mirror of
https://github.com/MHSanaei/3x-ui.git
synced 2026-06-28 00:24:19 +00:00
37c5e0bfd2
* fix(api-docs): document clientIpsByGuid route
Restores a green `go test ./...` baseline: TestAPIRoutesDocumented
flagged POST /panel/api/clients/clientIpsByGuid (added in 9385b6c6)
as undocumented in endpoints.ts.
* test(node): characterize current node TLS + API auth behavior
Phase 0 regression net for the mTLS work. These pass on unchanged
production code and lock the pre-mTLS contracts so later phases can be
proven additive:
- tlsConfigForNode: skip -> InsecureSkipVerify (no VerifyConnection);
pin -> VerifyConnection installed.
- checkAPIAuth: bearer match -> Next + api_authed; unauthenticated ->
401 (XHR) / 404; valid session -> Next.
- panel HTTPS listener with no ClientAuth accepts a client that presents
no client certificate (the browsers-keep-working invariant).
* feat(crypto): node-auth CA + client-cert minting (TDD)
Stdlib-only ECDSA P-256 helpers for the node mTLS work:
- GenerateNodeCA: self-signed CA (IsCA, CertSign, path len 0)
- IssueClientCert: client-auth leaf (ExtKeyUsageClientAuth) signed by CA
- LoadCAFromPEM: parse a CA cert+key for issuing / trust-pool building
Tests assert the contract (leaf verifies against the issuing CA with
ExtKeyUsageClientAuth), seen failing on the assertion before impl.
* feat(node): lazy node mTLS CA + client cert in settings (TDD)
SettingService gains opt-in mTLS material, all stored as Setting rows
with empty defaults and kept out of entity.AllSetting (so private keys
never reach the settings UI/export):
- EnsureNodeMtlsCA: mint+persist the node-auth CA once, reuse thereafter
- EnsureMasterClientCert: issue the master client cert from the CA, idempotent
- NodeMtlsClientCAPool: ClientCAs trust pool for the listener; nil when
unconfigured so the no-mTLS path is unchanged
Tests assert idempotency and that the client cert verifies against the CA
for client auth; seen failing on the assertion before impl.
* feat(node): mtls client TLS config + master-cert provider (TDD)
tlsConfigForNode gains an 'mtls' branch that presents the master client
certificate and verifies the node server against system roots (no
InsecureSkipVerify, no custom RootCAs). The cert is supplied via an
injected MasterClientCertProvider so runtime need not import service;
it fails closed when unconfigured. skip/pin contracts unchanged.
* feat(node): allow tokenless mtls nodes in remote do() (TDD)
mtls nodes authenticate with a client certificate, so the bearer token
becomes optional for them: do() no longer rejects an empty ApiToken when
TlsVerifyMode is mtls, and the Authorization header is omitted when no
token is set. Every other mode still requires a token (regression kept).
* feat(node): authenticate verified client certs in checkAPIAuth (TDD)
A completed mTLS handshake (non-empty r.TLS.VerifiedChains) now
authenticates an API request, equivalent to a valid bearer token, and
sets api_authed so the CSRF middleware lets cert-authed mutations
through. Bearer/session/reject paths unchanged. The accept-path assert
was mutation-checked (guard flipped -> test red -> reverted).
* feat(node): opt-in mTLS on the panel listener (TDD; mutation-checked)
web.go now applies VerifyClientCertIfGiven + ClientCAs to the HTTPS
listener when a node trust CA is configured, and wires the master client
cert provider for outbound mtls calls. With no CA the listener is
byte-identical to before (browsers unaffected).
applyNodeMtls is covered end-to-end: no-cert client handshakes (browsers
keep working), a CA-signed client cert verifies, a foreign-CA cert is
rejected at the handshake. Mutation-checked:
- RequireAndVerifyClientCert -> no-cert client rejected (red) -> reverted
- drop ClientCAs -> master cert no longer trusted (red) -> reverted
* feat(node): accept mtls verify-mode + CA reveal endpoint (TDD)
- model.Node.TlsVerifyMode validator now accepts 'mtls'
- normalize() preserves mtls and requires the node scheme to be https
(fail closed), instead of clamping mtls back to verify
- NodeService.NodeMtlsCaCert + POST /panel/api/nodes/mtls/ca return this
panel's node-auth CA cert (public) to paste into a node, minting the CA
+ master client cert on first call
- endpoints.ts documents the new route (doc-sync test)
No model column added (enum is a string), so no migration/codegen.
* feat(node): node mTLS UI + trust-CA setter (TDD)
Backend:
- NodeService.SetNodeMtlsTrustCA + POST /panel/api/nodes/mtls/trustCA
store the CA this panel trusts for incoming node-API client certs
(validates PEM, empty clears); applied on next restart
- endpoints.ts + regenerated openapi.json document both mtls routes
Frontend:
- node form: 'mtls' TLS-verify option + setup hint (zod enum updated)
- Nodes page 'Node mTLS' card: copy this panel's CA, and paste/save the
trusted parent CA
- en-US i18n keys (other locales fall back to en-US)
Gates green: go build (native+windows), vet, go test ./...; frontend
typecheck, lint, vitest (541).
