mirror of
https://github.com/MHSanaei/3x-ui.git
synced 2026-07-17 10:06:08 +00:00
5e1cb7693b
* fix(email): resolve a name-addr smtpFrom into bare envelope address and display name The save-time validator accepts any RFC 5322 address form, so a value like '3x-ui Panel <panel(at)example.com>' passes validation, but Send and TestConnection fed that raw string to MAIL FROM, which strict servers reject with 501, and buildMessage mangled it into a quoted local part. Parse the configured sender at the point of use: the envelope gets the bare address and, when no explicit sender name is set, the display name embedded in the setting is used for the From header. * fix(email): report a missing sender address from the SMTP connection test TestConnection skipped the empty-from guard that Send enforces, so with no sender and no username configured the test issued the null reverse-path and could report success against a lenient relay while every real notification send kept failing with the missing-sender error. Guard the test path the same way and surface a dedicated translated message. * fix(sub): fall back to the raw subscription when an auto-detected format has no content With format auto-detection enabled, a client whose User-Agent matched the Clash or JSON regex was routed straight to that format handler. For a subscription whose entries convert to neither format (an MTProto-only subscription, for example) the handler returns an empty document and the request ended as 404, breaking a URL that served the raw list before the toggle. The auto-detect branches now serve the detected format only when it produces content and otherwise continue to the raw response; the explicit format endpoints keep answering 404 for empty documents. * fix(node): match prefixed central tags when filtering a selected-mode node snapshot FilterNodeSnapshot compared a node snapshot's inbound tags against the raw selected-tag list with an exact match, while its two siblings (SnapshotHasUnadoptedInbounds and the reconcile tagToCentral map) expand each selected tag to both its bare node-side form and its n<id>- prefixed central form. A panel-created node inbound is recorded in the selected list under the central prefixed tag but reported by the node under the bare tag, so the exact match dropped it from every snapshot and the orphan sweep then deleted its central row one tick after creation. Expand the allowed set with the same prefix flip the siblings use. * fix(client): refuse a bulk quota reduction that would fall to or below zero BulkAdjust clamped a client's new traffic limit with max(total+addBytes, 0). Because 0 is the unlimited sentinel, reducing a client's quota by more than it had left silently granted that client unlimited traffic. The sibling expiry branch already refuses an over-reduction; mirror it for quota so the adjustment is skipped with a clear reason instead of crossing the sentinel. * fix(client): persist a bulk adjustment's applied field even when the sibling field is skipped In a mixed BulkAdjust (both a days delta and a bytes delta), a per-field planning skip such as "unlimited expiry" or "unlimited traffic" was recorded in the same map that gated the client_traffics write. The applied field was already written to the inbound JSON and the clients table, but the enforcement row was left untouched, so the depletion job cut the client on the old limit while the panel showed the new one. Gate the traffic-row write on an actual inbound-processing failure rather than on any planning-phase skip note. * fix(inbound): always create in AddInbound instead of overwriting a row whose id was posted The add controller binds the inbound model's id form field and never clears it, and AddInbound persisted with GORM Save, which updates in place when the primary key is non-zero. A client that reused an existing id (for instance by duplicating an inbound fetched from /get and changing the port) silently overwrote that stored row instead of creating a new inbound. Zero the id at the top of AddInbound, matching how it already zeroes the client-stat ids. * fix(inbound): accept WireGuard clients when creating an inbound AddInbound's per-client validation switch had cases for every protocol except WireGuard, so a WireGuard client fell through to the default branch that requires a non-empty id. WireGuard clients are keyed by their public key and carry no id, so importing a WireGuard inbound or re-adding one to a reconciling node was rejected with "empty client ID". Add a wireguard case that validates the client key, mirroring addInboundClient. * fix(client): stop holding the inbound-lock registry mutex while waiting on one inbound lockInbound acquired the global registry mutex and then blocked on the per-inbound mutex without releasing the registry first. A slow client operation holding one inbound's mutex (for example a bulk delete pushing to an unreachable node) made the next waiter park on that inbound while still holding the registry mutex, which in turn blocked lockInbound for every other inbound — freezing client mutations panel-wide. Release the registry mutex before taking the per-inbound lock. * fix(client): honor keepTraffic when deleting a client that is attached to inbounds Delete, DeleteByEmail and BulkDelete all pass keepTraffic to their final cleanup transaction, but each called the per-inbound delete helper with a hardcoded false. That helper purges the client's traffic, IP and stat rows before the gated cleanup runs, so keepTraffic=true still destroyed all traffic history for any client actually attached to an inbound (the pinned test only covered a record with no inbound mappings). Thread the caller's keepTraffic through to the per-inbound helper at all three call sites. * fix(inbound): defer a local MTProto inbound edit's sidecar push until after commit UpdateInbound applied a local MTProto inbound change by calling the runtime UpdateInbound (which stops/starts the mtg sidecar or talks to it) from inside runSerializedTx. That runs process and network I/O on the single traffic-writer goroutine while a DB transaction is open, so a slow sidecar stalls traffic accounting and every concurrent client mutation, and a later step failing the transaction leaves the sidecar ahead of the rolled-back row. Move the push into the post-commit hook, matching the xray branch. Adds a SetLocalRuntimeOverride test seam mirroring the existing node override so the deferral is regression tested. * fix(client): delete external-link rows when bulk-deleting clients The single-client Delete path removes a client's client_external_links rows, but BulkDelete (and the DelDepleted reaper that routes through it) deleted the record, mappings and traffic while leaving the external-link rows keyed by the now-dead client id, so they accumulated as orphans. Delete them in the same cleanup transaction, keyed by client id like the single path. * fix(inbound): request an xray restart when toggling a routed MTProto inbound AddInbound, DelInbound and UpdateInbound all flag needRestart when an inbound routes MTProto through xray, so the egress SOCKS bridge is regenerated. Only SetInboundEnable's local path omitted it, so toggling a routed MTProto inbound off then on left the bridge out of the running config while the sidecar dialed its loopback port, blackholing that inbound until an unrelated restart. Flag the restart on the local enable path too. * fix(client): apply enable-by-email to every inbound a client is attached to ToggleClientEnableByEmail (Telegram bot) and SetClientEnableByEmail (LDAP sync) resolved a single inbound via the legacy client_traffics pointer and flipped enable only there. A client attached to several inbounds kept connecting through the siblings' running Xray after being disabled, and the next edit could re-enable it everywhere from a stale sibling. Route both through the applyClientFieldByEmail fan-out (the #5039 fix path) so the whole multi-inbound identity is toggled at once, dropping the circular Set/Toggle dependency. * fix(traffic): commit a traffic tick even when a best-effort maintenance helper fails addTrafficLocked stages the inbound and client deltas, then runs three helpers (auto-renew, disable depleted clients, disable depleted inbounds) that are meant to log and continue. All three reused the function-scope err that the deferred commit/rollback inspects, so the last helper's error decided the whole tick: a failure in disableInvalidInbounds rolled back the already-staged traffic while AddTraffic reported success, and because xray had already advanced its counter baseline that traffic was lost for good. Give each best-effort helper its own error variable so only a genuine staging failure rolls the tick back. * fix(traffic): re-enable clients and serialize the write in Reset All Client Traffic ClientService.ResetAllTraffics zeroed up/down but, unlike every sibling reset path, never restored enable=true, so clients that had been auto-disabled for exceeding their quota stayed cut with zero usage after a reset. It also wrote client_traffics directly on the shared DB handle instead of through the serial traffic writer, reintroducing the cross-transaction lock-order deadlock the writer exists to prevent. Restore enable and run the reset inside submitTrafficWrite within one transaction. * fix(traffic): keep node reset propagation out of the serial traffic writer ResetAllTraffics and ResetInboundTraffic performed their remote-node reset HTTP calls inside submitTrafficWrite. Each call can block up to the remote timeout, and Reset All Traffics loops every node serially, so the single traffic-writer goroutine was held for seconds — long enough that the concurrent 5s traffic poll timed out submitting its own write and dropped the deltas it had already drained from xray. Do the DB reset inside the writer, then propagate to the nodes after it returns, matching how the mtproto quota reset is already sequenced. * fix(sub): stop the subscription from 500ing on valid-but-unusual stream settings The raw share-link generators used unchecked type assertions and unguarded array indexing: an empty Reality shortIds/serverNames array (random.Num(0) panics), a tcp-http header with no request block or an empty request.path, a grpc block missing its keys, empty stream settings, and a non-string Host header all panicked mid-generation. Because getSubs loops every client's link with no recover, one such client 500s the entire subscription for everyone. The sibling JSON, Clash and frontend generators already guard these; make the raw generators match with comma-ok assertions and length checks. * fix(sub): tolerate a hysteria inbound without hysteriaSettings in the JSON subscription genHy asserted stream["hysteriaSettings"].