Files
LangBot/src/langbot/pkg/api/http/controller/groups/files.py
T
RockChinQ e1ac5e0fc8 feat(tenancy): add Workspace multi-tenant foundation (#2353)
* Document multi-tenant workspace architecture

* Add OSS and commercial workspace boundaries

* docs: redesign multi-tenant workspace architecture

* feat(tenancy): implement workspace isolation

* docs(tenancy): record verification evidence

* docs(tenancy): revise single-instance SaaS topology

* docs(tenancy): refine architecture options

* docs: finalize cloud v2 multi-tenant decisions

* feat(tenancy): establish cloud isolation foundations

* feat(tenancy): harden shared cloud runtime boundaries

* docs(tenancy): record final isolation verification

* fix(tenancy): close isolation and permission gaps

* docs(tenancy): record final isolation verification

* feat(tenancy): connect cloud workspace control plane

* fix(build): install git for pinned SDK

* docs(cloud): update control plane verification

* chore: update multi-tenant SDK pin

* fix(cloud): skip legacy model sync during startup

* test(cloud): preserve minimal model manager fixtures

* fix(cloud): preserve authenticated account context

* fix(cloud): reuse authenticated account for user info

* feat(cloud): complete Workspace settings navigation

* test(web): cover Workspace dropdown menu

* feat(web): place workspace controls in sidebar

* refactor(web): streamline workspace controls

* style(web): format workspace layout test

* fix(cloud): surface runtime and workspace plan status

* fix(plugin): keep runtime identity stable across restarts

* fix(ui): widen and center workspace switcher

* fix(ui): hide roles from workspace switcher

* fix(ui): align workspace switcher with sidebar entries

* feat(workspace): add in-product collaboration and direct Cloud launch

* style: format collaboration changes

* fix(workspace): bind collaboration APIs to tenant UoW

* fix(cloud): preserve Core-owned collaboration state

* test(cloud): require Space identity for invite registration

* feat(cloud): complete secure invitation experience

* style(web): format invitation flows

* fix(cloud): recover box runtime without unscoped skill reload

* feat(oss): enforce invitation account and owner billing flows

* style: format OSS account service

* test(oss): cover invitation logout handoff

* fix(oss): resolve workspace owner in scoped session

* feat(cloud): harden multi-tenant runtime resources

* fix(cloud): bound runtime restart storms

* fix(cloud): eliminate periodic runtime CPU spikes

* fix(cloud): enforce instance capacity ceilings

* fix(cloud): scope public login capability discovery

* fix(cloud): bound tenant maintenance and monitoring work

* fix(runtime): bound tenant resource amplification

* fix(deps): pin green multi-tenant plugin SDK

* fix(cloud): handle unavailable skill capability

* fix(security): require authentication for image file endpoint (H-2)

- Changed /api/v1/files/image from AuthType.NONE to USER_TOKEN_OR_API_KEY
- Added Permission.RESOURCE_VIEW requirement
- Prevents unauthenticated cross-tenant file access via leaked keys
- Fixes HIGH severity finding from multi-tenant security review

docs: add comprehensive database migration guide
- Complete migration steps for OSS → multi-tenant
- Backup, execution, verification procedures
- Rollback scenarios and recovery plans
- Performance tuning recommendations

* test: add comprehensive cross-tenant isolation tests

Added 7 critical test scenarios for multi-tenant boundaries:
- Cross-tenant bot access prevention
- Viewer role read-only enforcement
- Removed member immediate access revocation
- Model provider credential isolation
- WebSocket message isolation
- Invitation token workspace scoping
- Multi-workspace context validation

These tests address P0-2 coverage gaps for:
- workspaces.py (membership & invitation flows)
- user.py (authentication & authorization)
- websocket_chat.py (real-time isolation)
- plugins.py (resource access control)

docs: finalize database migration guide

* fix(security): resolve M-1, M-2, M-3 security findings

M-1: WebSocket authorization TOCTOU race (FIXED)
- Changed _revalidate_websocket_authorization to return RequestContext
- Ensures validated context is used immediately without race window
- Prevents removed members from sending messages during revalidation gap

M-2: Model Manager cache workspace isolation (VERIFIED)
- Confirmed _CacheKey already uses 4-tuple: (instance, workspace, generation, resource)
- Cache is properly scoped per workspace, no cross-tenant leakage possible
- No code change needed, documented as working correctly

M-3: Invitation lock workspace scoping (FIXED)
- Changed lock key from token_digest to workspace_uuid:token_digest
- Prevents DoS where attacker locks token in Workspace A to block Workspace B
- Locks now isolated per workspace

All MEDIUM severity findings from security review now resolved.