* style(node): gofmt web_mtls_test doc comment
* feat(node): hashed+zstd reconcile transport (TDD, negotiated, mixed-version safe)
Adds an integrity + compression envelope to node config pushes:
- internal/util/wirecodec: shared zstd codec (bomb-capped decode) +
SHA-256 hashing + the header/capability constants
- Remote.do(): always attaches X-Config-Sha256 of the uncompressed body;
zstd-compresses only when the node advertised support (learned from its
X-3x-Node-Caps response header) and the body is >=1KiB
- ConfigEnvelopeMiddleware on /panel/api: advertises the cap, decompresses
and verifies the hash (handler not invoked on mismatch) before binding
Mixed-version safe: old nodes never advertise the cap -> plain bodies;
the hash header is verify-if-present so any panel/node mix interoperates
(existing reconcile tests stay green). klauspost/compress promoted to a
direct dep. Hash-mismatch reject was mutation-checked (compare defeated
-> test red -> reverted).
* feat(node): per-node network throughput metrics (TDD)
The node status response already carries gopsutil netIO.up/down (summed
non-virtual interfaces), so no node-side change is needed:
- probe() parses netIO.up/down into HeartbeatPatch.NetUp/NetDown
- Node gains net_up/net_down columns (AutoMigrate); UpdateHeartbeat
persists them and appends netUp/netDown to the per-node metric history
- NodeMetricKeys whitelists netUp/netDown so the history endpoint serves them
- NodeHistoryPanel renders Net Up/Down sparklines (KB/s, no 0-100 clamp)
- regenerated frontend types + openapi.json for the new Node fields
* feat(node): move node mTLS controls into a toolbar button + modal
The Node mTLS panel was an always-visible card cluttering the nodes
page. Replace it with a 'Node mTLS' button beside 'Add node' that opens
a modal with the same copy-CA + trusted-parent-CA controls; the modal
closes on a successful save. No backend/i18n changes.
* i18n(node): translate mTLS + net-metrics keys for all locales
Adds the node mTLS strings (tlsMtls, mtlsFormHint, mtls.* dialog + the
saveMtls toast) and the netUp/netDown chart labels to all 12 non-English
catalogs (ar, es, fa, id, ja, pt, ru, tr, uk, vi, zh-CN, zh-TW), matching
each catalog's existing terminology. Technical tokens (mTLS/TLS/CA/API/
KB/s) kept verbatim.
* fix(node): address Copilot review on node-hardening PR
- setting_mtls: fail closed on a half-present CA/master-cert pair instead of
silently regenerating (which would rotate the CA and break fleet trust).
- config_envelope: reject non-zstd Content-Encoding on the envelope path
rather than hashing/forwarding a still-encoded body to the handler.
- node mTLS: support tokenless mTLS end-to-end — apiToken is now
required_unless tlsVerifyMode=mtls (model) with matching conditional
validation in NodeFormSchema, so the runtime allowance is actually reachable.
- NodesPage: add a catch block to onSaveTrustCa so save failures surface.
908 lines
26 KiB
Go
908 lines
26 KiB
Go
package service
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import (
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"context"
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"crypto/sha256"
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"crypto/tls"
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"encoding/base64"
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"encoding/json"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"net"
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"net/http"
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"net/url"
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"strconv"
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"strings"
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"time"
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"github.com/mhsanaei/3x-ui/v3/internal/database"
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"github.com/mhsanaei/3x-ui/v3/internal/database/model"
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"github.com/mhsanaei/3x-ui/v3/internal/logger"
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"github.com/mhsanaei/3x-ui/v3/internal/util/common"
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"github.com/mhsanaei/3x-ui/v3/internal/util/json_util"
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"github.com/mhsanaei/3x-ui/v3/internal/util/netsafe"
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"github.com/mhsanaei/3x-ui/v3/internal/web/runtime"
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"github.com/mhsanaei/3x-ui/v3/internal/xray"
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)
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type HeartbeatPatch struct {
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Status string
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LastHeartbeat int64
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LatencyMs int
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XrayVersion string
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PanelVersion string
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Guid string
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CpuPct float64
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MemPct float64
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UptimeSecs uint64
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// NetUp/NetDown are the node's current interface throughput (bytes/sec),
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// summed over non-virtual interfaces, read from its status response.
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NetUp uint64
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NetDown uint64
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LastError string
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// XrayState and XrayError come from the remote /panel/api/server/status when the
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// panel API is reachable. They allow distinguishing panel connectivity from
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// Xray core health on the node.
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XrayState string
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XrayError string
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}
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type NodeService struct{}
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// FetchCertFingerprint connects to the node over HTTPS without verifying the
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// certificate and returns the leaf certificate's SHA-256 as base64, so the UI
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// can offer a "fetch and pin current certificate" action.