(map[string]any) without the comma-ok form, so a hysteria inbound whose StreamSettings omit the hysteriaSettings key (a valid, representable shape the raw generator renders fine) panicked and 500ed the entire JSON subscription. Use comma-ok; the downstream reads already guard each key, so a nil map degrades gracefully. * fix(sub): emit the pinned peer cert sha256 in Clash subscriptions The Clash stream builder computed tlsSettings["pin-sha256"] from the inbound's pinnedPeerCertSha256, but applySecurity's tls case never copied it onto the proxy, so it was written with no reader and silently dropped. Clash subscribers lost certificate pinning while JSON subscribers kept it. Surface pin-sha256 on the proxy in the tls case, matching the JSON emitter. * fix(link): parse the snake_case and extra-blob xhttp fields when importing a share link The panel's share-link emitters (Go and TS) carry advanced xhttp knobs as a snake_case x_padding_bytes plus an extra=<json> payload, but the Go parser's xhttp branch read only top-level camelCase params, so importing an xhttp link via the outbound-subscription feature dropped xPaddingBytes, scMaxEachPostBytes and the rest, silently reverting them to the stream defaults and producing a non-working outbound. Mirror the TS parser: read the snake_case alias, merge the extra JSON blob, then let explicit camelCase params win. * fix(frontend): decode URL-safe base64 when parsing an imported share link Base64.decode called window.atob directly, which rejects the base64url alphabet (- and _) and unpadded input. But the panel's own share-link emitter uses Base64.encode(x, true) (URL-safe, unpadded), and real SIP002 links do too, so importing a Shadowsocks link whose method:password encodes with a - or _ threw, fell back to the raw undecoded string, and produced a wrong method and garbage password (the vmess parser shared the same limitation). Normalize base64url and re-pad before atob so decode round-trips every emitted link. * fix(link): honor the vmess ws path and hysteria2 vcn params on import Two Go/TS parser parity gaps in the outbound share-link import path: parseVmess only applied a ws link's path when the inner JSON also carried a host key, so a generator that omits host dropped the path back to the default; and parseHysteria2 hardcoded verifyPeerCertByName to empty, ignoring the vcn param the panel emits, so a hysteria2 outbound with a decoy SNI and a distinct cert name failed TLS verification after import. The TS parser handles both; make the Go parser match. * fix(ui): stop the sniffing form island from clobbering unrendered fields antd's Form.useWatch only reports registered fields, so while the sniffing toggle was off the island emitted { enabled: false } upward and replaced the full Sniffing object in form state. Saving a VLESS reverse outbound then crashed in sniffingToWire on the missing ipsExcluded array; the loopback outbound and the inbound sniffing tab shared the same hole. Watch the store with preserve: true so unrendered fields keep their values, and seed a missing value from the schema defaults instead of an empty cast. * fix(sub): drop empty remark segments instead of leaving a stray separator expandSegment dropped a "|" segment only when its tokens rendered the unlimited mark, so a segment whose only token resolved to the empty string (a client with no comment, an unlimited client's expiry date) was kept as bare decoration, leaving a trailing "|" or a dangling emoji on every share link's remark. Drop a token-bearing segment whenever none of its tokens produce a real value, while still keeping pure-literal segments. * fix(xray): keep source- and domains-scoped routing rules when an inbound is deleted removeInboundTagFromRules drops a routing rule whose inboundTag list becomes empty only if the rule has no other matcher, but routingMatcherKeys omitted xray-core's canonical source and domains keys. A rule scoped by source or domains (common in hand-authored or imported configs) therefore lost its whole body — including a security-relevant block — when its single listed inbound was deleted, instead of just having the tag trimmed. Recognize source and domains as live matchers. * fix(xray): guard RemoveUser against an uninitialized handler client Every XrayAPI handler method returns an error when HandlerServiceClient is nil, except RemoveUser, which dereferenced it directly. A depletion sweep runs Init with the port ignored and, during a restart window where the fresh process's api port is still 0, Init fails and leaves the client nil — so RemoveUser panicked (recovered by the traffic writer, but re-thrown every poll) instead of returning an error. Add the same nil guard the siblings have. * fix(xray): do not revive a manually stopped Xray on a background restart RestartXray cleared isManuallyStopped unconditionally at its top, so the @30s pending-config cron (and warp/ldap/outbound reconcile jobs) that call RestartXray(false) resurrected an Xray the admin had deliberately stopped — unlike the crash-detector, which honors the manual-stop flag. Skip a non-forced restart while the stop flag is set; only an explicit forced restart clears it. * fix(xray): retry a failed pending-restart instead of dropping the config change The 30s cron consumed the need-restart flag with IsNeedRestartAndSetFalse before calling RestartXray and only logged a failure. If RestartXray failed early (a transient GetXrayConfig DB error) the old process kept running the old config, the crash detector saw a running process and never retried, and the flag stayed cleared — so an admin's saved change silently never reached the core. Move the consume/restart/retry into ApplyPendingRestart, which re-arms the flag on failure so the next tick retries. * fix(xray): synchronize the process version and apiPort fields Start writes p.version and p.apiPort (via refreshVersion/refreshAPIPort) after flipping the process to running, while GetXrayVersion and GetAPIPort read them lock-free from the status and traffic poll goroutines. The struct mutex deliberately excluded these fields, so a restart racing a poll was a real data race — a torn read of the version string header can crash. Extend the mutex to cover version and apiPort, doing the blocking version probe before taking the lock. * fix(settings): detect a wildcard listen collision between the web and sub ports The web/sub same-port check compared the two listen addresses as raw strings, so binding both on all interfaces with different spellings (webListen 0.0.0.0 vs an empty subListen) slipped past validation and only failed at startup with an opaque bind error. Treat any wildcard listen ('', 0.0.0.0, ::) as overlapping so the clash is reported up front, while still allowing two distinct specific addresses to share a port. * fix(db): mark the IP-limit cleanup seeder done on a fresh install ResetIpLimitNoFail2ban is a one-time migration that, on a host without fail2ban, zeroes every existing client's limitIp because the limit can't be enforced. It was missing from the fresh-install fast-path seeder list, so on a brand-new DB it did not run on the first boot but fired on the second — wiping any IP limits the admin had set in between. Add it to the fast-path so a truly fresh install marks it done up front (there is nothing to clean), leaving later admin-set limits intact. * fix(security): dial outbound subscriptions through the SSRF guard The outbound-subscription fetch validated the URL host once (resolving DNS and rejecting private targets) but then fetched with a plain HTTP client that re-resolves the host at dial time, so a subscription domain the attacker controls could pass validation as a public IP and rebind to 127.0.0.1 / a cloud metadata endpoint / an internal host for the actual dial — a blind SSRF into the panel's network. Route the direct fetch (and its redirects) through netsafe.SSRFGuardedDialContext, which resolves, checks and dials the same IP atomically, carrying the subscription's AllowPrivate flag on the request context; a configured egress proxy still dials its loopback bridge unguarded. * fix(security): bound the login-limiter attempts map The login rate limiter keys its records on the caller-supplied username and only evicted a record when that exact key was revisited or the login succeeded. An unauthenticated attacker replaying one CSRF token while rotating a fresh username per request seeded a record that was never revisited, growing the map without bound until the panel OOMs. Cap the map: before inserting a new record, reclaim records whose block has lapsed and whose failures aged out, and if the map is still at the ceiling under a broad flood, drop one so memory can never grow past the cap. * fix(tgbot): require admin for privileged callbacks, not just the first switch answerCallback wraps only its first callback switch in an isAdmin guard; the second switch (server usage, inbound/online enumeration, database backup export, ban logs, mass traffic reset, client creation) ran for every caller. Telegram delivers a callback with the tapping user's id, so a non-admin who can see an admin's inline keyboard — as when the bot runs in a group — could tap Backup and receive the full database and config, or reset all traffic. Default-deny before the second switch: a non-admin may only run the per-user client_* callbacks that resolve their own data from their Telegram id. * fix(eventbus): dispatch each subscriber in its own goroutine The fan-out loop called every subscriber's handler sequentially on the single dispatch goroutine. The email and Telegram notifiers block on network I/O for tens of seconds (or minutes when the remote is slow), so one slow subscriber stalled the whole loop: the 256-slot channel then filled and Publish silently dropped later events — including high-value xray.crash and node.down notifications unrelated to the slow handler. Hand each delivered event to every handler in its own goroutine so a blocking subscriber can no longer stall delivery to the others. safeCall already recovers panics, so a detached handler cannot take down the bus. * fix(integration): cap WARP API response body size doWarpRequest read the response with an unbounded io.ReadAll, unlike the sibling NordVPN client which already caps every read at maxResponseSize. A hostile panel egress proxy or a MITM on the Cloudflare WARP endpoint could stream an arbitrarily large body and force the panel into an unbounded allocation. Wrap the body in an io.LimitReader(maxResponseSize) to match the NordVPN client. * fix(email): bound every SMTP step with a connection deadline The "starttls"/"none" transport delivered through net/smtp.SendMail, which dials with an untimed net.Dial and never sets a socket deadline. When an SMTP server accepted the TCP connection but then stalled (or was a blackhole), the caller was released by Send's 30s select, but the sender goroutine and its socket stayed blocked until the OS TCP timeout — minutes per notification, leaking a goroutine and a connection each time. sendWithTLS dialed with a timeout but likewise armed no deadline on the protocol phase, and TestConnection (called synchronously from the settings handler, with no select guard) could hang the request indefinitely. Replace SendMail with sendPlain, which dials with smtpConnectTimeout and arms conn.SetDeadline(smtpDeadline) before the greeting read, preserving SendMail's opportunistic STARTTLS upgrade. Arm the same deadline in sendWithTLS and TestConnection so every SMTP step is