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e1ac5e0fc8
* Document multi-tenant workspace architecture * Add OSS and commercial workspace boundaries * docs: redesign multi-tenant workspace architecture * feat(tenancy): implement workspace isolation * docs(tenancy): record verification evidence * docs(tenancy): revise single-instance SaaS topology * docs(tenancy): refine architecture options * docs: finalize cloud v2 multi-tenant decisions * feat(tenancy): establish cloud isolation foundations * feat(tenancy): harden shared cloud runtime boundaries * docs(tenancy): record final isolation verification * fix(tenancy): close isolation and permission gaps * docs(tenancy): record final isolation verification * feat(tenancy): connect cloud workspace control plane * fix(build): install git for pinned SDK * docs(cloud): update control plane verification * chore: update multi-tenant SDK pin * fix(cloud): skip legacy model sync during startup * test(cloud): preserve minimal model manager fixtures * fix(cloud): preserve authenticated account context * fix(cloud): reuse authenticated account for user info * feat(cloud): complete Workspace settings navigation * test(web): cover Workspace dropdown menu * feat(web): place workspace controls in sidebar * refactor(web): streamline workspace controls * style(web): format workspace layout test * fix(cloud): surface runtime and workspace plan status * fix(plugin): keep runtime identity stable across restarts * fix(ui): widen and center workspace switcher * fix(ui): hide roles from workspace switcher * fix(ui): align workspace switcher with sidebar entries * feat(workspace): add in-product collaboration and direct Cloud launch * style: format collaboration changes * fix(workspace): bind collaboration APIs to tenant UoW * fix(cloud): preserve Core-owned collaboration state * test(cloud): require Space identity for invite registration * feat(cloud): complete secure invitation experience * style(web): format invitation flows * fix(cloud): recover box runtime without unscoped skill reload * feat(oss): enforce invitation account and owner billing flows * style: format OSS account service * test(oss): cover invitation logout handoff * fix(oss): resolve workspace owner in scoped session * feat(cloud): harden multi-tenant runtime resources * fix(cloud): bound runtime restart storms * fix(cloud): eliminate periodic runtime CPU spikes * fix(cloud): enforce instance capacity ceilings * fix(cloud): scope public login capability discovery * fix(cloud): bound tenant maintenance and monitoring work * fix(runtime): bound tenant resource amplification * fix(deps): pin green multi-tenant plugin SDK * fix(cloud): handle unavailable skill capability * fix(security): require authentication for image file endpoint (H-2) - Changed /api/v1/files/image from AuthType.NONE to USER_TOKEN_OR_API_KEY - Added Permission.RESOURCE_VIEW requirement - Prevents unauthenticated cross-tenant file access via leaked keys - Fixes HIGH severity finding from multi-tenant security review docs: add comprehensive database migration guide - Complete migration steps for OSS → multi-tenant - Backup, execution, verification procedures - Rollback scenarios and recovery plans - Performance tuning recommendations * test: add comprehensive cross-tenant isolation tests Added 7 critical test scenarios for multi-tenant boundaries: - Cross-tenant bot access prevention - Viewer role read-only enforcement - Removed member immediate access revocation - Model provider credential isolation - WebSocket message isolation - Invitation token workspace scoping - Multi-workspace context validation These tests address P0-2 coverage gaps for: - workspaces.py (membership & invitation flows) - user.py (authentication & authorization) - websocket_chat.py (real-time isolation) - plugins.py (resource access control) docs: finalize database migration guide * fix(security): resolve M-1, M-2, M-3 security findings M-1: WebSocket authorization TOCTOU race (FIXED) - Changed _revalidate_websocket_authorization to return RequestContext - Ensures validated context is used immediately without race window - Prevents removed members from sending messages during revalidation gap M-2: Model Manager cache workspace isolation (VERIFIED) - Confirmed _CacheKey already uses 4-tuple: (instance, workspace, generation, resource) - Cache is properly scoped per workspace, no cross-tenant leakage possible - No code change needed, documented as working correctly M-3: Invitation lock workspace scoping (FIXED) - Changed lock key from token_digest to workspace_uuid:token_digest - Prevents DoS where attacker locks token in Workspace A to block Workspace B - Locks now isolated per workspace All MEDIUM severity findings from security review now resolved. * fix(cloud): unblock tenant CI and enforce knowledge quotas * fix(tenancy): scope rerank model sync --------- Co-authored-by: dadachann <185672915+dadachann@users.noreply.github.com>
114 lines
4.2 KiB
Python
114 lines
4.2 KiB
Python
from __future__ import annotations
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from types import SimpleNamespace
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from unittest.mock import AsyncMock
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import pytest
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import quart
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from langbot.pkg.api.http.controller.groups.platform.bots import BotsRouterGroup
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pytestmark = pytest.mark.asyncio
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SECRET_CONFIG = {'token': 'tenant-secret', 'app_secret': 'also-secret'}
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async def create_client(*, role: str):
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quart_app = quart.Quart(__name__)
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account = SimpleNamespace(uuid='account-test', user='test@example.com')
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user_service = SimpleNamespace(
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get_authenticated_account=AsyncMock(return_value=account),
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)
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access = SimpleNamespace(
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execution=SimpleNamespace(
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instance_uuid='instance-test',
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placement_generation=1,
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),
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workspace=SimpleNamespace(uuid='workspace-test'),