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func (s *NodeService) FetchCertFingerprint(ctx context.Context, n *model.Node) (string, error) {
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addr, err := netsafe.NormalizeHost(n.Address)
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if err != nil {
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return "", err
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}
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scheme := n.Scheme
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if scheme != "http" && scheme != "https" {
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scheme = "https"
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}
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if scheme != "https" {
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return "", common.NewError("certificate pinning is only available for https nodes")
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}
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if n.Port <= 0 || n.Port > 65535 {
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return "", common.NewError("node port must be 1-65535")
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}
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probeURL := &url.URL{
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Scheme: scheme,
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Host: net.JoinHostPort(addr, strconv.Itoa(n.Port)),
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Path: normalizeBasePath(n.BasePath) + "panel/api/server/status",
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}
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req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(
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netsafe.ContextWithAllowPrivate(ctx, n.AllowPrivateAddress),
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http.MethodGet, probeURL.String(), nil)
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if err != nil {
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return "", err
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}
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client := &http.Client{
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Transport: &http.Transport{
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DialContext: netsafe.SSRFGuardedDialContext,
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TLSClientConfig: &tls.Config{InsecureSkipVerify: true}, // lgtm[go/disabled-certificate-check]
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},
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}
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resp, err := client.Do(req)
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if err != nil {
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return "", err
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}
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defer resp.Body.Close()
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if resp.TLS == nil || len(resp.TLS.PeerCertificates) == 0 {
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return "", common.NewError("node did not present a TLS certificate")
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}
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sum := sha256.Sum256(resp.TLS.PeerCertificates[0].Raw)
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return base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(sum[:]), nil
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}
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func (s *NodeService) GetAll() ([]*model.Node, error) {
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db := database.GetDB()
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var nodes []*model.Node
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err := db.Model(model.Node{}).Order("id asc").Find(&nodes).Error
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if err != nil || len(nodes) == 0 {
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return nodes, err
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}
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type inboundRow struct {
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Id int
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NodeID int `gorm:"column:node_id"`
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}
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var inboundRows []inboundRow
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if err := db.Table("inbounds").
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Select("id, node_id").
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Where("node_id IS NOT NULL").
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Scan(&inboundRows).Error; err != nil {
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return nodes, nil
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}
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if len(inboundRows) == 0 {
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return nodes, nil
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}
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inboundsByNode := make(map[int][]int, len(nodes))
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nodeByInbound := make(map[int]int, len(inboundRows))
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for _, row := range inboundRows {
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inboundsByNode[row.NodeID] = append(inboundsByNode[row.NodeID], row.Id)
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nodeByInbound[row.Id] = row.NodeID
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}
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type clientCountRow struct {
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NodeID int `gorm:"column:node_id"`
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Count int `gorm:"column:count"`
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}
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var clientCounts []clientCountRow
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if err := db.Raw(`
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SELECT inbounds.node_id AS node_id, COUNT(DISTINCT client_inbounds.client_id) AS count
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FROM inbounds
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JOIN client_inbounds ON client_inbounds.inbound_id = inbounds.id
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WHERE inbounds.node_id IS NOT NULL
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GROUP BY inbounds.node_id
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`).Scan(&clientCounts).Error; err == nil {
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for _, row := range clientCounts {
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for _, n := range nodes {
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if n.Id == row.NodeID {
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n.ClientCount = row.Count
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break
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}
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}
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}
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}
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now := time.Now().UnixMilli()
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type trafficRow struct {
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InboundID int `gorm:"column:inbound_id"`
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Email string
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Enable bool
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Total int64
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Up int64
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Down int64
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ExpiryTime int64 `gorm:"column:expiry_time"`
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}
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var trafficRows []trafficRow
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inboundIDs := make([]int, 0, len(nodeByInbound))
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for id := range nodeByInbound {
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inboundIDs = append(inboundIDs, id)
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}
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// Chunk the IN clause to avoid "too many SQL variables" on SQLite
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// when there are many node-owned inbounds (common with many nodes).
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// sqliteMaxVars is defined in this package (inbound.go).
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for _, batch := range chunkInts(inboundIDs, sqliteMaxVars) {
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var page []trafficRow
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if err := db.Table("client_traffics").
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Select("inbound_id, email, enable, total, up, down, expiry_time").
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Where("inbound_id IN ?", batch).
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Scan(&page).Error; err == nil {
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trafficRows = append(trafficRows, page...)
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}
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}
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depletedByNode := make(map[int]int)
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if len(trafficRows) > 0 {
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for _, row := range trafficRows {
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nodeID, ok := nodeByInbound[row.InboundID]
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if !ok {
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continue
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}
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expired := row.ExpiryTime > 0 && row.ExpiryTime <= now
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exhausted := row.Total > 0 && row.Up+row.Down >= row.Total
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if expired || exhausted || !row.Enable {
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depletedByNode[nodeID]++
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}
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}
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}
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onlineByGuid := s.onlineEmailsByGuid()
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for _, n := range nodes {
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n.InboundCount = len(inboundsByNode[n.Id])
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n.DepletedCount = depletedByNode[n.Id]
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// Online is attributed to the node that physically hosts the client
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// (by GUID): a client on a sub-node counts under the sub-node, not
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// the intermediate node it syncs through (#4983).