bounded. * fix(server): guard access-log parser against malformed lines GetXrayLogs split each Xray access-log line on whitespace and then read fixed offsets — parts[1] for the timestamp and parts[i+1] after the "from", "accepted" and "email:" markers — without checking the line had that many fields. A truncated or malformed line (the logged destination is attacker-influenced) indexed past the slice and panicked; the panel handler returned a 500 via Gin's recovery. Extract the per-line field parsing into parseAccessLogFields and length guard every positional lookup so a short line yields a partial entry instead of panicking. * fix(server): guard xray key-generator output parsing GetNewX25519Cert, GetNewmldsa65 and GetNewmlkem768 parsed xray's stdout by reading lines[0], lines[1] and each line's second colon-separated field without any length check — unlike GetNewEchCert, which already guards its line count. If the xray binary printed fewer than two lines or reformatted its labels (a version change, or a silent failure that emitted nothing), the fixed slice index panicked and the handler 500'd. Extract the shared parsing into parseXrayKeyPairOutput, which length guards the line count and each label split and returns an error instead of panicking, then route all three generators through it. * fix(tgbot): stop auto-deleted messages from resetting wizard state SendMsgToTgbotDeleteAfter spawns a goroutine that, after the display delay, deleted the transient message and then unconditionally cleared the chat's conversation state. Every caller that ends a wizard step already clears the state synchronously, so that call was redundant — and harmful: if within the delay the user advanced to the next step (a callback sets a fresh awaiting_* state), the late goroutine wiped it, and the user's next message fell through unrecognized, silently dropping their input. Move the delayed deletion into deleteMessageAfterDelay, which only removes the message and no longer touches the conversation state. Guard deleteMessageTgBot against a nil bot so the deletion path is unit-testable. * fix(frontend): refetch a fresh CSRF token on 403 instead of reusing the stale meta tag On a 403 to an unsafe method the client cleared its cached CSRF token and called ensureCsrfToken to retry. But ensureCsrfToken prefers the <meta name="csrf-token"> tag baked into the page, which the production panel always injects, so the "refresh" re-read the same stale token and the /csrf-token refetch was never reached — the retry re-sent the token that had just been rejected and the save failed with an error toast. The token lives in the session and rotates when the session is regenerated (for example re-login in another tab), leaving the tab's baked-in meta token stale. Fetch the current token straight from /csrf-token in the 403 branch so the retry uses the authoritative server value. The existing tests only passed because they strip the meta tag; the new test keeps a stale tag present. * fix(frontend): surface backend error text from failed requests HttpUtil.get/post read the thrown HttpError body as response.data.message, but the backend error envelope (entity.Msg) serializes its text as msg. On any non-2xx JSON response the real reason was therefore dropped and the operator saw only the generic "Request failed with status N" toast. Read response.data.msg first (keeping message and the native error text as fallbacks). The sibling test had pinned the wrong body shape ({ message }); correct it to the real backend shape ({ success:false, msg }) so it exercises the actual envelope. * fix(frontend): share one WebSocket connection across bridge and hooks websocketBridge.ts and useWebSocket.ts each declared their own module-scoped sharedClient plus an identical getSharedClient, so the "shared" client was not shared between them: whenever a page using useWebSocket (Clients/Inbounds) mounted alongside the always-mounted bridge, the panel opened two sockets to /ws. The server then pushed every traffic/stats/nodes/inbounds snapshot to both, doubling WebSocket bandwidth and running two independent reconnect loops, and the hook's socket was never disconnected on unmount. Hoist a single getSharedWebSocketClient into api/websocket.ts and route both the bridge and the hook through it, so exactly one connection is opened. * fix(frontend): guard the outbounds WebSocket handler against non-array payloads onOutbounds wrote the raw WebSocket payload straight into the outboundsTraffic cache, unlike the sibling onNodes/onInbounds handlers which first check Array.isArray. A malformed non-array push (for example an object) would land in the cache with staleTime Infinity; consumers that call .find()/.map() on the outbounds list would then throw and crash the Outbounds tab. Add the same Array.isArray guard so a bad push is ignored. * fix(frontend): key the node table by the computed row key, not id The desktop node table used rowKey="id", but transitive sub-nodes (the read-only rows surfaced from downstream nodes) all carry id 0, so a topology with two or more transitive rows gave React duplicate keys. antd's rowKey prop overrides the row object's own computed `key` (`t-${guid}` for transitive rows, the numeric id otherwise), so the unique key the code already builds was ignored — causing row-state/DOM mis-association on any re-render (heartbeat refetch, address-eye toggle). The mobile card path already keyed by record.key. Key the table by "key" so transitive rows get their distinct t-${guid} identity; direct nodes keep key === id, so row selection (filtered to numeric keys) is unchanged. * fix(frontend): map routing row actions through the rule's real index The routing table hides balancer-loopback rules (`_bl_*`) but keeps each visible row's original index in `key`, then handed antd's positional row index straight to edit/delete/toggle/move/drag — all of which mutate the full, unfiltered routing.rules array. Once a hidden loopback rule precedes a visible one (e.g. a balancer whose fallback is another balancer, plus any rule added afterwards), the positional index no longer matches the array index, so deleting or editing a rule silently hit the wrong one — including destroying the loopback rule that keeps the balancer alive. Add originalRuleIndex to translate a positional row index back through the row's `key`, and route every mutating handler (openEdit, confirmDelete, toggleRule, moveUp/moveDown, drag) through it. When no loopback rows are hidden the mapping is the identity, so ordinary configs are unaffected. * fix(frontend): map outbound row actions through the outbound's real index The outbounds table hides balancer-loopback outbounds (`_bl_*`) but keeps each visible row's original index in `key`, then passed antd's positional row index to edit/delete/move and to the per-row probe (onTest) and its result lookup — all of which address the full, unfiltered outbounds array. Once a hidden loopback outbound precedes a visible one, the positional index diverges from the array index, so deleting or editing an outbound hit the wrong one (its deletion-impact plan and removal targeting the wrong entry), and the test button probed / showed results against the wrong outbound. Add originalOutboundIndex and route the mutating handlers through it; key the probe trigger and test-result columns by record.key. With no loopback rows hidden the mapping is the identity, so ordinary configs are unaffected. * fix(frontend): tolerate a malformed happyEyeballs value in the Xray Basics tab BasicsTab derived directHappyEyeballs by calling HappyEyeballsSchema.parse during render, guarding only against null/non-object. A wrong-typed field (e.g. happyEyeballs.tryDelayMs as a string) or any other shape mismatch — reachable via the Complete Template JSON editor or an imported config — threw straight out of render, white-screening the default Xray landing tab. Use safeParse and fall back to null so a bad value degrades to "no override" instead of crashing the page. * fix(frontend): preserve routing-rule fields the form does not surface The rule form rebuilt the rule from a fixed literal of only the fields it edits, and RoutingTab replaces the rule wholesale on confirm. Fields the form never exposes — localPort, localIP, process, ruleTag, webhook — are in the rule schema and can arrive via the advanced JSON editor or Import Rules; opening such a rule in the form and saving silently dropped them. Carry over every key of the original rule the form does not manage before applying the form-derived fields, so an edit only touches what it surfaces. * fix(frontend): re-sync the sniffing island when its value changes externally The sniffing config editor froze its seed value at mount and only watched its own inner AntD form, never reflecting a later change to the shared RHF `sniffing` path. Because the inbound form mounts every tab with forceRender, the friendly Sniffing tab and the Advanced JSON editor are live at once: editing sniffing in the JSON editor updated the RHF value but not the frozen island, so the next interaction with the friendly tab emitted the stale value and silently discarded the JSON edit. Add an effect that pushes an external value change into the inner form, guarded by the same lastEmitted marker the emit path uses so the island never re-seeds from its own echo and no update loop forms. * fix(frontend): don't drift a client's byte quota on a no-op save The quota field shows the total in GB rounded to two decimals; editing a client and saving converted that display value straight back to bytes. A byte total not aligned to 0.01 GB — one set via the API or an import — was therefore rewritten to the rounded value on any save that never touched the field, losing a few MB each time. Add resolveTotalBytes: keep the original byte total when the displayed GB still matches it, and only re-derive from GB when the user actually changed the field. * fix(eventbus): deliver events on a bounded per-subscriber worker The previous fix dispatched each event to every subscriber with a bare `go safeCall`. That unblocked the dispatch loop, but removed the bus's backpressure: under a login-attempt flood (which both notifier subscribers process without rate-limiting) with email/Telegram enabled, every attempt spawned handler goroutines that each block on network I/O for up to ~30s, with no bound — a goroutine and outbound-connection storm. It also let a subscriber's handler run concurrently with itself, racing the Telegram notifier's lazily-cached hostname. Give each subscriber its own bounded queue drained by a single worker goroutine. Dispatch does a non-blocking send per subscriber (dropping only that subscriber's event when its queue is full), so a slow subscriber still can't stall the others, concurrency is bounded to one in-flight handler per subscriber, per-subscriber event order is preserved, and Stop again waits for in-flight handlers to finish. * fix(frontend): map outbound mobile-card actions through the real index too The desktop outbounds table was keyed by the outbound's real index, but the mobile card list was left keying the probe trigger and every test-state lookup by the positional row index. With a hidden balancer-loopback outbound present, tapping Check on a mobile card probed the wrong outbound and the Test-All results landed on the wrong card. Key onTest and the testResult/isTesting reads by record.key, matching the desktop columns. * fix(frontend): meet WCAG AA contrast on the config-block link text The Storybook accessibility test flagged the share-link <code> block: with no explicit color it inherited a muted grey that renders as #888888 on the #f8f8f8 tertiary-fill background in CI's Chromium — a 3.33:1 contrast, below the 4.5:1 AA threshold. Set the text to the theme's primary text token so the colour is explicit and high-contrast in both light and dark themes instead of depending on an inherited value that varies by browser. * style(sub): simplify a negated conjunction to satisfy staticcheck QF1001 golangci-lint (staticcheck QF1001) flagged the `!