283 Commits

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
Sanaei	5e1cb7693b	Repo-wide self-correcting audit: 54 verified bug fixes (#5970) ... * fix(email): resolve a name-addr smtpFrom into bare envelope address and display name The save-time validator accepts any RFC 5322 address form, so a value like '3x-ui Panel <panel(at)example.com>' passes validation, but Send and TestConnection fed that raw string to MAIL FROM, which strict servers reject with 501, and buildMessage mangled it into a quoted local part. Parse the configured sender at the point of use: the envelope gets the bare address and, when no explicit sender name is set, the display name embedded in the setting is used for the From header. * fix(email): report a missing sender address from the SMTP connection test TestConnection skipped the empty-from guard that Send enforces, so with no sender and no username configured the test issued the null reverse-path and could report success against a lenient relay while every real notification send kept failing with the missing-sender error. Guard the test path the same way and surface a dedicated translated message. * fix(sub): fall back to the raw subscription when an auto-detected format has no content With format auto-detection enabled, a client whose User-Agent matched the Clash or JSON regex was routed straight to that format handler. For a subscription whose entries convert to neither format (an MTProto-only subscription, for example) the handler returns an empty document and the request ended as 404, breaking a URL that served the raw list before the toggle. The auto-detect branches now serve the detected format only when it produces content and otherwise continue to the raw response; the explicit format endpoints keep answering 404 for empty documents. * fix(node): match prefixed central tags when filtering a selected-mode node snapshot FilterNodeSnapshot compared a node snapshot's inbound tags against the raw selected-tag list with an exact match, while its two siblings (SnapshotHasUnadoptedInbounds and the reconcile tagToCentral map) expand each selected tag to both its bare node-side form and its n<id>- prefixed central form. A panel-created node inbound is recorded in the selected list under the central prefixed tag but reported by the node under the bare tag, so the exact match dropped it from every snapshot and the orphan sweep then deleted its central row one tick after creation. Expand the allowed set with the same prefix flip the siblings use. * fix(client): refuse a bulk quota reduction that would fall to or below zero BulkAdjust clamped a client's new traffic limit with max(total+addBytes, 0). Because 0 is the unlimited sentinel, reducing a client's quota by more than it had left silently granted that client unlimited traffic. The sibling expiry branch already refuses an over-reduction; mirror it for quota so the adjustment is skipped with a clear reason instead of crossing the sentinel. * fix(client): persist a bulk adjustment's applied field even when the sibling field is skipped In a mixed BulkAdjust (both a days delta and a bytes delta), a per-field planning skip such as "unlimited expiry" or "unlimited traffic" was recorded in the same map that gated the client_traffics write. The applied field was already written to the inbound JSON and the clients table, but the enforcement row was left untouched, so the depletion job cut the client on the old limit while the panel showed the new one. Gate the traffic-row write on an actual inbound-processing failure rather than on any planning-phase skip note. * fix(inbound): always create in AddInbound instead of overwriting a row whose id was posted The add controller binds the inbound model's id form field and never clears it, and AddInbound persisted with GORM Save, which updates in place when the primary key is non-zero. A client that reused an existing id (for instance by duplicating an inbound fetched from /get and changing the port) silently overwrote that stored row instead of creating a new inbound. Zero the id at the top of AddInbound, matching how it already zeroes the client-stat ids. * fix(inbound): accept WireGuard clients when creating an inbound AddInbound's per-client validation switch had cases for every protocol except WireGuard, so a WireGuard client fell through to the default branch that requires a non-empty id. WireGuard clients are keyed by their public key and carry no id, so importing a WireGuard inbound or re-adding one to a reconciling node was rejected with "empty client ID". Add a wireguard case that validates the client key, mirroring addInboundClient. * fix(client): stop holding the inbound-lock registry mutex while waiting on one inbound lockInbound acquired the global registry mutex and then blocked on the per-inbound mutex without releasing the registry first. A slow client operation holding one inbound's mutex (for example a bulk delete pushing to an unreachable node) made the next waiter park on that inbound while still holding the registry mutex, which in turn blocked lockInbound for every other inbound — freezing client mutations panel-wide. Release the registry mutex before taking the per-inbound lock. * fix(client): honor keepTraffic when deleting a client that is attached to inbounds Delete, DeleteByEmail and BulkDelete all pass keepTraffic to their final cleanup transaction, but each called the per-inbound delete helper with a hardcoded false. That helper purges the client's traffic, IP and stat rows before the gated cleanup runs, so keepTraffic=true still destroyed all traffic history for any client actually attached to an inbound (the pinned test only covered a record with no inbound mappings). Thread the caller's keepTraffic through to the per-inbound helper at all three call sites. * fix(inbound): defer a local MTProto inbound edit's sidecar push until after commit UpdateInbound applied a local MTProto inbound change by calling the runtime UpdateInbound (which stops/starts the mtg sidecar or talks to it) from inside runSerializedTx. That runs process and network I/O on the single traffic-writer goroutine while a DB transaction is open, so a slow sidecar stalls traffic accounting and every concurrent client mutation, and a later step failing the transaction leaves the sidecar ahead of the rolled-back row. Move the push into the post-commit hook, matching the xray branch. Adds a SetLocalRuntimeOverride test seam mirroring the existing node override so the deferral is regression tested. * fix(client): delete external-link rows when bulk-deleting clients The single-client Delete path removes a client's client_external_links rows, but BulkDelete (and the DelDepleted reaper that routes through it) deleted the record, mappings and traffic while leaving the external-link rows keyed by the now-dead client id, so they accumulated as orphans. Delete them in the same cleanup transaction, keyed by client id like the single path. * fix(inbound): request an xray restart when toggling a routed MTProto inbound AddInbound, DelInbound and UpdateInbound all flag needRestart when an inbound routes MTProto through xray, so the egress SOCKS bridge is regenerated. Only SetInboundEnable's local path omitted it, so toggling a routed MTProto inbound off then on left the bridge out of the running config while the sidecar dialed its loopback port, blackholing that inbound until an unrelated restart. Flag the restart on the local enable path too. * fix(client): apply enable-by-email to every inbound a client is attached to ToggleClientEnableByEmail (Telegram bot) and SetClientEnableByEmail (LDAP sync) resolved a single inbound via the legacy client_traffics pointer and flipped enable only there. A client attached to several inbounds kept connecting through the siblings' running Xray after being disabled, and the next edit could re-enable it everywhere from a stale sibling. Route both through the applyClientFieldByEmail fan-out (the #5039 fix path) so the whole multi-inbound identity is toggled at once, dropping the circular Set/Toggle dependency. * fix(traffic): commit a traffic tick even when a best-effort maintenance helper fails addTrafficLocked stages the inbound and client deltas, then runs three helpers (auto-renew, disable depleted clients, disable depleted inbounds) that are meant to log and continue. All three reused the function-scope err that the deferred commit/rollback inspects, so the last helper's error decided the whole tick: a failure in disableInvalidInbounds rolled back the already-staged traffic while AddTraffic reported success, and because xray had already advanced its counter baseline that traffic was lost for good. Give each best-effort helper its own error variable so only a genuine staging failure rolls the tick back. * fix(traffic): re-enable clients and serialize the write in Reset All Client Traffic ClientService.ResetAllTraffics zeroed up/down but, unlike every sibling reset path, never restored enable=true, so clients that had been auto-disabled for exceeding their quota stayed cut with zero usage after a reset. It also wrote client_traffics directly on the shared DB handle instead of through the serial traffic writer, reintroducing the cross-transaction lock-order deadlock the writer exists to prevent. Restore enable and run the reset inside submitTrafficWrite within one transaction. * fix(traffic): keep node reset propagation out of the serial traffic writer ResetAllTraffics and ResetInboundTraffic performed their remote-node reset HTTP calls inside submitTrafficWrite. Each call can block up to the remote timeout, and Reset All Traffics loops every node serially, so the single traffic-writer goroutine was held for seconds — long enough that the concurrent 5s traffic poll timed out submitting its own write and dropped the deltas it had already drained from xray. Do the DB reset inside the writer, then propagate to the nodes after it returns, matching how the mtproto quota reset is already sequenced. * fix(sub): stop the subscription from 500ing on valid-but-unusual stream settings The raw share-link generators used unchecked type assertions and unguarded array indexing: an empty Reality shortIds/serverNames array (random.Num(0) panics), a tcp-http header with no request block or an empty request.path, a grpc block missing its keys, empty stream settings, and a non-string Host header all panicked mid-generation. Because getSubs loops every client's link with no recover, one such client 500s the entire subscription for everyone. The sibling JSON, Clash and frontend generators already guard these; make the raw generators match with comma-ok assertions and length checks. * fix(sub): tolerate a hysteria inbound without hysteriaSettings in the JSON subscription genHy asserted stream["hysteriaSettings"].