Files
LangBot/tests/unit_tests/plugin/test_github_install_security.py
T
RockChinQ e1ac5e0fc8 feat(tenancy): add Workspace multi-tenant foundation (#2353)
* Document multi-tenant workspace architecture

* Add OSS and commercial workspace boundaries

* docs: redesign multi-tenant workspace architecture

* feat(tenancy): implement workspace isolation

* docs(tenancy): record verification evidence

* docs(tenancy): revise single-instance SaaS topology

* docs(tenancy): refine architecture options

* docs: finalize cloud v2 multi-tenant decisions

* feat(tenancy): establish cloud isolation foundations

* feat(tenancy): harden shared cloud runtime boundaries

* docs(tenancy): record final isolation verification

* fix(tenancy): close isolation and permission gaps

* docs(tenancy): record final isolation verification

* feat(tenancy): connect cloud workspace control plane

* fix(build): install git for pinned SDK

* docs(cloud): update control plane verification

* chore: update multi-tenant SDK pin

* fix(cloud): skip legacy model sync during startup

* test(cloud): preserve minimal model manager fixtures

* fix(cloud): preserve authenticated account context

* fix(cloud): reuse authenticated account for user info

* feat(cloud): complete Workspace settings navigation

* test(web): cover Workspace dropdown menu

* feat(web): place workspace controls in sidebar

* refactor(web): streamline workspace controls

* style(web): format workspace layout test

* fix(cloud): surface runtime and workspace plan status

* fix(plugin): keep runtime identity stable across restarts

* fix(ui): widen and center workspace switcher

* fix(ui): hide roles from workspace switcher

* fix(ui): align workspace switcher with sidebar entries

* feat(workspace): add in-product collaboration and direct Cloud launch

* style: format collaboration changes

* fix(workspace): bind collaboration APIs to tenant UoW

* fix(cloud): preserve Core-owned collaboration state

* test(cloud): require Space identity for invite registration

* feat(cloud): complete secure invitation experience

* style(web): format invitation flows

* fix(cloud): recover box runtime without unscoped skill reload

* feat(oss): enforce invitation account and owner billing flows

* style: format OSS account service

* test(oss): cover invitation logout handoff

* fix(oss): resolve workspace owner in scoped session

* feat(cloud): harden multi-tenant runtime resources

* fix(cloud): bound runtime restart storms

* fix(cloud): eliminate periodic runtime CPU spikes

* fix(cloud): enforce instance capacity ceilings

* fix(cloud): scope public login capability discovery

* fix(cloud): bound tenant maintenance and monitoring work

* fix(runtime): bound tenant resource amplification

* fix(deps): pin green multi-tenant plugin SDK

* fix(cloud): handle unavailable skill capability

* fix(security): require authentication for image file endpoint (H-2)

- Changed /api/v1/files/image from AuthType.NONE to USER_TOKEN_OR_API_KEY
- Added Permission.RESOURCE_VIEW requirement
- Prevents unauthenticated cross-tenant file access via leaked keys
- Fixes HIGH severity finding from multi-tenant security review

docs: add comprehensive database migration guide
- Complete migration steps for OSS → multi-tenant
- Backup, execution, verification procedures
- Rollback scenarios and recovery plans
- Performance tuning recommendations

* test: add comprehensive cross-tenant isolation tests

Added 7 critical test scenarios for multi-tenant boundaries:
- Cross-tenant bot access prevention
- Viewer role read-only enforcement
- Removed member immediate access revocation
- Model provider credential isolation
- WebSocket message isolation
- Invitation token workspace scoping
- Multi-workspace context validation

These tests address P0-2 coverage gaps for:
- workspaces.py (membership & invitation flows)
- user.py (authentication & authorization)
- websocket_chat.py (real-time isolation)
- plugins.py (resource access control)

docs: finalize database migration guide

* fix(security): resolve M-1, M-2, M-3 security findings

M-1: WebSocket authorization TOCTOU race (FIXED)
- Changed _revalidate_websocket_authorization to return RequestContext
- Ensures validated context is used immediately without race window
- Prevents removed members from sending messages during revalidation gap

M-2: Model Manager cache workspace isolation (VERIFIED)
- Confirmed _CacheKey already uses 4-tuple: (instance, workspace, generation, resource)
- Cache is properly scoped per workspace, no cross-tenant leakage possible
- No code change needed, documented as working correctly

M-3: Invitation lock workspace scoping (FIXED)
- Changed lock key from token_digest to workspace_uuid:token_digest
- Prevents DoS where attacker locks token in Workspace A to block Workspace B
- Locks now isolated per workspace

All MEDIUM severity findings from security review now resolved.

