mirror of
https://github.com/MHSanaei/3x-ui.git
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c41f97cf86
Each is independently reproducible; fixed together since one review pass found all of them. - manager.go: the shared "ip rule add fwmark" policy route had no existence check, so it duplicated in "ip rule show" on every interface bounce (which hostRulesFingerprint forces on any client add/remove/ re-IP). Now checked via "ip rule list | grep -q ..." first. (Finding 2) - params.go: ExternalInterface, IPv6ExternalInterface, and subnetIp/ subnetCidr are interpolated unescaped into a shell-executed PostUp/ PostDown line, but only obfuscation and the IPv6 subnet were validated before save. Added ValidateInterfaceName (a strict charset+length pattern) and ValidateSubnetIPv4 (netip.ParsePrefix), wired into normalizeAmneziaWGSettings. (Finding 3) - amneziawg_job.go: IsAwgInstalled() existed but nothing ever called it, so a host without awg/awg-quick (the Docker image, RHEL, Arch, a failed install.sh PPA step) logged a reconcile failure every 10s forever. Now checked once an inbound actually needs it, warning once instead of spamming. (Finding 4) - client_inbound_apply.go: the WireGuard/AmneziaWG credential carry-forward (added so a metadata-only client edit doesn't rotate keys) never covered ForwardedPorts, so a partial edit -- an API call or Telegram-bot toggle that omits the field -- silently wiped a client's port-forwarding spec. Carried forward and written back the same way the key fields already are. (Finding 5) - manager.go: hostRulesFingerprint keyed each peer on its IPv4 address only, and structuralFingerprint omitted IPv6Enabled/IPv6ExternalInterface entirely, so an IPv6-only change could pick the syncconf reload path (which never re-runs PostUp, leaving a stale NDP-proxy entry) or be a complete no-op. Both fingerprints now cover the IPv6 fields. (Finding 6) - port_conflict.go: the AmneziaWG egress bridge (injectAmneziawgEgress) binds 127.0.0.1:63100+id with no collision check anywhere, since it isn't a database row the ordinary port-conflict query can see -- same blind spot the reserved Xray API port already has its own check for. Added the equivalent check for the AmneziaWG bridge port. (Finding 7) - install.sh: install_amneziawg ran unconditionally for every install/ update, building a DKMS kernel module and enabling host-wide IPv4/IPv6 forwarding whether or not the feature is ever used. Gated behind a new should_install_amneziawg (XUI_INSTALL_AMNEZIAWG=true/false, or an interactive y/N prompt defaulting to no). Also replaced the deprecated apt-key adv with a dedicated keyring + signed-by= on the Debian branch, and guarded its sources.list appends against duplication on a retried install. (Finding 8) Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
444 lines
16 KiB
Go
444 lines
16 KiB
Go
package amneziawg
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import (
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"encoding/json"
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"fmt"
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"slices"
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"strings"
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"testing"
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"github.com/mhsanaei/3x-ui/v3/internal/database/model"
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)
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func mkInboundSettings(t *testing.T, server *ServerSettings, clients []model.Client) string {
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t.Helper()
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bs, err := json.Marshal(InboundSettings{Server: server, Clients: clients})
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("marshal settings: %v", err)
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}
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return string(bs)
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}
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func validServer() *ServerSettings {
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return &ServerSettings{
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PrivateKey: "serverPriv",
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PublicKey: "serverPub",
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SubnetIP: "10.8.1.0",
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SubnetCIDR: 24,
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}
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}
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func TestInstanceFromInboundParsesEnabledPeers(t *testing.T) {
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settings := mkInboundSettings(t, validServer(), []model.Client{
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{Email: "a@x", Enable: true, PublicKey: "pubA", PreSharedKey: "pskA", AllowedIPs: []string{"10.8.1.2/32"}},
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{Email: "b@x", Enable: false, PublicKey: "pubB", AllowedIPs: []string{"10.8.1.3/32"}},
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{Email: "c@x", Enable: true, PublicKey: "", AllowedIPs: []string{"10.8.1.4/32"}}, // no key: skipped
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{Email: "d@x", Enable: true, PublicKey: "pubD", AllowedIPs: nil}, // no address: skipped
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})
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ib := &model.Inbound{Id: 7, Tag: "awg-tag", Protocol: model.AmneziaWG, Port: 51820, Settings: settings}
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inst, ok := InstanceFromInbound(ib)
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if !ok {
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t.Fatal("expected a usable instance")
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}
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if inst.Id != 7 || inst.Tag != "awg-tag" || inst.ListenPort != 51820 {
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t.Fatalf("instance identity not carried over: %+v", inst)
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}
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if inst.InterfaceName != "awg7" {