(a && b)` guard in expandSegment. Rewrite it via De Morgan's law to the equivalent `!a || !b` form so the linter passes; behavior is unchanged. * fix: close panics and races the audit's own fixes left nearby Second-pass review of the 54-commit self-correcting audit. Each item below was confirmed by reading the surrounding source (and, where practical, the pre-fix code) before being changed; regression tests are included for every behavioral fix. Concurrency: - eventbus: Bus.Subscribe called wg.Add with no synchronization against a concurrent Bus.Stop's wg.Wait, a real "WaitGroup misuse" panic risk (e.g. a Telegram-bot settings save racing panel shutdown/restart). Stop now flips a mu-guarded `stopped` flag before waiting, and Subscribe checks it under the same lock, so Add and Wait can no longer race. Security: - login_limiter: evictForRoom's fallback eviction picked an arbitrary map key, including ones still under an active cooldown - an attacker flooding /login with fresh usernames could evict their own (or anyone's) blocked record and reset the lockout. The fallback now skips actively-blocked records, only falling back to an unconditional evict if the map is somehow entirely full of active blocks (preserves the hard memory cap). Subscription-endpoint panics (reachable by any client hitting /sub): - internal/sub/service.go: applyPathAndHostParams/Obj (ws/httpupgrade/xhttp with no path settings object) and the TLS alpn readers in three places used unchecked type assertions - exactly the bug classabab7cd0patched elsewhere in the same switch statements, just not these call sites. - internal/sub/json_service.go, clash_service.go: the externalProxy loops in the JSON and Clash generators used unchecked assertions on a legacy/admin-supplied field (missing "port", non-object entry, etc.). - internal/sub/json_service.go: realityData's shortId/serverName selection could assert a non-string array element. Other correctness: - client_traffic.go: ResetAllTraffics (touched by3eb214d0) still skipped clearing NodeClientTraffic node-sync baselines, unlike its sibling reset paths in the same file - a node's next sync would re-add pre-reset delta on top of the freshly-zeroed counter. - inbound_traffic.go: the traffic-tick tx's Commit/Rollback errors were silently discarded; now logged so a backend-level commit failure (e.g. an aborted Postgres tx from a best-effort helper) doesn't masquerade as a successful tick. - outbound_subscription.go: the new subscriptionFetchClient doc comment was wedged between fetchAndStore's existing comment and fetchAndStore itself, leaving fetchAndStore undocumented and the comment describing the wrong function. Convention cleanup: - Removed narrative // comments added by the audit that violate this repo's no-inline-comment rule (mostly narrating the specific bug/fix rather than a lasting contract, and mostly on new Test functions, which this repo's existing tests never comment) - calibrated against this exact codebase's own pre-existing comment style so legitimate godoc-style doc comments were left alone. --------- Co-authored-by: claude[bot] <41898282+claude[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
1277 lines
38 KiB
Go
1277 lines
38 KiB
Go
package service
|
|
|
|
import (
|
|
"context"
|
|
"encoding/json"
|
|
"fmt"
|
|
"maps"
|
|
"strings"
|
|
"time"
|
|
|
|
"github.com/mhsanaei/3x-ui/v3/internal/database"
|
|
"github.com/mhsanaei/3x-ui/v3/internal/database/model"
|
|
"github.com/mhsanaei/3x-ui/v3/internal/logger"
|
|
"github.com/mhsanaei/3x-ui/v3/internal/util/common"
|
|
"github.com/mhsanaei/3x-ui/v3/internal/util/random"
|
|
"github.com/mhsanaei/3x-ui/v3/internal/web/runtime"
|
|
"github.com/mhsanaei/3x-ui/v3/internal/xray"
|
|
|
|
"gorm.io/gorm"
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
func sameClientConfigExceptUpdatedAt(a, b map[string]any) bool {
|
|
aa := maps.Clone(a)
|
|
bb := maps.Clone(b)
|
|
delete(aa, "updated_at")
|
|
delete(bb, "updated_at")
|
|
an, aerr := json.Marshal(aa)
|
|
bn, berr := json.Marshal(bb)
|
|
return aerr == nil && berr == nil && string(an) == string(bn)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// advancePushedInbound advances the node's reconcile-skip fingerprint from the
|
|
// pre-edit settings to the saved ones after every per-client push succeeded.
|
|
func advancePushedInbound(rt runtime.Runtime, prevSettings string, ib *model.Inbound) {
|
|
rem, ok := rt.(*runtime.Remote)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
prev := *ib
|
|
prev.Settings = prevSettings
|
|
rem.AdvancePushedInbound(&prev, ib)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// delInboundClients removes several clients from a single inbound in one pass:
|
|
// one settings rewrite, one runtime sweep, one Save and one SyncInbound for the
|
|
// whole batch, instead of repeating the full per-client cycle. It mirrors the
|
|
// semantics of DelInboundClientByEmail for each removed client. needRestart is
|
|
// the OR across all removals.
|
|
func (s *ClientService) delInboundClients(inboundSvc *InboundService, inboundId int, recs []*model.ClientRecord, keepTraffic bool) (bool, error) {
|
|
if len(recs) == 0 {
|
|
return false, nil
|
|
}
|
|
defer lockInbound(inboundId).Unlock()
|
|
|
|
oldInbound, err := inboundSvc.GetInbound(inboundId)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
logger.Error("Load Old Data Error")
|
|
return false, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var settings map[string]any
|
|
if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(oldInbound.Settings), &settings); err != nil {
|
|
return false, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Match by email — the client's stable identity (see Delete). Removes every
|
|
// entry carrying a wanted email, independent of credential drift.
|
|
wanted := make(map[string]struct{}, len(recs))
|
|
for _, rec := range recs {
|
|
if rec.Email != "" {
|
|
wanted[rec.Email] = struct{}{}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
interfaceClients, ok := settings["clients"].([]any)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return false, common.NewError("invalid clients format in inbound settings")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
type removedClient struct {
|
|
email string
|
|
needApiDel bool
|
|
}
|
|
removed := make([]removedClient, 0, len(wanted))
|
|
newClients := make([]any, 0, len(interfaceClients))
|
|
for _, client := range interfaceClients {
|
|
c, ok := client.(map[string]any)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
newClients = append(newClients, client)
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
email, _ := c["email"].(string)
|
|
if _, hit := wanted[email]; hit && email != "" {
|
|
enable, _ := c["enable"].(bool)
|
|
removed = append(removed, removedClient{email: email, needApiDel: enable})
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
newClients = append(newClients, client)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if len(removed) == 0 {
|
|
return false, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
db := database.GetDB()
|
|
newClients = compactOrphans(db, newClients)
|
|
if newClients == nil {
|
|
newClients = []any{}
|
|
}
|
|
settings["clients"] = newClients
|
|
newSettings, err := json.MarshalIndent(settings, "", " ")
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return false, err
|
|
}
|
|
prevSettings := oldInbound.Settings
|
|
oldInbound.Settings = string(newSettings)
|
|
|
|
var sharedSet map[string]bool
|
|
if !keepTraffic {
|
|
removedEmails := make([]string, 0, len(removed))
|
|
for _, r := range removed {
|
|
if r.email != "" {
|
|
removedEmails = append(removedEmails, r.email)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
var sharedErr error
|
|
sharedSet, sharedErr = inboundSvc.emailsUsedByOtherInbounds(removedEmails, inboundId)
|
|
if sharedErr != nil {
|
|
return false, sharedErr
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
needRestart := false
|
|
|
|
// Read each client's live state before the DB write (DelClientStat would
|
|
// erase the enable flag we need to decide on a runtime removal).
|
|
type delTarget struct {
|
|
email string
|
|
emailShared bool
|
|
notDepleted bool
|
|
needApiDel bool
|
|
}
|
|
targets := make([]delTarget, 0, len(removed))
|
|
for _, r := range removed {
|
|
email := r.email
|
|
emailShared := sharedSet[strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(email))]
|
|
notDepleted := false
|
|
if len(email) > 0 {
|
|
var enables []bool
|
|
if err := db.Model(xray.ClientTraffic{}).Where("email = ?", email).Limit(1).Pluck("enable", &enables).Error; err != nil {
|
|
logger.Error("Get stats error")
|
|
return needRestart, err
|
|
}
|
|
notDepleted = len(enables) > 0 && enables[0]
|
|
}
|
|
targets = append(targets, delTarget{email: email, emailShared: emailShared, notDepleted: notDepleted, needApiDel: r.needApiDel})
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Persist the batch deletion atomically, serialized against the traffic poll
|
|
// to avoid the cross-transaction lock-order deadlock (runSerializedTx).
|
|
if txErr := runSerializedTx(func(tx *gorm.DB) error {
|
|
for _, t := range targets {
|
|
if t.emailShared || keepTraffic {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
if e := inboundSvc.DelClientIPs(tx, t.email); e != nil {
|
|
logger.Error("Error in delete client IPs")
|
|
return e
|
|
}
|
|
if len(t.email) > 0 {
|
|
if e := inboundSvc.DelClientStat(tx, t.email); e != nil {
|
|
logger.Error("Delete stats Data Error")
|
|
return e
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if e := tx.Save(oldInbound).Error; e != nil {
|
|
return e
|
|
}
|
|
finalClients, gcErr := inboundSvc.GetClients(oldInbound)
|
|
if gcErr != nil {
|
|
return gcErr
|
|
}
|
|
if err := s.SyncInbound(tx, inboundId, finalClients); err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
if oldInbound.NodeID != nil {
|
|
return (&NodeService{}).MarkNodeDirtyTx(tx, *oldInbound.NodeID)
|
|
}
|
|
return nil
|
|
}); txErr != nil {
|
|
return needRestart, txErr
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Resolve the node push plan once for the whole batch instead of per email.
