Files
LangBot/tests/unit_tests/api/test_bot_controller_secrets.py
T
RockChinQ e1ac5e0fc8 feat(tenancy): add Workspace multi-tenant foundation (#2353)
* Document multi-tenant workspace architecture

* Add OSS and commercial workspace boundaries

* docs: redesign multi-tenant workspace architecture

* feat(tenancy): implement workspace isolation

* docs(tenancy): record verification evidence

* docs(tenancy): revise single-instance SaaS topology

* docs(tenancy): refine architecture options

* docs: finalize cloud v2 multi-tenant decisions

* feat(tenancy): establish cloud isolation foundations

* feat(tenancy): harden shared cloud runtime boundaries

* docs(tenancy): record final isolation verification

* fix(tenancy): close isolation and permission gaps

* docs(tenancy): record final isolation verification

* feat(tenancy): connect cloud workspace control plane

* fix(build): install git for pinned SDK

* docs(cloud): update control plane verification

* chore: update multi-tenant SDK pin

* fix(cloud): skip legacy model sync during startup

* test(cloud): preserve minimal model manager fixtures

* fix(cloud): preserve authenticated account context

* fix(cloud): reuse authenticated account for user info

* feat(cloud): complete Workspace settings navigation

* test(web): cover Workspace dropdown menu

* feat(web): place workspace controls in sidebar

* refactor(web): streamline workspace controls

* style(web): format workspace layout test

* fix(cloud): surface runtime and workspace plan status

* fix(plugin): keep runtime identity stable across restarts

* fix(ui): widen and center workspace switcher

* fix(ui): hide roles from workspace switcher

* fix(ui): align workspace switcher with sidebar entries

* feat(workspace): add in-product collaboration and direct Cloud launch

* style: format collaboration changes

* fix(workspace): bind collaboration APIs to tenant UoW

* fix(cloud): preserve Core-owned collaboration state

* test(cloud): require Space identity for invite registration

* feat(cloud): complete secure invitation experience

* style(web): format invitation flows

* fix(cloud): recover box runtime without unscoped skill reload

* feat(oss): enforce invitation account and owner billing flows

* style: format OSS account service

* test(oss): cover invitation logout handoff

* fix(oss): resolve workspace owner in scoped session

* feat(cloud): harden multi-tenant runtime resources

* fix(cloud): bound runtime restart storms

* fix(cloud): eliminate periodic runtime CPU spikes

* fix(cloud): enforce instance capacity ceilings

* fix(cloud): scope public login capability discovery

* fix(cloud): bound tenant maintenance and monitoring work

* fix(runtime): bound tenant resource amplification

* fix(deps): pin green multi-tenant plugin SDK

* fix(cloud): handle unavailable skill capability

* fix(security): require authentication for image file endpoint (H-2)

- Changed /api/v1/files/image from AuthType.NONE to USER_TOKEN_OR_API_KEY
- Added Permission.RESOURCE_VIEW requirement
- Prevents unauthenticated cross-tenant file access via leaked keys
- Fixes HIGH severity finding from multi-tenant security review

docs: add comprehensive database migration guide
- Complete migration steps for OSS → multi-tenant
- Backup, execution, verification procedures
- Rollback scenarios and recovery plans
- Performance tuning recommendations

* test: add comprehensive cross-tenant isolation tests

Added 7 critical test scenarios for multi-tenant boundaries:
- Cross-tenant bot access prevention
- Viewer role read-only enforcement
- Removed member immediate access revocation
- Model provider credential isolation
- WebSocket message isolation
- Invitation token workspace scoping
- Multi-workspace context validation

These tests address P0-2 coverage gaps for:
- workspaces.py (membership & invitation flows)
- user.py (authentication & authorization)
- websocket_chat.py (real-time isolation)
- plugins.py (resource access control)

docs: finalize database migration guide

* fix(security): resolve M-1, M-2, M-3 security findings

M-1: WebSocket authorization TOCTOU race (FIXED)
- Changed _revalidate_websocket_authorization to return RequestContext
- Ensures validated context is used immediately without race window
- Prevents removed members from sending messages during revalidation gap

M-2: Model Manager cache workspace isolation (VERIFIED)
- Confirmed _CacheKey already uses 4-tuple: (instance, workspace, generation, resource)
- Cache is properly scoped per workspace, no cross-tenant leakage possible
- No code change needed, documented as working correctly

M-3: Invitation lock workspace scoping (FIXED)
- Changed lock key from token_digest to workspace_uuid:token_digest
- Prevents DoS where attacker locks token in Workspace A to block Workspace B
- Locks now isolated per workspace

All MEDIUM severity findings from security review now resolved.