(map[string]any) without the comma-ok form, so a hysteria inbound whose StreamSettings omit the hysteriaSettings key (a valid, representable shape the raw generator renders fine) panicked and 500ed the entire JSON subscription. Use comma-ok; the downstream reads already guard each key, so a nil map degrades gracefully. * fix(sub): emit the pinned peer cert sha256 in Clash subscriptions The Clash stream builder computed tlsSettings["pin-sha256"] from the inbound's pinnedPeerCertSha256, but applySecurity's tls case never copied it onto the proxy, so it was written with no reader and silently dropped. Clash subscribers lost certificate pinning while JSON subscribers kept it. Surface pin-sha256 on the proxy in the tls case, matching the JSON emitter. * fix(link): parse the snake_case and extra-blob xhttp fields when importing a share link The panel's share-link emitters (Go and TS) carry advanced xhttp knobs as a snake_case x_padding_bytes plus an extra=<json> payload, but the Go parser's xhttp branch read only top-level camelCase params, so importing an xhttp link via the outbound-subscription feature dropped xPaddingBytes, scMaxEachPostBytes and the rest, silently reverting them to the stream defaults and producing a non-working outbound. Mirror the TS parser: read the snake_case alias, merge the extra JSON blob, then let explicit camelCase params win. * fix(frontend): decode URL-safe base64 when parsing an imported share link Base64.decode called window.atob directly, which rejects the base64url alphabet (- and _) and unpadded input. But the panel's own share-link emitter uses Base64.encode(x, true) (URL-safe, unpadded), and real SIP002 links do too, so importing a Shadowsocks link whose method:password encodes with a - or _ threw, fell back to the raw undecoded string, and produced a wrong method and garbage password (the vmess parser shared the same limitation). Normalize base64url and re-pad before atob so decode round-trips every emitted link. * fix(link): honor the vmess ws path and hysteria2 vcn params on import Two Go/TS parser parity gaps in the outbound share-link import path: parseVmess only applied a ws link's path when the inner JSON also carried a host key, so a generator that omits host dropped the path back to the default; and parseHysteria2 hardcoded verifyPeerCertByName to empty, ignoring the vcn param the panel emits, so a hysteria2 outbound with a decoy SNI and a distinct cert name failed TLS verification after import. The TS parser handles both; make the Go parser match. * fix(ui): stop the sniffing form island from clobbering unrendered fields antd's Form.useWatch only reports registered fields, so while the sniffing toggle was off the island emitted { enabled: false } upward and replaced the full Sniffing object in form state. Saving a VLESS reverse outbound then crashed in sniffingToWire on the missing ipsExcluded array; the loopback outbound and the inbound sniffing tab shared the same hole. Watch the store with preserve: true so unrendered fields keep their values, and seed a missing value from the schema defaults instead of an empty cast. * fix(sub): drop empty remark segments instead of leaving a stray separator expandSegment dropped a "|" segment only when its tokens rendered the unlimited mark, so a segment whose only token resolved to the empty string (a client with no comment, an unlimited client's expiry date) was kept as bare decoration, leaving a trailing "|" or a dangling emoji on every share link's remark. Drop a token-bearing segment whenever none of its tokens produce a real value, while still keeping pure-literal segments. * fix(xray): keep source- and domains-scoped routing rules when an inbound is deleted removeInboundTagFromRules drops a routing rule whose inboundTag list becomes empty only if the rule has no other matcher, but routingMatcherKeys omitted xray-core's canonical source and domains keys. A rule scoped by source or domains (common in hand-authored or imported configs) therefore lost its whole body — including a security-relevant block — when its single listed inbound was deleted, instead of just having the tag trimmed. Recognize source and domains as live matchers. * fix(xray): guard RemoveUser against an uninitialized handler client Every XrayAPI handler method returns an error when HandlerServiceClient is nil, except RemoveUser, which dereferenced it directly. A depletion sweep runs Init with the port ignored and, during a restart window where the fresh process's api port is still 0, Init fails and leaves the client nil — so RemoveUser panicked (recovered by the traffic writer, but re-thrown every poll) instead of returning an error. Add the same nil guard the siblings have. * fix(xray): do not revive a manually stopped Xray on a background restart RestartXray cleared isManuallyStopped unconditionally at its top, so the @30s pending-config cron (and warp/ldap/outbound reconcile jobs) that call RestartXray(false) resurrected an Xray the admin had deliberately stopped — unlike the crash-detector, which honors the manual-stop flag. Skip a non-forced restart while the stop flag is set; only an explicit forced restart clears it. * fix(xray): retry a failed pending-restart instead of dropping the config change The 30s cron consumed the need-restart flag with IsNeedRestartAndSetFalse before calling RestartXray and only logged a failure. If RestartXray failed early (a transient GetXrayConfig DB error) the old process kept running the old config, the crash detector saw a running process and never retried, and the flag stayed cleared — so an admin's saved change silently never reached the core. Move the consume/restart/retry into ApplyPendingRestart, which re-arms the flag on failure so the next tick retries. * fix(xray): synchronize the process version and apiPort fields Start writes p.version and p.apiPort (via refreshVersion/refreshAPIPort) after flipping the process to running, while GetXrayVersion and GetAPIPort read them lock-free from the status and traffic poll goroutines. The struct mutex deliberately excluded these fields, so a restart racing a poll was a real data race — a torn read of the version string header can crash. Extend the mutex to cover version and apiPort, doing the blocking version probe before taking the lock. * fix(settings): detect a wildcard listen collision between the web and sub ports The web/sub same-port check compared the two listen addresses as raw strings, so binding both on all interfaces with different spellings (webListen 0.0.0.0 vs an empty subListen) slipped past validation and only failed at startup with an opaque bind error. Treat any wildcard listen ('', 0.0.0.0, ::) as overlapping so the clash is reported up front, while still allowing two distinct specific addresses to share a port. * fix(db): mark the IP-limit cleanup seeder done on a fresh install ResetIpLimitNoFail2ban is a one-time migration that, on a host without fail2ban, zeroes every existing client's limitIp because the limit can't be enforced. It was missing from the fresh-install fast-path seeder list, so on a brand-new DB it did not run on the first boot but fired on the second — wiping any IP limits the admin had set in between. Add it to the fast-path so a truly fresh install marks it done up front (there is nothing to clean), leaving later admin-set limits intact. * fix(security): dial outbound subscriptions through the SSRF guard The outbound-subscription fetch validated the URL host once (resolving DNS and rejecting private targets) but then fetched with a plain HTTP client that re-resolves the host at dial time, so a subscription domain the attacker controls could pass validation as a public IP and rebind to 127.0.0.1 / a cloud metadata endpoint / an internal host for the actual dial — a blind SSRF into the panel's network. Route the direct fetch (and its redirects) through netsafe.SSRFGuardedDialContext, which resolves, checks and dials the same IP atomically, carrying the subscription's AllowPrivate flag on the request context; a configured egress proxy still dials its loopback bridge unguarded. * fix(security): bound the login-limiter attempts map The login rate limiter keys its records on the caller-supplied username and only evicted a record when that exact key was revisited or the login succeeded. An unauthenticated attacker replaying one CSRF token while rotating a fresh username per request seeded a record that was never revisited, growing the map without bound until the panel OOMs. Cap the map: before inserting a new record, reclaim records whose block has lapsed and whose failures aged out, and if the map is still at the ceiling under a broad flood, drop one so memory can never grow past the cap. * fix(tgbot): require admin for privileged callbacks, not just the first switch answerCallback wraps only its first callback switch in an isAdmin guard; the second switch (server usage, inbound/online enumeration, database backup export, ban logs, mass traffic reset, client creation) ran for every caller. Telegram delivers a callback with the tapping user's id, so a non-admin who can see an admin's inline keyboard — as when the bot runs in a group — could tap Backup and receive the full database and config, or reset all traffic. Default-deny before the second switch: a non-admin may only run the per-user client_* callbacks that resolve their own data from their Telegram id. * fix(eventbus): dispatch each subscriber in its own goroutine The fan-out loop called every subscriber's handler sequentially on the single dispatch goroutine. The email and Telegram notifiers block on network I/O for tens of seconds (or minutes when the remote is slow), so one slow subscriber stalled the whole loop: the 256-slot channel then filled and Publish silently dropped later events — including high-value xray.crash and node.down notifications unrelated to the slow handler. Hand each delivered event to every handler in its own goroutine so a blocking subscriber can no longer stall delivery to the others. safeCall already recovers panics, so a detached handler cannot take down the bus. * fix(integration): cap WARP API response body size doWarpRequest read the response with an unbounded io.ReadAll, unlike the sibling NordVPN client which already caps every read at maxResponseSize. A hostile panel egress proxy or a MITM on the Cloudflare WARP endpoint could stream an arbitrarily large body and force the panel into an unbounded allocation. Wrap the body in an io.LimitReader(maxResponseSize) to match the NordVPN client. * fix(email): bound every SMTP step with a connection deadline The "starttls"/"none" transport delivered through net/smtp.SendMail, which dials with an untimed net.Dial and never sets a socket deadline. When an SMTP server accepted the TCP connection but then stalled (or was a blackhole), the caller was released by Send's 30s select, but the sender goroutine and its socket stayed blocked until the OS TCP timeout — minutes per notification, leaking a goroutine and a connection each time. sendWithTLS dialed with a timeout but likewise armed no deadline on the protocol phase, and TestConnection (called synchronously from the settings handler, with no select guard) could hang the request indefinitely. Replace SendMail with sendPlain, which dials with smtpConnectTimeout and arms conn.SetDeadline(smtpDeadline) before the greeting read, preserving SendMail's opportunistic STARTTLS upgrade. Arm the same deadline in sendWithTLS and TestConnection so every SMTP step is bounded. * fix(server): guard access-log parser against malformed lines GetXrayLogs split each Xray access-log line on whitespace and then read fixed offsets — parts[1] for the timestamp and parts[i+1] after the "from", "accepted" and "email:" markers — without checking the line had that many fields. A truncated or malformed line (the logged destination is attacker-influenced) indexed past the slice and panicked; the panel handler returned a 500 via Gin's recovery. Extract the per-line field parsing into parseAccessLogFields and length guard every positional lookup so a short line yields a partial entry instead of panicking. * fix(server): guard xray key-generator output parsing GetNewX25519Cert, GetNewmldsa65 and GetNewmlkem768 parsed xray's stdout by reading lines[0], lines[1] and each line's second colon-separated field without any length check — unlike GetNewEchCert, which already guards its line count. If the xray binary printed fewer than two lines or reformatted its labels (a version change, or a silent failure that emitted nothing), the fixed slice index panicked and the handler 500'd. Extract the shared parsing into parseXrayKeyPairOutput, which length guards the line count and each label split and returns an error instead of panicking, then route all three generators through it. * fix(tgbot): stop auto-deleted messages from resetting wizard state SendMsgToTgbotDeleteAfter spawns a goroutine that, after the display delay, deleted the transient message and then unconditionally cleared the chat's conversation state. Every caller that ends a wizard step already clears the state synchronously, so that call was redundant — and harmful: if within