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* feat(amneziawg): add native AmneziaWG protocol backend AmneziaWG (WireGuard plus DPI-resistant obfuscation) needs no Docker here — it runs as a genuine kernel interface via awg-quick/awg, managed the same way internal/mtproto manages mtg: one Inbound row is one desired Instance, and a Manager reconciles running interfaces toward the database every 10s (internal/web/job/amneziawg_job.go) plus immediately after a client edit (applyLocalAmneziaWG). Clients reuse model.Client verbatim (the same PrivateKey/PublicKey/ PreSharedKey/AllowedIPs fields WireGuard already uses), so bulk operations, the QR/share-link modal and subscriptions come from the shared inbound infrastructure instead of a parallel implementation. internal/amneziawg owns the obfuscation param generator/validator (ported from coinman-dev/3ax-ui, upgraded to AmneziaWG 2.0's S3/S4 padding and I1 signature packet) and the exec wrapper around awg-quick/awg, with fingerprint-based reconcile (noop / reload-via- syncconf / full restart) mirroring mtproto.Manager so a same-protocol edit doesn't force an unnecessary interface bounce that would drop every peer's connection. Frontend and install.sh's DKMS/awg-tools setup are tracked separately; this is backend-only. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(amneziawg): add frontend support and fix a Go->Zod generator gap Wires the amneziawg protocol through the panel UI the same way every other protocol is registered: a Zod settings schema (nested {server, clients}, matching the Go JSON exactly), the protocol enum, the inbound-form's per-protocol fields component and its tab-visibility allowlist, the default-settings factory, the client schema dispatcher, and the sniffing-capability exclusion (no Xray inbound exists for amneziawg, same as mtproto). Client key/allowedIPs fields are reused rather than duplicated: since AmneziaWG clients are wire-identical to WireGuard clients (same model.Client fields), ClientFormModal renders one shared field block for both, switching only the visible label by which protocol is active. The private-key input also gets a live public-key sync via a new useEffect, because unlike WireGuard's Xray-native inbound (which re-derives its public key at runtime and never stores one), AmneziaWG's server.publicKey is a real persisted field the Go backend reads directly — free-typing a new private key without this would silently save a mismatched keypair. Adds a downloadable per-client .conf (amneziawgConfig.ts, mirroring wireguardConfig.ts) with the obfuscation lines, and an InboundOption.AwgServer field on the Go side so the config builder gets the full server block in one round trip. Along the way, running tools/openapigen surfaced a real bug: it doesn't flatten anonymously-embedded Go structs the way encoding/json does, so ServerSettings embedding Obfuscation20 produced a Zod schema with a nested `obfuscation20` key that never matches the real wire JSON. Fixed by un-embedding (flat fields + an accessor method) and registering internal/amneziawg in the generator's own package list, which had been silently emitting a dangling schema reference. English and Russian translations are complete; the other 10 locale files still fall back to English for the new keys. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(amneziawg): complete frontend parity for the Inbounds list page The Clients page (form, CRUD, QR/config) already worked from the prior commit; this closes the remaining gap on the Inbounds side and in a couple of protocol allowlists that a plain search for existing wireguard/mtproto handling turned up. lib/xray/inbound-link.ts gets amneziawg-specific link/config builders (genAmneziaWGLink/genAmneziaWGConfig, plus the *s fan-out variants) mirroring the wireguard ones — AmneziaWG has no legacy peers-array to fall back to, so these read settings.clients directly and add the obfuscation lines every client must share with the server. Wired into genInboundLinks generically, and into three consumers that call the wireguard builders directly rather than through that dispatcher: QrCodeModal, InboundInfoModal, and InboundsPage's bulk export. ClientInfoModal, ClientBulkAddModal, and the bulk attach/detach modals each had their own protocol allowlist that needed amneziawg added alongside wireguard/mtproto. Two real gaps surfaced by grepping every remaining 'wireguard' / Protocols.WIREGUARD hit in frontend/src rather than trusting the checklist was exhaustive: - useInbounds.ts's TRACKED_PROTOCOLS gates the deactive/depleted/ expiring/online client counts shown per inbound on the list page; without amneziawg those counts would silently read zero. - inbound-tag.ts is an explicit client-side mirror of the Go backend's port_conflict.go (the file says so itself: "Keep in sync"). It still only special-cased wireguard for UDP, so an amneziawg inbound would have fallen through to the TCP default and disagreed with the backend's own port-conflict math. Also finishes translating the AmneziaWG UI strings into the 11 locale files that were still falling back to English (ar-EG, es-ES, fa-IR, id-ID, ja-JP, pt-BR, tr-TR, uk-UA, vi-VN, zh-CN, zh-TW), matching en-US/ru-RU key-for-key (26 new keys, verified by count in every file). Not run anywhere: npm run typecheck / build. This machine has neither Node nor npm, so nothing here has compiled — reviewed by hand plus brace/paren balance checks and cross-referencing the generated Zod/TS types. Treat this as needing a real typecheck before shipping. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(install): note that AmneziaWG kernel module install is still manual Tracked separately (not yet ported into this script) — see coinman-dev/3ax-ui's install_amneziawg for the reference approach (ppa:amnezia/ppa). Also serves as a real, path-filter-matching change to get the previous empty commit's CI trigger to actually fire — release.yml's push trigger is paths-scoped and an empty commit changes no files, so it never matched. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(amneziawg): add a button to randomize obfuscation parameters Mirrors the existing key-regenerate button next to the private key field. Client-side randomization matches the ranges/constraints of GenerateObfuscation20's "default" preset (internal/amneziawg/params.go) closely enough for a form suggestion — the user can still hand-edit any field afterward. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(install): auto-install the AmneziaWG DKMS module + amneziawg-tools Ports install_amneziawg from coinman-dev/3ax-ui's install.sh, adapted to this script's broader distro coverage and NONINTERACTIVE convention: - Ubuntu/Debian/Armbian: ppa:amnezia/ppa (primary, tested path), with a reachability pre-check for the Launchpad PPA host — often blocked by hosting providers, especially Russian VPS — so a flaky network skips the feature instead of hanging apt through several retries. - Fedora/RHEL-family, Arch/Manjaro/Parch: best-effort fallback to plain wireguard-tools (+ AUR amneziawg-dkms via yay/paru when available), with a manual-install pointer. - Everything else: manual-install pointer only. Also installs ndppd and persists IPv4/IPv6 forwarding (for the future IPv6/NDP phase, not yet wired into the panel) and adds a Secure Boot warning at the end of the run, since a DKMS-built module is unsigned and won't load while it's enabled — a common trap on cloud VPS images. Never fatal: the panel installs and runs fine either way, an AmneziaWG inbound just won't bring up its tunnel until the module is present. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(amneziawg): resolve all 3 real CI failures (typecheck/lint/codegen) Found by checking the fork's Actions tab after the last two pushes — the release build passed (it doesn't run these checks) but the separate CI workflow caught three real issues: - golangci-lint (noctx): every internal/amneziawg/manager.go exec.Command call is now exec.CommandContext with a 30s timeout, so a hung awg-quick/awg invocation can't block the reconcile job indefinitely (mirrors internal/mtproto/process.go's own CommandContext usage). - tsc --noEmit: frontend/src/schemas/client.ts's hand-maintained InboundOptionSchema (used by the useClients hook, separate from the auto-generated one in generated/) never got an awgServer field added when the AmneziaWG frontend work was done — every read of inbound.awgServer.* in amneziawgConfig.ts was typing as {}. Added AwgServerOptionSchema, nested (not flattened like wg*) to match what amneziawgConfig.ts already expects. Also guarded server.publicKey in inbound-link.ts's genAmneziaWGLink against the schema's optional type. - codegen staleness: frontend/public/openapi.json is produced by a Node script (gen:api) this machine can't run; hand-applied the exact diff the CI failure log already showed (amneziawg protocol enum entry, ServerSettings schema, InboundOption.awgServer, one example payload), verified as valid JSON. Also confirmed independently by this run: install_amneziawg (previous commit) installed and loaded the DKMS module successfully on both amd64 and arm64 CI runners. The two "Deploy Smoke Tests" failures are unrelated to this change — this fork has only ever published the dev-latest pre-release, and GitHub's /releases/latest API deliberately excludes pre-releases, so the smoke test's no-argument install path (which resolves "latest") has nothing to find. Not a regression; needs an actual tagged release whenever that's wanted. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(amneziawg): Phase 2a — IPv6 support + NDP proxy Adds native dual-stack IPv6 to AmneziaWG inbounds, ported from coinman-dev/3ax-ui's approach: - ServerSettings gets ipv6Enabled/ipv6Subnet/ipv6ExternalInterface; Instance carries the server's own IPv6 address (first host of the subnet) alongside its IPv4 one. - defaultAmneziaWGClients allocates an IPv6 host address per client (second AllowedIPs entry) when the server has IPv6 enabled, reusing allocateWireguardAddress — which needed a real fix along the way: it always suffixed "/32" regardless of address family, which is wrong for an IPv6 host address (needs /128). Now family-aware. - generateServerConfig's PostUp/PostDown gains IPv6 forward-accept rules, proxy_ndp sysctl, and one `ip -6 neigh add/del proxy` entry per enabled peer with an IPv6 address — the lightweight per-client method, not the ndppd-daemon whole-subnet method (not worth the config-file-management complexity at this scale; ndppd itself is still installed by install.sh in case that changes later). - ValidateIPv6Subnet rejects a malformed subnet before save. - Frontend: ipv6Enabled/ipv6Subnet/ipv6ExternalInterface fields on the AmneziaWG inbound form, EN+RU translations, openapi.json/generated/* regenerated (the latter via `go run ./tools/openapigen`, pure Go). Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(amneziawg): fill in IPv6 fields missed by the Phase 2a commit Two real gaps the CI caught (both new fields, both my miss): - inbound-defaults.ts's createDefaultAmneziawgInboundSettings() built a server object literal predating ipv6Enabled/ipv6Subnet/ ipv6ExternalInterface — AmneziawgServer's inferred type now requires them (zod .default() fields are non-optional post-parse), so this didn't typecheck at all. - openapi.json's ipv6Enabled property was missing the description the real generator attaches (the Go doc comment covering all three IPv6 fields is attached to the first one) — a one-line diff, but git diff --exit-code doesn't care how small. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(amneziawg): Phase 2b — per-client port-forwarding Admins can now set a per-client ForwardedPorts string (e.g. "80, 443, 8000-8100") that gets DNAT'd + FORWARD'd to that peer's tunnel address via iptables rules in PostUp/PostDown, ported and simplified from coinman-dev/3ax-ui's shared/portfwd. Two decisions worth flagging for future readers: - The iptables --comment tag on each rule is awg-fwd-<fnv32a(email)>, not the raw client email. Email is admin/API-supplied free text that ends up embedded in a shell-executed PostUp/PostDown line; a hash can never carry a shell metacharacter through where raw interpolation could. - The reconcile manager gained a third fingerprint (portFwdFP, next to the existing structural/peers ones). `awg syncconf` only touches the WireGuard peer table — it never re-applies PostUp/PostDown iptables rules — so a port-forward-only change has to force a full awg-quick down+up bounce, same as a structural change, rather than the lighter sync a plain peer add/remove can use. Also fixes a real pre-existing bug found while wiring up IPv6 client allocation in the previous commit's spirit: allocateWireguardAddress always suffixed "/32" regardless of address family, which produced invalid host bits for IPv6 (needs "/128"). ForwardedPorts flows through model.Client -> model.ClientRecord (gorm column wg_forwarded_ports, auto-migrated) -> ToRecord/ToClient/ MergeClientRecord, mirroring the awgServer field's earlier lesson that new fields need checking against a second, hand-maintained persistence-layer struct. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(amneziawg): route a client's traffic through Xray via the Routing page Every enabled AmneziaWG inbound gets its own Xray TPROXY bridge automatically, with no toggle to enable first: a loopback dokodemo-door inbound (sockopt.tproxy) tagged with the AmneziaWG inbound's own real tag, so it's already selectable in the existing Routing page's inbound-tag picker — the same trick the mtproto sidecar's own bridge already relies on (InboundService.GetInboundTags is a plain, protocol-blind SELECT over every inbound row's tag, no dedicated UI plumbing needed). internal/amneziawg's defaultPostUpDown TPROXYs every peer's traffic into that bridge unconditionally; the bridge's port is derived deterministically from the inbound's id (EgressPortForInbound) so the kernel-side reconcile loop and the Xray-config generator never need to negotiate a runtime value between them. injectAmneziawgEgress never generates a routing rule itself — whether a client's traffic goes anywhere beyond Xray's default routing is entirely up to whatever rules the admin adds through the existing Routing UI (pick the AmneziaWG inbound's tag as source, optionally a specific peer's IP via that page's own Source-IP field, and an outbound), exactly the same workflow as routing any other protocol. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(amneziawg): recover orphaned interfaces after an ungraceful exit Two gaps left an AmneziaWG interface stuck outside the manager's control after a crash (kill -9/OOM/panic skips StopAll): - ensureRestart's teardown was gated on the in-memory `exists` map, which is always empty on a fresh process, so a survived interface never got interfaceDown before interfaceUp tried `ip link add` against a name the kernel already had — failing forever and never populating m.ifaces, so traffic accounting silently stopped and the inbound could never be removed. Gate on isInterfaceUp instead, which checks real kernel state rather than this process's own bookkeeping. - An inbound deleted from the database entirely while the panel was down has no entry in `desired` ever again, so it never reaches the per-id cleanup loop in Reconcile (which only walks m.ifaces). Add a one-time sweepOrphansLocked scan of configDir, mirroring mtproto.Manager.sweepOrphansLocked, that tears down and removes any leftover interface/config not in the current desired set. Found by the automated review on MHSanaei/3x-ui#6105 (Finding 1). Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * i18n(amneziawg): backfill IPv6/obfuscation/port-forwarding keys in 11 locales Only en-US/ru-RU ever got these 9 keys as each AmneziaWG feature landed (the regenerate-obfuscation button, then Phase 2a's IPv6 fields, then Phase 2b's per-client ForwardedPorts) — the other 11 locale files were never backfilled, so i18next has been silently falling back to English for all of them since Phase 1. Cosmetic-only (never broke anything), but now closed for every shipped locale. * fix(amneziawg): resolve 7 Medium findings from the automated PR review Each is independently reproducible; fixed together since one review pass found all of them. - manager.go: the shared "ip rule add fwmark" policy route had no existence check, so it duplicated in "ip rule show" on every interface bounce (which hostRulesFingerprint forces on any client add/remove/ re-IP). Now checked via "ip rule list | grep -q ..." first. (Finding 2) - params.go: ExternalInterface, IPv6ExternalInterface, and subnetIp/ subnetCidr are interpolated unescaped into a shell-executed PostUp/ PostDown line, but only obfuscation and the IPv6 subnet were validated before save. Added ValidateInterfaceName (a strict charset+length pattern) and ValidateSubnetIPv4 (netip.ParsePrefix), wired into normalizeAmneziaWGSettings. (Finding 3) - amneziawg_job.go: IsAwgInstalled() existed but nothing ever called it, so a host without awg/awg-quick (the Docker image, RHEL, Arch, a failed install.sh PPA step) logged a reconcile failure every 10s forever. Now checked once an inbound actually needs it, warning once instead of spamming. (Finding 4) - client_inbound_apply.go: the WireGuard/AmneziaWG credential carry-forward (added so a metadata-only client edit doesn't rotate keys) never covered ForwardedPorts, so a partial edit -- an API call or Telegram-bot toggle that omits the field -- silently wiped a client's port-forwarding spec. Carried forward and written back the same way the key fields already are. (Finding 5) - manager.go: hostRulesFingerprint keyed each peer on its IPv4 address only, and structuralFingerprint omitted IPv6Enabled/IPv6ExternalInterface entirely, so an IPv6-only change could pick the syncconf reload path (which never re-runs PostUp, leaving a stale NDP-proxy entry) or be a complete no-op. Both fingerprints now cover the IPv6 fields. (Finding 6) - port_conflict.go: the AmneziaWG egress bridge (injectAmneziawgEgress) binds 127.0.0.1:63100+id with no collision check anywhere, since it isn't a database row the ordinary port-conflict query can see -- same blind spot the reserved Xray API port already has its own check for. Added the equivalent check for the AmneziaWG bridge port. (Finding 7) - install.sh: install_amneziawg ran unconditionally for every install/ update, building a DKMS kernel module and enabling host-wide IPv4/IPv6 forwarding whether or not the feature is ever used. Gated behind a new should_install_amneziawg (XUI_INSTALL_AMNEZIAWG=true/false, or an interactive y/N prompt defaulting to no). Also replaced the deprecated apt-key adv with a dedicated keyring + signed-by= on the Debian branch, and guarded its sources.list appends against duplication on a retried install. (Finding 8) Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(amneziawg): make the Xray TPROXY bridge a per-inbound opt-in Addresses Finding 10 from the automated PR review: an always-on TPROXY bridge makes every AmneziaWG tunnel hard-depend on Xray being up (all traffic, including DNS, drops whenever Xray restarts), and forces a full awg-quick down+up bounce on any client add/remove/re-IP, permanently losing the syncconf fast path. Adds ServerSettings.RouteThroughXray (off by default): - defaultPostUpDown only emits the TPROXY/policy-route rules when it's on; a plain AmneziaWG tunnel now has zero Xray dependency out of the box. - structuralFingerprint covers it (toggling it changes whether PostUp/ PostDown contain any TPROXY rules at all -- structural, not a per-peer host-rule). hostRulesFingerprint's IPv4 tracking is now itself conditional on RouteThroughXray (and IPv6 tracking on IPv6Enabled), so an instance that never uses either keeps the syncconf fast path for a plain peer re-IP. - injectAmneziawgEgress only creates a bridge for inbounds that opted in; checkAmneziawgEgressConflict (the Finding-7 fix) now parses each candidate through InstanceFromInbound so a non-routed inbound's port is correctly never treated as reserved. - New inbound-level Switch in the AmneziaWG form; the actual outbound decision is still made entirely through the panel's stock Routing page, same as before -- only whether the bridge exists at all is now a choice. Translation keys added to all 13 locales in the same commit this time, not backfilled later (see Finding 9's lesson). Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(amneziawg): resolve 4 Low findings from the automated PR review - manager.go: serverAddress assumed subnetIp always ends in ".0"; a base like "10.8.1.5" was used verbatim as the server's own address, eventually colliding with peer allocation (which starts at .2 upward). Now derives the first host of the actual subnetIp/subnetCidr network via netip, matching serverAddressV6's own approach. A /32 base (no host bits at all) is still used as-is. (Finding 12, partial -- the /16 pool-widening half of this finding only exists on the upstream-pr/amneziawg branch's merged client_wireguard.go, not here; handled separately on that branch.) - manager.go: ensureLocked carried the previous per-peer traffic counters (`last`) forward even through a full restart, but awg-quick down+up resets the kernel's own counters to zero -- the next CollectTraffic computed a large negative delta (clamped to 0), silently discarding real traffic. Extracted the decision into nextTrafficBaseline: only a reload (syncconf) preserves the baseline. (Finding 13) - portfwd.go: exported ForwardedPortsInclude; inbound_amneziawg.go's new checkForwardedPortsConflict uses it to reject, at save time, a client's forwardedPorts that would DNAT the panel's own port or another enabled inbound's port to the tunnel client -- portForwardLines has no destination restriction, so this collision was previously silent. Wired into both the single-client update path and the add-client path (client_inbound_apply.go), plus normalizeAmneziaWGSettings for the whole-inbound save path. (Finding 14) - inbound.go: InboundOption.AwgServer sent the whole ServerSettings struct including PrivateKey to GetInboundOptions callers -- a shared, admin-wide dropdown-filling endpoint the frontend's own AwgServerOptionSchema never reads that field from. Redacted it before assigning. (Finding 11) Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(amneziawg): don't widen the peer address pool past AmneziaWG's own subnet Completes Finding 12 from the automated PR review (the serverAddress half of this finding was already fixed on main and cherry-picked here). This half is specific to this branch: allocateWireguardAddress's /16 pool-widening fallback is an independent addition from upstream's own main that this branch inherited during the cherry-pick rebase -- it doesn't exist on the fork's own main at all, so this fix can't be cherry-picked the normal way and is committed directly here. Widening is safe for WireGuard's own Xray-native inbound (AllowedIPs isn't tied to a strict kernel interface subnet), but AmneziaWG's kernel interface Address is exactly the configured subnet -- an address allocated from the containing /16 once the /24 fills up would be silently unroutable. allocateWireguardAddress now takes an explicit allowWidening bool: WireGuard's own caller passes true (unchanged behavior), AmneziaWG's passes false (fails loudly on exhaustion instead). Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(docker): note that AmneziaWG doesn't work in this image Investigated: the image is Alpine-based, and AmneziaWG's own packaging (DKMS module + amneziawg-tools) doesn't target Alpine/musl at all -- unlike the Debian/Ubuntu/Fedora/Arch paths install.sh already handles, there's no package to apk add even with full host network/capabilities. The panel already degrades gracefully (IsAwgInstalled() logs one warning instead of retrying forever), so no code change is needed -- just made the reason explicit at the point where a user would reach for cap_add/ network_mode to try to work around it. * fix(sub): include amneziawg inbounds in subscription links getInboundsBySubId's SQL protocol allowlist never had 'amneziawg' added, so every AmneziaWG client was silently excluded from all three subscription formats (plain/individual links, JSON, Clash) and from the Telegram bot's QR/individual-link buttons, which fetch through the same path. genAmneziaWGLink itself was already fully implemented and already wired into GetLink's dispatch switch -- it just never got a chance to run. Same bug shape as the earlier TRACKED_PROTOCOLS frontend gap: a hardcoded protocol list one entry short. Found while investigating whether the Telegram bot needed AmneziaWG- specific client-management code -- it doesn't (the bot itself is fully protocol-agnostic), but this is the actual root cause of "can't share an AmneziaWG client's config via the bot." Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(inbound): enforce node-eligibility server-side, not just in the UI Investigated multi-node interaction with AmneziaWG: the master's own reconcile (DesiredAmneziaWGInstances) and Xray config generation (injectAmneziawgEgress, the GenXrayInboundConfig protocol skip) all correctly filter on NodeID IS NULL, so a node-assigned AmneziaWG (or MTProto) inbound would never be managed by the master. But nothing stopped one from being created that way: NODE_ELIGIBLE_PROTOCOLS (frontend/src/pages/inbounds/form/InboundFormModal.tsx) only hides the node picker client-side -- a direct API call could set nodeId on an AmneziaWG inbound, which every node then reconciles as an ordinary local inbound (nodes run the identical binary, full cron suite included), leaving it running unmanaged and untracked by the master's own AmneziaWG bookkeeping. Added isNodeEligibleProtocol (inbound_protocol.go), mirroring the frontend's allowlist, and enforced it in both AddInbound (the actually exploitable path -- nodeId comes straight from the request) and UpdateInbound (defense in depth; NodeID is already restored from the stored row there before this check, so it mainly guards against a protocol change on an existing node-hosted inbound). Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(amneziawg): allow TPROXY-marked traffic through a default-deny INPUT chain TPROXY never rewrites a packet's own destination address, only the routing decision. A default-deny firewall whose INPUT chain sanity-checks "is this destination actually local" (UFW's ufw-not-local, via addrtype --dst-type LOCAL, is a concrete example) silently drops the redirected packet before Xray's socket ever sees it -- RouteThroughXray looked fully configured (TPROXY rule present and counting, Xray listening with IP_TRANSPARENT set) yet every peer's traffic vanished with no trace on either side. Adds an idempotent, never-torn-down "iptables -I INPUT 1 -m mark --mark <fwmark> -j ACCEPT" alongside the existing shared policy route, so this works regardless of which firewall manager owns the rest of the INPUT chain. * fix(frontend): give AmneziaWG the same UDP tag and its own tag color The Inbounds list only special-cased isWireguard/isHysteria for the "UDP" network badge, so an AmneziaWG row showed just the bare protocol tag with no transport badge next to it. Added the missing isAmneziawg flag (mirrors isWireguard exactly) and wired it into the same branch. Client-row protocol-color maps in ClientsPage/HostList had no amneziawg entry, silently falling back to grey -- ClientInfoModal already had amneziawg: 'yellow' from earlier work, these two just never got it. * feat(logs): show which AmneziaWG client an access-log line belongs to The dokodemo-door TPROXY bridge every AmneziaWG peer's traffic is routed through has no per-user identity, so Xray's own access log never carries an "email:" token for these lines -- the Access Logs modal showed a blank Email column for every in-*-udp row, even though every other protocol's rows show the client normally. The peer's decapsulated tunnel IP does survive as the log's "from" address, and that IP deterministically maps to exactly one configured peer. Builds a "<inbound tag>|<ip>" -> email index from the same AmneziaWG inbounds already parsed elsewhere (amneziawg.InstanceFromInbound), and fills in Email from it whenever the raw log line didn't have one. * fix(amneziawg): enable sniffing on the TPROXY bridge Domain-based Routing rules could never match RouteThroughXray traffic: an AmneziaWG peer resolves DNS itself, through the tunnel, before ever sending a packet, so the decapsulated traffic TPROXY hands to the bridge is already a bare destination IP with no domain name attached at the network layer. Every other inbound recovers this via sniffing (confirmed working for the stock wireguard inbound, which does have it configured); the bridge never got a sniffing block at all, so only tag/IP/network-based rules could ever match it -- any domain rule above it in the list was silently unreachable. * docs: add an AmneziaWG config page and list it as a supported protocol Closes the PR checklist gap: the feature shipped with zero mention on the docs site. Mirrors reality.mdx's structure (key settings, setup steps, config excerpt) and notes the Docker/multi-node/Telegram-bot caveats the PR itself is honest about not having confirmed. * fix: address the fresh review round on PR #6105 (8 findings) 1. hostRulesFingerprint didn't account for ForwardedPorts when RouteThroughXray was off, so re-IPing a peer with port-forwarding configured left stale DNAT rules pointing at an address the next peer could be handed. 2. Server/client config values (keys, email, I1) were never validated for control characters before being written into the generated .conf; a newline could smuggle a PostUp hook into awg-quick's parser. Added ValidateConfigValue at save time and a sanitizeConfigValue backstop at render time. 3. checkForwardedPortsConflict didn't scope to node_id IS NULL, so a port used only on a different node produced a false collision; also hoisted the panel-port/inbounds lookup out of the per-client loop (portConflictContext) so N clients cost one query, not N. 4. PostDown commands were ";"-joined and abort on the first failure; appendOrTrue makes teardown best-effort so an external firewall flush can't leave DNAT rules to accumulate across bounces. 5. The "ip rule list | grep -q" existence check could SIGPIPE under pipefail and re-add a duplicate rule; switched to grep -c >/dev/null. 6. Ported the vpn:// share-link format (base64url of the plain .conf text, matching the real AmneziaVPN app) onto this branch -- it had only ever landed on our own fork's main, so this PR branch was still on the old amneziawg://+query-params scheme our own docs no longer described. Also corrected the docs' install.sh claim (opt-in/ interactive, not automatic) and stale pre-opt-in comments in route_egress.go. 7. install.sh: Arch's ndppd install used pacman -Syu (full system upgrade) instead of -Sy like every other call in the script; and should_install_amneziawg re-prompted on every `x-ui update` even when awg was already installed. 8. CollectTraffic could clobber a concurrent restart's freshly-reset (empty) traffic baseline with stale pre-restart counters, since getPeerStats runs lock-free; now checks pointer identity before writing back. sweepOrphansLocked permanently disabled itself on a transient os.ReadDir failure instead of allowing a retry. go build/vet/test and frontend typecheck/lint/build/vitest all pass. * fix(install.sh): check the live sysctl value, not sysctl.conf text Reviewer feedback (cherts, PR #6105): grepping /etc/sysctl.conf for the setting name is unreliable -- many distros split sysctl config across /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf, and /etc/sysctl.conf can be a symlink into that directory, so the check can miss an already-active setting (harmless duplicate append) or match a disabled/commented line (forwarding silently stays off). Query the live value via `sysctl -n` instead, which is accurate regardless of which file set it. Applied the same fix to both the IPv6 and IPv4 checks for consistency. * fix: update inbound_amneziawg.go to the split buildInboundForLocalRuntime Same fork-only-file blind spot as the one caught on our own main after the 3.6.0 sync: upstream split buildRuntimeInboundForAPI into buildInboundForNodePush / buildInboundForLocalRuntime (part of the node-sync client-deletion fix,5bc81dfd), updating every call site it could see. This file doesn't exist upstream, so it kept calling the old name even after the branch merged in that commit. * fix(frontend): recognize AmneziaWG's vpn:// scheme in share-link labels The shared link-tag/label helper (used by the client info modal, QR modal, and subscription page) had no entry for the vpn:// scheme AmneziaWG links use, so it fell through to the generic fallback: a plain "Vpn" tag with no color, and an empty remark/port that made the row's title fall back to "Link N" instead of the inbound's actual name:port — unlike every other protocol, which shows its real tag and label. vpn:// links are base64url of a plain .conf text (matching the real AmneziaVPN app's own share-link format), not a structured URL, so there's no query string or #hash to read a remark/port from. Decode the payload and pull the remark/endpoint back out of the .conf text directly instead. * fix(xray): force a full restart for TPROXY inbounds, never hot-add them Real incident: an AmneziaWG inbound with RouteThroughXray enabled lost all internet on that connection after a migration. Root-caused on the live box -- iptables TPROXY counters were incrementing (packets correctly redirected to 127.0.0.1:63110), but nothing was actually listening there (ss showed nothing on that port) until a full `systemctl restart x-ui`, after which the bridge came up immediately. Xray-core's gRPC AddInbound reports success for a new sockopt.tproxy inbound (internal/amneziawg's own Xray egress bridge is the only kind this fork ever generates) but doesn't reliably bind a working listener for it outside of process startup -- the bridge silently never comes up, and RouteThroughXray traffic goes nowhere until the next full restart happens to occur for an unrelated reason. diffInbounds already has this exact defensive pattern for REALITY inbounds ("a gRPC remove+add does not reliably rebuild the REALITY authenticator"), just never extended to TPROXY, and only in the already-existing-then-changed branch -- the "brand new inbound" branch had no such guard at all, which is exactly the path a freshly-enabled RouteThroughXray bridge takes. Added inboundUsesTproxy and wired it into both branches. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(amneziawg): flag Xray for resync when a peer edit changes qualifying state Real production bug, root-caused on iiadmin-vps: updateAmneziaWGInbound/ AddInbound/DelInbound only ever updated the kernel interface via amneziawg.GetManager() -- they never called SetNeedRestart the way every other protocol's mutation path does (client_crud.go, inbound.go, etc. all do). injectAmneziawgEgress's TPROXY bridge inbound depends on InstanceFromInbound finding at least one qualifying peer plus RouteThroughXray, so an edit that flips that (first peer added, last one removed, RouteThroughXray toggled on) previously required a full panel restart before the bridge actually got created, with no error anywhere: the kernel interface would handshake fine, but traffic redirected into the bridge's TPROXY port went nowhere because nothing was listening there. diffInbounds/inboundUsesTproxy already correctly force a full restart for a brand new TPROXY inbound (bdee0a20) -- that part was never the bug. The gap was entirely upstream: nothing ever told Xray a resync was even needed. * fix(clients): reject AllowedIPs already used on another WireGuard/AmneziaWG inbound defaultWireguardClients/defaultAmneziaWGClients only ever checked uniqueness against their own inbound's client list, so two inbounds sharing a subnet (same protocol or not) could silently hand out or accept the same address -- the exact scenario behind a real duplicate-IP incident where a WireGuard and an AmneziaWG client both ended up on the same address. otherTunnelAllowedIPs now collects every address already claimed on every other tunnel inbound and folds it into both the auto-allocation pool and the manual-entry collision check, naming the other inbound in the error when it fires. * fix(frontend): add the missing AmneziaWG config download on the sub page The subscription page already