.Permission.OWNER_TRANSFER)
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assert not authz.has_permission(ctx, authz.Permission.WORKSPACE_DELETE)
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assert not authz.has_permission(ctx, authz.Permission.BILLING_LINK_MANAGE)
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assert authz.has_permission(ctx, authz.Permission.MEMBER_INVITE)
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def test_operator_can_run_but_cannot_manage_resources_or_secrets():
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ctx = _context(authz.WorkspaceRole.OPERATOR)
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assert authz.has_permission(ctx, authz.Permission.RUNTIME_OPERATE)
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assert not authz.has_permission(ctx, authz.Permission.RESOURCE_MANAGE)
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assert not authz.has_permission(ctx, authz.Permission.PROVIDER_SECRET_MANAGE)
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def test_unknown_role_has_no_permissions():
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assert authz.permissions_for_role('unknown') == frozenset()
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def test_require_permission_reports_stable_permission():
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ctx = _context(authz.WorkspaceRole.VIEWER)
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try:
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authz.require_permission(ctx, authz.Permission.RESOURCE_MANAGE)
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except authz.PermissionDeniedError as exc:
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assert exc.permission == authz.Permission.RESOURCE_MANAGE.value
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assert exc.error_code == 'permission_denied'
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else:
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raise AssertionError('PermissionDeniedError was not raised')
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def test_execution_context_preserves_workspace_and_generation():
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from langbot.pkg.api.http.context import ExecutionContext
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ctx = _context(authz.WorkspaceRole.DEVELOPER)
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execution = ExecutionContext.from_request(ctx, bot_uuid='bot-test', pipeline_uuid='pipeline-test')
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assert execution.instance_uuid == 'instance-test'
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assert execution.workspace_uuid == 'workspace-test'
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assert execution.placement_generation == 1
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assert execution.bot_uuid == 'bot-test'
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assert execution.pipeline_uuid == 'pipeline-test'
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assert execution.trigger_principal == ctx.principal
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