the delay the user advanced to the next step (a callback sets a fresh awaiting_* state), the late goroutine wiped it, and the user's next message fell through unrecognized, silently dropping their input. Move the delayed deletion into deleteMessageAfterDelay, which only removes the message and no longer touches the conversation state. Guard deleteMessageTgBot against a nil bot so the deletion path is unit-testable. * fix(frontend): refetch a fresh CSRF token on 403 instead of reusing the stale meta tag On a 403 to an unsafe method the client cleared its cached CSRF token and called ensureCsrfToken to retry. But ensureCsrfToken prefers the <meta name="csrf-token"> tag baked into the page, which the production panel always injects, so the "refresh" re-read the same stale token and the /csrf-token refetch was never reached — the retry re-sent the token that had just been rejected and the save failed with an error toast. The token lives in the session and rotates when the session is regenerated (for example re-login in another tab), leaving the tab's baked-in meta token stale. Fetch the current token straight from /csrf-token in the 403 branch so the retry uses the authoritative server value. The existing tests only passed because they strip the meta tag; the new test keeps a stale tag present. * fix(frontend): surface backend error text from failed requests HttpUtil.get/post read the thrown HttpError body as response.data.message, but the backend error envelope (entity.Msg) serializes its text as msg. On any non-2xx JSON response the real reason was therefore dropped and the operator saw only the generic "Request failed with status N" toast. Read response.data.msg first (keeping message and the native error text as fallbacks). The sibling test had pinned the wrong body shape ({ message }); correct it to the real backend shape ({ success:false, msg }) so it exercises the actual envelope. * fix(frontend): share one WebSocket connection across bridge and hooks websocketBridge.ts and useWebSocket.ts each declared their own module-scoped sharedClient plus an identical getSharedClient, so the "shared" client was not shared between them: whenever a page using useWebSocket (Clients/Inbounds) mounted alongside the always-mounted bridge, the panel opened two sockets to /ws. The server then pushed every traffic/stats/nodes/inbounds snapshot to both, doubling WebSocket bandwidth and running two independent reconnect loops, and the hook's socket was never disconnected on unmount. Hoist a single getSharedWebSocketClient into api/websocket.ts and route both the bridge and the hook through it, so exactly one connection is opened. * fix(frontend): guard the outbounds WebSocket handler against non-array payloads onOutbounds wrote the raw WebSocket payload straight into the outboundsTraffic cache, unlike the sibling onNodes/onInbounds handlers which first check Array.isArray. A malformed non-array push (for example an object) would land in the cache with staleTime Infinity; consumers that call .find()/.map() on the outbounds list would then throw and crash the Outbounds tab. Add the same Array.isArray guard so a bad push is ignored. * fix(frontend): key the node table by the computed row key, not id The desktop node table used rowKey="id", but transitive sub-nodes (the read-only rows surfaced from downstream nodes) all carry id 0, so a topology with two or more transitive rows gave React duplicate keys. antd's rowKey prop overrides the row object's own computed `key` (`t-${guid}` for transitive rows, the numeric id otherwise), so the unique key the code already builds was ignored — causing row-state/DOM mis-association on any re-render (heartbeat refetch, address-eye toggle). The mobile card path already keyed by record.key. Key the table by "key" so transitive rows get their distinct t-${guid} identity; direct nodes keep key === id, so row selection (filtered to numeric keys) is unchanged. * fix(frontend): map routing row actions through the rule's real index The routing table hides balancer-loopback rules (`_bl_*`) but keeps each visible row's original index in `key`, then handed antd's positional row index straight to edit/delete/toggle/move/drag — all of which mutate the full, unfiltered routing.rules array. Once a hidden loopback rule precedes a visible one (e.g. a balancer whose fallback is another balancer, plus any rule added afterwards), the positional index no longer matches the array index, so deleting or editing a rule silently hit the wrong one — including destroying the loopback rule that keeps the balancer alive. Add originalRuleIndex to translate a positional row index back through the row's `key`, and route every mutating handler (openEdit, confirmDelete, toggleRule, moveUp/moveDown, drag) through it. When no loopback rows are hidden the mapping is the identity, so ordinary configs are unaffected. * fix(frontend): map outbound row actions through the outbound's real index The outbounds table hides balancer-loopback outbounds (`_bl_*`) but keeps each visible row's original index in `key`, then passed antd's positional row index to edit/delete/move and to the per-row probe (onTest) and its result lookup — all of which address the full, unfiltered outbounds array. Once a hidden loopback outbound precedes a visible one, the positional index diverges from the array index, so deleting or editing an outbound hit the wrong one (its deletion-impact plan and removal targeting the wrong entry), and the test button probed / showed results against the wrong outbound. Add originalOutboundIndex and route the mutating handlers through it; key the probe trigger and test-result columns by record.key. With no loopback rows hidden the mapping is the identity, so ordinary configs are unaffected. * fix(frontend): tolerate a malformed happyEyeballs value in the Xray Basics tab BasicsTab derived directHappyEyeballs by calling HappyEyeballsSchema.parse during render, guarding only against null/non-object. A wrong-typed field (e.g. happyEyeballs.tryDelayMs as a string) or any other shape mismatch — reachable via the Complete Template JSON editor or an imported config — threw straight out of render, white-screening the default Xray landing tab. Use safeParse and fall back to null so a bad value degrades to "no override" instead of crashing the page. * fix(frontend): preserve routing-rule fields the form does not surface The rule form rebuilt the rule from a fixed literal of only the fields it edits, and RoutingTab replaces the rule wholesale on confirm. Fields the form never exposes — localPort, localIP, process, ruleTag, webhook — are in the rule schema and can arrive via the advanced JSON editor or Import Rules; opening such a rule in the form and saving silently dropped them. Carry over every key of the original rule the form does not manage before applying the form-derived fields, so an edit only touches what it surfaces. * fix(frontend): re-sync the sniffing island when its value changes externally The sniffing config editor froze its seed value at mount and only watched its own inner AntD form, never reflecting a later change to the shared RHF `sniffing` path. Because the inbound form mounts every tab with forceRender, the friendly Sniffing tab and the Advanced JSON editor are live at once: editing sniffing in the JSON editor updated the RHF value but not the frozen island, so the next interaction with the friendly tab emitted the stale value and silently discarded the JSON edit. Add an effect that pushes an external value change into the inner form, guarded by the same lastEmitted marker the emit path uses so the island never re-seeds from its own echo and no update loop forms. * fix(frontend): don't drift a client's byte quota on a no-op save The quota field shows the total in GB rounded to two decimals; editing a client and saving converted that display value straight back to bytes. A byte total not aligned to 0.01 GB — one set via the API or an import — was therefore rewritten to the rounded value on any save that never touched the field, losing a few MB each time. Add resolveTotalBytes: keep the original byte total when the displayed GB still matches it, and only re-derive from GB when the user actually changed the field. * fix(eventbus): deliver events on a bounded per-subscriber worker The previous fix dispatched each event to every subscriber with a bare `go safeCall`. That unblocked the dispatch loop, but removed the bus's backpressure: under a login-attempt flood (which both notifier subscribers process without rate-limiting) with email/Telegram enabled, every attempt spawned handler goroutines that each block on network I/O for up to ~30s, with no bound — a goroutine and outbound-connection storm. It also let a subscriber's handler run concurrently with itself, racing the Telegram notifier's lazily-cached hostname. Give each subscriber its own bounded queue drained by a single worker goroutine. Dispatch does a non-blocking send per subscriber (dropping only that subscriber's event when its queue is full), so a slow subscriber still can't stall the others, concurrency is bounded to one in-flight handler per subscriber, per-subscriber event order is preserved, and Stop again waits for in-flight handlers to finish. * fix(frontend): map outbound mobile-card actions through the real index too The desktop outbounds table was keyed by the outbound's real index, but the mobile card list was left keying the probe trigger and every test-state lookup by the positional row index. With a hidden balancer-loopback outbound present, tapping Check on a mobile card probed the wrong outbound and the Test-All results landed on the wrong card. Key onTest and the testResult/isTesting reads by record.key, matching the desktop columns. * fix(frontend): meet WCAG AA contrast on the config-block link text The Storybook accessibility test flagged the share-link <code> block: with no explicit color it inherited a muted grey that renders as #888888 on the #f8f8f8 tertiary-fill background in CI's Chromium — a 3.33:1 contrast, below the 4.5:1 AA threshold. Set the text to the theme's primary text token so the colour is explicit and high-contrast in both light and dark themes instead of depending on an inherited value that varies by browser. * style(sub): simplify a negated conjunction to satisfy staticcheck QF1001 golangci-lint (staticcheck QF1001) flagged the `!(a && b)` guard in expandSegment. Rewrite it via De Morgan's law to the equivalent `!a || !b` form so the linter passes; behavior is unchanged. * fix: close panics and races the audit's own fixes left nearby Second-pass review of the 54-commit self-correcting audit. Each item below was confirmed by reading the surrounding source (and, where practical, the pre-fix code) before being changed; regression tests are included for every behavioral fix. Concurrency: - eventbus: Bus.Subscribe called wg.Add with no synchronization against a concurrent Bus.Stop's wg.Wait, a real "WaitGroup misuse" panic risk (e.g. a Telegram-bot settings save racing panel shutdown/restart). Stop now flips a mu-guarded `stopped` flag before waiting, and Subscribe checks it under the same lock, so Add and Wait can no longer race. Security: - login_limiter: evictForRoom's fallback eviction picked an arbitrary map key, including ones still under an active cooldown - an attacker flooding /login with fresh usernames could evict their own (or anyone's) blocked record and reset the lockout. The fallback now skips actively-blocked records, only falling back to an unconditional evict if the map is somehow entirely full of active blocks (preserves the hard memory cap). Subscription-endpoint panics (reachable by any client hitting /sub): - internal/sub/service.go: applyPathAndHostParams/Obj (ws/httpupgrade/xhttp with no path settings object) and the TLS alpn readers in three places used unchecked type assertions - exactly the bug class abab7cd0 patched elsewhere in the same switch statements, just not these call sites. - internal/sub/json_service.go, clash_service.go: the externalProxy loops in the JSON and Clash generators used unchecked assertions on a legacy/admin-supplied field (missing "port", non-object entry, etc.). - internal/sub/json_service.go: realityData's shortId/serverName selection could assert a non-string array element. Other correctness: - client_traffic.go: ResetAllTraffics (touched by 3eb214d0) still skipped clearing NodeClientTraffic node-sync baselines, unlike its sibling reset paths in the same file - a node's next sync would re-add pre-reset delta on top of the freshly-zeroed counter. - inbound_traffic.go: the traffic-tick tx's Commit/Rollback errors were silently discarded; now logged so a backend-level commit failure (e.g. an aborted Postgres tx from a best-effort helper) doesn't masquerade as a successful tick. - outbound_subscription.go: the new subscriptionFetchClient doc comment was wedged between fetchAndStore's existing comment and fetchAndStore itself, leaving fetchAndStore undocumented and the comment describing the wrong function. Convention cleanup: - Removed narrative // comments added by the audit that violate this repo's no-inline-comment rule (mostly narrating the specific bug/fix rather than a lasting contract, and mostly on new Test functions, which this repo's existing tests never comment) - calibrated against this exact codebase's own pre-existing comment style so legitimate godoc-style doc comments were left alone. --------- Co-authored-by: claude[bot] <41898282+claude[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>	2026-07-17 00:33:06 +02:00