gave WireGuard links their own "Config" block (copy/download/QR of the actual .conf, via wireguardConfigFromLink reversing the wireguard:// query params) but had no equivalent for AmneziaWG's vpn:// links -- its isWireguardLink gate never matched them, and no reverse-parse helper existed for this page specifically. Every other surface (InboundInfoModal, ClientInfoModal, ClientQrModal) already had this parity; this was the one page that didn't. Fixed by adding amneziawgConfigFromLink (inbound-link.ts), simpler than its WireGuard counterpart since a vpn:// payload already *is* the plain .conf text -- just base64url-decode it, no query-param reconstruction needed -- and wiring it into SubPage.tsx alongside the existing WireGuard block, reusing the same pages.clients.amneziaWgConfig label the other three surfaces already use. * fix(xray): force a full restart for password-auth SOCKS5 hot-apply Real production incident: editing a client under an AmneziaWG inbound left its embedded SOCKS5 relay's settings byte-different (a new account list), and Xray's gRPC remove+add hot swap silently dropped the account for a peer whose email contained non-ASCII characters -- its tunnel kept handshaking fine but all its traffic got rejected at the SOCKS5 layer, while every other peer on the same relay was unaffected. A full restart (reading the same JSON straight from disk) always produced the correct account list. socks isn't in userDiffableProtocols (that only covers vless/vmess/trojan's clients+email shape, not accounts+user), so any settings drift on this inbound fell through to the generic remove+add path. Forces a restart instead, the same defensive choice already made for REALITY and TPROXY -- scoped to auth:"password" specifically so the other, noauth SOCKS5 bridges (panel/node/mtproto egress) keep the cheaper hot path. * Fix Attach reusing one identity's address across wg/awg inbounds ClientService.Attach deliberately copies one identity's stored AllowedIPs into every WireGuard/AmneziaWG inbound it's attached to in the same call, so the same person gets the same tunnel address on every protocol they use. Its loop calls addInboundClient once per inbound, and each of those independently computes otherTunnelAllowedIPs -- so by the second inbound in the batch, the first inbound's just-written copy of this identity's own address looked like a cross-inbound collision against itself. Real production symptom this caused: detaching then re-attaching a client to both wg and awg failed with "wireguard: allowedIPs entry X is already used by a client on inbound 'awg' (#N)" -- the exact address the identity is supposed to keep, rejected as if it belonged to someone else. Add a selfEmails exclusion to otherTunnelAllowedIPs and populate it from the client(s) being processed at the one real call site. Safe unconditionally: ClientRecord.Email is globally unique, so a match can only ever be this same identity's own entry on a sibling inbound, never a genuine different client's address. Reproduced the underlying mechanism live (manual entry correctly rejected as a cross-inbound collision; fresh auto-allocation correctly avoided a used address) before writing the fix, to confirm the guard itself works and the bug is specifically in how Attach's per-inbound calls interact with it. * Attach: allocate fresh when re-attaching with no active tunnel The previous fix (82cc69f5) made Attach's own address-reuse correctly not collide with itself across inbounds -- but it still always reused an identity's stored AllowedIPs verbatim, even when that identity currently has zero WireGuard/AmneziaWG attachments at all. A real report from testing this live: an identity fully detached from both its wg and awg inbounds, then re-attached, got its old address back even though several lower addresses were free -- because nothing about being fully detached ever cleared the stored value Attach copies from. Add hasTunnelAttachment, checked once against the identity's CURRENT inbound set before Attach's loop runs: if none of its current inbounds is WireGuard/AmneziaWG, clear the stored AllowedIPs so this attach allocates fresh (matching what a brand-new client would get) instead of resurrecting an address nothing reserves anymore. Left alone when the identity already has an active tunnel elsewhere, so extending it to a second protocol still keeps a consistent address. * Fix TestOtherTunnelAllowedIPsExcludesSelfEmail's own test setup CI caught this: the "genuinely different client" (other@wg) was seeded onto the SAME inbound passed as excludeID, which otherTunnelAllowedIPs already excludes entirely regardless of the selfEmails fix -- so the assertion that its address is still reported could never have passed, proving nothing either way. Move it onto the sibling inbound alongside shared@id, which is what the test actually needs to exercise (two clients on one sibling, one excluded by email, one not). * Attach: never inherit an address that doesn't fit the target inbound hasTunnelAttachment (from the earlier fix, commit 51067f16) only asked "does this identity have ANY tunnel attachment", treating that as license to reuse its stored address verbatim on every inbound being attached. Real production case this missed: an identity's stored address came from WireGuard's own fallback subnet (10.0.0.0/24, used when that inbound has no other clients to infer a base from), then got attached to a second, AmneziaWG inbound configured for a completely different subnet (10.8.1.0/24). defaultAmneziaWGClients's already-set-AllowedIPs branch only checks for collisions, never subnet membership, so the mismatched address was accepted silently -- producing a peer that can never actually connect, since an AmneziaWG address must fall inside the kernel interface's own configured subnet to be routable at all. Add addressesFitAmneziaWGInbound, checked per inbound inside Attach's loop: if the inherited address doesn't fit the SPECIFIC inbound being attached, clear it just for that one so it gets a fresh, valid allocation instead, while other already-attached inbounds keep their existing values. WireGuard has no equivalent strict subnet requirement (allocateWireguardAddress can widen to a fallback pool for it), so this only ever constrains AmneziaWG targets. * Give WireGuard an explicit, admin-configurable subnet field WireGuard previously had no configurable subnet at all -- only an implicit one, either inferred from existing clients' own addresses (wireguardAllocationBase) or a hardcoded 10.0.0.0/24 fallback when none exist yet. AmneziaWG, by contrast, has always had a real server.subnetIp/subnetCidr field in its settings, editable in the UI. User request: give WireGuard the same treatment. Backend: explicitWireguardSubnetBase reads an optional subnetIp/ subnetCidr pair from the inbound's own settings JSON (mirroring AmneziaWG's defaultAmneziaWGSubnetBases). defaultWireguardClients checks it first; only when unset does it fall back to today's inference-from-existing-clients behavior, so an inbound saved before this field existed keeps working exactly as it always has. Frontend: subnetIp/subnetCidr added to WireguardInboundSettingsSchema and the inbound form (mirroring AmneziaWG's own field layout/labels), with a real default (10.0.0.0/24, the same value the backend already fell back to) seeded for newly created inbounds so the field starts populated and editable rather than blank. Translated across all 13 locales. This also structurally closes the class of bug fixed in 82cc69f5/291c47b3: with wg and awg subnets explicit and independently controllable, an admin who wants matching addresses across both protocols can configure them to actually agree, instead of one silently inheriting the other's incompatible range. * Split the client edit form's AllowedIPs into per-protocol fields A client attached to both WireGuard and AmneziaWG shared one AllowedIPs form field with a dynamically-switching label, so its two genuinely different addresses could never both be shown or edited correctly. Worse, Update/Create broadcast that one shared value to every attached wg/awg inbound with no subnet-fit check, so an ordinary edit save could silently overwrite one protocol's address with the other's -- the same bug class already fixed for Attach, but reachable from any client edit. model.Client gains an optional AllowedIPsByInbound map so a caller can send distinct values per inbound; Update/Create honor it and, when it's absent, clear a shared value that doesn't fit an AmneziaWG inbound's own subnet instead of writing it through. A new TunnelAllowedIPsByInbound read path feeds the real per-inbound address to the client edit form via GET, which now renders two separate, correctly-labeled fields whenever both protocols are attached (unchanged single dynamic field otherwise). * Regenerate openapi.json for the new allowedIPsByInbound field Follow-up to 878ee839: gen:zod (frontend/src/generated) was already regenerated and committed, but gen:api (frontend/public/openapi.json) wasn't, so CI's codegen drift check failed. * Fix build breakage from merging upstream main: Update() gained a limitHwid param Two of our own AllowedIPs tests (not present upstream, so the merge never flagged them as conflicting) still called the old 3-arg Update(inboundSvc, id, client) -- upstream's hardware-ID-limit feature added a required limitHwid parameter that every other caller in this package already passes. Also drop createDefaultInboundSettings from InboundsPage.tsx: the merge conflict resolution kept the import, but upstream's clone-payload refactor (buildClonePayload, inbound-clone.ts) already calls it internally now -- this file doesn't need it directly anymore. * Fix real bug: AmneziaWG clients rejected as "empty client ID" in 3 places Three switch statements on inbound.Protocol handle "wireguard" explicitly (checking client.PublicKey) but fall through to the default case for "amneziawg" (checking client.ID, which AmneziaWG clients never set -- they use PublicKey/Email like WireGuard, not the VMess/VLESS UUID field). This is what the 4 AllowedIPs tests were actually catching: UpdateInboundClient's newClientId derivation hit this same default branch, so every Update() on an AmneziaWG client returned "empty client ID" before ever reaching the AllowedIPs logic being tested. Fixed by adding "amneziawg" alongside "wireguard" in each switch: addInboundClient's per-client validation, UpdateInboundClient's newClientId derivation, and AddInbound's per-client validation (the third one wasn't hit by these tests, but has the identical bug -- creating a brand-new AmneziaWG inbound with a client attached would fail the same way). * refactor(amneziawg): rename Obfuscation20 to Obfuscation31, drop the dead mobile preset Mechanical rename ahead of the AmneziaWG 3.1 parameter work: the type, generator and prose all said 2.0, and the "mobile" generator preset was reachable only from its own test. No behavior change. * feat(amneziawg): AmneziaWG 3.1 obfuscation parameters (backend + generated schemas) Adds the 3.1 parameter surface to the inbound settings and both Go config emitters: I2-I5 signature packets, HeaderProtectionKey (base64 32-byte, shared server<->client), ContentPaddingAddition, the five handshake-timing randomization ranges (RekeyAfterTime/RekeyTimeout/RejectAfterTime/ KeepaliveTimeout/MaxHandshakeAttempts), and the RandomTrailers/ DisableCookies switches. Freshly generated sets fill everything except I2-I5 (matching Amnezia's own generator) with jittered ranges bracketing WireGuard's stock timing constants; every reject window starts >= 30s above the rekey window by construction. Empty fields stay off the wire, so blanking a field disables just that feature. Validation generalizes the H1-H4 range checker for the new uint32-range fields, requires min 1 on timers, cross-checks rekey-vs-reject, and demands a real 32-byte base64 header-protection key. The manager warns once per process when the installed awg tools predate 3.1 but an inbound uses 3.1 parameters (awg-quick rejects unknown keys with a generic error otherwise); apply still proceeds. Requires amneziawg-tools v3.1.20260812+ / module or amneziawg-go v3.1.20260814+ on the host. * feat(amneziawg): emit and randomize 3.1 parameters in the frontend Both client-config emitters (the vpn:// link builder and the clients-page .conf builder) now carry the 3.1 [Interface] lines in the same order as the Go emitters. The obfuscation randomizer moves out of InboundFormModal into a shared lib/xray/amneziawg-obfuscation.ts that also fills the new fields, and createDefaultAmneziawgInboundSettings switches from static values to that generator — a fresh inbound now really gets the unique fingerprint the docs promise instead of the same jc=5/jmin=10 set on every install. Schema parse-time defaults for the new fields stay ''/false on purpose: real values come only from the generator, so resaving an inbound never mutates its stored parameters. A new parity test pins the hand-written AmneziawgServerSchema to the generated ServerSettings key set, so a field added on one side can no longer silently vanish from configs. * feat(amneziawg): 3.1 form fields and translations Inbound form gains inputs for I2-I5, HeaderProtectionKey (filled by the existing obfuscation Regenerate button), ContentPaddingAddition, the five timing ranges, and the RandomTrailers/DisableCookies switches; the MTU input picks up the min=1 its schema already enforced. All 13 locales get the 19 new keys and drop the "2.0" branding from the s3/s4/i1 labels. * docs(amneziawg): document 3.1 parameters; install.sh kernel/version notes The AmneziaWG page's obfuscation section moves from the 2.0 to the 3.1 parameter set: table rows for I2-I5, HeaderProtectionKey, ContentPaddingAddition, the timing-randomization ranges and the RandomTrailers/DisableCookies switches, a requirements callout (tools v3.1.20260812+, module/awg-go v3.1.20260814+, Linux 6.7+ for the DKMS path), and a sample client .conf that matches what the panel actually emits (including the DNS defaults and PersistentKeepalive it always had). install.sh warns before a DKMS build on a pre-6.7 kernel and after any install that left pre-3.1 amneziawg-tools on PATH. Also updates the hosts API operation paths ({id} -> {groupId}) in the stale ru/zh/fa reference pages: syncing docs/public/openapi.json for the new AmneziaWG schema fields surfaced that rename, which had never been copied over, and the docs build fails on paths missing from the spec. * fix(amneziawg): reject control characters and canonicalize 3.1 range values Adversarial review of the 3.1 work surfaced a validation gap: base64.DecodeString silently ignores CR/LF, so a header-protection key that picked up a line wrap in transit decoded to a valid 32 bytes, passed validation, and was emitted verbatim into every client config — where the orphan second line breaks the import while the server (whose emitter strips control chars) keeps running with the correct key. The key and range validators now reject control characters outright. Also from the same review: range values are canonicalized on save ("110 - 140" -> "110-140", whitespace-only collapses to feature-off, closing a case where the server conf rendered an invalid blank-value line the client emitters omitted); the rekey/reject invariant is now enforced against WireGuard's 120s/180s defaults when only one side is set; and the structural fingerprint joins on "\n" instead of "|", which is a legal I1-I5 character and made adjacent free-text fields join-ambiguous. * fix(install): resolve latest release tag via web redirect to dodge API rate limits The non-interactive install smoke test resolved the release version through the unauthenticated GitHub API (api.github.com/.../releases/latest), which allows only 60 requests/hour per IP. The test installs twice in one run, and on shared CI runner IPs the second call gets rate-limited, returns no tag_name, and install.sh treats an empty version as fatal (exit 1) — the same "Failed to fetch x-ui version" real users hit behind CGNAT/shared addresses. resolve_latest_tag() now reads the tag from the github.com releases/latest web redirect (not subject to the API rate limit), falling back to the API only if the redirect yields nothing. Verified with the real deploy/test/smoke-noninteractive.sh (two installs, both green). * fix(amneziawg): three review findings on #6105, plus a comment trim 1. A peer's allowedIPs reached the generated .conf unvalidated and unsanitized, unlike email/publicKey/preSharedKey which normalizeAmneziaWGSettings already guards. A newline in an entry let a following "[Interface]" re-open the interface section, whose "PostUp = ..." awg-quick then runs as root on the next apply. Reproduced end to end against generateServerConfig. The save path now rejects and canonicalizes through normalizeWireguardAllowedIPs, and the render path sanitizes as a backstop for rows predating the validation (an upgrade, a restored backup, a direct DB edit). H1-H4 get the same render-time sanitize, and the two NIC name fields a plausibility check, since stripping control characters alone would still let a shell metacharacter into a root-executed PostUp line. 2. EgressPortForInbound is 63100 + inbound id, so an id past 2435 derives a port above 65535 -- and Xray rejects the whole generated config over one invalid port, taking every other protocol down with it. It now reports ok=false past the range, and both the Xray bridge and its TPROXY rules are skipped instead of emitting an impossible port. 3. The downloadable AmneziaWG .conf read ClientRecord.allowedIPs, a single shared column that holds the WireGuard address for an identity attached to both protocols -- the exact ambiguity tunnelAllowedIPs was added to resolve for the edit form. The info and QR modals already hydrate that field, so they now pass this inbound's own address to the builder. Also trims the comment blocks in the files touched here to the 2-line guidance in CLAUDE.md: internal/amneziawg alone carried 423 comment lines in over-long blocks against 118 for the comparable internal/mtproto, and is now at 110. Every non-obvious constraint is kept (the kernel S1/S2 rule, why PostDown is best-effort, why grep -c and not -q, why the fingerprints split three ways); the narration is gone. Two hot_diff.go comments pointed at an internal/amneziawgnet package and an injectAmneziawgnetSocks function that exist nowhere in the tree; the checks themselves are unchanged. * feat(logs): add an AmneziaWG log view to the overview The overview has an access-log view for Xray but nothing for AmneziaWG, so when a tunnel misbehaves there is no way to see it from the panel at all. A kernel tunnel logs no per-request lines, so the equivalent view is built from the two things it does expose: - Live per-peer activity from `awg show <iface> dump`, joined to the client email through the desired peer set: last handshake, endpoint, allowed IPs, cumulative transfer and online state, newest handshake first. - The panel's own AmneziaWG event lines (interface up/down, awg-quick failures, the pre-3.1 tools warning), which are what actually explain a peer being absent from the table. POST /panel/api/server/amneziawglogs/:count serves both, with the same count + filter contract GetXrayLogs uses, and the modal mirrors XrayLogModal's toolbar, auto-update, mobile cards and download. The action-bar button is gated on a new status.amneziawg.configured, which stays true while an inbound exists but its interface is down -- exactly when the event lines matter. Verified against a running panel: the endpoint returns the peer table and real event lines ("awg/awg-quick not found on PATH", "create config dir: permission denied"), and count and filter both narrow as documented. One of those lines surfaced a Debugf that had been rendering as "for inbound1:amneziawg:"; fixed here since it is now user-visible. * fix(amneziawg): stop double-counting a routed inbound's traffic injectAmneziawgEgress tags its Xray bridge with the AmneziaWG inbound's own tag, so the stock Routing page can target it. Xray therefore reports that bridge's bytes under the inbound's tag, and XrayTrafficJob feeds them to AddTraffic -- which accumulates -- on top of the same bytes AmneziaWGJob already reported from `awg show dump`. An inbound with routeThroughXray on counted roughly twice its real traffic, which also inflates the quota checks that read the same counters. The awg counters are the complete measure: every peer, whether or not TPROXY routed it, and the same wire bytes the per-client totals are built from, so they stay and the Xray rows are dropped. Per-client stats were never affected -- a dokodemo-door bridge has no per-user identity, so Xray emits no user>>>email rows for it. Filtering happens before every consumer, so the DB totals, the external traffic inform and the dashboard's live speed all read one source per inbound. The set of bridge tags now comes from a predicate shared with injectAmneziawgEgress itself, with a test that pins the two together -- naming one tag too few doubles the traffic again, one too many makes real traffic vanish. * fix(amneziawg): align the three .conf emitters on one peer field order The panel builds an AmneziaWG client .conf in three independent places, and they disagreed: buildAmneziaWGClientConfig put PresharedKey right after PublicKey (wg-quick(8)'s own order, and what both WireGuard emitters on the clients side already use), while genAmneziaWGConfig and the Go amneziaWGConfigText put it after Endpoint. A user comparing a subscription link against a downloaded .conf sees the difference immediately, and the generators are exactly the kind of parallel implementation CLAUDE.md warns about drifting. Moves the two outliers onto the wg-quick order. Also drops the stray trailing newline that only appeared when PersistentKeepalive was set, so a config now always ends on its last set field whichever that is -- the same shape all three emitters produce for the same client. Parsing is unaffected either way (the format is order-insensitive, and the AmneziaVPN app reads it as a flat key-value bag), so this changes only the rendered text. Adds a test on each side that pins the peer block's field order, since nothing previously asserted it. * refactor(amneziawg): switch to the embedded amneziawg-go/gVisor architecture Replaces the kernel-module (DKMS) + awg-quick + TPROXY backend with the fork's own embedded design: amneziawg-go runs in-process over a userspace gVisor netstack, and each peer's decapsulated traffic relays into its own loopback Xray SOCKS5 inbound, so Xray's native stats/sniffing/routing work for free instead of through hand-rolled bridges. No kernel module, no DKMS, no Secure Boot conflicts, works the same in a container as on bare metal. - internal/amneziawgnet: new package (Device/UAPI, gVisor netstack, TCP/UDP forwarding, SOCKS5 relay, peer identity, IPv6 host-alias egress identity, per-client port-forwarding) - amneziawg-go v3.1.20260814 + gvisor. - internal/amneziawg: keep the reusable protocol-shape types/validation (Instance/Peer/Obfuscation, InstanceFromInbound); drop the OS-shellout half (awg-quick, TPROXY policy routing, NDP proxy, peer-stats parsing). - internal/web/service: rewire the 5 integration points (job, runtime, client-apply, web shutdown, xray config) from the old manager to the new one; the AmneziaWG log view is rebuilt on the embedded Device's own UAPI dump (extended to carry endpoint/AllowedIPs) instead of `awg show dump`. - install.sh: drop DKMS/ndppd/TPROXY/Secure-Boot installer code (~250 lines) - an entire recurring class of installer fragility goes away. - frontend: drop the now-meaningless routeThroughXray toggle (the relay is always on); keep the field in the Zod schema, unexposed, so it isn't silently stripped from stored settings on next save - two regression tests deliberately depend on the Go struct still carrying it. - docs/i18n: rewrite amneziawg.mdx for the new architecture; drop the dead routeThroughXray translation keys across all 13 locales. Real production throughput (embedded core datapath, isolated bench, same box the kernel-module path was measured on): ~296 Mbit/s up, ~640 Mbit/s down, vs. 414.69 MB/s (~3.3 Gbit/s) for the kernel module on the same hardware - a real gap, tempered by this being single-stream/no-SOCKS5-hop and most VPN traffic