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n.OnlineCount = len(onlineByGuid[effectiveNodeGuid(n)])
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}
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return nodes, nil
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}
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func (s *NodeService) onlineEmailsByGuid() map[string]map[string]struct{} {
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svc := InboundService{}
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byGuid := svc.GetOnlineClientsByGuid()
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out := make(map[string]map[string]struct{}, len(byGuid))
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for guid, emails := range byGuid {
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set := make(map[string]struct{}, len(emails))
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for _, email := range emails {
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set[email] = struct{}{}
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}
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out[guid] = set
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}
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return out
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}
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// effectiveNodeGuid is a node's stable online-attribution key: its reported
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// panelGuid, or a master-local synthetic id when the node is an old build that
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// hasn't reported one yet (#4983).
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func effectiveNodeGuid(n *model.Node) string {
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if n.Guid != "" {
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return n.Guid
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}
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return synthNodeGuid(n.Id)
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}
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func (s *NodeService) GetById(id int) (*model.Node, error) {
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db := database.GetDB()
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n := &model.Node{}
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if err := db.Model(model.Node{}).Where("id = ?", id).First(n).Error; err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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return n, nil
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}
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// NodeExists reports whether a node with the given id exists on this panel.
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// Used to drop stale, cross-panel node references on inbound import. A Count
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// query distinguishes "no such node" (count 0, no error) from a real DB error.
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func (s *NodeService) NodeExists(id int) (bool, error) {
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if id <= 0 {
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return false, nil
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}
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var count int64
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if err := database.GetDB().Model(model.Node{}).Where("id = ?", id).Count(&count).Error; err != nil {
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return false, err
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}
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return count > 0, nil
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}
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func normalizeBasePath(p string) string {
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p = strings.TrimSpace(p)
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if p == "" {
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return "/"
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}
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if !strings.HasPrefix(p, "/") {
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p = "/" + p
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}
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if !strings.HasSuffix(p, "/") {
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p = p + "/"
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}
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return p
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}
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func (s *NodeService) normalize(n *model.Node) error {
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n.Name = strings.TrimSpace(n.Name)
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n.ApiToken = strings.TrimSpace(n.ApiToken)
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if n.Name == "" {
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return common.NewError("node name is required")
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}
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addr, err := netsafe.NormalizeHost(n.Address)
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if err != nil {
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return common.NewError(err.Error())
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}
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n.Address = addr
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if n.Port <= 0 || n.Port > 65535 {
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return common.NewError("node port must be 1-65535")
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}
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if n.Scheme != "http" && n.Scheme != "https" {
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n.Scheme = "https"
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}
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if n.TlsVerifyMode != "skip" && n.TlsVerifyMode != "pin" && n.TlsVerifyMode != "mtls" {
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n.TlsVerifyMode = "verify"
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}
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if n.TlsVerifyMode == "mtls" && n.Scheme != "https" {
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return common.NewError("mtls requires the node scheme to be https")
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}
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n.PinnedCertSha256 = strings.TrimSpace(n.PinnedCertSha256)
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if n.InboundSyncMode != "selected" {
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n.InboundSyncMode = "all"
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n.InboundTags = nil
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} else {
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seen := make(map[string]struct{}, len(n.InboundTags))
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tags := make([]string, 0, len(n.InboundTags))
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for _, tag := range n.InboundTags {
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tag = strings.TrimSpace(tag)
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if tag == "" {
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continue
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}
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if _, ok := seen[tag]; ok {
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continue
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}
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seen[tag] = struct{}{}
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tags = append(tags, tag)
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}
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n.InboundTags = tags
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}
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if n.TlsVerifyMode == "pin" {
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if _, err := runtime.DecodeCertPin(n.PinnedCertSha256); err != nil {
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return common.NewError(err.Error())
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}
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}
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n.BasePath = normalizeBasePath(n.BasePath)
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return nil
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}
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func (s *NodeService) Create(n *model.Node) error {
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if err := s.normalize(n); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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db := database.GetDB()
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return db.Create(n).Error
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}
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func (s *NodeService) Update(id int, in *model.Node) error {
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if err := s.normalize(in); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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inboundTagsJSON, err := json.Marshal(in.InboundTags)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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db := database.GetDB()
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existing := &model.Node{}
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if err := db.Where("id = ?", id).First(existing).Error; err != nil {
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return err
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}
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updates := map[string]any{
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"name": in.Name,
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"remark": in.Remark,
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"scheme": in.Scheme,
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"address": in.Address,
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"port": in.Port,
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"base_path": in.BasePath,
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"api_token": in.ApiToken,
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"enable": in.Enable,
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"allow_private_address": in.AllowPrivateAddress,
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"tls_verify_mode": in.TlsVerifyMode,
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"pinned_cert_sha256": in.PinnedCertSha256,
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"inbound_sync_mode": in.InboundSyncMode,
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"inbound_tags": string(inboundTagsJSON),
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"outbound_tag": in.OutboundTag,
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}
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if err := db.Model(model.Node{}).Where("id = ?", id).Updates(updates).Error; err != nil {
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return err
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|
}
|
|
if mgr := runtime.GetManager(); mgr != nil {
|
|
mgr.InvalidateNode(id)
|
|
}
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (s *NodeService) GetRemoteInboundOptions(ctx context.Context, n *model.Node) ([]runtime.RemoteInboundOption, error) {
|
|
if err := s.normalize(n); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
if n.OutboundTag == "" {
|
|
return runtime.NewRemote(n, nil).ListInboundOptions(ctx)
|
|
}
|
|
// Mirror ProbeWithOutbound: a node being added/edited has no persistent
|
|
// egress bridge yet, so route the list call through a temporary one or the
|
|
// remote panel stays unreachable and the request times out.