Tomi lla	129f50d92a	feat(sub): auto-detect subscription format by User-Agent (Updated) (#5826) ... * feat(settings): add subscription format controls * feat(sub): auto-detect subscription formats * fix(xray): validate balancer regexes before save * Revert "fix(xray): validate balancer regexes before save" This reverts commit 8a208ce71b. * doc(endpoints): align indent spaces * doc(settings): improve error message formatting in validateSubUserAgentRegex - Use NewErrorf with proper formatting instead of NewError with string concatenation - Add comment explaining the rationale for returning original pattern value - This preserves the intentional design where empty input is stored as empty in the DB and inherited as the runtime default at read time --------- Co-authored-by: Tomilla <5007859+Tomilla@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Sanaei <ho3ein.sanaei@gmail.com>	2026-07-14 13:01:40 +02:00
Yuri Khachaturyan	1cfd7b49b0	fix(email): build an RFC 5322 message with a proper From address and name (#5941) ... The notification/test email carried only From/To/Subject/MIME headers, and the From header was the raw SMTP username. Two problems: - When the SMTP login is not a bare email address (common with relays and submission services), the From header has no valid address and strict receivers reject the message — e.g. Gmail returns "550-5.7.1 ... Messages missing a valid address in From: header". - There was no Date (mandatory per RFC 5322 section 3.6) and no Message-ID, which also raises spam score. Add smtpFrom (sender address) and smtpFromName (display name) settings and assemble the message with net/mail: a name-addr From ("Name" <addr>), a Date, a Message-ID, and an RFC 2047 encoded Subject, in a deterministic header order. From falls back to the username when smtpFrom is empty, so existing setups keep working. Wire the settings through the model, the SMTP send and test paths, the Email settings UI, and all 13 locale files; regenerate the Zod/OpenAPI artifacts. Validate smtpFrom in AllSetting.CheckValid (reject anything net/mail cannot parse), which surfaces a bad address at configuration time and prevents CRLF header injection; strip CR/LF in buildMessage as defense in depth. Add buildMessage and CheckValid tests.	2026-07-14 12:55:46 +02:00
MHSanaei	4e928a1ce0	v3.5.0	2026-07-12 22:08:19 +02:00
MHSanaei	e211a5cc47	feat(frontend): hide redundant migration download on sqlite panels ... Back Up's .db now restores directly into a PostgreSQL panel, so the SQLite-side Download Migration row only duplicated it; the row stays on PostgreSQL panels where it is the only PG-to-SQLite path. Restore accepts .dump and .db everywhere, the backup modal texts describe the accepted formats in all locales, and the orphaned migrationDownloadDesc key is removed.	2026-07-12 20:14:42 +02:00
MHSanaei	77dffe9a85	feat(server): sniff sqlite panel restore uploads and keep the fallback on failure ... The SQLite panel's Restore now detects the upload by content like the PostgreSQL panel does: migration dumps are rebuilt with RestoreSQLite, pg_dump archives get a clear error instead of 'Invalid db file format', and every upload passes the panel-schema pre-flight before Xray stops. The .backup fallback survives a failed Xray start and is named in the error, the DB pool is reopened on every error path after CloseDB, and a failed InitDB closes the imported file before restoring the fallback so the rename cannot hit a Windows sharing violation.	2026-07-12 20:14:22 +02:00
MHSanaei	54fc0fd47c	fix(database): make cross-db migration lossless, transactional, and pre-checked ... migrationModels was missing ClientGroup and ClientGlobalTraffic, so both migration directions silently dropped client groups and global client traffic; the model list is now extracted to allModels and a parity test keeps the two lists from drifting again. MigrateData runs its truncate and copy inside one transaction so a failed import rolls back instead of leaving the destination truncated (sequences resync after commit since setval is non-transactional). New PrepareSQLiteForMigration rejects uploads that are not a panel database and AutoMigrates old backups so their missing tables cannot break the row copy.	2026-07-12 20:14:07 +02:00
MHSanaei	30b611614b	feat: import SQLite migration dumps through the PostgreSQL panel restore ... The SQLite panel's Download Migration produces a portable SQL text dump advertised as seeding a PostgreSQL panel, but the PostgreSQL Restore only accepted pg_dump custom archives, so the migration file was rejected with 'Invalid file' even though the upload picker asked for .dump. importDB now sniffs the upload header: PGDMP archives keep the pg_restore path, while raw SQLite databases (.db) and SQL text migration dumps are rebuilt, integrity-checked, and copied into PostgreSQL with the same MigrateData engine as 'x-ui migrate-db --dsn'. The restore picker accepts .dump/.db on PostgreSQL and the backup modal texts describe the accepted formats in every locale.	2026-07-12 18:04:38 +02:00
isultanov99	30f6bc1833	feat: Add outbound egress metadata (IP + country) (#5886) ... * Add outbound egress metadata Show egress IP and country information for outbound HTTP tests. The probe reuses the temporary SOCKS route from the existing HTTP test and fetches Cloudflare trace metadata after the reachability check succeeds. The outbound list now adds separate Egress and Country columns, hides egress IPs until the user reveals them, and marks Cloudflare WARP results with an orange cloud pill. Mobile cards keep the same data compact by placing the country and IPv4/IPv6 values on separate lines. Validation: npm run typecheck; npm run lint; npm run build; go test ./internal/web/service/outbound * Use context-aware DNS lookup for egress trace * Address outbound egress review feedback Restore the Real Delay selector and TCP default so the egress metadata change does not remove an existing test mode. Keep HTTP probe tests hermetic by stubbing egress trace lookups, run IPv4 and IPv6 trace fetches concurrently with a shorter diagnostic timeout, scope mobile IP reveal state per row, support keyboard activation for reveal toggles, and treat WARP+ trace values as WARP-like.	2026-07-12 15:09:52 +02:00
MHSanaei	814cda3fb4	feat(xray): update xray-core to v26.7.11 and adapt panel ... Bump xtls/xray-core to 50231eaf (v26.7.11) and the three binary pins (DockerInit.sh, release.yml x2) in lockstep. Adapt the panel to the upstream changes: - Shadowsocks "none"/"plain" and VMess "none"/"zero" were removed from the core. A migration rewrites stored none/plain SS methods to a supported cipher and none/zero VMess security to "auto" (on both the clients column and inbound settings JSON); the SS build-time heal does the same so a row injected after boot cannot brick startup. The removed values are dropped from every frontend option list, schema and adapter, and coerced to "auto" at the Go link/sub/Clash emit sites and both link importers. Fix the CipherType_NONE sentinel that no longer compiles. - Unencrypted vless/trojan outbounds to a public address are now refused by the core. Validate outbounds through the vendored config loader when saving the xray template and when storing/merging outbound subscriptions, so one such outbound cannot keep the core from starting. - New TCP finalmask type "xmc" (Minecraft mimicry): add it to the sub link allowlist, the frontend enum and the FinalMask form (hostname, usernames, required password), and document it. - streamSettings gained a "method" alias for "network"; canonicalize it to "network" at inbound save time and in the form adapters/schema so a method-keyed config keeps its transport. - New root "env" config key is passed through xray.Config, compared in Equals, and forces a restart in the hot diff. - REALITY now defaults minClientVer to 26.3.27; update the form placeholder.	2026-07-12 00:30:47 +02:00
Dmitrii Ignatov	affcf6c422	fix(link): strip query and trailing slash when parsing ss:// port (#5895) ... * fix(link): strip query and trailing slash when parsing ss:// port Subscription-provided Shadowsocks links use the SIP002 form ss://userinfo@host:port[/][?plugin=...]#tag. parseShadowsocks only stripped the #fragment, so a "?plugin=" / "?type=" query and the optional trailing slash leaked into the host:port split, strconv.Atoi failed, and the port was silently set to 0 (the error was discarded). Direct link import was unaffected because it runs through the frontend parser, which already handles this. Strip the query and the trailing slash before splitting host:port, mirroring the frontend outbound-link-parser and the SIP002 grammar. This complements #5432, which fixed the SS2022 generation side. Add table-driven parseShadowsocks tests covering modern, legacy, base64url userinfo, the SIP002 slash+plugin form, and SIP022 percent-encoded userinfo with a dual-key password. * fix(link): surface ss:// port parse errors instead of defaulting to 0 The modern and legacy Shadowsocks branches discarded the strconv.Atoi error when reading the port, silently yielding port 0 for any malformed host:port. Return a parse error instead, matching defaultPort's existing pattern in this file, so a bad link is skipped by ParseSubscriptionBody rather than injected as an unusable port-0 outbound.	2026-07-11 23:34:09 +02:00
MHSanaei	cbd2940a63	fix(node): adopt a node inbound's host overrides into the master ... Per-inbound Host overrides (Security/SNI/Fingerprint/ALPN and friends) are looked up by the local inbound id when subscriptions render, but nothing in the node sync ever fetched the node's hosts table: an inbound adopted from a managed node got zero Host rows on the master, so its subscription configs fell back to a bare TLS block without the fingerprint/SNI the node was configured with. When a traffic snapshot carries a tag with no central row yet - the only moment adoption can happen - the sync job now also pulls the node's existing hosts/list endpoint (best-effort, so old nodes just skip it) and the adoption branch materializes that inbound's groups against the new central id inside the same transaction, reusing the group-to-rows projection the hosts API already uses. Master stays authoritative afterwards: this is a one-time import, not a continuous sync, matching how the inbound's own settings are adopted. Closes #5890	2026-07-11 23:17:57 +02:00