being latency-bound rather than throughput-saturating. * fix(amneziawg): restore the branch's own Obfuscation31 shape + 2 CodeQL findings The previous push's wholesale-copy of types.go/params.go from the fork's main branch pulled in that branch's own independent (and incompatible) naming for the same AWG 3.1 feature set: Obfuscation20/GenerateObfuscation20 instead of this branch's already-shipped Obfuscation31/GenerateObfuscation31, and a missing CanonicalizeUintRange -- broke every Go CI job (the whole matrix fails to compile when any one package doesn't, which is why govulncheck/ golangci/postgres-durable-first/race all failed identically, not just go-test). Restores params.go/params_test.go verbatim from this branch's own last commit (a strict superset of validation: it already cross-checks rekey vs. reject timing windows, which the copied version never did) and folds the 3.0/3.1 fields (HeaderProtectionKey, ContentPaddingAddition, the 5 timing fields, RandomTrailers/DisableCookies) into Obfuscation31 itself, matching the original struct exactly instead of as separate top-level Instance fields. instance.go, the two amneziawgnet call sites, and 7 amneziawgnet test files updated to match. Also drops the one test (sanitizeConfigValue) that only ever served the retired kernel-module .conf writer -- correctly not ported, so the test testing it shouldn't have been copied either. Also fixes 2 CodeQL findings the same push surfaced: a clamped uint64->int64 conversion for the new log view's live byte counters (server.go), and an unneeded len+len sum feeding a slice pre-size in the v6-egress outbound merge (xray.go) -- append already grows correctly without it. * chore(amneziawg): regenerate frontend schemas for updated doc comments npm run gen was missed after the previous commit's types.go doc-comment edits (Obfuscation20 -> Obfuscation31, ValidateHeaderProtection -> ValidateObfuscation in the prose) -- openapigen bakes those comments into the generated schema's description field, so the committed frontend/src/generated/schemas.ts and openapi.json still had the old wording. codegen's git-diff-exit-code check caught it correctly. * fix(amneziawg): narrow 2 test fixtures that collided with MaxForwardedPorts TestCheckForwardedPortsConflict_CollidesWithEnabledInboundPort and ..._NoCollisionWhenPortsDontOverlap used "8000-8100"/"9000-9100" as their ForwardedPorts fixture -- 101 ports each, one over MaxForwardedPorts (100). The cap check (checkForwardedPortsConflict, added this session alongside the SOCKS-phantom-port check) fires first, so both tests got "more than 100 forwarded ports" instead of ever reaching the collision logic they're actually testing. The cap itself has its own dedicated boundary test already; these two just needed a narrower range that still covers/misses port 8080 as intended -- 8075-8085 and 9075-9085, 11 ports each. * fix(amneziawg): checkAmneziawgnetSocksConflict had no receiver in its new home My merge-conflict resolution kept this as a method call (s.checkAmneziawgnetSocksConflict) inside checkPortConflictTx, a plain function with no *InboundService receiver -- upstream's #6225 fix moved the port-conflict check out of the (s *InboundService) method and into this new tx-scoped free function, and I didn't notice the call site needed to change shape too. CI caught it immediately (undefined: s); nothing in this specific package can be locally verified past internal/database's own unrelated, pre-existing CGO build issue on this dev machine. Since the signature had to change either way, folded in the fix already flagged as a separate follow-up: checkAmneziawgnetSocksConflict now takes the caller's db handle instead of fetching its own via database.GetDB(), so it actually runs inside the same serialized transaction #6225 introduced -- previously it sat right next to that race fix without benefiting from it. * fix: address the review findings on the embedded AmneziaWG PR 5 blocking findings: - Floor S3/S4 at 12 in both obfuscation generators (Go and frontend) and reject a hand-edited value below that when HeaderProtectionKey is set -- IpcSet requires it, and ~39% of previously-generated sets violated it silently. - Guard PrivateKey/PrimaryDNS/SecondaryDNS/remark against newline injection in the AmneziaWG .conf builder (both the Go subscription-link path and the frontend downloadable-config path) -- unguarded, any of them could inject an arbitrary config line into a subscriber's client. - Bound the derived AmneziaWG SOCKS relay port to <= 65535 once an inbound's id is known, and check the reverse direction (does the relay port collide with an existing inbound's port) on both create and update -- previously only port -> relay collisions were checked, not relay -> port. - Gate injectAmneziawgV6Egress on the same V6AliasesActive predicate desiredV6Aliases already uses, so the two can't disagree about whether a peer's IPv6 identity is actually active at the OS level. 2 minor findings: - Fix the forwarded-ports cap check's off-by-one (a spec covering exactly the cap was rejected as if it were over it). - Correct docker-compose.yml's stale comment describing the retired DKMS/kernel-module architecture. * chore: retrigger CI build (armv5) failed on a transient Go module proxy network error (INTERNAL_ERROR stream reset on sagernet/sing), unrelated to this PR's changes. * docs: fix doc comments still describing the retired DKMS/awg-quick design A few doc comments (and one illustrative test log line) survived the embedded-architecture cutover unchanged and now contradict the code they sit next to: - internal/amneziawg/types.go's package comment claimed this package still owns a Manager that reconciles OS-level interfaces via awg-quick/DKMS -- that Manager was removed; the reconcile loop lives in internal/amneziawgnet now, and this package is protocol-shape-only. - internal/amneziawg/params.go's ValidateObfuscation/ValidateConfigValue comments cited "awg-quick up" / "awg-quick executes as root" as the reason to validate -- the server itself never calls awg-quick in this architecture; the same value still reaches a real rendered .conf that a client app or an admin's own awg-quick CLI applies downstream, so the validation is still warranted, just for a different consumer. Mirrored the same fix in inbound_amneziawg.go's matching comment and its test's comment. - internal/amneziawgnet/manager.go's Manager doc comments (x3) pointed readers at "internal/amneziawg.Manager" for comparison -- that type no longer exists in this diff at all. Repointed at internal/mtproto.Manager, the pattern this was actually modeled on and the one that's still real. - Swapped one test's illustrative "awg-quick up awg2 failed" log line for a message shaped like this architecture's actual amneziawgnet logging, so a reader skimming the test doesn't wonder whether the server still shells out to awg-quick. No behavior change. * fix(docs): re-run codegen for xray-settings.mdx after conflict merge The automated conflict-resolution hand-merge for this generated file was content-correct but didn't byte-match a real regen (different YAML long-string folding style). Re-ran npm run gen + docs' gen:api and kept that canonical output instead. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(amneziawg): drop the dead access-log email backfill amneziawgEmailIndex keyed peers by "<tag>|<tunnel IP>", a scheme built for the retired TPROXY bridge where the peer's decapsulated tunnel address survived as the access log's from-address. The embedded architecture relays through a loopback SOCKS5 dial, so every AmneziaWG log line's from-address is 127.0.0.1:<ephemeral> and the lookup could never match: the index was rebuilt on every log view just to miss. Remove the index, its GetXrayLogs wiring and its test. If per-line emails are wanted back, the relay would have to publish a local-port->email registry for the viewer to resolve loopback sources. * fix(api): generate AmneziaWGLogs/PeerActivity schemas instead of hand-writing them The amneziawglogs endpoint's response structs were missing from openapigen's StructAllow, so they were silently absent from every generated schema/example, the endpoints.ts entry carried a hand-written response, and AmneziaWGLogModal.tsx duplicated the shapes as local interfaces - the exact drift the allowlist rule exists to prevent. Allowlist both structs with example tags, point the endpoint at the generated schema, import the generated types in the modal, and sync docs/public/openapi.json. * chore(amneziawg): drop the unreferenced quiccapture package Nothing imports internal/amneziawg/quiccapture and no route exposes it; its package doc justifies the code as a port of frontend/src/lib/xray/i1Generators.ts, which does not exist in this repository, and promises an API round-trip that also does not exist. 1,110 lines of unreachable code with misleading provenance claims. Revert this commit to bring the package back when the live-capture I1 feature and its frontend counterpart actually land. * fix(clients): re-run cross-inbound conflict checks on the serialized writer The new client-level checks - cross-inbound AllowedIPs collisions and AmneziaWG forwardedPorts conflicts - read a fresh DB snapshot, decide, and only then enter runSerializedTx, while lockInbound only serializes writers on the SAME inbound. Two concurrent client creates on two different tunnel inbounds both passed the read and both committed, yielding two peers with one address: the exact check-then-claim race81cfd857(#6225) closed for AddInbound, which this PR's own checkAmneziawgnetSocksReverseConflict already cites. Keep the pre-tx pass for fail-fast UX and re-validate inside the transaction, where the single writer makes the answer authoritative. The race test drives two goroutines at two inbounds and demands exactly one winner; it fails with committed=2 when the in-tx re-check is removed. * fix(amneziawg): hot-apply depletion disables like mtproto does applyTrafficMutationBatch special-cases MTProto so a quota/expiry depletion cuts the sidecar immediately, but AmneziaWG fell through to runtime AddUser/RemoveUser - explicit no-ops for this protocol - so a depleted peer kept tunneling until the next 10s reconcile tick. Route it through applyLocalAmneziaWG, whose own contract (re-read committed settings, filter depleted clients, push to the interface) is exactly this case; the comment claiming it mirrors applyLocalMtproto is now true for the depletion path too. * fix(amneziawg): persist cleared DNS fields instead of resurrecting defaults PrimaryDNS/SecondaryDNS marshaled with omitempty, so clearing them persisted settings with no key at all - and the frontend re-parses stored settings through a Zod schema whose .default('8.8.8.8') / .default('8.8.4.4') fire on missing keys, silently repopulating the form on every load and re-persisting the defaults on the next save. Blank is a documented, meaningful state (no DNS line in client configs); drop omitempty so a cleared value survives the round-trip. The regression test normalizes a server block with cleared DNS and fails when the keys are dropped. * fix(amneziawg): accept cleared numeric obfuscation/subnet fields in the form AntD InputNumber emits null when cleared, Zod .default() only replaces undefined, and unlike wireguard.ts - whose optionalClearedInt comment documents exactly this failure mode - the AmneziaWG schema declared subnetCidr and jc/jmin/jmax/s1-s4 as bare z.number() defaults. Clearing any of the eight fields made safeParse reject the null and block the save until the user retyped a value. Absorb null into undefined while keeping each field's schema default, so a cleared field refills its documented default and legacy blobs with absent keys behave as before. * fix(amneziawg): guard the third .conf emitter against newline injection The review-round fix added the newline guard to amneziaWGConfigText (Go) and buildAmneziaWGClientConfig, but genAmneziaWGConfig in inbound-link.ts - the third of the three emitters its own comment says must not drift - still rendered privateKey/primaryDns/secondaryDns/remark unescaped, so a newline there injected a config line (e.g. a rogue PostUp) into the inbound form's