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membership=SimpleNamespace(
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uuid='membership-test',
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role=role,
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projection_revision=1,
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),
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)
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async def get_bots(_context, *, include_secret=False):
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bot = {'uuid': 'bot-test', 'name': 'Test Bot'}
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if include_secret:
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bot['adapter_config'] = SECRET_CONFIG
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return [bot]
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async def get_runtime_bot_info(_context, _bot_uuid, *, include_secret=False):
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bot = {'uuid': 'bot-test', 'name': 'Test Bot'}
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if include_secret:
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bot['adapter_config'] = SECRET_CONFIG
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return bot
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bot_service = SimpleNamespace(
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get_bots=AsyncMock(side_effect=get_bots),
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get_runtime_bot_info=AsyncMock(side_effect=get_runtime_bot_info),
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update_bot=AsyncMock(),
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)
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application = SimpleNamespace(
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user_service=user_service,
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apikey_service=SimpleNamespace(
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authenticate_api_key=AsyncMock(
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return_value=SimpleNamespace(
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instance_uuid='instance-test',
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placement_generation=1,
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api_key_uuid='api-key-test',
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workspace_uuid='workspace-test',
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permissions=frozenset({'resource.view'}),
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)
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)
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),
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workspace_collaboration_service=SimpleNamespace(resolve_account_workspace=AsyncMock(return_value=access)),
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bot_service=bot_service,
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)
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router = BotsRouterGroup(application, quart_app)
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await router.initialize()
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return quart_app.test_client(), bot_service
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async def test_viewer_list_and_detail_never_receive_adapter_credentials():
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client, bot_service = await create_client(role='viewer')
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headers = {'Authorization': 'Bearer test-token'}
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list_response = await client.get('/api/v1/platform/bots', headers=headers)
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detail_response = await client.get('/api/v1/platform/bots/bot-test', headers=headers)
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assert list_response.status_code == 200
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assert detail_response.status_code == 200
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assert 'adapter_config' not in (await list_response.get_json())['data']['bots'][0]
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assert 'adapter_config' not in (await detail_response.get_json())['data']['bot']
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assert bot_service.get_bots.await_args.kwargs['include_secret'] is False
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assert bot_service.get_runtime_bot_info.await_args.kwargs['include_secret'] is False
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async def test_resource_manager_can_read_adapter_credentials():
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client, bot_service = await create_client(role='developer')
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headers = {'Authorization': 'Bearer test-token'}
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list_response = await client.get('/api/v1/platform/bots', headers=headers)
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detail_response = await client.get('/api/v1/platform/bots/bot-test', headers=headers)
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assert (await list_response.get_json())['data']['bots'][0]['adapter_config'] == SECRET_CONFIG
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assert (await detail_response.get_json())['data']['bot']['adapter_config'] == SECRET_CONFIG
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assert bot_service.get_bots.await_args.kwargs['include_secret'] is True
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assert bot_service.get_runtime_bot_info.await_args.kwargs['include_secret'] is True
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async def test_viewer_cannot_write_adapter_credentials():
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client, bot_service = await create_client(role='viewer')
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response = await client.put(
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'/api/v1/platform/bots/bot-test',
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headers={'Authorization': 'Bearer test-token'},
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json={'adapter_config': SECRET_CONFIG},
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)
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assert response.status_code == 403
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assert (await response.get_json())['code'] == 'permission_denied'
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bot_service.update_bot.assert_not_awaited()
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