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t.Fatalf("InterfaceName = %q, want awg7", inst.InterfaceName)
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}
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if len(inst.Address) != 1 || inst.Address[0] != "10.8.1.1/24" {
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t.Fatalf("Address = %v, want [10.8.1.1/24]", inst.Address)
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}
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if len(inst.Peers) != 1 {
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t.Fatalf("Peers = %+v, want exactly 1 (only a@x qualifies)", inst.Peers)
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}
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p := inst.Peers[0]
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if p.Email != "a@x" || p.PublicKey != "pubA" || p.PresharedKey != "pskA" || len(p.AllowedIPs) != 1 || p.AllowedIPs[0] != "10.8.1.2/32" {
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t.Fatalf("peer mismatch: %+v", p)
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}
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}
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func TestInstanceFromInboundRejectsWrongProtocol(t *testing.T) {
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settings := mkInboundSettings(t, validServer(), []model.Client{
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{Email: "a@x", Enable: true, PublicKey: "pubA", AllowedIPs: []string{"10.8.1.2/32"}},
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})
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ib := &model.Inbound{Id: 1, Protocol: model.VLESS, Settings: settings}
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if _, ok := InstanceFromInbound(ib); ok {
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t.Fatal("non-AmneziaWG inbound must be rejected")
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}
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}
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func TestInstanceFromInboundRejectsNil(t *testing.T) {
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if _, ok := InstanceFromInbound(nil); ok {
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t.Fatal("nil inbound must be rejected")
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}
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}
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func TestInstanceFromInboundRejectsMissingServer(t *testing.T) {
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ib := &model.Inbound{Id: 1, Protocol: model.AmneziaWG, Settings: `{"clients":[]}`}
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if _, ok := InstanceFromInbound(ib); ok {
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t.Fatal("settings with no server block must be rejected")
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}
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}
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func TestInstanceFromInboundRejectsUnparseableSettings(t *testing.T) {
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ib := &model.Inbound{Id: 1, Protocol: model.AmneziaWG, Settings: `not json`}
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if _, ok := InstanceFromInbound(ib); ok {
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t.Fatal("unparseable settings must be rejected")
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}
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}
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func TestInstanceFromInboundEmptyWhenNoEnabledPeers(t *testing.T) {
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settings := mkInboundSettings(t, validServer(), []model.Client{
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{Email: "a@x", Enable: false, PublicKey: "pubA", AllowedIPs: []string{"10.8.1.2/32"}},
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})
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ib := &model.Inbound{Id: 1, Protocol: model.AmneziaWG, Settings: settings}
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if _, ok := InstanceFromInbound(ib); ok {
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t.Fatal("an inbound with zero enabled peers must be skipped, like mtproto.InstanceFromInbound")
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}
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}
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func TestServerAddress(t *testing.T) {
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cases := []struct {
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subnet string
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cidr int
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want string
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}{
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{"10.8.1.0", 24, "10.8.1.1/24"},
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{"10.8.1.0", 0, "10.8.1.1/24"}, // cidr <= 0 defaults to /24
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{"192.168.5.10", 32, "192.168.5.10/32"},
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}
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for _, c := range cases {
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if got := serverAddress(c.subnet, c.cidr); got != c.want {
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t.Errorf("serverAddress(%q, %d) = %q, want %q", c.subnet, c.cidr, got, c.want)
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}
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}
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}
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// fixedObfuscation is a deterministic Obfuscation20 for tests that compare
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// two instances for equality — GenerateObfuscation20 is randomized per call
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// by design (see its doc comment) and must never be used where the test
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// expects two "identical" instances to actually match.