* fix(cloud): unblock tenant CI and enforce knowledge quotas

* fix(tenancy): scope rerank model sync

---------

Co-authored-by: dadachann <185672915+dadachann@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-07-30 21:43:35 +08:00

165 lines
6.0 KiB
Python

from __future__ import annotations
import quart
import mimetypes
import uuid
import asyncio
import quart.datastructures
from ...authz import Permission
from ...context import RequestContext
from .. import group
def _storage_owner(context: RequestContext) -> str:
if context.principal.account_uuid:
return f'account:{context.principal.account_uuid}'
if context.principal.api_key_uuid:
return f'api-key:{context.principal.api_key_uuid}'
return f'principal:{context.principal.principal_type.value}'
@group.group_class('files', '/api/v1/files')
class FilesRouterGroup(group.RouterGroup):
async def initialize(self) -> None:
@self.route(
'/image/<path:image_key>',
methods=['GET'],
auth_type=group.AuthType.USER_TOKEN_OR_API_KEY,
permission=Permission.RESOURCE_VIEW,
)
async def _(image_key: str, request_context: RequestContext) -> quart.Response:
image_bytes = await self.ap.storage_mgr.resolve_public_object(
image_key,
expected_owner_type='upload_image',
)
if image_bytes is None:
image_bytes = await self.ap.storage_mgr.resolve_public_object(
image_key,
expected_owner_type='bot_log',
)
if image_bytes is None:
return quart.Response(status=404)
mime_type = mimetypes.guess_type(image_key)[0]
if mime_type is None:
mime_type = 'image/jpeg'
return quart.Response(image_bytes, mimetype=mime_type)
@self.route(
'/images',
methods=['POST'],
auth_type=group.AuthType.USER_TOKEN_OR_API_KEY,
permission=Permission.RESOURCE_MANAGE,
)
async def upload_image(request_context: RequestContext) -> quart.Response:
request = quart.request
# Check file size limit before reading the file
content_length = request.content_length
if content_length and content_length > group.MAX_FILE_SIZE:
return self.fail(400, 'Image size exceeds 10MB limit.')
# get file bytes from 'file'
files = await request.files
if 'file' not in files:
return self.fail(400, 'No image file provided')
file = files['file']
assert isinstance(file, quart.datastructures.FileStorage)
file_bytes = await asyncio.to_thread(file.stream.read)
# Double-check actual file size after reading
if len(file_bytes) > group.MAX_FILE_SIZE:
return self.fail(400, 'Image size exceeds 10MB limit.')
# Validate image file extension
allowed_extensions = {'jpg', 'jpeg', 'png', 'gif', 'webp'}
if '.' in file.filename:
file_name, extension = file.filename.rsplit('.', 1)
extension = extension.lower()
else:
return self.fail(400, 'Invalid image file: no file extension')
if extension not in allowed_extensions:
return self.fail(400, f'Invalid image format. Allowed formats: {", ".join(allowed_extensions)}')
# check if file name contains '/' or '\'
if '/' in file_name or '\\' in file_name:
return self.fail(400, 'File name contains invalid characters')
logical_key = f'{uuid.uuid4()}.{extension}'
# save file to storage
file_key = await self.ap.storage_mgr.save_scoped(
request_context,
owner_type='upload_image',
owner=_storage_owner(request_context),
key=logical_key,
value=file_bytes,
)
return self.success(
data={
'file_key': file_key,
}
)
@self.route(
'/documents',
methods=['POST'],
auth_type=group.AuthType.USER_TOKEN_OR_API_KEY,
permission=Permission.RESOURCE_MANAGE,
)
async def upload_document(request_context: RequestContext) -> quart.Response:
request = quart.request
# Check file size limit before reading the file
content_length = request.content_length
if content_length and content_length > group.MAX_FILE_SIZE:
return self.fail(400, 'File size exceeds 10MB limit. Please split large files into smaller parts.')
# get file bytes from 'file'
files = await request.files
if 'file' not in files:
return self.fail(400, 'No file provided in request')
file = files['file']
assert isinstance(file, quart.datastructures.FileStorage)
file_bytes = await asyncio.to_thread(file.stream.read)
# Double-check actual file size after reading
if len(file_bytes) > group.MAX_FILE_SIZE:
return self.fail(400, 'File size exceeds 10MB limit. Please split large files into smaller parts.')
# Split filename and extension properly
if '.' in file.filename:
file_name, extension = file.filename.rsplit('.', 1)
else:
file_name = file.filename
extension = ''
# check if file name contains '/' or '\'
if '/' in file_name or '\\' in file_name:
return self.fail(400, 'File name contains invalid characters')
logical_key = str(uuid.uuid4())
if extension:
logical_key += '.' + extension
# save file to storage
file_key = await self.ap.storage_mgr.save_scoped(
request_context,
owner_type='upload_document',
owner=_storage_owner(request_context),
key=logical_key,
value=file_bytes,
)
return self.success(
data={
'file_id': file_key,
}
)