* fix(cloud): unblock tenant CI and enforce knowledge quotas

* fix(tenancy): scope rerank model sync

---------

Co-authored-by: dadachann <185672915+dadachann@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-07-30 21:43:35 +08:00

175 lines
5.7 KiB
Python

from __future__ import annotations
import httpx
import pytest
from langbot.pkg.plugin import connector as connector_module
from .test_connector_methods import create_mock_connector
TRUSTED_LEGACY_REQUEST = {
'owner': 'langbot-app',
'repo': 'demo-plugin',
'release_tag': 'v1.0.0',
'asset_url': 'https://github.com/langbot-app/demo-plugin/releases/download/v1.0.0/demo.lbpkg',
}
def _patch_client(monkeypatch, handler):
real_async_client = httpx.AsyncClient
observed: list[dict] = []
def client_factory(*args, **kwargs):
observed.append(dict(kwargs))
return real_async_client(
transport=httpx.MockTransport(handler),
follow_redirects=kwargs.get('follow_redirects', False),
trust_env=kwargs.get('trust_env', True),
timeout=kwargs.get('timeout'),
)
monkeypatch.setattr(connector_module.httpx, 'AsyncClient', client_factory)
return observed
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
'asset_url',
[
'http://127.0.0.1/internal.lbpkg',
'https://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data',
'https://github.com@127.0.0.1/internal.lbpkg',
'https://evil.example/langbot-app/demo-plugin/releases/download/v1.0.0/demo.lbpkg',
],
)
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_github_install_rejects_internal_or_untrusted_asset_url_before_network(
monkeypatch,
asset_url,
):
connector = create_mock_connector()
monkeypatch.setattr(
connector_module.httpx,
'AsyncClient',
lambda *_args, **_kwargs: pytest.fail('network client must not be created'),
)
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match='GitHub release asset URL'):
await connector._download_github_package(
{**TRUSTED_LEGACY_REQUEST, 'asset_url': asset_url},
None,
)
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_github_asset_id_is_resolved_server_side_and_redirect_escape_is_rejected(
monkeypatch,
):
connector = create_mock_connector()
def handler(request: httpx.Request) -> httpx.Response:
if request.url.path.endswith('/releases/42'):
return httpx.Response(
200,
json={
'id': 42,
'tag_name': 'v1.0.0',
'assets': [{'id': 99, 'size': 128, 'state': 'uploaded'}],
},
)
if request.url.path.endswith('/releases/assets/99'):
return httpx.Response(
302,
headers={'location': 'http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data'},
)
raise AssertionError(f'unexpected request: {request.url}')
observed = _patch_client(monkeypatch, handler)
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match='untrusted host'):
await connector._download_github_package(
{
'owner': 'langbot-app',
'repo': 'demo-plugin',
'release_tag': 'v1.0.0',
'release_id': 42,
'asset_id': 99,
'asset_url': 'https://attacker.invalid/ignored',
},
None,
)
assert len(observed) == 1
assert observed[0]['trust_env'] is False
assert observed[0]['follow_redirects'] is False
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_github_download_rejects_oversized_content_length(monkeypatch):
connector = create_mock_connector()
monkeypatch.setattr(connector_module, '_GITHUB_PLUGIN_DOWNLOAD_MAX_BYTES', 8)
def handler(_request: httpx.Request) -> httpx.Response:
return httpx.Response(200, headers={'content-length': '9'}, content=b'')
_patch_client(monkeypatch, handler)
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match='10 MiB download limit'):
await connector._download_github_package(TRUSTED_LEGACY_REQUEST, None)
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_github_download_counts_chunked_stream_bytes(monkeypatch):
connector = create_mock_connector()
monkeypatch.setattr(connector_module, '_GITHUB_PLUGIN_DOWNLOAD_MAX_BYTES', 8)
class ChunkedBody(httpx.AsyncByteStream):
async def __aiter__(self):
yield b'1234'
yield b'56789'
def handler(_request: httpx.Request) -> httpx.Response:
return httpx.Response(200, stream=ChunkedBody())
_patch_client(monkeypatch, handler)
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match='10 MiB download limit'):
await connector._download_github_package(TRUSTED_LEGACY_REQUEST, None)
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_github_asset_id_download_allows_github_object_redirect(monkeypatch):
connector = create_mock_connector()
def handler(request: httpx.Request) -> httpx.Response:
if request.url.path.endswith('/releases/42'):
return httpx.Response(
200,
json={
'id': 42,
'tag_name': 'v1.0.0',
'assets': [{'id': 99, 'size': 7, 'state': 'uploaded'}],
},
)
if request.url.path.endswith('/releases/assets/99'):
return httpx.Response(
302,
headers={
'location': 'https://release-assets.githubusercontent.com/github-production-release-asset/demo'
},
)
if request.url.host == 'release-assets.githubusercontent.com':
return httpx.Response(200, content=b'package')
raise AssertionError(f'unexpected request: {request.url}')
_patch_client(monkeypatch, handler)
package = await connector._download_github_package(
{
'owner': 'langbot-app',
'repo': 'demo-plugin',
'release_tag': 'v1.0.0',
'release_id': 42,
'asset_id': 99,
},
None,
)
assert package == b'package'