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func fixedObfuscation() Obfuscation20 {
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return Obfuscation20{Jc: 4, Jmin: 40, Jmax: 100, S1: 30, S2: 90, S3: 20, S4: 10, H1: "10-2000", H2: "3000-5000", H3: "6000-8000", H4: "9000-11000", I1: "<r 64>"}
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}
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func baseInstance() Instance {
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return Instance{
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Id: 1,
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Tag: "awg-1",
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InterfaceName: "awg1",
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ListenPort: 51820,
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PrivateKey: "priv",
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PublicKey: "pub",
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Address: []string{"10.8.1.1/24"},
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Obfuscation: fixedObfuscation(),
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Peers: []Peer{
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{Email: "a@x", PublicKey: "pubA", PresharedKey: "pskA", AllowedIPs: []string{"10.8.1.2/32"}},
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{Email: "b@x", PublicKey: "pubB", AllowedIPs: []string{"10.8.1.3/32"}},
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},
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}
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}
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func TestStructuralFingerprintStableAndSensitive(t *testing.T) {
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a := baseInstance()
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b := baseInstance()
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if a.structuralFingerprint() != b.structuralFingerprint() {
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t.Fatal("identical instances must produce the same structural fingerprint")
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}
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b.ListenPort = 51821
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if a.structuralFingerprint() == b.structuralFingerprint() {
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t.Fatal("a listen port change must change the structural fingerprint")
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}
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c := baseInstance()
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c.Peers[0].AllowedIPs = []string{"10.8.1.99/32"}
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if a.structuralFingerprint() != c.structuralFingerprint() {
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t.Fatal("a peer-only change must NOT change the structural fingerprint")
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}
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d := baseInstance()
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d.IPv6Enabled = true
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if a.structuralFingerprint() == d.structuralFingerprint() {
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t.Fatal("enabling IPv6 must change the structural fingerprint")
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}
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e := baseInstance()
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e.IPv6Enabled = true
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f := baseInstance()
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f.IPv6Enabled = true
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f.IPv6ExternalInterface = "eth1"
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if e.structuralFingerprint() == f.structuralFingerprint() {
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t.Fatal("changing IPv6ExternalInterface must change the structural fingerprint -- otherwise the edit is a complete no-op")
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}
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}
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func TestPeersFingerprintOrderIndependentButContentSensitive(t *testing.T) {
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a := baseInstance()
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reordered := baseInstance()
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reordered.Peers[0], reordered.Peers[1] = reordered.Peers[1], reordered.Peers[0]
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if a.peersFingerprint() != reordered.peersFingerprint() {
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t.Fatal("reordering peers must not change the peers fingerprint")
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}
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changed := baseInstance()
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changed.Peers[0].AllowedIPs = []string{"10.8.1.250/32"}
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if a.peersFingerprint() == changed.peersFingerprint() {
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t.Fatal("changing a peer's AllowedIPs must change the peers fingerprint")
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}
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fewer := baseInstance()
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fewer.Peers = fewer.Peers[:1]
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if a.peersFingerprint() == fewer.peersFingerprint() {
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t.Fatal("removing a peer must change the peers fingerprint")
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}
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}
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func TestEnsureActionFor(t *testing.T) {
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cases := []struct {
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name string
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up bool
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curStruct, curHostRules, curPeers string
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newStruct, newHostRules, newPeers string
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want ensureAction
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}{
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{"down forces restart even if identical", false, "s", "f", "p", "s", "f", "p", ensureRestart},
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{"structural change forces restart", true, "s1", "f", "p", "s2", "f", "p", ensureRestart},
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{"port-forward change forces restart", true, "s", "f1", "p", "s", "f2", "p", ensureRestart},
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{"peer-ip change (its TPROXY rule) forces restart", true, "s", "ip:old", "p", "s", "ip:new", "p", ensureRestart},