|
|
var nodeRt runtime.Runtime
|
|
nodePush := false
|
|
if oldInbound.NodeID != nil {
|
|
rt, push, _, perr := inboundSvc.nodePushPlan(oldInbound)
|
|
if perr != nil {
|
|
return needRestart, perr
|
|
}
|
|
nodeRt, nodePush = rt, push
|
|
// Large batches collapse into one reconcile push rather than M deletes.
|
|
if nodePush && len(targets) > nodeBulkPushThreshold {
|
|
nodePush = false
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Apply runtime deletes after commit — outside the serialized writer so a
|
|
// slow node call can't stall traffic accounting.
|
|
nodePushFailed := false
|
|
for _, t := range targets {
|
|
if len(t.email) == 0 {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
if oldInbound.NodeID == nil {
|
|
if t.needApiDel && t.notDepleted {
|
|
rt, rterr := inboundSvc.runtimeFor(oldInbound)
|
|
if rterr != nil {
|
|
needRestart = true
|
|
} else if err1 := rt.RemoveUser(context.Background(), oldInbound, t.email); err1 != nil {
|
|
if !strings.Contains(err1.Error(), fmt.Sprintf("User %s not found.", t.email)) {
|
|
needRestart = true
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
} else if nodePush {
|
|
if err1 := nodeRt.DeleteUser(context.Background(), oldInbound, t.email); err1 != nil {
|
|
logger.Warning("Error in deleting client on", nodeRt.Name(), ":", err1)
|
|
nodePushFailed = true
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if nodePush && !nodePushFailed {
|
|
advancePushedInbound(nodeRt, prevSettings, oldInbound)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return needRestart, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (s *ClientService) checkEmailsExistForClients(inboundSvc *InboundService, clients []model.Client, emailSubIDs map[string]string) (string, error) {
|
|
if emailSubIDs == nil {
|
|
var err error
|
|
emailSubIDs, err = inboundSvc.getAllEmailSubIDs()
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return "", err
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
seen := make(map[string]string, len(clients))
|
|
for _, client := range clients {
|
|
if client.Email == "" {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
key := strings.ToLower(client.Email)
|
|
if prev, ok := seen[key]; ok {
|
|
if prev != client.SubID || client.SubID == "" {
|
|
return client.Email, nil
|
|
}
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
seen[key] = client.SubID
|
|
if existingSub, ok := emailSubIDs[key]; ok {
|
|
if client.SubID == "" || existingSub == "" || existingSub != client.SubID {
|
|
return client.Email, nil
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return "", nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (s *ClientService) AddInboundClient(inboundSvc *InboundService, data *model.Inbound) (bool, error) {
|
|
return s.addInboundClient(inboundSvc, data, nil)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// addInboundClient is AddInboundClient with an optional precomputed email→subId
|
|
// map. Bulk callers pass a single snapshot so the global getAllEmailSubIDs scan
|
|
// runs once for the whole batch instead of once per target inbound; a nil map
|
|
// makes it compute its own (the single-add path).
|
|
func (s *ClientService) addInboundClient(inboundSvc *InboundService, data *model.Inbound, emailSubIDs map[string]string) (bool, error) {
|
|
defer lockInbound(data.Id).Unlock()
|
|
|
|
clients, err := inboundSvc.GetClients(data)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return false, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var settings map[string]any
|
|
err = json.Unmarshal([]byte(data.Settings), &settings)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return false, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
interfaceClients := settings["clients"].([]any)
|
|
nowTs := time.Now().Unix() * 1000
|
|
for i := range interfaceClients {
|
|
if cm, ok := interfaceClients[i].(map[string]any); ok {
|
|
if _, ok2 := cm["created_at"]; !ok2 {
|
|
cm["created_at"] = nowTs
|
|
}
|
|
cm["updated_at"] = nowTs
|
|
existingSub, _ := cm["subId"].(string)
|
|
if strings.TrimSpace(existingSub) == "" {
|
|
cm["subId"] = random.NumLower(16)
|
|
}
|
|
interfaceClients[i] = cm
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
existEmail, err := s.checkEmailsExistForClients(inboundSvc, clients, emailSubIDs)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return false, err
|
|
}
|
|
if existEmail != "" {
|
|
return false, common.NewError("Duplicate email:", existEmail)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
oldInbound, err := inboundSvc.GetInbound(data.Id)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return false, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
existingClients, err := inboundSvc.GetClients(oldInbound)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return false, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// A client already on this inbound is skipped instead of appended again:
|
|
// checkEmailsExistForClients exempts a matching subId so one identity can
|
|
// live on several inbounds, which let retried or raced adds duplicate the
|
|
// same email inside a single settings array (#5770). clients and
|
|
// interfaceClients are parsed from the same data.Settings array, so they
|
|
// stay index-aligned while filtering.
|
|
if len(existingClients) > 0 && len(clients) > 0 {
|
|
existingEmails := make(map[string]struct{}, len(existingClients))
|
|
for _, c := range existingClients {
|
|
if c.Email != "" {
|
|
existingEmails[strings.ToLower(c.Email)] = struct{}{}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
keptClients := make([]model.Client, 0, len(clients))
|
|
keptWire := make([]any, 0, len(interfaceClients))
|
|
for i, c := range clients {
|
|
if c.Email != "" {
|
|
if _, dup := existingEmails[strings.ToLower(c.Email)]; dup {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
keptClients = append(keptClients, c)
|
|
if i < len(interfaceClients) {
|
|
keptWire = append(keptWire, interfaceClients[i])
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if len(keptClients) == 0 {
|
|
return false, nil
|
|
}
|
|
clients = keptClients
|
|
interfaceClients = keptWire
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if oldInbound.Protocol == model.WireGuard {
|
|
if dErr := defaultWireguardClients(existingClients, clients, interfaceClients); dErr != nil {
|
|
return false, dErr
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for _, client := range clients {
|
|
if strings.TrimSpace(client.Email) == "" {
|
|
return false, common.NewError("client email is required")
|
|
}
|
|
switch oldInbound.Protocol {
|
|
case "trojan":
|
|
if client.Password == "" {
|
|
return false, common.NewError("empty client ID")
|
|
}
|
|
case "shadowsocks":
|
|
if client.Email == "" {
|
|
return false, common.NewError("empty client ID")
|
|
}
|
|
case "hysteria":
|
|
if client.Auth == "" {
|
|
return false, common.NewError("empty client ID")
|
|
}
|
|
case "wireguard":
|
|
if client.PublicKey == "" {
|
|
return false, common.NewError("wireguard client requires a key")
|
|
}
|
|
case "mtproto":
|
|
if client.Secret == "" {
|
|
return false, common.NewError("mtproto client requires a secret")
|
|
}
|
|
if client.AdTag != "" && !model.ValidMtprotoAdTag(client.AdTag) {
|
|
return false, common.NewError("mtproto client ad tag must be 32 hex characters")
|
|
}
|
|
default:
|
|
if client.ID == "" {
|
|
return false, common.NewError("empty client ID")
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var oldSettings map[string]any
|
|
err = json.Unmarshal([]byte(oldInbound.Settings), &oldSettings)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return false, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if oldInbound.Protocol == model.Shadowsocks {
|
|
applyShadowsocksClientMethod(interfaceClients, oldSettings)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
oldClients, _ := oldSettings["clients"].([]any)
|
|
oldClients = compactOrphans(database.GetDB(), oldClients)
|
|
oldClients = append(oldClients, interfaceClients...)
|
|
|
|
oldSettings["clients"] = oldClients
|
|
|
|
newSettings, err := json.MarshalIndent(oldSettings, "", " ")
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return false, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
prevSettings := oldInbound.Settings
|
|
oldInbound.Settings = string(newSettings)
|
|
|
|
needRestart := false
|
|
|
|
rt, push, _, perr := inboundSvc.nodePushPlan(oldInbound)
|
|
if perr != nil {
|
|
return false, perr
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Persist client stats + inbound atomically, serialized against the traffic
|
|
// poll to avoid the cross-transaction lock-order deadlock (runSerializedTx).
|
|
if txErr := runSerializedTx(func(tx *gorm.DB) error {
|
|
for i := range clients {
|
|
if len(clients[i].Email) == 0 {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
if e := inboundSvc.AddClientStat(tx, data.Id, &clients[i]); e != nil {
|
|
return e
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if e := tx.Save(oldInbound).Error; e != nil {
|
|
return e
|
|
}
|
|
finalClients, gcErr := inboundSvc.GetClients(oldInbound)
|
|
if gcErr != nil {
|
|
return gcErr
|
|
}
|
|
if err := s.SyncInbound(tx, oldInbound.Id, finalClients); err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
if oldInbound.NodeID != nil {
|
|
return (&NodeService{}).MarkNodeDirtyTx(tx, *oldInbound.NodeID)
|
|
}
|
|
return nil
|
|
}); txErr != nil {
|
|
return false, txErr
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Apply to the running runtime after commit — outside the serialized writer
|
|
// so a slow node call can't stall traffic accounting.
