fix(runtime): cap remote node response size to bound master memory (#5361)

Remote node HTTP responses were read with an unbounded io.ReadAll, so a
broken or hostile node could force the master panel to buffer an arbitrarily
large body. The single Remote.do choke point that all node calls funnel
through now:
  - validates the HTTP status before reading any success payload (a non-OK
    body is only read up to a small bounded diagnostic snippet, so a node
    cannot make the master buffer a large body just to return an error);
  - fast-fails on an honestly-declared oversize Content-Length;
  - reads the success body through readCappedBody, an io.LimitReader cap
    (64 MiB) that rejects oversize with a typed error.

The 64 MiB cap bounds one response's wire/decompressed size; it is documented
as not a process-wide memory bound (endpoint-specific caps and a concurrency
budget remain follow-ups).

Tests cover the cap+1 boundary, an oversize streamed body, a normal envelope,
and non-OK status precedence.
This commit is contained in:
n0ctal
2026-06-20 03:38:52 +05:00
committed by GitHub
parent f63ed9f510
commit b0ef60670c
2 changed files with 152 additions and 4 deletions
+56 -4
View File
@@ -28,6 +28,38 @@ const remoteHTTPTimeout = 10 * time.Second
// overhead can outweigh the savings.
const zstdMinBodyBytes = 1024
// maxRemoteResponseBytes caps a single node RPC's response body. It bounds the
// wire/decompressed size of one response — the real guard against a broken or
// hostile node streaming an unbounded body. It is NOT a process-wide memory
// bound: concurrent RPCs and the decoded JSON can each exceed it, so
// endpoint-specific caps and a concurrency budget remain follow-ups. Node
// responses (traffic snapshots, client-IP lists, inbound options) are JSON and
// stay well under it.
const maxRemoteResponseBytes = 64 << 20 // 64 MiB
// errBodyDiagBytes bounds how much of a non-OK error body we read for a
// diagnostic snippet (and to let small-error connections be reused) without
// buffering a potentially huge or hostile error payload.
const errBodyDiagBytes = 8 << 10 // 8 KiB
// errRemoteResponseTooLarge is returned when a node response exceeds the cap.
var errRemoteResponseTooLarge = errors.New("remote response exceeds size limit")
// readCappedBody reads all of r but rejects bodies larger than limit, returning
// errRemoteResponseTooLarge. It reads at most limit+1 bytes so a body of exactly
// limit is accepted and the first oversize byte is detected without buffering
// more.
func readCappedBody(r io.Reader, limit int64) ([]byte, error) {
raw, err := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(r, limit+1))
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if int64(len(raw)) > limit {
return nil, errRemoteResponseTooLarge
}
return raw, nil
}
type envelope struct {
Success bool `json:"success"`
Msg string `json:"msg"`
@@ -203,14 +235,34 @@ func (r *Remote) do(ctx context.Context, method, path string, body any) (*envelo
defer resp.Body.Close()
r.recordCaps(resp.Header)
raw, err := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("read body: %w", err)
}
// Validate status before reading a success payload: a non-OK response's
// body is never used beyond a short diagnostic, so don't let a node force us
// to buffer a large body just to return an HTTP error.
if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
snippet, _ := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(resp.Body, errBodyDiagBytes))
if msg := bytes.TrimSpace(snippet); len(msg) > 0 {
// %q quotes/escapes the untrusted node body so control characters or
// newlines in it can't garble or inject into the error/log output.
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%s %s: HTTP %d: %q", method, path, resp.StatusCode, msg)
}
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%s %s: HTTP %d", method, path, resp.StatusCode)
}
// Fast-fail on an honestly-declared oversize body; the LimitReader below is
// the real guard since Content-Length is untrusted, may be absent, or is -1
// under transparent decompression.