downloaded .conf. Add the same guard, plus the regression tests the original fix shipped without: all four fields on the Go and both frontend emitters go red if any guard is removed. * test(amneziawg): pin the S3/S4 floors the TS drift guard claims to mirror The test's docstring says it mirrors internal/amneziawg/params_test.go, but it asserted S3>=8/S4>=4 while the Go test and both generators pin 12/12 - the floor ValidateObfuscation enforces whenever a header protection key is set, which this generator always sets. A regression narrowing the TS floors into 8-11/4-11 would have passed the drift guard and produced configs the backend rejects on save. * docs: restore the pia repo-map entry and document the AmneziaWG subsystem Merging main dropped CLAUDE.md's internal/pia/ bullet (added by #6272) while resolving the repo-map conflict - the package itself is untouched. Restore it, add the missing map entries for the two packages this branch introduces (internal/amneziawg/, internal/amneziawgnet/), bump the cron count, and give amneziawg_job its row in architecture.md's 5.4 table. * chore(amneziawg): correct comments stranded by the architecture pivot ae77c7e9's cutover to the embedded gVisor path deleted the kernel-module code but left several comments describing it in the present tense: hot_diff.go cited the removed service.amneziawgEgressStreamSettings and wrongly claimed AmneziaWG is the only sockopt.tproxy source (tunnel's TProxy mode is the live one the guard protects), socks_config.go pointed at the deleted EgressBasePort/EgressPortForInbound, manager.go referred to the deleted Manager and its fingerprinting as live code, web.go's cron registration claimed the job scrapes traffic (its own doc says it does not), and types.go capped ContentPaddingAddition at uint16 when validation and upstream both use uint32. * style(lint): satisfy gofumpt/goimports so make verify is green json_service.go's two 'Tag: "proxy"}' literals came in with main's owncc245a90formatting commit and fail the repo's gofumpt gate for everyone; the import grouping in inbound_amneziawg.go is from the serialized-writer fix on this branch. --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: Sanaei <ho3ein.sanaei@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: claude[bot] <41898282+claude[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2855 lines
89 KiB
Go
2855 lines
89 KiB
Go
package sub
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import (
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"crypto/sha256"
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"encoding/base64"
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"encoding/hex"
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"fmt"
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"maps"
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"net"
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"net/url"
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"slices"
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"sort"
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"strconv"
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"strings"
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"sync"
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"time"
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"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
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"github.com/goccy/go-json"
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"github.com/mhsanaei/3x-ui/v3/internal/amneziawg"
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"github.com/mhsanaei/3x-ui/v3/internal/database"
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"github.com/mhsanaei/3x-ui/v3/internal/database/model"
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"github.com/mhsanaei/3x-ui/v3/internal/logger"
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"github.com/mhsanaei/3x-ui/v3/internal/util/common"
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"github.com/mhsanaei/3x-ui/v3/internal/util/random"
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wgutil "github.com/mhsanaei/3x-ui/v3/internal/util/wireguard"
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"github.com/mhsanaei/3x-ui/v3/internal/web/service"
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"github.com/mhsanaei/3x-ui/v3/internal/xray"
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)
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var salamanderWarningSeen sync.Map
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// SubService provides business logic for generating subscription links and managing subscription data.
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type SubService struct {
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address string
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remarkTemplate string
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datepicker string
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// subscriptionBody is true only when rendering the actual subscription
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// content a client app imports (raw /sub fetch, /json, /clash). The remark
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// template's per-client info is emitted there (on the first link); every
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// other context — the sub info page, the panel's link/QR displays — renders
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// the name-only template, like Remnawave.
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subscriptionBody bool
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// usageShown emits info once per subscription identity, including twins.
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// PrepareForRequest resets this per-request state.
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usageShown map[string]bool
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showIdentityOnAllLinks bool
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inboundService service.InboundService
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settingService service.SettingService
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// nodesByID is populated per request from the Node table so
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// resolveInboundAddress can return the node's address for any
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// inbound whose NodeID is set. Keeps the per-link host derivation
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// O(1) instead of O(N) DB hits.
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nodesByID map[int]*model.Node
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// statsByEmail maps a client email to its traffic row across ALL inbounds
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// loaded for the request. client_traffics.email is globally unique, so this
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// lets statsForClient resolve usage for a client even on an inbound that
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// doesn't own its row (multi-inbound subscriptions). Filled in
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// getInboundsBySubId; reset per request in PrepareForRequest.
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statsByEmail map[string]xray.ClientTraffic
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// clientsByInbound caches clients resolved for this request keyed by
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// inbound id then email, so the per-protocol link generators look a client
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// up without re-parsing the inbound's settings JSON per link.
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// fullyPrimedInbounds marks inbounds whose complete client list is cached
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// (a miss there is authoritative). Reset per request in PrepareForRequest.
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clientsByInbound map[int]map[string]model.Client
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fullyPrimedInbounds map[int]bool
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// settingsByInbound caches each inbound's settings decoded once per request
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// with the clients array left out; generators read only inbound-level
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// fields (encryption, method, version, …) from it.
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settingsByInbound map[int]map[string]any
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}
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// NewSubService creates a new subscription service with the given configuration.
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func NewSubService(remarkTemplate string) *SubService {
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return &SubService{
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remarkTemplate: remarkTemplate,
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}
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}
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// ForRequest returns a shallow copy with request-scoped state populated.
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// Subscription controllers share one base SubService, so request-specific
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// fields such as address and nodesByID must live on a per-request copy.
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func (s *SubService) ForRequest(host string) *SubService {
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req := *s
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req.PrepareForRequest(host)
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return &req
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}
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// PrepareForRequest sets per-request state (host + nodes map) on this
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// SubService instance. HTTP handlers should call ForRequest instead so the
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// controller's shared base service is never mutated by concurrent requests.
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func (s *SubService) PrepareForRequest(host string) {
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if !isRoutableHost(host) {
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if d := s.configuredPublicHost(); d != "" {
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host = d
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} else if isLoopbackHost(host) {
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host = "localhost"
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}
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}
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s.address = host
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s.usageShown = map[string]bool{}
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s.statsByEmail = map[string]xray.ClientTraffic{}
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s.clientsByInbound = map[int]map[string]model.Client{}
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s.fullyPrimedInbounds = map[int]bool{}
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s.settingsByInbound = map[int]map[string]any{}
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s.loadNodes()
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s.loadRemarkSettings()
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}
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// primeLinkClients caches clients (first occurrence per email, matching the
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// old settings-JSON iteration order) so clientForLink resolves them without a
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// parse. complete marks the inbound's whole client list as cached.
