Files
3x-ui/internal/util/netsafe/netsafe_test.go
T
Sanaei b51f09768b fix(netsafe): classify IPv6 transition and CGNAT ranges as internal
IsBlockedIP leaned entirely on Go's net.IP predicates, which judge an
address by its own range only. 6to4 (2002::/16), NAT64 (64:ff9b::/96 and
64:ff9b:1::/48) and Teredo (2001::/32) each tunnel an arbitrary IPv4
destination inside an IPv6 address, so all five predicates returned false
for e.g. 64:ff9b::7f00:1 and the SSRF guard waved it through. CGNAT
(100.64.0.0/10) and the deprecated site-local block were unclassified for
the same reason. Reported as GHSA-cfpf-wmjp-gh6c.

Reaching the embedded IPv4 needs a 6to4 tunnel, NAT64 gateway or Teredo
client on the host, none of which exist by default, so this is hardening
rather than a live path off a stock install. The guard backs outbound
subscription fetches, node sync, reality scan, the tgbot API URL and the
xray setting test URL, which is reason enough to close the gap.

The deprecated and local-use prefixes are blocked outright since nothing
public routes through them. The NAT64 well-known prefix is judged by the
IPv4 it embeds instead: on a DNS64 network every public IPv4 host resolves
into it, so blocking it wholesale would break legitimate fetches.
2026-08-19 19:37:14 +02:00

141 lines
4.1 KiB
Go

package netsafe
import (
"context"
"net"
"strings"
"testing"
)
func TestIsBlockedIP(t *testing.T) {
cases := []struct {
ip string
want bool
}{
{"127.0.0.1", true},
{"::1", true},
{"10.0.0.5", true},
{"172.16.0.1", true},
{"192.168.1.1", true},
{"169.254.0.1", true},
{"0.0.0.0", true},
{"::", true},
{"8.8.8.8", false},
{"1.1.1.1", false},
{"2606:4700:4700::1111", false},
// IPv6 transition prefixes tunnel an arbitrary IPv4 destination that
// Go's net.IP predicates do not see through (GHSA-cfpf-wmjp-gh6c).
{"2002:7f00:0001::1", true}, // 6to4 -> 127.0.0.1
{"2002:a9fe:a9fe::1", true}, // 6to4 -> 169.254.169.254
{"64:ff9b::7f00:1", true}, // NAT64 well-known -> 127.0.0.1
{"64:ff9b::a9fe:a9fe", true}, // NAT64 well-known -> 169.254.169.254
{"64:ff9b:1::a9fe:a9fe", true}, // NAT64 local-use
{"2001:0:dead:beef::80ff:fffe", true}, // Teredo -> 127.0.0.1
{"100.64.0.1", true}, // CGNAT
{"::ffff:100.64.0.1", true}, // CGNAT via 4-in-6
{"fec0::1", true}, // site-local
{"64:ff9b::8.8.8.8", false}, // NAT64 to a public host stays reachable
{"2001:db8::1", false}, // documentation prefix is not Teredo
}
for _, c := range cases {
t.Run(c.ip, func(t *testing.T) {
ip := net.ParseIP(c.ip)
if ip == nil {
t.Fatalf("could not parse %q", c.ip)
}
if got := IsBlockedIP(ip); got != c.want {
t.Fatalf("IsBlockedIP(%s) = %v, want %v", c.ip, got, c.want)
}
})
}
}
func TestAllowPrivateFromContext_Default(t *testing.T) {
if AllowPrivateFromContext(context.Background()) {
t.Fatal("default context should report AllowPrivate=false")
}
}
func TestAllowPrivateFromContext_RoundTrip(t *testing.T) {
ctx := ContextWithAllowPrivate(context.Background(), true)
if !AllowPrivateFromContext(ctx) {
t.Fatal("expected AllowPrivate=true after ContextWithAllowPrivate(true)")
}
ctx = ContextWithAllowPrivate(ctx, false)
if AllowPrivateFromContext(ctx) {
t.Fatal("expected AllowPrivate=false after overriding with false")
}
}
func TestNormalizeHost_Valid(t *testing.T) {
cases := []struct {
in string
want string
}{
{"example.com", "example.com"},
{" example.com ", "example.com"},
{"a.b.c.example.com", "a.b.c.example.com"},
{"10.0.0.1", "10.0.0.1"},
{"[2606:4700:4700::1111]", "2606:4700:4700::1111"},
{"2606:4700:4700::1111", "2606:4700:4700::1111"},
}
for _, c := range cases {
t.Run(c.in, func(t *testing.T) {
got, err := NormalizeHost(c.in)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("NormalizeHost(%q) returned error: %v", c.in, err)
}
if !strings.EqualFold(got, c.want) {
t.Fatalf("NormalizeHost(%q) = %q, want %q", c.in, got, c.want)
}
})
}
}
func TestNormalizeHost_Invalid(t *testing.T) {
cases := []string{
"",
" ",
"-leading-dash.com",
"trailing-dash-.com",
"bad host with spaces",
"under_score.example.com",
"exa$mple.com",
strings.Repeat("a", 254),
}
for _, in := range cases {
t.Run(in, func(t *testing.T) {
if _, err := NormalizeHost(in); err == nil {
t.Fatalf("NormalizeHost(%q) expected error, got nil", in)
}
})
}
}
func TestSSRFGuardedDialContext_BlocksLiteralPrivateIP(t *testing.T) {
_, err := SSRFGuardedDialContext(context.Background(), "tcp", "127.0.0.1:1")
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected dial to 127.0.0.1 to be blocked")
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "blocked") {
t.Fatalf("expected 'blocked' in error, got: %v", err)
}
}
func TestSSRFGuardedDialContext_AllowPrivateBypassesGuard(t *testing.T) {
ctx := ContextWithAllowPrivate(context.Background(), true)
_, err := SSRFGuardedDialContext(ctx, "tcp", "127.0.0.1:1")
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("dial to a closed loopback port should still fail at the connect step")
}
if strings.Contains(err.Error(), "blocked private/internal address") {
t.Fatalf("expected guard to be bypassed when AllowPrivate=true, got: %v", err)
}
}
func TestSSRFGuardedDialContext_BadAddress(t *testing.T) {
if _, err := SSRFGuardedDialContext(context.Background(), "tcp", "no-port"); err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error for address without port")
}
}