|
|
if oldInbound.NodeID == nil {
|
|
if !push {
|
|
needRestart = true
|
|
} else if oldInbound.Protocol == model.MTProto {
|
|
inboundSvc.applyLocalMtproto(oldInbound.Id)
|
|
} else {
|
|
for _, client := range clients {
|
|
if len(client.Email) == 0 {
|
|
needRestart = true
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
if !client.Enable {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
cipher := ""
|
|
if oldInbound.Protocol == "shadowsocks" {
|
|
cipher = oldSettings["method"].(string)
|
|
}
|
|
err1 := rt.AddUser(context.Background(), oldInbound, map[string]any{
|
|
"email": client.Email,
|
|
"id": client.ID,
|
|
"auth": client.Auth,
|
|
"security": client.Security,
|
|
"flow": client.Flow,
|
|
"password": client.Password,
|
|
"cipher": cipher,
|
|
"publicKey": client.PublicKey,
|
|
"allowedIPs": client.AllowedIPs,
|
|
"preSharedKey": client.PreSharedKey,
|
|
"keepAlive": keepAliveStr(client.KeepAlive),
|
|
})
|
|
if err1 == nil {
|
|
logger.Debug("Client added on", rt.Name(), ":", client.Email)
|
|
} else {
|
|
logger.Debug("Error in adding client on", rt.Name(), ":", err1)
|
|
needRestart = true
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
// Large batches would be M sequential per-client RPCs; the inbound's saved
|
|
// settings already hold the final set, so mark dirty and let one reconcile
|
|
// push converge the node instead.
|
|
if push && len(clients) > nodeBulkPushThreshold {
|
|
push = false
|
|
}
|
|
for _, client := range clients {
|
|
if push {
|
|
if err1 := rt.AddClient(context.Background(), oldInbound, client); err1 != nil {
|
|
logger.Warning("Error in adding client on", rt.Name(), ":", err1)
|
|
push = false
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if push {
|
|
advancePushedInbound(rt, prevSettings, oldInbound)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return needRestart, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (s *ClientService) UpdateInboundClient(inboundSvc *InboundService, data *model.Inbound, oldEmail string) (bool, error) {
|
|
defer lockInbound(data.Id).Unlock()
|
|
|
|
clients, err := inboundSvc.GetClients(data)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return false, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var settings map[string]any
|
|
err = json.Unmarshal([]byte(data.Settings), &settings)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return false, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
interfaceClients := settings["clients"].([]any)
|
|
|
|
oldInbound, err := inboundSvc.GetInbound(data.Id)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return false, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
oldClients, err := inboundSvc.GetClients(oldInbound)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return false, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
newClientId := ""
|
|
switch oldInbound.Protocol {
|
|
case "trojan":
|
|
newClientId = clients[0].Password
|
|
case "shadowsocks":
|
|
newClientId = clients[0].Email
|
|
case "hysteria":
|
|
newClientId = clients[0].Auth
|
|
case "wireguard":
|
|
newClientId = clients[0].Email
|
|
case "mtproto":
|
|
newClientId = clients[0].Email
|
|
default:
|
|
newClientId = clients[0].ID
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Locate the client to replace by email — the client's stable identity.
|
|
// Credentials (uuid/password/auth) can drift from the inbound JSON, so they
|
|
// are never used for matching.
|
|
clientIndex := -1
|
|
for index, oldClient := range oldClients {
|
|
if strings.EqualFold(oldClient.Email, oldEmail) {
|
|
oldEmail = oldClient.Email
|
|
clientIndex = index
|
|
break
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if newClientId == "" || clientIndex == -1 {
|
|
return false, common.NewError("empty client ID")
|
|
}
|
|
if strings.TrimSpace(clients[0].Email) == "" {
|
|
return false, common.NewError("client email is required")
|
|
}
|
|
if oldInbound.Protocol == model.MTProto && clients[0].AdTag != "" && !model.ValidMtprotoAdTag(clients[0].AdTag) {
|
|
return false, common.NewError("mtproto client ad tag must be 32 hex characters")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if clients[0].Email != oldEmail {
|
|
existEmail, err := s.checkEmailsExistForClients(inboundSvc, clients, nil)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return false, err
|
|
}
|
|
if existEmail != "" {
|
|
return false, common.NewError("Duplicate email:", existEmail)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// WireGuard keys are never rotated by an edit: when the incoming payload omits
|
|
// them (a metadata-only change), carry the stored credentials forward so the
|
|
// settings JSON and the running peer keep the client's identity.
|
|
if oldInbound.Protocol == model.WireGuard && clientIndex >= 0 && clientIndex < len(oldClients) {
|
|
old := oldClients[clientIndex]
|
|
if clients[0].PrivateKey == "" {
|
|
clients[0].PrivateKey = old.PrivateKey
|
|
}
|
|
if clients[0].PublicKey == "" {
|
|
clients[0].PublicKey = old.PublicKey
|
|
}
|
|
if len(clients[0].AllowedIPs) == 0 {
|
|
clients[0].AllowedIPs = old.AllowedIPs
|
|
} else {
|
|
normalized, nErr := normalizeWireguardAllowedIPs(clients[0].AllowedIPs)
|
|
if nErr != nil {
|
|
return false, nErr
|
|
}
|
|
if len(normalized) == 0 {
|
|
clients[0].AllowedIPs = old.AllowedIPs
|
|
} else {
|
|
peers := make([]string, 0, len(oldClients))
|
|
for i := range oldClients {
|
|
if i == clientIndex {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
peers = append(peers, oldClients[i].AllowedIPs...)
|
|
}
|
|
if hit := wireguardAllowedIPsCollision(normalized, peers); hit != "" {
|
|
return false, common.NewError("wireguard: allowedIPs entry already used by another client:", hit)
|
|
}
|
|
clients[0].AllowedIPs = normalized
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if clients[0].PreSharedKey == "" {
|
|
clients[0].PreSharedKey = old.PreSharedKey
|
|
}
|
|
if clients[0].KeepAlive == 0 {
|
|
clients[0].KeepAlive = old.KeepAlive
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var oldSettings map[string]any
|
|
err = json.Unmarshal([]byte(oldInbound.Settings), &oldSettings)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return false, err
|
|
}
|
|
settingsClients, _ := oldSettings["clients"].([]any)
|
|
var preservedCreated any
|
|
var preservedSubID string
|
|
var oldClientMap map[string]any
|
|
if clientIndex >= 0 && clientIndex < len(settingsClients) {
|
|
if oldMap, ok := settingsClients[clientIndex].(map[string]any); ok {
|
|
oldClientMap = oldMap
|
|
if v, ok2 := oldMap["created_at"]; ok2 {
|
|
preservedCreated = v
|
|
}
|
|
preservedSubID, _ = oldMap["subId"].(string)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if oldInbound.Protocol == model.Shadowsocks {
|
|
applyShadowsocksClientMethod(interfaceClients, oldSettings)
|
|
}
|
|
if len(interfaceClients) > 0 {
|
|
if newMap, ok := interfaceClients[0].(map[string]any); ok {
|
|
if preservedCreated == nil {
|
|
preservedCreated = time.Now().Unix() * 1000
|
|
}
|
|
newMap["created_at"] = preservedCreated
|
|
newSub, _ := newMap["subId"].(string)
|
|
if strings.TrimSpace(newSub) == "" {
|
|
if strings.TrimSpace(preservedSubID) != "" {
|
|
newMap["subId"] = preservedSubID
|
|
} else {
|
|
newMap["subId"] = random.NumLower(16)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if v, ok2 := newMap["subId"].(string); ok2 {
|
|
clients[0].SubID = v
|
|
}
|
|
if oldInbound.Protocol == model.WireGuard {
|
|
newMap["privateKey"] = clients[0].PrivateKey
|
|
newMap["publicKey"] = clients[0].PublicKey
|
|
newMap["allowedIPs"] = clients[0].AllowedIPs
|
|
if clients[0].PreSharedKey != "" {
|
|
newMap["preSharedKey"] = clients[0].PreSharedKey
|
|
}
|
|
if clients[0].KeepAlive > 0 {
|
|
newMap["keepAlive"] = clients[0].KeepAlive
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if oldClientMap != nil && sameClientConfigExceptUpdatedAt(oldClientMap, newMap) {
|
|
if v, ok2 := oldClientMap["updated_at"]; ok2 {
|
|
newMap["updated_at"] = v
|
|
} else {
|
|
delete(newMap, "updated_at")
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
newMap["updated_at"] = time.Now().Unix() * 1000
|
|
}
|
|
interfaceClients[0] = newMap
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
settingsClients[clientIndex] = interfaceClients[0]
|
|
oldSettings["clients"] = settingsClients
|
|
|
|
if oldInbound.Protocol == model.VLESS {
|
|
hasVisionFlow := false
|
|
for _, c := range settingsClients {
|
|
cm, ok := c.(map[string]any)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
if flow, _ := cm["flow"].(string); flow == "xtls-rprx-vision" {
|
|
hasVisionFlow = true
|
|
break
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if !hasVisionFlow {
|
|
delete(oldSettings, "testseed")
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
newSettings, err := json.MarshalIndent(oldSettings, "", " ")
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return false, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if string(newSettings) == oldInbound.Settings {
|
|
return false, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
prevSettings := oldInbound.Settings
|
|
oldInbound.Settings = string(newSettings)
|
|
|
|
needRestart := false
|
|
|
|
// Resolve the push plan before the DB write so a node-state lookup failure
|
|
// still aborts the whole update without committing anything (it used to roll
|
|
// the transaction back). nodePushPlan only reads, so order doesn't matter.
|
|
var rt runtime.Runtime
|
|
var push bool
|
|
if len(oldEmail) > 0 {
|
|
var perr error
|
|
rt, push, _, perr = inboundSvc.nodePushPlan(oldInbound)
|
|
if perr != nil {
|
|
return false, perr
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Persist client stats + inbound atomically, serialized against the traffic
|
|
// poll to avoid the cross-transaction lock-order deadlock (runSerializedTx).