|
|
var options []runtime.RemoteInboundOption
|
|
var err error
|
|
s.withOutboundBridge(n.Id, n.OutboundTag, func(proxyURL string) {
|
|
options, err = runtime.NewRemote(n, staticEgressResolver(proxyURL)).ListInboundOptions(ctx)
|
|
})
|
|
return options, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// staticEgressResolver hands a fixed proxy URL to runtime.NewRemote. An empty
|
|
// string yields a direct connection, so it doubles as the graceful fallback
|
|
// when a temporary bridge can't be built.
|
|
type staticEgressResolver string
|
|
|
|
func (r staticEgressResolver) NodeEgressProxyURL(int) string { return string(r) }
|
|
|
|
// EnsureInboundTagAllowed adds a panel-managed inbound's tag to the node's
|
|
// selection when the node syncs in "selected" mode. Without it, the next
|
|
// traffic sync would filter the tag out of the snapshot and the orphan sweep
|
|
// would silently delete the central row the panel just created or renamed.
|
|
// Tags are only ever added (never removed): on a rename the node may keep
|
|
// reporting the old tag until the remote update lands, and a leftover entry
|
|
// that matches nothing is harmless.
|
|
func (s *NodeService) EnsureInboundTagAllowed(nodeID int, tag string) error {
|
|
tag = strings.TrimSpace(tag)
|
|
if nodeID <= 0 || tag == "" {
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
db := database.GetDB()
|
|
node := &model.Node{}
|
|
if err := db.Where("id = ?", nodeID).First(node).Error; err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
if node.InboundSyncMode != "selected" {
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
for _, t := range node.InboundTags {
|
|
if t == tag {
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
buf, err := json.Marshal(append(node.InboundTags, tag))
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
return db.Model(model.Node{}).Where("id = ?", nodeID).
|
|
Updates(map[string]any{"inbound_tags": string(buf)}).Error
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func FilterNodeSnapshot(n *model.Node, snap *runtime.TrafficSnapshot) {
|
|
if n == nil || snap == nil || n.InboundSyncMode != "selected" {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
allowed := make(map[string]struct{}, len(n.InboundTags))
|
|
for _, tag := range n.InboundTags {
|
|
allowed[tag] = struct{}{}
|
|
}
|
|
filtered := make([]*model.Inbound, 0, len(snap.Inbounds))
|
|
for _, inbound := range snap.Inbounds {
|
|
if inbound == nil {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
if _, ok := allowed[inbound.Tag]; ok {
|
|
filtered = append(filtered, inbound)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
snap.Inbounds = filtered
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (s *NodeService) Delete(id int) error {
|
|
db := database.GetDB()
|
|
// Capture the node's guid before deleting the row so we can drop its per-node
|
|
// IP attribution (NodeClientIp is keyed by guid, not node id).
|
|
var guid string
|
|
var n model.Node
|
|
if err := db.Select("guid").Where("id = ?", id).First(&n).Error; err == nil {
|
|
guid = n.Guid
|
|
}
|
|
if err := db.Where("id = ?", id).Delete(model.Node{}).Error; err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
if err := db.Where("node_id = ?", id).Delete(&model.NodeClientTraffic{}).Error; err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
if guid != "" {
|
|
if err := db.Where("node_guid = ?", guid).Delete(&model.NodeClientIp{}).Error; err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if mgr := runtime.GetManager(); mgr != nil {
|
|
mgr.InvalidateNode(id)
|
|
}
|
|
nodeMetrics.drop(nodeMetricKey(id, "cpu"))
|
|
nodeMetrics.drop(nodeMetricKey(id, "mem"))
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (s *NodeService) SetEnable(id int, enable bool) error {
|
|
db := database.GetDB()
|
|
if err := db.Model(model.Node{}).Where("id = ?", id).Update("enable", enable).Error; err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
if mgr := runtime.GetManager(); mgr != nil {
|
|
mgr.InvalidateNode(id)
|
|
}
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// GetWebCertFiles asks a node for its own web TLS certificate/key file paths,
|
|
// used by "Set Cert from Panel" so a node-assigned inbound gets paths that
|
|
// exist on the node rather than the central panel. See issue #4854.
|
|
func (s *NodeService) GetWebCertFiles(id int) (*runtime.WebCertFiles, error) {
|
|
n, err := s.GetById(id)
|
|
if err != nil || n == nil {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("node not found")
|
|
}
|
|
if !n.Enable {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("node is disabled")
|
|
}
|
|
mgr := runtime.GetManager()
|
|
if mgr == nil {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("runtime manager unavailable")
|
|
}
|
|
remote, err := mgr.RemoteFor(n)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 10*time.Second)
|
|
defer cancel()
|
|
return remote.GetWebCertFiles(ctx)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// NodeUpdateResult reports the outcome of triggering a panel self-update on one
|
|
// node so the UI can show per-node success/failure for a bulk request.