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{"peers-only change reloads", true, "s", "f", "p1", "s", "f", "p2", ensureReload},
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{"identical up interface is a noop", true, "s", "f", "p", "s", "f", "p", ensureNoop},
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}
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for _, c := range cases {
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t.Run(c.name, func(t *testing.T) {
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got := ensureActionFor(c.up, c.curStruct, c.curHostRules, c.curPeers, c.newStruct, c.newHostRules, c.newPeers)
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if got != c.want {
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t.Errorf("ensureActionFor() = %v, want %v", got, c.want)
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}
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})
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}
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}
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func TestHostRulesFingerprintCoversForwardedPortsAndPeerIP(t *testing.T) {
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a := baseInstance()
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b := baseInstance()
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if a.hostRulesFingerprint() != b.hostRulesFingerprint() {
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t.Fatal("identical instances must produce the same host-rules fingerprint")
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}
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if a.hostRulesFingerprint() == "" {
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t.Fatal("every peer always gets a TPROXY rule now, so the fingerprint must never be empty when peers exist")
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}
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forwarded := baseInstance()
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forwarded.Peers[0].ForwardedPorts = "80,443"
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if a.hostRulesFingerprint() == forwarded.hostRulesFingerprint() {
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t.Fatal("adding ForwardedPorts must change the host-rules fingerprint")
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}
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reIPed := baseInstance()
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reIPed.Peers[0].AllowedIPs = []string{"10.8.1.250/32"}
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if a.hostRulesFingerprint() == reIPed.hostRulesFingerprint() {
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t.Fatal("changing a peer's IP must change the host-rules fingerprint -- its TPROXY rule is keyed on that IP")
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}
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fewer := baseInstance()
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fewer.Peers = fewer.Peers[:1]
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if a.hostRulesFingerprint() == fewer.hostRulesFingerprint() {
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t.Fatal("removing a peer must change the host-rules fingerprint -- one fewer TPROXY rule is needed")
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}
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ip6Added := baseInstance()
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ip6Added.Peers[0].AllowedIPs = []string{"10.8.1.2/32", "fd86:ea04:1115::2/128"}
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if a.hostRulesFingerprint() == ip6Added.hostRulesFingerprint() {
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t.Fatal("adding a peer's IPv6 address must change the host-rules fingerprint -- its NDP-proxy entry is keyed on it, and a change here must force the full bounce that (re-)runs PostUp")
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}
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}
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func TestRouteEgressComment(t *testing.T) {
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if got := routeEgressComment(""); got != "awg-route" {
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t.Errorf("empty email must fall back to awg-route, got %q", got)
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}
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a := routeEgressComment("a@x")
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b := routeEgressComment("b@x")
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if a == b {
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t.Fatal("different emails must produce different comment tags")
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}
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if a != routeEgressComment("a@x") {
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t.Fatal("the same email must always produce the same comment tag")
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}
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}
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func TestRouteEgressLines(t *testing.T) {
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up := routeEgressLines("-A", "awg1", "10.8.1.2/32", "a@x", 63101)
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if len(up) != 2 {
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t.Fatalf("expected one TPROXY line per protocol (tcp+udp), got %d: %v", len(up), up)
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}
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for _, proto := range []string{"tcp", "udp"} {
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found := false
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for _, l := range up {
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if !strings.Contains(l, "-p "+proto) {
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continue
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}
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found = true
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if !strings.Contains(l, "-i awg1") || !strings.Contains(l, "-s 10.8.1.2") ||
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!strings.Contains(l, "--on-port 63101") ||
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!strings.Contains(l, "--on-ip 127.0.0.1") ||
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!strings.Contains(l, fmt.Sprintf("--tproxy-mark %#x/%#x", EgressFwmark, EgressFwmark)) ||
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!strings.Contains(l, "-A PREROUTING") {
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t.Errorf("%s line missing expected fields: %s", proto, l)
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}
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}
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if !found {