MHSanaei	e6bef229ae	fix(web): opt panel pages out of Cloudflare Rocket Loader ... Behind Cloudflare with Rocket Loader enabled, the panel's entry bundles were rewritten and executed through Rocket Loader's own loader instead of as native ES modules (a reporter's network capture shows the main bundle initiated by rocket-loader.min.js). That breaks module semantics and script ordering, leaving a blank page after login even though every asset returns 200 - most visibly with a custom URI path, where the injected base path must be set before the bundle boots. Stamp data-cfasync="false" - Cloudflare's documented per-script opt-out - on the built entry script tags via a build-time transformIndexHtml hook (Vite regenerates entry tags, so a source-HTML attribute would be stripped), and on the runtime-injected base-path/version inline script in serveDistPage. Closes #5868	2026-07-11 22:48:59 +02:00
MHSanaei	975b1f1acc	fix(iplimit): ban a dead connection once instead of every scan ... When a client's connection drops without a clean TCP close, xray-core keeps its online-map entry until the session context ends (idle policy), minutes after the kernel socket is gone. The 10s IP-limit scan kept seeing that stale IP as the oldest live one and re-emitted the same [LIMIT_IP] Disconnecting OLD IP line plus a RemoveUser/AddUser cycle every scan - operators measured 100+ repeats over ~1000s for a single network switch, forcing absurd fail2ban maxretry values to avoid banning legitimate mobile users. The core refreshes an entry's lastSeen only when a new connection from that IP is dispatched, never on traffic, so a frozen lastSeen across scans is a dead connection, not a reconnect. Track the lastSeen of each banned (email, ip) pair and skip the log line and disconnect until it advances; a real reconnect moves lastSeen and is enforced exactly as before, and an age cutoff that could misclassify long-lived active tunnels is deliberately avoided. Closes #5893	2026-07-11 22:48:58 +02:00
MHSanaei	6aa87f4e57	fix(clients): finish deleting from every inbound when one fails ... Delete aborted its per-inbound loop on the first error, so a client attached to inbounds across several nodes lost at most one per attempt: the loop never reached the remaining nodes, the record cleanup after the loop never ran, and each retry started over with whatever was left. Operators with many nodes had to delete the same client once per node. Collect per-inbound failures and keep going so every reachable inbound and node is cleaned in a single pass, then keep the client record only when something failed - its settings JSON still holds the client there, so the next delete retries exactly the leftovers - and return the joined failures instead of silently reporting success. DeleteByEmail's legacy fallback loop gets the same treatment. Closes #5845	2026-07-11 22:48:57 +02:00
MHSanaei	200ea09157	fix(node): never sweep a node's inbounds before their first adoption ... Adding a node imports nothing; its pre-existing inbounds only become central rows on the first clean traffic-sync tick. But any save of the node (switching sync mode, picking tags after "Load inbounds from node") marks it config-dirty, and the next tick then ran ReconcileNode before that first adoption: with zero central rows the delete sweep saw every remote tag as undesired and destroyed the node's real inbounds - in "all" mode all of them - disconnecting live clients with no confirmation, and the master then reported "record not found". Track the first completed clean sync in nodes.inbounds_adopted_at and skip the sweep (pushes still run) until it is set, so "absent locally" can no longer be conflated with "deleted on the master". A node that has synced before still sweeps normally, including the offline last-inbound-deleted case. Existing nodes are seeded as adopted on upgrade to keep their behavior unchanged. Closes #5898	2026-07-11 22:48:57 +02:00
MHSanaei	fc625d8f66	fix(database): drop the legacy UNIQUE constraint on inbounds.port ... Inbound.Port carried a unique gorm tag before multi-node existed; the tag was removed from the model long ago, but AutoMigrate never drops a constraint, so SQLite databases created in that era still physically enforce global port uniqueness. On such installs the node-scoped port conflict logic is correct yet the raw insert fails - manual "Deploy to node" saves and setRemoteTraffic's central-inbound adoption both die with "UNIQUE constraint failed: inbounds.port" when two nodes use the same port. Add a SQLite-only migration that drops an explicit unique index on port directly, and rebuilds the table (create from the current model, copy shared columns, swap) when the constraint is inline, since SQLite can't ALTER it away. Fresh databases and Postgres are untouched. Closes #5894	2026-07-11 22:48:56 +02:00
MHSanaei	c4448f4ea8	fix(clients): rename client record atomically with inbound settings ... Update committed an email rename to the clients table with a standalone write before the per-inbound loop rewrote each inbound's settings JSON. In that window the record held the new email while the JSON still held the old one, so any concurrent SyncInbound (traffic poll, another edit) found no record for the old email and inserted a duplicate seeded from the stale JSON - carrying the same subId, which then failed every later edit with "Duplicate subId". The subId collision check also ran after that write, so even a rejected update permanently renamed the email. Move the rename inside UpdateInboundClient's serialized transaction, next to the settings save and SyncInbound, so no other writer can see one without the other; skip it when a record already owns the target email (the merge case). Update now only runs collision checks before the loop and falls back to a direct rename solely for records with no attached inbound. This covers both the REST API and the web UI editor, which share this path. Closes #5870	2026-07-11 22:48:54 +02:00
MHSanaei	3b731cd657	fix(clients): reuse stored credentials when re-adding an existing identity ... Create permits a repeat add for an email that already exists when the payload subId matches the stored one (the documented way to attach an identity to more inbounds), but it never seeded the payload from the existing record, so an omitted id minted a fresh UUID via fillProtocolDefaults. SyncInbound then overwrote the shared clients.uuid row by email while previously-attached inbounds kept the original UUID in their settings JSON, silently desyncing panel credentials from subscription links. BulkCreate had the identical gap. Seed ID/Password/Auth/Secret from the existing record in both paths (mirroring what Update, Attach and BulkAttach already do), and preserve Secret in Update too so partial edits of MTProto clients cannot rotate the stored secret. Closes #5903	2026-07-11 22:48:51 +02:00
mrnickson-hue	ed9686bf29	fix(clients): include Telegram ID in client list search (#5888) ... * fix(clients): include Telegram ID in client list search clientMatchesSearch only checked Email/SubID/Comment/UUID/Password/Auth, so searching the client list for a Telegram user ID never matched even though the field is stored on every client. This is a real regression, not a field that was simply never included: before the paged search endpoint (#4500), the frontend searched with ObjectUtil.deepSearch() over the full client object, which recursed into every field including tgId. Replacing that with a fixed backend field list silently dropped it (along with a few other fields, but tgId is the one that's actually needed here since it's the panel's own way of looking a client up when it only knows their Telegram ID). TgID is int64 (0 = unset), so it can't sit in the existing []string candidates array — matched separately via strconv, and skipped when 0 to avoid a needle of "0" spuriously matching every client without a Telegram ID. Fixes #5880 * fix(clients): drop explanatory comment, mention Telegram ID in search hint Addresses review feedback on #5888: - Removed the // comment block above the TgID check in clientMatchesSearch per repo convention (code should read on its own). - Updated searchPlaceholder in all 13 locale files to mention Telegram ID, since the search box now actually matches on it. * test(clients): remove TgID search test per maintainer request	2026-07-10 12:20:35 +02:00
Sanaei	f3e99058f9	fix(sub): apply host Allow Insecure to Hysteria2 subscription links (#5866) ... Host.AllowInsecure was only wired into the shared VLESS/VMess/Trojan/Shadowsocks endpoint path (applyEndpointAllowInsecure). Hysteria/Hysteria2 builds its links through its own applyExternalProxyHysteriaParams (raw hysteria2:// link) and buildHysteriaProxy (Clash/Mihomo proxy), neither of which read the host's allowInsecure flag, so a self-signed Hysteria2 host never got insecure=1 or skip-cert-verify: true. Fixes #5865. Co-authored-by: claude[bot] <41898282+claude[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>	2026-07-09 02:03:05 +02:00
Sentiago	142dab9ee8	feat(balancer): add balancer-to-balancer fallback support (#5586) ... * feat(balancer): add balancer-to-balancer fallback support Xray does not natively support using a balancer as fallbackTag for another balancer. This feature automates the loopback workaround: when a user selects a balancer as fallback, the panel generates a loopback outbound + routing rule in the template. How it works: - User picks fallback balancer from dropdown - Panel creates loopback outbound _bl_{target} + routing rule - Balancer fallbackTag set to _bl_{target} - Traffic: Balancer A → loopback _bl_B → routing rule → Balancer B Key features: - Dedup: multiple balancers sharing same fallback reuse one loopback - DFS cycle detection at edit time and on save - Self-reference guard (cannot select own balancer) - Delete protection (blocks if used as fallback by others) - Cleans up routing rules referencing deleted balancers - Override resolves balancer tags through loopback mechanism - All live status tags resolved for display - Internal _bl_ objects filtered from Outbounds/Routing UI - Backward-compatible with old _bl_ naming format - Translations for all 13 locales * fix(review): override regression, save payload sync, i18n completeness - OverrideBalancer: only resolve to loopback when resolution succeeds, pass original target through for plain outbound tags - onSaveAll: serialize cleaned template before save to ensure the healed/cleaned config is what gets persisted - Add reservedPrefix translation key to all 12 non-English locales - Restore trailing newlines in all 13 translation JSON files * fix(test): update balancer form modal tests after cycle-detection guard The okButtonProps disabled guard (added in 56d5825c) prevents the modal from firing onOk when the form is invalid. The old tests clicked the button expecting validation errors to appear, but antd Modal never calls onOk on a disabled button — causing false failures. Rewrite to test the actual guard behavior: - Button starts disabled (empty form) - Stays disabled with tag only (selector still empty) - Stays disabled for duplicate tag - Disabled button does not trigger onConfirm --------- Co-authored-by: MHSanaei <ho3ein.sanaei@gmail.com>	2026-07-09 01:59:51 +02:00
Rouzbeh†	ea24ef0a69	feat(xray): default outbound in basic routing (#5815) ... * feat(xray): default outbound picker in basic routing Let panel users choose which outbound handles unmatched traffic by moving it to the first position in the template outbounds list. * fix(xray): keep direct/blocked outbounds when changing default * style(routing): revert incidental whitespace churn Drop double blank lines and the reformatted function signature so the default-outbound diff stays focused on behavior.	2026-07-09 01:55:47 +02:00