* fix(cloud): unblock tenant CI and enforce knowledge quotas

* fix(tenancy): scope rerank model sync

---------

Co-authored-by: dadachann <185672915+dadachann@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-07-30 21:43:35 +08:00

114 lines
4.2 KiB
Python

from __future__ import annotations
from types import SimpleNamespace
from unittest.mock import AsyncMock
import pytest
import quart
from langbot.pkg.api.http.controller.groups.platform.bots import BotsRouterGroup
pytestmark = pytest.mark.asyncio
SECRET_CONFIG = {'token': 'tenant-secret', 'app_secret': 'also-secret'}
async def create_client(*, role: str):
quart_app = quart.Quart(__name__)
account = SimpleNamespace(uuid='account-test', user='test@example.com')
user_service = SimpleNamespace(
get_authenticated_account=AsyncMock(return_value=account),
)
access = SimpleNamespace(
execution=SimpleNamespace(
instance_uuid='instance-test',
placement_generation=1,
),
workspace=SimpleNamespace(uuid='workspace-test'),
membership=SimpleNamespace(
uuid='membership-test',
role=role,
projection_revision=1,
),
)
async def get_bots(_context, *, include_secret=False):
bot = {'uuid': 'bot-test', 'name': 'Test Bot'}
if include_secret:
bot['adapter_config'] = SECRET_CONFIG
return [bot]
async def get_runtime_bot_info(_context, _bot_uuid, *, include_secret=False):
bot = {'uuid': 'bot-test', 'name': 'Test Bot'}
if include_secret:
bot['adapter_config'] = SECRET_CONFIG
return bot
bot_service = SimpleNamespace(
get_bots=AsyncMock(side_effect=get_bots),
get_runtime_bot_info=AsyncMock(side_effect=get_runtime_bot_info),
update_bot=AsyncMock(),
)
application = SimpleNamespace(
user_service=user_service,
apikey_service=SimpleNamespace(
authenticate_api_key=AsyncMock(
return_value=SimpleNamespace(
instance_uuid='instance-test',
placement_generation=1,
api_key_uuid='api-key-test',
workspace_uuid='workspace-test',
permissions=frozenset({'resource.view'}),
)
)
),
workspace_collaboration_service=SimpleNamespace(resolve_account_workspace=AsyncMock(return_value=access)),
bot_service=bot_service,
)
router = BotsRouterGroup(application, quart_app)
await router.initialize()
return quart_app.test_client(), bot_service
async def test_viewer_list_and_detail_never_receive_adapter_credentials():
client, bot_service = await create_client(role='viewer')
headers = {'Authorization': 'Bearer test-token'}
list_response = await client.get('/api/v1/platform/bots', headers=headers)
detail_response = await client.get('/api/v1/platform/bots/bot-test', headers=headers)
assert list_response.status_code == 200
assert detail_response.status_code == 200
assert 'adapter_config' not in (await list_response.get_json())['data']['bots'][0]
assert 'adapter_config' not in (await detail_response.get_json())['data']['bot']
assert bot_service.get_bots.await_args.kwargs['include_secret'] is False
assert bot_service.get_runtime_bot_info.await_args.kwargs['include_secret'] is False
async def test_resource_manager_can_read_adapter_credentials():
client, bot_service = await create_client(role='developer')
headers = {'Authorization': 'Bearer test-token'}
list_response = await client.get('/api/v1/platform/bots', headers=headers)
detail_response = await client.get('/api/v1/platform/bots/bot-test', headers=headers)
assert (await list_response.get_json())['data']['bots'][0]['adapter_config'] == SECRET_CONFIG
assert (await detail_response.get_json())['data']['bot']['adapter_config'] == SECRET_CONFIG
assert bot_service.get_bots.await_args.kwargs['include_secret'] is True
assert bot_service.get_runtime_bot_info.await_args.kwargs['include_secret'] is True
async def test_viewer_cannot_write_adapter_credentials():
client, bot_service = await create_client(role='viewer')
response = await client.put(
'/api/v1/platform/bots/bot-test',
headers={'Authorization': 'Bearer test-token'},
json={'adapter_config': SECRET_CONFIG},
)
assert response.status_code == 403
assert (await response.get_json())['code'] == 'permission_denied'
bot_service.update_bot.assert_not_awaited()