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t.Errorf("missing a %s TPROXY line in %v", proto, up)
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}
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}
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if strings.Contains(up[0], "10.8.1.2/32") {
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t.Errorf("expected the /32 mask stripped from the source match, got %s", up[0])
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}
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down := routeEgressLines("-D", "awg1", "10.8.1.2/32", "a@x", 63101)
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if len(down) != 2 || !strings.Contains(down[0], "-D PREROUTING") {
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t.Fatalf("expected symmetric -D lines, got %v", down)
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}
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if got := routeEgressLines("-A", "awg1", "", "a@x", 63101); got != nil {
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t.Errorf("empty clientIP must yield no lines, got %v", got)
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}
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}
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func TestEgressPortForInbound(t *testing.T) {
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if got := EgressPortForInbound(1); got != EgressBasePort+1 {
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t.Errorf("EgressPortForInbound(1) = %d, want %d", got, EgressBasePort+1)
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}
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if EgressPortForInbound(1) == EgressPortForInbound(2) {
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t.Fatal("different inbound ids must derive different ports")
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}
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}
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func TestDefaultPostUpDownEmitsTproxyForEveryPeer(t *testing.T) {
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inst := baseInstance() // two peers, a@x and b@x, no opt-in flag exists anymore
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up, down := defaultPostUpDown(inst, "eth0")
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wantPort := fmt.Sprintf("--on-port %d", EgressPortForInbound(inst.Id))
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if !strings.Contains(up, "TPROXY") || !strings.Contains(up, wantPort) {
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t.Errorf("expected TPROXY rules targeting this instance's own bridge port in PostUp, got:\n%s", up)
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}
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if !strings.Contains(down, "TPROXY") {
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t.Errorf("expected matching TPROXY removals in PostDown, got:\n%s", down)
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}
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if !strings.Contains(up, fmt.Sprintf("ip rule add fwmark %#x", EgressFwmark)) {
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t.Errorf("expected the shared policy route to be added once in PostUp, got:\n%s", up)
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}
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if wantCheck := fmt.Sprintf("ip rule list | grep -q 'fwmark %#x lookup %d'", EgressFwmark, EgressTable); !strings.Contains(up, wantCheck) {
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t.Errorf("expected an existence check before 'ip rule add', so repeated bounces don't accumulate duplicate rules, got:\n%s", up)
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}
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if strings.Contains(down, "ip rule") || strings.Contains(down, "ip route") {
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t.Error("the shared policy route must never be removed in PostDown -- other instances may still need it")
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}
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// Both peers always get TPROXY'd now, no opt-in: 2 peers * 2 protocols.
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if got := strings.Count(up, "TPROXY"); got != 4 {
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t.Errorf("expected exactly 4 TPROXY lines (tcp+udp for each of the 2 peers), got %d in:\n%s", got, up)
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}
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none := Instance{Id: 2, InterfaceName: "awg2"} // no peers at all
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upNone, _ := defaultPostUpDown(none, "eth0")
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if strings.Contains(upNone, "TPROXY") || strings.Contains(upNone, "ip rule add fwmark") {
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t.Errorf("an instance with no peers must not emit any TPROXY/policy-route lines, got:\n%s", upNone)
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}
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}
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func TestGenerateServerConfigContainsExpectedLines(t *testing.T) {
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inst := baseInstance()
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inst.ExternalInterface = "eth0"
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cfg := generateServerConfig(inst)
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want := []string{
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"[Interface]",
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"PrivateKey = priv",
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"Address = 10.8.1.1/24",
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"ListenPort = 51820",
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"[Peer]",
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"PublicKey = pubA",
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"PresharedKey = pskA",
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"AllowedIPs = 10.8.1.2/32",
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"PublicKey = pubB",
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"AllowedIPs = 10.8.1.3/32",
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"MASQUERADE",
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}
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for _, w := range want {
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if !strings.Contains(cfg, w) {
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t.Errorf("generated config missing %q\n---\n%s", w, cfg)
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}
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}
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// The second peer has no PresharedKey — its block must not emit the field at all.