|
|
if txErr := runSerializedTx(func(tx *gorm.DB) error {
|
|
if len(clients[0].Email) > 0 {
|
|
if len(oldEmail) > 0 {
|
|
emailUnchanged := strings.EqualFold(oldEmail, clients[0].Email)
|
|
targetExists := int64(0)
|
|
if !emailUnchanged {
|
|
if e := tx.Model(xray.ClientTraffic{}).Where("email = ?", clients[0].Email).Count(&targetExists).Error; e != nil {
|
|
return e
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if emailUnchanged || targetExists == 0 {
|
|
if e := inboundSvc.UpdateClientStat(tx, oldEmail, &clients[0]); e != nil {
|
|
return e
|
|
}
|
|
if e := inboundSvc.UpdateClientIPs(tx, oldEmail, clients[0].Email); e != nil {
|
|
return e
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
stillUsed, sErr := inboundSvc.emailUsedByOtherInbounds(oldEmail, data.Id)
|
|
if sErr != nil {
|
|
return sErr
|
|
}
|
|
if !stillUsed {
|
|
if e := inboundSvc.DelClientStat(tx, oldEmail); e != nil {
|
|
return e
|
|
}
|
|
if e := inboundSvc.DelClientIPs(tx, oldEmail); e != nil {
|
|
return e
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if e := inboundSvc.UpdateClientStat(tx, clients[0].Email, &clients[0]); e != nil {
|
|
return e
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
if e := inboundSvc.AddClientStat(tx, data.Id, &clients[0]); e != nil {
|
|
return e
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
stillUsed, sErr := inboundSvc.emailUsedByOtherInbounds(oldEmail, data.Id)
|
|
if sErr != nil {
|
|
return sErr
|
|
}
|
|
if !stillUsed {
|
|
if e := inboundSvc.DelClientStat(tx, oldEmail); e != nil {
|
|
return e
|
|
}
|
|
if e := inboundSvc.DelClientIPs(tx, oldEmail); e != nil {
|
|
return e
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if e := tx.Save(oldInbound).Error; e != nil {
|
|
return e
|
|
}
|
|
// Rename the client record in the same transaction as the settings JSON
|
|
// so no concurrent SyncInbound can see one renamed without the other.
|
|
if len(oldEmail) > 0 && !strings.EqualFold(oldEmail, clients[0].Email) {
|
|
var renameTaken int64
|
|
if e := tx.Model(&model.ClientRecord{}).Where("email = ?", clients[0].Email).Count(&renameTaken).Error; e != nil {
|
|
return e
|
|
}
|
|
if renameTaken == 0 {
|
|
if e := tx.Model(&model.ClientRecord{}).Where("email = ?", oldEmail).Update("email", clients[0].Email).Error; e != nil {
|
|
return e
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
finalClients, gcErr := inboundSvc.GetClients(oldInbound)
|
|
if gcErr != nil {
|
|
return gcErr
|
|
}
|
|
if err := s.SyncInbound(tx, oldInbound.Id, finalClients); err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
if oldInbound.NodeID != nil {
|
|
return (&NodeService{}).MarkNodeDirtyTx(tx, *oldInbound.NodeID)
|
|
}
|
|
return nil
|
|
}); txErr != nil {
|
|
return false, txErr
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Apply to the running runtime after the DB is committed — outside the
|
|
// serialized writer so a slow node call can't stall traffic accounting.
|
|
if len(oldEmail) > 0 {
|
|
if oldInbound.NodeID == nil {
|
|
if !push {
|
|
needRestart = true
|
|
} else if oldInbound.Protocol == model.MTProto {
|
|
inboundSvc.applyLocalMtproto(oldInbound.Id)
|
|
} else {
|
|
if oldClients[clientIndex].Enable {
|
|
err1 := rt.RemoveUser(context.Background(), oldInbound, oldEmail)
|
|
if err1 == nil {
|
|
logger.Debug("Old client deleted on", rt.Name(), ":", oldEmail)
|
|
} else if strings.Contains(err1.Error(), fmt.Sprintf("User %s not found.", oldEmail)) {
|
|
logger.Debug("User is already deleted. Nothing to do more...")
|
|
} else {
|
|
logger.Debug("Error in deleting client on", rt.Name(), ":", err1)
|
|
needRestart = true
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if clients[0].Enable {
|
|
cipher := ""
|
|
if oldInbound.Protocol == "shadowsocks" {
|
|
cipher = oldSettings["method"].(string)
|
|
}
|
|
err1 := rt.AddUser(context.Background(), oldInbound, map[string]any{
|
|
"email": clients[0].Email,
|
|
"id": clients[0].ID,
|
|
"security": clients[0].Security,
|
|
"flow": clients[0].Flow,
|
|
"auth": clients[0].Auth,
|
|
"password": clients[0].Password,
|
|
"cipher": cipher,
|
|
"publicKey": clients[0].PublicKey,
|
|
"allowedIPs": clients[0].AllowedIPs,
|
|
"preSharedKey": clients[0].PreSharedKey,
|
|
"keepAlive": keepAliveStr(clients[0].KeepAlive),
|
|
})
|
|
if err1 == nil {
|
|
logger.Debug("Client edited on", rt.Name(), ":", clients[0].Email)
|
|
} else {
|
|
logger.Debug("Error in adding client on", rt.Name(), ":", err1)
|
|
needRestart = true
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
} else if push {
|
|
if err1 := rt.UpdateUser(context.Background(), oldInbound, oldEmail, clients[0]); err1 != nil {
|
|
logger.Warning("Error in updating client on", rt.Name(), ":", err1)
|
|
} else {
|
|
advancePushedInbound(rt, prevSettings, oldInbound)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
logger.Debug("Client old email not found")
|
|
needRestart = true
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return needRestart, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (s *ClientService) DelInboundClientByEmail(inboundSvc *InboundService, inboundId int, email string, keepTraffic bool, fullDelete bool) (bool, error) {
|
|
defer lockInbound(inboundId).Unlock()
|
|
|
|
oldInbound, err := inboundSvc.GetInbound(inboundId)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
logger.Error("Load Old Data Error")
|
|
return false, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var settings map[string]any
|
|
if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(oldInbound.Settings), &settings); err != nil {
|
|
return false, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
interfaceClients, ok := settings["clients"].([]any)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return false, common.NewError("invalid clients format in inbound settings")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var newClients []any
|
|
needApiDel := false
|
|
found := false
|
|
|
|
for _, client := range interfaceClients {
|
|
c, ok := client.(map[string]any)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
if cEmail, ok := c["email"].(string); ok && cEmail == email {
|
|
found = true
|
|
needApiDel, _ = c["enable"].(bool)
|
|
} else {
|
|
newClients = append(newClients, client)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if !found {
|
|
return false, fmt.Errorf("%w for email: %s", ErrClientNotInInbound, email)
|
|
}
|
|
db := database.GetDB()
|
|
newClients = compactOrphans(db, newClients)
|
|
if newClients == nil {
|
|
newClients = []any{}
|
|
}
|
|
settings["clients"] = newClients
|
|
newSettings, err := json.MarshalIndent(settings, "", " ")
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return false, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
prevSettings := oldInbound.Settings
|
|
oldInbound.Settings = string(newSettings)
|
|
|
|
emailShared, err := inboundSvc.emailUsedByOtherInbounds(email, inboundId)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return false, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
needRestart := false
|
|
|
|
// Decide what to delete and the push plan before the serialized DB write —
|
|
// these are reads, and nodePushPlan failing should abort before committing.
|
|
delStat := false
|
|
if len(email) > 0 && !emailShared && !keepTraffic {
|
|
traffic, tErr := inboundSvc.GetClientTrafficByEmail(email)
|
|
if tErr != nil {
|
|
return false, tErr
|
|
}
|
|
delStat = traffic != nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// The runtime user is scoped to this inbound's tag + email, so the push plan
|
|
// is resolved independently of emailShared — a sibling inbound still carrying
|
|
// the email must not suppress removing the user from this inbound's Xray.
|
|
var rt runtime.Runtime
|
|
var push bool
|
|
if len(email) > 0 && (oldInbound.NodeID != nil || needApiDel) {
|
|
r, p, _, perr := inboundSvc.nodePushPlan(oldInbound)
|
|
if perr != nil {
|
|
return false, perr
|
|
}
|
|
rt, push = r, p
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Persist the deletion atomically, serialized against the traffic poll to
|
|
// avoid the cross-transaction lock-order deadlock (runSerializedTx).
|
|
if txErr := runSerializedTx(func(tx *gorm.DB) error {
|
|
if !emailShared && !keepTraffic {
|
|
if e := inboundSvc.DelClientIPs(tx, email); e != nil {
|
|
logger.Error("Error in delete client IPs")
|
|
return e
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if delStat {
|
|
if e := inboundSvc.DelClientStat(tx, email); e != nil {
|
|
logger.Error("Delete stats Data Error")
|
|
return e
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if e := tx.Save(oldInbound).Error; e != nil {
|
|
return e
|
|
}
|
|
finalClients, gcErr := inboundSvc.GetClients(oldInbound)
|
|
if gcErr != nil {
|
|
return gcErr
|
|
}
|
|
if err := s.SyncInbound(tx, inboundId, finalClients); err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
if oldInbound.NodeID != nil {
|
|
return (&NodeService{}).MarkNodeDirtyTx(tx, *oldInbound.NodeID)
|
|
}
|
|
return nil
|
|
}); txErr != nil {
|
|
return false, txErr
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Apply the runtime delete after commit — outside the serialized writer so a
|
|
// slow node call can't stall traffic accounting. Independent of emailShared:
|
|
// Xray users are keyed by inbound tag, so the user must be removed from this
|
|
// inbound's runtime even when the same email survives in another inbound.