if resp.ContentLength > maxRemoteResponseBytes {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%s %s: %w (content-length %d, cap %d)", method, path, errRemoteResponseTooLarge, resp.ContentLength, maxRemoteResponseBytes)
}
raw, err := readCappedBody(resp.Body, maxRemoteResponseBytes)
if err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, errRemoteResponseTooLarge) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%s %s: %w (cap %d bytes)", method, path, err, maxRemoteResponseBytes)
}
return nil, fmt.Errorf("read body: %w", err)
}
var env envelope
if err := json.Unmarshal(raw, &env); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("decode envelope: %w", err)
+96
View File
@@ -1,16 +1,112 @@
package runtime
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"net/url"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/mhsanaei/3x-ui/v3/internal/database/model"
)
// TestRemoteDo_RejectsOversizeResponse: a node streaming a body larger than
// maxRemoteResponseBytes must error out instead of the master buffering it
// unbounded.
func TestRemoteDo_RejectsOversizeResponse(t *testing.T) {
srv := httptest.NewTLSServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
chunk := bytes.Repeat([]byte("a"), 1<<20) // 1 MiB
for written := 0; written <= maxRemoteResponseBytes; written += len(chunk) {
if _, err := w.Write(chunk); err != nil {
return // client stopped reading at the cap
}
}
}))
defer srv.Close()
r := NewRemote(nodeForServer(t, srv, "skip", ""), nil)
if _, err := r.do(context.Background(), http.MethodGet, "/probe", nil); !errors.Is(err, errRemoteResponseTooLarge) {
t.Fatalf("do() error = %v, want errRemoteResponseTooLarge", err)
}
}
// TestRemoteDo_AcceptsNormalResponse confirms the cap does not break a normal
// under-limit envelope.
func TestRemoteDo_AcceptsNormalResponse(t *testing.T) {
srv := httptest.NewTLSServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"success":true,"msg":"ok","obj":{"x":1}}`))
}))
defer srv.Close()
r := NewRemote(nodeForServer(t, srv, "skip", ""), nil)
env, err := r.do(context.Background(), http.MethodGet, "/probe", nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("do() unexpected error: %v", err)
}
if env == nil || !env.Success {
t.Fatalf("env = %+v, want Success=true", env)
}
}
// TestReadCappedBody_Boundary pins the cap+1 contract cheaply (no large allocs):
// a body of exactly limit is accepted; limit+1 and beyond are rejected.
func TestReadCappedBody_Boundary(t *testing.T) {
const limit = 8
cases := []struct {
name string
n int
wantErr bool
}{
{"under", limit - 1, false},
{"exact", limit, false},
{"over-by-one", limit + 1, true},
{"way-over", limit * 4, true},
}
for _, c := range cases {
t.Run(c.name, func(t *testing.T) {
raw, err := readCappedBody(bytes.NewReader(bytes.Repeat([]byte("x"), c.n)), limit)
if c.wantErr {
if !errors.Is(err, errRemoteResponseTooLarge) {
t.Fatalf("n=%d: err=%v, want errRemoteResponseTooLarge", c.n, err)
}
return
}
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("n=%d: unexpected err %v", c.n, err)
}
if len(raw) != c.n {
t.Fatalf("n=%d: read %d bytes, want %d", c.n, len(raw), c.n)
}
})
}
}
// TestRemoteDo_NonOKStatusReturnsHTTPError confirms a non-OK status is reported
// as an HTTP error (with a bounded diagnostic snippet) rather than being read as
// a success payload — i.e. status precedence over the body.
func TestRemoteDo_NonOKStatusReturnsHTTPError(t *testing.T) {
srv := httptest.NewTLSServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusInternalServerError)
_, _ = w.Write([]byte("boom"))
}))
defer srv.Close()
r := NewRemote(nodeForServer(t, srv, "skip", ""), nil)
_, err := r.do(context.Background(), http.MethodGet, "/probe", nil)
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("do() error = nil, want HTTP 500 error")
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "HTTP 500") || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "boom") {
t.Fatalf("error = %q, want it to mention HTTP 500 and the body snippet", err)
}
}
type stubEgress struct{ url string }
func (s stubEgress) NodeEgressProxyURL(int) string { return s.url }