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if strings.Count(cfg, "PresharedKey") != 1 {
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t.Errorf("expected exactly one PresharedKey line (peer b@x has none), got config:\n%s", cfg)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestWriteObfuscationDefaultsBlankH(t *testing.T) {
|
|
var b strings.Builder
|
|
writeObfuscation(&b, Obfuscation20{})
|
|
out := b.String()
|
|
for i, want := range []string{"H1 = 1", "H2 = 2", "H3 = 3", "H4 = 4"} {
|
|
if !strings.Contains(out, want) {
|
|
t.Errorf("blank H%d must fall back to default %q, got:\n%s", i+1, want, out)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
// S3/S4/I1 are zero-valued here and must be omitted entirely.
|
|
if strings.Contains(out, "S3") || strings.Contains(out, "S4") || strings.Contains(out, "I1") {
|
|
t.Errorf("zero-valued S3/S4/I1 must be omitted, got:\n%s", out)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestInterfaceNameForID(t *testing.T) {
|
|
if got := interfaceNameForID(42); got != "awg42" {
|
|
t.Errorf("interfaceNameForID(42) = %q, want awg42", got)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestInboundIDForInterfaceName(t *testing.T) {
|
|
cases := []struct {
|
|
name string
|
|
wantID int
|
|
wantOK bool
|
|
}{
|
|
{"awg42", 42, true},
|
|
{"awg0", 0, true},
|
|
{"awg", 0, false}, // no digits after the prefix
|
|
{"wg0", 0, false}, // wrong prefix entirely (plain WireGuard)
|
|
{"awgabc", 0, false}, // non-numeric suffix
|
|
{"awg-1", 0, false}, // Atoi rejects the leading '-' as part of TrimPrefix's leftover, but guard anyway
|
|
}
|
|
for _, c := range cases {
|
|
id, ok := inboundIDForInterfaceName(c.name)
|
|
if ok != c.wantOK || (ok && id != c.wantID) {
|
|
t.Errorf("inboundIDForInterfaceName(%q) = (%d, %v), want (%d, %v)", c.name, id, ok, c.wantID, c.wantOK)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestOrphanedInterfaces(t *testing.T) {
|
|
confFiles := []string{
|
|
"awg1.conf", // in want -> not orphaned
|
|
"awg2.conf", // not in want -> orphaned
|
|
"awg3.conf", // not in want -> orphaned
|
|
"notes.txt", // wrong suffix -> ignored
|
|
"awgxyz.conf", // unparseable id -> ignored
|
|
}
|
|
want := map[int]struct{}{1: {}}
|
|
|
|
got := orphanedInterfaces(confFiles, want)
|
|
slices.Sort(got)
|
|
if wantOut := []string{"awg2", "awg3"}; !slices.Equal(got, wantOut) {
|
|
t.Errorf("orphanedInterfaces() = %v, want %v", got, wantOut)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestOrphanedInterfacesEmptyWantOrphansEverything(t *testing.T) {
|
|
got := orphanedInterfaces([]string{"awg5.conf"}, map[int]struct{}{})
|
|
if want := []string{"awg5"}; !slices.Equal(got, want) {
|
|
t.Errorf("orphanedInterfaces() = %v, want %v", got, want)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|