|
|
if len(email) > 0 {
|
|
if oldInbound.NodeID == nil {
|
|
if oldInbound.Protocol == model.MTProto {
|
|
// mtg serves the full secret set, so any client delete re-applies
|
|
// it (removing the last client stops the sidecar) regardless of the
|
|
// client's enable state.
|
|
inboundSvc.applyLocalMtproto(oldInbound.Id)
|
|
} else if needApiDel {
|
|
// Local inbound: a disabled client isn't in the running Xray, so only
|
|
// a live one (needApiDel) needs an API removal.
|
|
if !push {
|
|
needRestart = true
|
|
} else if err1 := rt.RemoveUser(context.Background(), oldInbound, email); err1 == nil {
|
|
logger.Debug("Client deleted on", rt.Name(), ":", email)
|
|
needRestart = false
|
|
} else if strings.Contains(err1.Error(), fmt.Sprintf("User %s not found.", email)) {
|
|
logger.Debug("User is already deleted. Nothing to do more...")
|
|
} else {
|
|
logger.Debug("Error in deleting client on", rt.Name(), ":", email)
|
|
needRestart = true
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
// Node inbound: propagate the delete regardless of the enable flag —
|
|
// the node's own DB still carries a disabled client and would
|
|
// resurrect it on the next snapshot otherwise. A full client delete
|
|
// must remove the node's client record too, not just detach it from
|
|
// this inbound (#5797).
|
|
if push {
|
|
var err1 error
|
|
if fullDelete {
|
|
err1 = rt.DeleteClient(context.Background(), email)
|
|
} else {
|
|
err1 = rt.DeleteUser(context.Background(), oldInbound, email)
|
|
}
|
|
if err1 != nil {
|
|
logger.Warning("Error in deleting client on", rt.Name(), ":", err1)
|
|
} else {
|
|
advancePushedInbound(rt, prevSettings, oldInbound)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return needRestart, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (s *ClientService) SetClientTelegramUserID(inboundSvc *InboundService, trafficId int, tgId int64) (bool, error) {
|
|
traffic, inbound, err := inboundSvc.GetClientInboundByTrafficID(trafficId)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return false, err
|
|
}
|
|
if inbound == nil {
|
|
return false, common.NewError("Inbound Not Found For Traffic ID:", trafficId)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
clientEmail := traffic.Email
|
|
|
|
oldClients, err := inboundSvc.GetClients(inbound)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return false, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
found := false
|
|
for _, oldClient := range oldClients {
|
|
if oldClient.Email == clientEmail {
|
|
found = true
|
|
break
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if !found {
|
|
return false, common.NewError("Client Not Found For Email:", clientEmail)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var settings map[string]any
|
|
err = json.Unmarshal([]byte(inbound.Settings), &settings)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return false, err
|
|
}
|
|
clients := settings["clients"].([]any)
|
|
var newClients []any
|
|
for client_index := range clients {
|
|
c := clients[client_index].(map[string]any)
|
|
if c["email"] == clientEmail {
|
|
c["tgId"] = tgId
|
|
c["updated_at"] = time.Now().Unix() * 1000
|
|
newClients = append(newClients, any(c))
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
settings["clients"] = newClients
|
|
modifiedSettings, err := json.MarshalIndent(settings, "", " ")
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return false, err
|
|
}
|
|
inbound.Settings = string(modifiedSettings)
|
|
needRestart, err := s.UpdateInboundClient(inboundSvc, inbound, clientEmail)
|
|
return needRestart, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (s *ClientService) CheckIsEnabledByEmail(inboundSvc *InboundService, clientEmail string) (bool, error) {
|
|
_, inbound, err := inboundSvc.GetClientInboundByEmail(clientEmail)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return false, err
|
|
}
|
|
if inbound == nil {
|
|
return false, common.NewError("Inbound Not Found For Email:", clientEmail)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
clients, err := inboundSvc.GetClients(inbound)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return false, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
isEnable := false
|
|
|
|
for _, client := range clients {
|
|
if client.Email == clientEmail {
|
|
isEnable = client.Enable
|
|
break
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return isEnable, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (s *ClientService) ToggleClientEnableByEmail(inboundSvc *InboundService, clientEmail string) (bool, bool, error) {
|
|
current, err := s.CheckIsEnabledByEmail(inboundSvc, clientEmail)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return false, false, err
|
|
}
|
|
target := !current
|
|
needRestart, err := s.applyClientFieldByEmail(inboundSvc, clientEmail, func(c map[string]any) {
|
|
c["enable"] = target
|
|
})
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return false, needRestart, err
|
|
}
|
|
return target, needRestart, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (s *ClientService) SetClientEnableByEmail(inboundSvc *InboundService, clientEmail string, enable bool) (bool, bool, error) {
|
|
current, err := s.CheckIsEnabledByEmail(inboundSvc, clientEmail)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return false, false, err
|
|
}
|
|
if current == enable {
|
|
return false, false, nil
|
|
}
|
|
needRestart, err := s.applyClientFieldByEmail(inboundSvc, clientEmail, func(c map[string]any) {
|
|
c["enable"] = enable
|
|
})
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return false, needRestart, err
|
|
}
|
|
return true, needRestart, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// applyClientFieldByEmail loads the inbound currently hosting clientEmail,
|
|
// confirms the client exists, applies mutate to the matching client (plus a
|
|
// refreshed updated_at), and hands a single-client update payload to
|
|
// UpdateInboundClient. The rebuilt clients array intentionally contains only
|
|
// the matched client — that is the input contract UpdateInboundClient expects
|
|
// (clients[0] is the new data; clientEmail locates the row to replace). It
|
|
// backs the single-field by-email setters below.
|
|
// applyClientFieldByEmail mutates a client field on every inbound the email is
|
|
// attached to. A multi-inbound client is one logical identity: patching only
|
|
// the first inbound's JSON would leave the siblings stale, and the next
|
|
// SyncInbound over a stale sibling would revert the edit in the normalized
|
|
// records (#5039).
|
|
func (s *ClientService) applyClientFieldByEmail(inboundSvc *InboundService, clientEmail string, mutate func(c map[string]any)) (bool, error) {
|
|
inboundIds, err := s.GetInboundIdsForEmail(database.GetDB(), clientEmail)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return false, err
|
|
}
|
|
if len(inboundIds) == 0 {
|
|
// Legacy fallback for clients that only live in the inbound JSON and
|
|
// were never normalized into client_inbounds.
|
|
_, inbound, gErr := inboundSvc.GetClientInboundByEmail(clientEmail)
|
|
if gErr != nil {
|
|
return false, gErr
|
|
}
|
|
if inbound == nil {
|
|
return false, common.NewError("Inbound Not Found For Email:", clientEmail)
|
|
}
|
|
inboundIds = []int{inbound.Id}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
needRestart := false
|
|
found := false
|
|
for _, ibId := range inboundIds {
|
|
inbound, gErr := inboundSvc.GetInbound(ibId)
|
|
if gErr != nil {
|
|
return needRestart, gErr
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var settings map[string]any
|
|
if uErr := json.Unmarshal([]byte(inbound.Settings), &settings); uErr != nil {
|
|
return needRestart, uErr
|
|
}
|
|
clients, _ := settings["clients"].([]any)
|
|
// UpdateInboundClient expects a single-client payload, so keep only the
|
|
// matching entry in the scratch copy; it splices the result back into
|
|
// the inbound's full client list itself.
|
|
var newClients []any
|
|
for client_index := range clients {
|
|
c, ok := clients[client_index].(map[string]any)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
if c["email"] == clientEmail {
|
|
mutate(c)
|
|
c["updated_at"] = time.Now().Unix() * 1000
|
|
newClients = append(newClients, any(c))
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if len(newClients) == 0 {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
found = true
|
|
settings["clients"] = newClients
|
|
modifiedSettings, mErr := json.MarshalIndent(settings, "", " ")
|
|
if mErr != nil {
|
|
return needRestart, mErr
|
|
}
|
|
inbound.Settings = string(modifiedSettings)
|
|
nr, uErr := s.UpdateInboundClient(inboundSvc, inbound, clientEmail)
|
|
if uErr != nil {
|
|
return needRestart, uErr
|
|
}
|
|
needRestart = needRestart || nr
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if !found {
|
|
return needRestart, common.NewError("Client Not Found For Email:", clientEmail)
|
|
}
|
|
return needRestart, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (s *ClientService) ResetClientIpLimitByEmail(inboundSvc *InboundService, clientEmail string, count int) (bool, error) {
|
|
return s.applyClientFieldByEmail(inboundSvc, clientEmail, func(c map[string]any) {
|
|
c["limitIp"] = count
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (s *ClientService) ResetClientExpiryTimeByEmail(inboundSvc *InboundService, clientEmail string, expiry_time int64) (bool, error) {
|
|
return s.applyClientFieldByEmail(inboundSvc, clientEmail, func(c map[string]any) {
|
|
c["expiryTime"] = expiry_time
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (s *ClientService) ResetClientTrafficLimitByEmail(inboundSvc *InboundService, clientEmail string, totalGB int) (bool, error) {
|
|
if totalGB < 0 {
|
|
return false, common.NewError("totalGB must be >= 0")
|
|
}
|
|
return s.applyClientFieldByEmail(inboundSvc, clientEmail, func(c map[string]any) {
|
|
c["totalGB"] = totalGB * 1024 * 1024 * 1024
|
|
})
|
|
}
|