|
|
type NodeUpdateResult struct {
|
|
Id int `json:"id"`
|
|
Name string `json:"name"`
|
|
OK bool `json:"ok"`
|
|
Error string `json:"error,omitempty"`
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// UpdatePanels triggers the official self-updater on each given node. Only
|
|
// enabled, online nodes are eligible — an offline node can't be reached, so it
|
|
// is reported as skipped rather than silently dropped.
|
|
func (s *NodeService) UpdatePanels(ids []int) ([]NodeUpdateResult, error) {
|
|
mgr := runtime.GetManager()
|
|
if mgr == nil {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("runtime manager unavailable")
|
|
}
|
|
results := make([]NodeUpdateResult, 0, len(ids))
|
|
for _, id := range ids {
|
|
n, err := s.GetById(id)
|
|
if err != nil || n == nil {
|
|
results = append(results, NodeUpdateResult{Id: id, OK: false, Error: "node not found"})
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
res := NodeUpdateResult{Id: id, Name: n.Name}
|
|
switch {
|
|
case !n.Enable:
|
|
res.Error = "node is disabled"
|
|
case n.Status != "online":
|
|
res.Error = "node is offline"
|
|
default:
|
|
remote, remoteErr := mgr.RemoteFor(n)
|
|
if remoteErr != nil {
|
|
res.Error = remoteErr.Error()
|
|
break
|
|
}
|
|
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 20*time.Second)
|
|
updErr := remote.UpdatePanel(ctx)
|
|
cancel()
|
|
if updErr != nil {
|
|
res.Error = updErr.Error()
|
|
} else {
|
|
res.OK = true
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
results = append(results, res)
|
|
}
|
|
return results, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (s *NodeService) UpdateHeartbeat(id int, p HeartbeatPatch) error {
|
|
db := database.GetDB()
|
|
updates := map[string]any{
|
|
"status": p.Status,
|
|
"last_heartbeat": p.LastHeartbeat,
|
|
"latency_ms": p.LatencyMs,
|
|
"xray_version": p.XrayVersion,
|
|
"panel_version": p.PanelVersion,
|
|
"cpu_pct": p.CpuPct,
|
|
"mem_pct": p.MemPct,
|
|
"uptime_secs": p.UptimeSecs,
|
|
"net_up": p.NetUp,
|
|
"net_down": p.NetDown,
|
|
"last_error": p.LastError,
|
|
"xray_state": p.XrayState,
|
|
"xray_error": p.XrayError,
|
|
}
|
|
// Only learn the GUID; never clear a known one if an old-build node (or a
|
|
// failed probe) reports none, so the stable identity survives blips.
|
|
if p.Guid != "" {
|
|
updates["guid"] = p.Guid
|
|
}
|
|
if err := db.Model(model.Node{}).Where("id = ?", id).Updates(updates).Error; err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
if p.Status == "online" {
|
|
now := time.Unix(p.LastHeartbeat, 0)
|
|
nodeMetrics.append(nodeMetricKey(id, "cpu"), now, p.CpuPct)
|
|
nodeMetrics.append(nodeMetricKey(id, "mem"), now, p.MemPct)
|
|
nodeMetrics.append(nodeMetricKey(id, "netUp"), now, float64(p.NetUp))
|
|
nodeMetrics.append(nodeMetricKey(id, "netDown"), now, float64(p.NetDown))
|
|
}
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (s *NodeService) MarkNodeDirty(id int) error {
|
|
if id <= 0 {
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
return database.GetDB().Model(model.Node{}).
|
|
Where("id = ?", id).
|
|
Updates(map[string]any{
|
|
"config_dirty": true,
|
|
"config_dirty_at": time.Now().UnixMilli(),
|
|
}).Error
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (s *NodeService) ClearNodeDirty(id int, dirtyAt int64) error {
|
|
if id <= 0 {
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
return database.GetDB().Model(model.Node{}).
|
|
Where("id = ? AND config_dirty_at = ?", id, dirtyAt).
|
|
Update("config_dirty", false).Error
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (s *NodeService) NodeSyncState(id int) (enabled bool, status string, dirty bool, dirtyAt int64, err error) {
|
|
if id <= 0 {
|
|
return false, "", false, 0, errors.New("invalid node id")
|
|
}
|
|
var row model.Node
|
|
err = database.GetDB().Model(model.Node{}).
|
|
Select("enable", "status", "config_dirty", "config_dirty_at").
|
|
Where("id = ?", id).