Yuri Khachaturyan	2c28fa5f48	fix(inbound): scope port-conflict check to the stored node on update (#5833) ... * fix(inbound): scope port-conflict check to the stored node on update UpdateInbound called checkPortConflict before restoring the inbound's NodeID from the database, so the check used the NodeID from the request body. That value is unreliable for edits: clients omit it (nodeId is `json:",omitempty"`) and the code already treats the stored NodeID as authoritative — an inbound can't be moved between nodes via edit. With a nil request NodeID a node inbound was mis-checked as a local/main-panel inbound and falsely collided with an unrelated inbound that happened to reuse the same port on the central panel (or another node). Symptom: editing a node inbound's listen address was rejected with "port <p> (tcp) already used by inbound ... " and silently discarded. Load the old inbound and restore inbound.NodeID *before* checkPortConflict, so the check runs against the node the inbound actually lives on. checkPortConflict already scopes candidates by node (sameNode); it was simply being fed the wrong NodeID. Add a regression test that seeds a main-panel and a node inbound on the same port and asserts the node inbound stays editable (fails before this change with the exact "already used" rejection). * style(inbound): trim inline comments from port-conflict scoping Repo convention forbids // line comments in committed Go; keep the scoping fix self-documenting.	2026-07-09 01:18:30 +02:00
Grigoriy	d2efe9b022	fix(sub): include native WireGuard clients in Clash and JSON subscriptions (#5676) ... The Clash (buildProxy) and JSON (getConfig) subscription generators had no WireGuard branch, so a native WireGuard inbound's clients were silently dropped: buildProxy hit its default nil case, and getConfig emitted a config with no proxy outbound. Only the raw subscription (genWireguardLink) and external-link Clash path handled WireGuard. Add a WireGuard case to both generators, mirroring genWireguardLink: the peer public key is derived from the inbound secretKey, while the private key, tunnel address (mihomo ip/ipv6, Xray settings.address), pre-shared key and keep-alive come from the client. The peer routes the full tunnel (0.0.0.0/0, ::/0), which both mihomo and Xray also default to. Field names verified against the mihomo WireGuardOption source (private-key, public-key, pre-shared-key, persistent-keepalive, ip, ipv6, mtu, dns) and the Xray wireguard outbound schema (secretKey, address, peers[].publicKey/endpoint/ preSharedKey/keepAlive/allowedIPs, mtu).	2026-07-09 00:52:46 +02:00
Grigoriy	cb5b3a803a	fix(wireguard): build peers in GenXrayInboundConfig so node reconcile keeps clients (#5684) ... Adding a WireGuard client on the master broke every WireGuard connection on the sub-node until Xray was manually restarted on the node. Adding the same client directly on the node worked. Root cause: the panel stores WireGuard clients under the settings key `clients` (the shape every other protocol uses), but xray-core's wireguard inbound is configured with `peers`. The `clients`->`peers` conversion lived only in the full-config generation path (XrayService.GetXrayConfig), which runs on a full Xray restart. The live gRPC AddInbound path goes through (*Inbound).GenXrayInboundConfig, which passed the WireGuard settings verbatim - with `clients` and no `peers`. Why the master path broke it and the node path did not: - Adding on the node is a single safe operation: AddInboundClient -> AddUser -> AlterInbound{AddUser} -> wireguard.Server.AddUser, which appends one peer via IPC without touching the others. The inbound is local (NodeID == nil), so nothing is marked dirty and no reconcile runs. - Adding on the master does two things: it pushes the client to the node (the same safe hot-add, which succeeds), and it marks the node dirty. The reconcile then pushes panel/api/inbounds/update/:id to the node, whose InboundService.UpdateInbound applies it live via DelInbound + AddInbound (buildRuntimeInboundForAPI -> Local.AddInbound -> GenXrayInboundConfig). That re-adds the wireguard inbound with zero peers, wiping the device and dropping every connected client. A manual restart regenerated the full config, converted clients to peers, and restored them - hence "only a restart fixes it". Fix: convert WireGuard `clients` to `peers` in GenXrayInboundConfig itself, the single chokepoint for every live AddInbound (create, edit, node reconcile). WireguardClientsToPeers always rebuilds `peers` from `clients` (matching GetXrayConfig field for field) and drops the `clients` key. It does not gate on `peers` being absent: the panel seeds every WireGuard inbound with an empty `peers: []` placeholder (frontend inbound-defaults), so a "skip if peers present" guard would match that placeholder and make the conversion never run, leaving the live path emitting zero peers. The conversion stays idempotent by removing `clients`, so a second call - or an inbound with no `clients` - is a no-op, leaving the full-config path unaffected. This also fixes plain WireGuard inbound edits on a standalone panel, which went through the same peerless rebuild.	2026-07-09 00:52:03 +02:00
Rouzbeh†	b8a654967f	Add encrypted DNS presets (#5837)	2026-07-09 00:45:35 +02:00
AmirRnz	42690e1b8c	feat(hosts): bulk-add multiple hosts to multiple inbounds (#5677) ... * feat(hosts): bulk-add multiple hosts to multiple inbounds Allow users to select multiple inbound IDs and enter multiple host addresses (with optional per-host port override) in a single form submission. - Add BulkAddHostReq entity and POST /panel/api/hosts/bulk/add endpoint - Add AddHostsBulk service with GORM transaction safety - Add parseHostAndPort helper (IPv4, bracketed/bracketless IPv6, port) - Update HostFormModal to multi-select inbounds and tag-input hosts - Wire bulkCreate mutation in HostsPage with existing-host suggestions - Register endpoint in api-docs/endpoints.ts and regenerate OpenAPI/Zod * feat(hosts): group override records by group_id and support group editing * fix: import Popover in HostList * fix: use messageApi in HostFormModal * fix(hosts): resolve 4 bugs found in host-group code review - fix(schema): allow empty hosts array in BulkAddHostSchema so users can save a host without an address (inherits inbound endpoint). The old .min(1) was never enforced at runtime since the schema is only used for type inference, but the type was incorrect. - fix(service): validate new inbound IDs in UpdateHostGroup before deleting old rows, matching the same check already present in AddHostGroup. Prevents orphaned host rows when an invalid inbound ID is supplied on edit. - fix(service): replace full-table scan in GetHostsByInbound with two targeted queries (DISTINCT group_id WHERE inbound_id=?, then WHERE group_id IN ?) to avoid loading every host in the DB. - fix(mutations): remove unused createMut / create export from useHostMutations. The /hosts/add endpoint is identical to /hosts/bulk/add; only bulkCreate is used by the UI. * fix(hosts): address code review feedback (optimize bulk inserts, add validation tests, and remove comments) * fix(fmt): apply gofumpt formatting to model.go and db.go The previous merge commit incorrectly applied gofmt (tab-aligned) to these files. The repository's golangci config requires gofumpt+goimports which produces space-aligned struct fields. This commit restores the correct gofumpt formatting that matches upstream/main. * chore(frontend): regenerate API schemas and update lockfile * fix * refactor(hosts): dedupe host-group service and tidy frontend AddHostGroup and UpdateHostGroup shared an identical ~35-field model.Host construction and hand-rolled transaction boilerplate (tx.Begin plus a committed flag plus a deferred recover/rollback). Extract buildHostRows, validateInboundsExist and formatHostAddr, and run every mutation through db.Transaction. groupHosts collapses its duplicated address/port formatting and create/append fork into one path using slices.Contains. Behavior-preserving: host.go drops ~90 lines with the existing service/controller tests green. Frontend: drop the Partial union and two as-casts in HostsPage.onSave (the modal always passes a full BulkAddHostValues), and remove the movable index map in HostList in favor of the table render index arg. --------- Co-authored-by: claude[bot] <41898282+claude[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Sanaei <ho3ein.sanaei@gmail.com>	2026-07-08 23:35:20 +02:00
n0ctal	f431e9cc03	fix(inbounds): apply runtime changes after the DB commit (#5768) ... * fix(inbounds): apply runtime changes after commit * ci: fix staticcheck findings	2026-07-08 22:12:28 +02:00
MHSanaei	a067f817ae	refactor: modernize Go with strings.SplitSeq and maps.Copy ... Replace strings.Split loops with strings.SplitSeq iterators in the CSV parsers (reality_scan and the scale-test helpers) and swap a manual map copy for maps.Copy in the MTProto traffic collector. No behavior change; these are the fixes the modernize analyzer reports.	2026-07-08 22:10:54 +02:00
n0ctal	7c183dbd97	fix(clients): surface bulk-reset auto-enable failures (#5763) ... * fix(clients): surface bulk-reset auto-enable failures BulkResetTraffic re-enables a disabled client before resetting its traffic, but discarded the s.Update result with `_, _ =`, so a failed re-enable was silent: the client stayed disabled with nothing logged, unlike the single-client ResetTraffic path which already warns on the same call. Check the error and log a warning to match, and add a regression test covering BulkResetTraffic's previously-untested re-enable path. * ci: update Go toolchain for govulncheck --------- Co-authored-by: Sanaei <ho3ein.sanaei@gmail.com>	2026-07-08 20:53:42 +02:00
n0ctal	567a4ac4fe	fix(clients): parse only settings.clients across protocols (#5855) ... * fix(clients): parse only settings.clients across protocols Several inbound settings readers decoded the whole settings object into map[string][]model.Client. Real protocol settings include scalar keys such as VLESS decryption and Hysteria version, so that shape can fail before callers reach settings.clients or leave them relying on decoder side effects. Add one shared helper that extracts only the clients field through json.RawMessage, then use it from GetClients, SearchClientTraffic and the IP-limit job fallback paths. Regression tests cover VLESS and Hysteria settings with scalar protocol fields. * fix(clients): reject empty inbound settings	2026-07-08 20:31:00 +02:00
mrnickson-hue	7db92d6318	fix(inbound): reject finalmask + REALITY combo (crashes Xray-core) (#5861) ... * fix(inbound): reject finalmask configured together with REALITY security finalmask wraps the connection before REALITY's own handshake takes over (TcpmaskManager.WrapListener -> WrapConnServer runs at Accept() time, ahead of reality.Server()). reality.Server() does an unchecked type assertion assuming a raw *net.TCPConn; with finalmask in front, that assertion panics and takes down the entire xray-core process on the very first connection to the inbound - not just that connection. Upstream (XTLS/Xray-core#6453) confirmed this will be documented as unsupported rather than made graceful, so the panel needs to stop this combination from being saved rather than relying on docs. AddInbound/UpdateInbound now reject streamSettings with security=reality and a non-empty finalmask.tcp/udp with a clear error instead of letting it reach Xray. Related: MHSanaei/3x-ui#5857 * fix(inbound): heal legacy rows and narrow the finalmask+REALITY guard Per review feedback on #5861: - Narrow the check to finalmask.tcp only. xray-core's TcpmaskManager (the thing that wraps the TCP listener ahead of REALITY's handshake, the actual cause of the panic) is only constructed when tcp masks are present; a finalmask.udp-only config never touches that accept path and doesn't reproduce the crash, so it shouldn't be rejected. Extracted the shared check into finalMaskRealityTcpMasks() so both the save-time guard and the config-build heal below use one definition of "dangerous". - Heal already-saved bad rows in GetXrayConfig(), the same way liftXhttpSessionIDKeys and HealShadowsocksClientMethods heal other legacy data at config-build time. AddInbound/UpdateInbound only cover the two save paths - a row that already carries this combination (saved before this guard existed, synced from a node, restored from a backup, or edited directly in the DB) would still crash Xray-core on the next restart without this. - Add end-to-end tests exercising AddInbound, UpdateInbound, and GetXrayConfig directly (seeding rows through the real DB) rather than only unit-testing the extracted helper in isolation, so a wiring regression in any of the three call sites gets caught.	2026-07-08 20:29:51 +02:00