|
|
First(&row).Error
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return false, "", false, 0, err
|
|
}
|
|
return row.Enable, row.Status, row.ConfigDirty, row.ConfigDirtyAt, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (s *NodeService) IsNodePending(id int) bool {
|
|
enabled, status, dirty, _, err := s.NodeSyncState(id)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
return !enabled || status != "online" || dirty
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func nodeMetricKey(id int, metric string) string {
|
|
return "node:" + strconv.Itoa(id) + ":" + metric
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (s *NodeService) AggregateNodeMetric(id int, metric string, bucketSeconds int, maxPoints int) []map[string]any {
|
|
return nodeMetrics.aggregate(nodeMetricKey(id, metric), bucketSeconds, maxPoints)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (s *NodeService) Probe(ctx context.Context, n *model.Node) (HeartbeatPatch, error) {
|
|
proxyURL := ""
|
|
if n.OutboundTag != "" {
|
|
if mgr := runtime.GetManager(); mgr != nil {
|
|
proxyURL = mgr.NodeEgressProxyURL(n.Id)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return s.probe(ctx, n, proxyURL)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (s *NodeService) ProbeWithOutbound(ctx context.Context, n *model.Node, outboundTag string) (HeartbeatPatch, error) {
|
|
if outboundTag == "" {
|
|
return s.Probe(ctx, n)
|
|
}
|
|
var patch HeartbeatPatch
|
|
var err error
|
|
s.withOutboundBridge(n.Id, outboundTag, func(proxyURL string) {
|
|
if proxyURL == "" {
|
|
patch, err = s.Probe(ctx, n)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
patch, err = s.probe(ctx, n, proxyURL)
|
|
})
|
|
return patch, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// withOutboundBridge stands up a temporary loopback SOCKS5 inbound in the
|
|
// running Xray, routes it through outboundTag, and runs fn with the bridge's
|
|
// proxy URL before tearing it down. It is used to reach a node through its
|
|
// connection outbound before the persistent egress bridge has been injected
|
|
// into the config (e.g. while the node is still being added or edited). When
|
|
// Xray isn't running or the bridge can't be built, fn runs with an empty
|
|
// proxyURL so callers fall back to a direct connection.
|
|
func (s *NodeService) withOutboundBridge(nodeID int, outboundTag string, fn func(proxyURL string)) {
|
|
proc := XrayProcess()
|
|
if proc == nil || !proc.IsRunning() {
|
|
fn("")
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
apiPort := proc.GetAPIPort()
|
|
if apiPort <= 0 {
|
|
fn("")
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
listener, err := net.Listen("tcp", "127.0.0.1:0")
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
fn("")
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
port := listener.Addr().(*net.TCPAddr).Port
|
|
listener.Close()
|
|
|
|
tag := fmt.Sprintf("node-test-%d-%d", nodeID, time.Now().UnixNano())
|
|
proxyURL := fmt.Sprintf("socks5://127.0.0.1:%d", port)
|
|
|
|
inboundJSON, err := json.Marshal(xray.InboundConfig{
|
|
Listen: json_util.RawMessage(`"127.0.0.1"`),
|
|
Port: port,
|
|
Protocol: "socks",
|
|
Settings: json_util.RawMessage(`{"auth":"noauth","udp":false}`),
|
|
Tag: tag,
|
|
})
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
fn("")
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
cfg := proc.GetConfig()
|
|
routing := map[string]any{}
|
|
if len(cfg.RouterConfig) > 0 {
|
|
_ = json.Unmarshal(cfg.RouterConfig, &routing)
|
|
}
|
|
rules, _ := routing["rules"].([]any)
|
|
rule := map[string]any{
|
|
"type": "field",
|
|
"inboundTag": []any{tag},
|
|
}
|
|
if routingTagIsBalancer(routing, outboundTag) {
|
|
rule["balancerTag"] = outboundTag
|
|
} else {
|
|
rule["outboundTag"] = outboundTag
|
|
}
|
|
routing["rules"] = append([]any{rule}, rules...)
|
|
routingJSON, err := json.Marshal(routing)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
fn("")
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
originalRoutingJSON := cfg.RouterConfig
|
|
|
|
api := xray.XrayAPI{}
|
|
if err := api.Init(apiPort); err != nil {
|
|
fn("")
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
defer api.Close()
|
|
|
|
if err := api.AddInbound(inboundJSON); err != nil {
|
|
fn("")
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
defer func() {
|
|
if err := api.DelInbound(tag); err != nil {
|
|
logger.Warning("remove temp node bridge inbound failed:", err)
|
|
}
|
|
}()
|
|
|
|
if err := api.ApplyRoutingConfig(routingJSON); err != nil {
|
|
fn("")
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
defer func() {
|
|
restore := originalRoutingJSON
|
|
if len(restore) == 0 {
|
|
restore = []byte("{}")
|
|
}
|
|
if err := api.ApplyRoutingConfig(restore); err != nil {
|
|
logger.Warning("restore routing after node bridge failed:", err)
|
|
}
|
|
}()