Volov Vyacheslav	e424cc0f4d	fix(routing): allow dns.servers on private IPs past the geoip:private block rule (#5774) ... * fix(routing): allow dns.servers on private IPs past the geoip:private block rule Xray's own DNS client traffic is dispatched through the same routing table as proxied client traffic. When dns.servers points at a private IP (e.g. a self-hosted AdGuard Home / Pi-hole reachable on the same Docker network as Xray) and the panel's default geoip:private block rule is active, Xray's own DNS lookups get silently dropped. Xray then falls back to dialing destinations by raw hostname once its internal DNS attempt times out (~4s), so proxied connections still work, just with a multi-second stall added to every new domain-based connection, with no error surfaced anywhere. EnsureDnsServerRouting keeps a managed "direct" allow-rule for any private literal IP found in dns.servers, inserted immediately before the geoip:private block rule (matched by shape, not position). It only acts when both ingredients are present, keeps the managed rule in sync as dns.servers changes across saves, and never touches manually authored rules. Fixes #5773 * fix(routing): scope the DNS allow-rule to its port, guard against reorder/UI drift Addresses three review findings on the initial fix: 1. The allow-rule now carries a "port" matcher (grouped by the dns.servers entries that share it), instead of opening every port on the private DNS IP to proxy-client traffic. A private resolver that also exposes an unauthenticated admin UI on the same address would otherwise become reachable through the proxy too. 2. EnsureDnsServerRouting now strips every previously-managed rule and rebuilds the current set fresh, reinserted immediately before the (re-indexed) geoip:private block rule on every save. Comparing IP content alone missed the case where an admin drags the rule below the block rule in the Routing tab (or reorders something else and incidentally moves it) — silently reintroducing the exact stall this fix addresses, with nothing to notice or correct it. 3. dnsAllowRuleShape now tolerates an "enabled" key as long as it's true, matching the existing EnsureStatsRouting precedent (xray_setting.go's `delete(apiRule, "enabled")`). The Routing tab's rule editor writes that key on every save regardless of whether anything changed, and its enabled switch writes it on a plain toggle — without this, either action permanently disowns the rule from management and a duplicate gets inserted next save. A rule explicitly disabled (enabled=false) is left alone and a fresh one is (re-)created, respecting the admin's choice instead of silently re-enabling it. No-op detection now compares rebuilt rules against the original routing.rules JSON (both decoded through encoding/json to a common type) rather than reflect.DeepEqual on the parsed Go values, which falsely reported changes for identical content stored as []any vs []string. 5 new tests cover multi-port grouping, position drift, and both enabled-key cases; existing tests updated for the port field. * fix: avoid size-computation overflow in allocation hint CodeQL flagged make([]map[string]any, 0, len(clean)+len(managed)) as a potential integer-overflow risk in the capacity computation. Drop the addition and hint with len(clean) alone — it already covers most of the eventual size, and append still grows correctly for the rest. --------- Co-authored-by: Volov <volovdata@google.com>	2026-07-08 20:28:11 +02:00
mrnickson-hue	57300f44bd	fix(ldap): convert default total GB to bytes when auto-creating clients (#5854) ... * fix(ldap): convert default total GB to bytes when auto-creating clients LdapSyncJob.buildClient stored ldapDefaultTotalGB directly into Client.TotalGB without the GB-to-bytes conversion every other client creation path applies (client form's gbToBytes, tgbot's limitTraffic*1024^3, client_inbound_apply.go's totalGB*1024^3). A "Default total (GB)" of 10 was persisted as 10 bytes, depleting the client almost immediately. Closes #5852 * test(ldap): pin the GB-to-bytes conversion in buildClient Per review feedback on #5854: the existing test only exercised defGB=0, so it wouldn't have caught the missing conversion.	2026-07-08 20:24:21 +02:00
MHSanaei	328d920e98	feat(mtproto): enforce per-client quota & expiry via mtg-multi limits ... Map each mtproto client's totalGB and expiryTime onto mtg-multi's new [secret-limits] (quota/expires): emit them into the generated config and hot-apply through PUT /secrets so live connections survive. Quota is written as an exact "<n>B" byte count that round-trips through both the config and API parsers without the precision loss of a base-2 unit. The sidecar's quota counter is not pruned when a secret is dropped, so a panel-side traffic reset re-pushes the client's secret and then calls POST /secrets/{name}/reset-quota (wired into every reset path) so a renewed client is not immediately re-blocked. Resolve the mtg-multi binary from the fork's latest release tag in DockerInit.sh and release.yml instead of a hardcoded version pin, so the panel no longer needs a manual bump per fork release.	2026-07-08 15:30:56 +02:00
MHSanaei	bc309ed9f8	refactor(frontend): replace axios with the native Fetch API ... Drop the axios (and qs) dependencies in favor of a native fetch wrapper. axios only ever handled same-origin JSON/form calls, a CSRF header, a 401 redirect, and a 403-retry, all of which the platform now provides directly. - New src/api/http-init.ts (replaces axios-init.ts) reimplements the request/response interceptors on fetch: base-path prefixing, X-Requested-With, same-origin credentials, the CSRF token on unsafe methods, a single 403 retry with token refresh, and the 401 redirect-and-latch. A small encodeForm() reproduces qs's arrayFormat:'repeat' encoding, so the request wire format is unchanged. - HttpUtil (src/utils/index.ts) keeps its public signatures and the Msg envelope, so the ~49 API call sites are untouched. HttpOptions is now hand-rolled instead of extending AxiosRequestConfig. - PanelUpdateModal drops its lone direct axios.get in favor of HttpUtil.get with { silent, timeout }. - Add tests for the fetch core (CSRF header, form/JSON/FormData bodies, base-path prefix, 403 retry, 401 redirect, tolerant body parse) and for HttpUtil's envelope unwrap / toast / error mapping; this logic was previously untested. - Remove the vendor-axios manualChunks branch and the qs type shim, and reword stale "axios" mentions in docs and route comments.	2026-07-08 01:09:18 +02:00
Rouzbeh†	15faec6258	fix(logs): limit Xray log growth (#5840) ... * Limit Xray log growth * Apply suggestion from @github-actions[bot] Co-authored-by: github-actions[bot] <41898282+github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * Apply suggestion from @github-actions[bot] Co-authored-by: github-actions[bot] <41898282+github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Mahyar Dana <dana.mahyar76@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: github-actions[bot] <41898282+github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>	2026-07-08 00:33:34 +03:00
MHSanaei	2c49dbf54e	fix(node): start a fresh quota window when a node auto-renews a client ... When a node-hosted client auto-renews, the node extends the deadline and zeroes its own counters, but the master treated the counter drop like any reset dip (#5456): the delta clamped to zero, the renewed expiry was adopted, and the old period's up/down stayed on the master row. A "100 GB every 30 days" package never got a fresh quota on the master for node inbounds. Detect the renewal in setRemoteTrafficLocked - reset days configured, an absolute deadline that moved forward, and the node counter falling below the stored baseline - and on that path adopt the node's post-renewal counters and enable state absolutely instead of adding the clamped delta, plus clear the email's stale cross-panel global-traffic rows, mirroring what the local autoRenewClients path already does. A plain counter dip without a deadline move keeps the existing clamp behavior, and a deadline extension with rising counters keeps accumulating. Closes #5843	2026-07-07 15:05:23 +02:00
MHSanaei	cc3303dd8c	fix(sub): carry a host's Final Mask into raw share links ... A Host's Final Mask was merged into the JSON and Clash subscription outputs via applyHostStreamOverrides, but the raw link builders compute the fm param once from the inbound's own streamSettings.finalmask before the per-host fan-out, and the endpoint override path never read the host's mask. A Final Mask configured only on a host was silently dropped from vless/trojan/ss/vmess share links while an inbound-level mask worked everywhere. Merge the host mask into the fm param per endpoint with the same additive semantics as the JSON path (host tcp/udp masks appended to the inbound's, quicParams only when the inbound has none), for both the URL-param and the VMess object link forms. Closes #5831	2026-07-07 15:05:23 +02:00
MHSanaei	52d4af71bc	fix(ldap): attach auto-created clients to every configured inbound tag ... The sync job built an independent client per configured tag and called CreateOne once per tag. Each call generated a fresh random subId, and the email-uniqueness check in ClientService.Create only re-admits a taken email when the incoming subId matches the stored one - so the first tag succeeded and every other tag failed with "email already in use", leaving new LDAP users on a single inbound. Build the client once per email and hand ClientService.Create the full list of resolved inbound ids, the same path the panel's own client create endpoint uses: one identity (email, subId) attached to all configured tags, with per-protocol credentials filled per inbound. Unknown tags are now skipped with a warning instead of building clients against a nil inbound. Closes #5846	2026-07-07 15:05:22 +02:00
MHSanaei	7cb2adf429	fix(client): clean node_client_traffics rows when deleting a client ... Delete and DeleteByEmail removed client_traffics, global-traffic, and inbound_client_ips rows but never the per-node baseline rows in node_client_traffics, so every deleted client left orphaned baselines behind for each registered node. The shared DelClientStat and delClientStatsByEmails helpers already clean that table; mirror the same cleanup in both row-cleanup paths so the record-only and record-less delete flows stop leaking baselines. Closes #5841	2026-07-07 15:05:22 +02:00
ecgang	6e75938c61	[Feature]: Add a tooltip/hint to the "Password" field in the client form clarifying which protocols use it (#5809) ... * feat(clients): clarify which protocols use the Password and Hysteria Auth fields Add tooltips to the Password and Hysteria Auth Form.Items in the client form, explaining that Password is only consumed by Trojan and Shadowsocks (ignored for VLESS, VMess, Hysteria, WireGuard) and that Hysteria Auth is the credential Hysteria actually uses. Adds passwordDesc/hysteriaAuthDesc keys to all 13 locale files, following the existing limitIpDesc/totalGBDesc tooltip convention. Closes #5803 * test(clients): assert Password/Hysteria Auth tooltip hints render	2026-07-07 14:43:09 +02:00
MHSanaei	ad7a0f8164	refactor(mtproto): manage ad-tags per client only ... The inbound-level ad-tag duplicated the per-client override for no gain: the fork's global tag applied to every secret anyway, so one value had two homes and they could drift. The inbound form field, the settings key, and the global ad-tag in the generated config and in the PUT /secrets body are gone; the tag is set on each client instead. Existing inbound-level values are intentionally not migrated; a leftover settings key is stripped on the next save.	2026-07-07 12:19:26 +02:00
MHSanaei	43500a5470	feat(mtproto): per-client ad-tags, management-API auth, and record secret sync ... Catch the panel up to the mtg-multi README (v1.14.0): - Each client can now carry its own 32-hex advertising tag overriding the inbound-level one. The tag lives on the client (settings JSON is the source of truth, clients.ad_tag is the UI projection), is rendered into the fork's [secret-ad-tags] section for active secrets only (mtg rejects a config whose override names an unknown secret), is pushed per entry through PUT /secrets, and is part of the reload fingerprint so a tag edit hot-applies without dropping connections. - The loopback management API can replace the whole secret set, so every mtg process now gets a random per-process api-token; the manager sends it as a bearer token on PUT /secrets and GET /stats and reuses it across config rewrites, because mtg reads the token only at startup. - Malformed tags are rejected at every save path and additionally dropped in InstanceFromInbound: one bad tag would otherwise fail the whole generated config and take every client of the inbound down with it. - SyncInbound never copied a re-keyed mtproto secret into the canonical clients table, so the clients page and subscription links kept serving the old secret, which mtg then rejects. It is now guarded-copied like the other credentials.	2026-07-07 12:00:43 +02:00
Sanaei	6214ff4edc	fix(mtproto): stop dropping connections on client/inbound edits; add live updates + ad-tag (#5838) ... * fix(mtproto): split the mtg fingerprint into structural and secrets parts A reordered clients array in the stored settings used to read as a config change because the fingerprint concatenated secrets in array order, and one opaque fingerprint could not tell a restart-worthy change (bind address, fronting, throttle) from a secret-set change a reload-capable mtg can absorb in place. Sort the secret pairs so order stops mattering, and split the value so the upcoming hot-reload path can decide between keeping, reloading, and restarting the process. * fix(mtproto): stop restarting mtg on every inbound edit Saving an mtproto inbound tore down and respawned its mtg sidecar even when nothing material changed, dropping every live Telegram connection: the update path pushed DelInbound+AddInbound, and Remove deletes the manager's map entry, so Ensure's fingerprint no-op gate could never fire. Route mtproto updates through a single Ensure call so an edit that leaves the generated TOML alone keeps the process, and only real config changes restart it. Capturing the pre-edit protocol also fixes a latent leak: changing an inbound's protocol away from mtproto never stopped the sidecar, because the snapshot handed to the runtime already carried the new protocol and the removal took the xray branch, leaving an orphaned mtg holding the port. An mtproto push failure no longer requests an xray restart - xray cannot fix the sidecar, and the 10s reconcile job self-heals it. The regression test fakes mtg by re-executing the test binary, counting spawns through a pid file: an unchanged save and a remark-only edit must keep the process, a re-keyed secret must restart it. * fix(mtproto): exclude depleted clients from the reconcile job to match the sync push The 10s reconcile job derived mtg secret sets from raw inbound settings while the interactive push filtered clients through buildRuntimeInboundForAPI, which drops client_traffics-disabled (depleted or expired) clients. The two paths therefore disagreed on the fingerprint - each disagreement one needless mtg restart dropping live connections - and worse, the job kept serving depleted clients' secrets indefinitely, so running out of traffic never actually cut an mtproto client's access. DesiredMtprotoInstances now builds the job's desired state with the same depletion overlay the push uses (one bulk client_traffics query), drops inbounds whose every secret is filtered away so their sidecar stops, and AddInbound pushes the filtered payload too so an imported inbound carrying disabled stats does not seed a fingerprint the next reconcile disagrees with. * feat(mtproto): hot-reload mtg secrets in place instead of restarting A client add, removal, re-key, or enable-toggle changes only the [secrets] section of the generated config, yet the panel could apply it only by killing and respawning the mtg sidecar, dropping every Telegram connection on that inbound. Split the ensure decision three ways: an identical config is a no-op, a secrets-only change rewrites the TOML on the same api port and asks mtg to hot-swap it via POST /reload, and a structural change (or a failed reload) falls back to the full stop-and-start. The reload endpoint is served by the mhsanaei/mtg-multi fork; against an older binary the POST 404s and the manager restarts exactly as before, so panel and binary upgrades stay order-independent. * feat(mtproto): apply single-client edits to the sidecar immediately Client CRUD on an mtproto inbound was a runtime no-op, so an add, delete, re-key, or enable-toggle only reached mtg on the next 10s reconcile. With the sidecar now able to hot-reload, push the change straight after the edit commits: applyLocalMtproto rebuilds the inbound's filtered client set and re-applies it, so a new client works within a moment (and, on a reload-capable binary, without disturbing the others) and deleting the last client stops the process. The three interactive single-client paths (add, update, delete) call it; bulk operations still ride the reconcile job, which converges to the same state. * chore(mtproto): pin mtg-multi to the mhsanaei fork v1.13.3 The reload endpoint the panel now uses lives in the mhsanaei/mtg-multi fork, so point the source-build pin (DockerInit.sh + both release.yml matrices) at it and bump to v1.13.3. The install still produces the same mtg-multi binary name, so the mtg-<os>-<arch> rename and everything downstream are unchanged. Docs and the package comment note the hot-reload path and its restart fallback. * feat(mtproto): apply live secret updates via the management API and add ad-tag Two capabilities the mhsanaei/mtg-multi v1.13.3 fork exposes are now surfaced by the sidecar manager. Live updates go through PUT /secrets on the fork's management API instead of POST /reload: the panel already holds the whole desired set per inbound, so it sends secrets and the advertising tag as one JSON call that mtg applies atomically, keeping every unchanged connection and closing only removed or re-keyed ones. The config file is still written first so a restart or crash recovery reproduces the state, and any non-200 (an older binary, a refused connection) still falls back to a full restart. Per-inbound ad-tag adds an optional 32-hex Telegram advertising tag plus public-ipv4/public-ipv6 overrides. The ad-tag rides the reloadable secrets fingerprint, so changing it hot-applies without dropping connections; the public IPs are proxy-construction parameters and sit in the structural fingerprint, so a change there restarts the process. Empty public IPs are omitted so mtg auto-detects the reachable address. * feat(inbounds): expose the mtproto ad-tag and public IP in the inbound form Adds an Ad-tag field (validated as 32 hex characters) plus optional Public IPv4 and Public IPv6 overrides to the MTProto inbound form, backed by the same-named settings the sidecar writes into the mtg config. The public IPs are optional — left blank, mtg auto-detects the reachable address the ad-tag middle proxy needs. English strings are added to every locale; the non-English ones carry the English text until translated and fall back to it meanwhile. * ci(mtproto): install mtg-multi from prebuilt release binaries The fork now publishes release archives for every platform we package, so download and unpack the matching mtg-multi-<ver>-<os>-<arch> binary instead of compiling it from source with go install. Faster builds and no toolchain step, and the archive's platform labels line up with our matrix; the produced mtg-<os>-<arch> filenames are unchanged. * i18n(mtproto): localize the ad-tag and public IP strings The six mtgAdTag*/mtgPublicIp* keys shipped with English text in every locale as a placeholder. Translate them into the twelve non-English locales (Arabic, Spanish, Persian, Indonesian, Japanese, Portuguese-BR, Russian, Turkish, Ukrainian, Vietnamese, and Simplified/Traditional Chinese); en-US is unchanged. * retired goreportcard.com	2026-07-07 01:13:24 +02:00
MHSanaei	84b6423020	fix(mtproto): stop persisting a vestigial inbound-level secret ... MTProto is multi-client: mtg's [secrets] config and every share link read only the per-client secrets. The old HealMtprotoSecret regenerated an inbound-level secret on every save, and seedMtprotoSecretsToClients only dropped it for legacy single-secret inbounds, so multi-client inbounds kept a dead secret. That value once leaked into stale links imported into Telegram, which mtg then rejected as "incorrect client random". Replace HealMtprotoSecret with StripMtprotoInboundSecret (removes the key), strip on save in normalizeMtprotoSecret, and add a one-time stripMtprotoInboundSecrets migration that runs after the seeder so a legacy secret is first preserved onto a client before the inbound-level copy is dropped.	2026-07-06 17:55:57 +02:00
MHSanaei	27fd19895a	fix(mtproto): drop the remark fragment from tg proxy deep links ... genMtprotoLink appended the panel remark as a URL fragment (tg://proxy?...&secret=...#remark). Because secret/server is the last query value, lenient Telegram parsers fold the "#remark" into it and the imported proxy breaks with "incorrect client random". Telegram proxy deep links have no name field, so emit a clean link on both the backend (internal/sub) and frontend (inbound-link.ts). The remark still shows as a separate tag in the inbound info modal, which reads it from genAllLinks, not the URL. Guards: Go TestGenMtprotoLinkFields asserts no fragment; the frontend mtproto link test asserts no '#'.	2026-07-06 17:55:35 +02:00
MHSanaei	d8b9f535ff	style(model): drop trailing comment on Client.Secret to satisfy gofumpt ... The long example tag on Secret pulled the struct's trailing-comment block into a new alignment section, so gofumpt demanded every following comment be re-aligned to that tag's column. Removing the comment restores the previously accepted layout and follows the repo rule against line comments.	2026-07-06 16:16:31 +02:00
MHSanaei	d97bd8643e	feat(mtproto): adopt dolonet/mtg-multi and make MTProto inbounds multi-client ... Replace the upstream 9seconds/mtg sidecar with the dolonet/mtg-multi fork so a single MTProto inbound can serve many per-user secrets. Each panel client is now one named FakeTLS secret in the fork's [secrets] section: clients are first-class (attach/detach, limits, expiry, per-client tg:// links) exactly like every other protocol, mirroring the WireGuard multi-client model. Per-client traffic and online status come from the fork's /stats JSON API (its Prometheus output has no per-user label), fed into the existing email-keyed client_traffics accumulator; an optional throttle caps concurrent connections. A one-time seeder converts each legacy single-secret inbound into a one-client inbound. The fork ships only linux/darwin amd64/arm64 binaries but is pure Go, so provisioning builds it from source for every supported platform (release.yml, DockerInit.sh) while keeping the panel-expected mtg-<os>-<arch> filename and the 'run' verb, so process.go is untouched. Also fixes a pre-existing update.sh gap that never renamed the mtg binary for armv6/armv7 updates.	2026-07-06 16:04:32 +02:00