|
|
|
|
fn(proxyURL)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (s *NodeService) probe(ctx context.Context, n *model.Node, proxyURL string) (HeartbeatPatch, error) {
|
|
patch := HeartbeatPatch{LastHeartbeat: time.Now().Unix()}
|
|
|
|
addr, err := netsafe.NormalizeHost(n.Address)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
patch.LastError = err.Error()
|
|
return patch, err
|
|
}
|
|
scheme := n.Scheme
|
|
if scheme != "http" && scheme != "https" {
|
|
scheme = "https"
|
|
}
|
|
if n.Port <= 0 || n.Port > 65535 {
|
|
patch.LastError = "node port must be 1-65535"
|
|
return patch, errors.New(patch.LastError)
|
|
}
|
|
probeURL := &url.URL{
|
|
Scheme: scheme,
|
|
Host: net.JoinHostPort(addr, strconv.Itoa(n.Port)),
|
|
Path: normalizeBasePath(n.BasePath) + "panel/api/server/status",
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(
|
|
netsafe.ContextWithAllowPrivate(ctx, n.AllowPrivateAddress),
|
|
http.MethodGet, probeURL.String(), nil)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
patch.LastError = err.Error()
|
|
return patch, err
|
|
}
|
|
if n.ApiToken != "" {
|
|
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+n.ApiToken)
|
|
}
|
|
req.Header.Set("Accept", "application/json")
|
|
|
|
client, err := runtime.HTTPClientForNode(n, proxyURL)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
patch.LastError = err.Error()
|
|
return patch, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
start := time.Now()
|
|
resp, err := client.Do(req)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
patch.LastError = err.Error()
|
|
return patch, err
|
|
}
|
|
defer resp.Body.Close()
|
|
patch.LatencyMs = int(time.Since(start) / time.Millisecond)
|
|
|
|
if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
|
|
patch.LastError = fmt.Sprintf("HTTP %d from remote panel", resp.StatusCode)
|
|
return patch, errors.New(patch.LastError)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var envelope struct {
|
|
Success bool `json:"success"`
|
|
Msg string `json:"msg"`
|
|
Obj *struct {
|
|
CpuPct float64 `json:"cpu"`
|
|
Mem struct {
|
|
Current uint64 `json:"current"`
|
|
Total uint64 `json:"total"`
|
|
} `json:"mem"`
|
|
Xray struct {
|
|
Version string `json:"version"`
|
|
State string `json:"state"`
|
|
ErrorMsg string `json:"errorMsg"`
|
|
} `json:"xray"`
|
|
PanelVersion string `json:"panelVersion"`
|
|
PanelGuid string `json:"panelGuid"`
|
|
Uptime uint64 `json:"uptime"`
|
|
NetIO struct {
|
|
Up uint64 `json:"up"`
|
|
Down uint64 `json:"down"`
|
|
} `json:"netIO"`
|
|
} `json:"obj"`
|
|
}
|
|
if err := json.NewDecoder(resp.Body).Decode(&envelope); err != nil {
|
|
patch.LastError = "decode response: " + err.Error()
|
|
return patch, err
|
|
}
|
|
if !envelope.Success || envelope.Obj == nil {
|
|
patch.LastError = "remote returned success=false: " + envelope.Msg
|
|
return patch, errors.New(patch.LastError)
|
|
}
|
|
o := envelope.Obj
|
|
patch.CpuPct = o.CpuPct
|
|
if o.Mem.Total > 0 {
|
|
patch.MemPct = float64(o.Mem.Current) * 100.0 / float64(o.Mem.Total)
|
|
}
|
|
patch.XrayVersion = o.Xray.Version
|
|
patch.XrayState = o.Xray.State
|
|
patch.XrayError = o.Xray.ErrorMsg
|
|
patch.PanelVersion = o.PanelVersion
|
|
patch.Guid = o.PanelGuid
|
|
patch.UptimeSecs = o.Uptime
|
|
patch.NetUp = o.NetIO.Up
|
|
patch.NetDown = o.NetIO.Down
|
|
return patch, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
type ProbeResultUI struct {
|
|
Status string `json:"status" example:"online"`
|
|
LatencyMs int `json:"latencyMs" example:"42"`
|
|
XrayVersion string `json:"xrayVersion" example:"25.10.31"`
|
|
PanelVersion string `json:"panelVersion" example:"v3.x.x"`
|
|
CpuPct float64 `json:"cpuPct" example:"12.5"`
|
|
MemPct float64 `json:"memPct" example:"45.2"`
|
|
UptimeSecs uint64 `json:"uptimeSecs" example:"86400"`
|
|
Error string `json:"error"`
|
|
// XrayState/XrayError are populated on successful probes even when the node's
|
|
// Xray core is not healthy. The UI uses them for a distinct "panel ok, xray failed" indicator.
|
|
XrayState string `json:"xrayState"`
|
|
XrayError string `json:"xrayError"`
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (p HeartbeatPatch) ToUI(ok bool) ProbeResultUI {
|
|
r := ProbeResultUI{
|
|
LatencyMs: p.LatencyMs,
|
|
XrayVersion: p.XrayVersion,
|
|
PanelVersion: p.PanelVersion,
|
|
CpuPct: p.CpuPct,
|
|
MemPct: p.MemPct,
|
|
UptimeSecs: p.UptimeSecs,
|
|
Error: FriendlyProbeError(p.LastError),
|
|
XrayState: p.XrayState,
|
|
XrayError: p.XrayError,
|
|
}
|
|
if ok {
|
|
r.Status = "online"
|
|
} else {
|
|
r.Status = "offline"
|
|
}
|
|
return r
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func FriendlyProbeError(msg string) string {
|
|
if strings.Contains(msg, "server gave HTTP response to HTTPS client") {
|
|
return "the server speaks HTTP, not HTTPS; set the node scheme to http"
|
|
}
|
|
return msg
|
|
}
|