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func (s *SubService) primeLinkClients(inboundId int, clients []model.Client, complete bool) {
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if inboundId <= 0 {
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return
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}
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if s.clientsByInbound == nil {
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s.clientsByInbound = map[int]map[string]model.Client{}
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}
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m := s.clientsByInbound[inboundId]
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if m == nil {
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m = make(map[string]model.Client, len(clients))
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s.clientsByInbound[inboundId] = m
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}
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for _, c := range clients {
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if _, exists := m[c.Email]; !exists {
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m[c.Email] = c
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}
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}
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if complete {
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if s.fullyPrimedInbounds == nil {
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s.fullyPrimedInbounds = map[int]bool{}
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}
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s.fullyPrimedInbounds[inboundId] = true
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}
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}
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// clientForLink resolves one client of an inbound by email for link
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// generation: from the per-request cache when primed, otherwise by parsing
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// the settings JSON once and caching every client from it.
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func (s *SubService) clientForLink(inbound *model.Inbound, email string) (model.Client, bool) {
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if m, ok := s.clientsByInbound[inbound.Id]; ok {
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if c, hit := m[email]; hit {
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return c, true
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}
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if s.fullyPrimedInbounds[inbound.Id] {
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return model.Client{}, false
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}
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}
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clients, err := s.inboundService.GetClients(inbound)
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if err != nil {
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return model.Client{}, false
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}
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s.primeLinkClients(inbound.Id, clients, true)
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for i := range clients {
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if clients[i].Email == email {
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return clients[i], true
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}
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}
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return model.Client{}, false
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}
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// linkSettings returns the inbound's settings decoded once per request with
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// the clients array left out — the link generators read only inbound-level
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// fields from it and resolve clients via clientForLink. The shallow
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// RawMessage pass skips materializing a huge clients array entirely.
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func (s *SubService) linkSettings(inbound *model.Inbound) map[string]any {
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if inbound.Id > 0 {
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if cached, ok := s.settingsByInbound[inbound.Id]; ok {
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return cached
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}
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}
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shallow := map[string]json.RawMessage{}
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_ = json.Unmarshal([]byte(inbound.Settings), &shallow)
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out := make(map[string]any, len(shallow))
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for key, raw := range shallow {
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if key == "clients" {
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continue
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}
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var value any
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_ = json.Unmarshal(raw, &value)
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out[key] = value
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}
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if inbound.Id > 0 {
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if s.settingsByInbound == nil {
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s.settingsByInbound = map[int]map[string]any{}
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}
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s.settingsByInbound[inbound.Id] = out
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}
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return out
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}
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// loadRemarkSettings populates the per-request remark formatting state so
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// every subscription format — raw, JSON, Clash — renders remarks the same way
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// (the date formatter reads datepicker). Loading it only in getSubs left
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// JSON/Clash with the zero value.
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func (s *SubService) loadRemarkSettings() {
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var err error
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s.datepicker, err = s.settingService.GetDatepicker()
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if err != nil {
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s.datepicker = "gregorian"
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}
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s.showIdentityOnAllLinks, err = s.settingService.GetSubShowIdentityOnAllLinks()
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if err != nil {
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s.showIdentityOnAllLinks = false
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}
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}
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func (s *SubService) configuredPublicHost() string {
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if d, err := s.settingService.GetSubDomain(); err == nil && d != "" {
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return d
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}
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if d, err := s.settingService.GetWebDomain(); err == nil && d != "" {
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return d
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}
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return ""
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}
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func isRoutableHost(host string) bool {
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if host == "" {
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return false
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}
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if ip := net.ParseIP(strings.Trim(host, "[]")); ip != nil {
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return !ip.IsLoopback() && !ip.IsUnspecified()
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}
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return true
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}
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func isLoopbackHost(host string) bool {
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ip := net.ParseIP(strings.Trim(host, "[]"))
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return ip != nil && ip.IsLoopback()
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}
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// listenIsInternalOnly reports whether a bind address is reachable only from
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// the same host — a loopback IP or a unix-domain socket. Such an inbound can't
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// be dialed directly by a remote client, so when it is the child side of a
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// fallback its share link must be projected through the master. A public or
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// wildcard listen (""/0.0.0.0/::) is reachable on its own port and advertises
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// itself.
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func listenIsInternalOnly(listen string) bool {
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if listen == "" {
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return false
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}
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if listen[0] == '@' || listen[0] == '/' {
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return true
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}
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return isLoopbackHost(listen)
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}
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// matchingClients returns the inbound's clients whose SubID equals subId,
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// resolved from the normalized clients/client_inbounds tables (both filter
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// columns indexed) instead of parsing the settings JSON — at large client
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// counts that parse made every subscription fetch cost seconds. The
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// case-insensitive email dedupe stays as cheap insurance even though
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// clients.email is unique, preserving the #5134 guarantee that duplicate
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// settings entries never fan out into duplicate profiles. Resolved clients
|
|
// are primed into the per-request cache so the link generators don't parse
|
|
// settings either.
|
|
func (s *SubService) matchingClients(inbound *model.Inbound, subId string) []model.Client {
|
|
clients, err := s.inboundService.GetClientsBySubId(inbound.Id, subId)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
logger.Error("SubService - GetClientsBySubId: Unable to get clients from inbound")
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
var out []model.Client
|
|
seen := make(map[string]struct{}, len(clients))
|
|
for _, client := range clients {
|
|
key := strings.ToLower(client.Email)
|
|
if _, dup := seen[key]; dup {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
seen[key] = struct{}{}
|
|
out = append(out, client)
|
|
}
|
|
s.primeLinkClients(inbound.Id, out, false)
|
|
return out
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// RecordSubscriptionFetch records a successful subscription response for all clients sharing subId.
|
|
func (s *SubService) RecordSubscriptionFetch(subId string) error {
|
|
if strings.TrimSpace(subId) == "" {
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
return database.GetDB().Model(&xray.ClientTraffic{}).
|
|
Where("email IN (SELECT email FROM clients WHERE sub_id = ?)", subId).
|
|
Update("last_sub_fetch", time.Now().UnixMilli()).Error
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// GetSubs retrieves subscription links for a given subscription ID and host.
|
|
func (s *SubService) GetSubs(subId string, host string) ([]string, []string, int64, xray.ClientTraffic, error) {
|
|
return s.ForRequest(host).getSubs(subId)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (s *SubService) getSubs(subId string) ([]string, []string, int64, xray.ClientTraffic, error) {
|
|
var result []string
|
|
var emails []string
|
|
var traffic xray.ClientTraffic
|
|
var hasEnabledClient bool
|
|
inbounds, err := s.getInboundsBySubId(subId)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, nil, 0, traffic, err
|
|
}
|
|
externalLinks, err := s.getClientExternalLinksBySubId(subId)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, nil, 0, traffic, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if len(inbounds) == 0 && len(externalLinks) == 0 {
|
|
return nil, nil, 0, traffic, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
seenEmails := make(map[string]struct{})
|
|
for _, inbound := range inbounds {
|
|
clients := s.matchingClients(inbound, subId)
|
|
if len(clients) == 0 {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
s.projectThroughFallbackMaster(inbound)
|
|
// Host overrides apply AFTER fallback projection so a host's
|
|
// address/TLS wins over the projected master stream.
|
|
hostEps := s.hostEndpoints(inbound, "raw")
|
|
for _, client := range clients {
|
|
if client.Enable {
|
|
hasEnabledClient = true
|
|
}
|
|
var link string
|
|
if len(hostEps) > 0 {
|
|
link = s.linkFromHosts(inbound, client, hostEps)
|
|
} else {
|
|
link = s.GetLink(inbound, client.Email)
|
|
}
|
|
result = append(result, link)
|
|
emails = append(emails, client.Email)
|
|
seenEmails[client.Email] = struct{}{}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
for _, ext := range externalLinks {
|
|
if ext.Enable {
|
|
hasEnabledClient = true
|
|
}
|
|
for _, el := range expandEntry(ext) {
|
|
if link := applyRemarkToLink(el.Link, el.Name); link != "" {
|
|
result = append(result, link)
|
|
emails = append(emails, ext.Email)
|
|
seenEmails[ext.Email] = struct{}{}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
uniqueEmails := make([]string, 0, len(seenEmails))
|
|
for e := range seenEmails {
|
|
uniqueEmails = append(uniqueEmails, e)
|
|
}
|
|
traffic, lastOnline := s.AggregateTrafficByEmails(uniqueEmails)
|
|
traffic.Enable = hasEnabledClient
|
|
return result, emails, lastOnline, traffic, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// inboundLinks builds the share links for every distinct client of one inbound
|
|
// the same way getSubs does — managed Host endpoints win over the plain link so
|
|
// {{HOST}} and per-host variants render — but across all clients rather than a
|
|
// single subId. Dedups duplicate client JSON entries by email (#5134). Backs the
|
|
// panel's "Export all inbound links" so it matches the client/QR pages.
|
|
func (s *SubService) inboundLinks(inbound *model.Inbound) []string {
|
|
clients, err := s.inboundService.GetClients(inbound)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
s.primeLinkClients(inbound.Id, clients, true)
|
|
s.projectThroughFallbackMaster(inbound)
|
|
hostEps := s.hostEndpoints(inbound, "raw")
|
|
var out []string
|
|
seen := make(map[string]struct{}, len(clients))
|
|
for _, client := range clients {
|
|
key := strings.ToLower(client.Email)
|
|
if _, dup := seen[key]; dup {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
seen[key] = struct{}{}
|
|
var link string
|
|
if len(hostEps) > 0 {
|
|
link = s.linkFromHosts(inbound, client, hostEps)
|
|
} else {
|
|
link = s.GetLink(inbound, client.Email)
|
|
}
|
|
out = append(out, splitLinkLines(link)...)
|
|
}
|
|
return out
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// AggregateTrafficByEmails resolves traffic for every email in one
|
|
// query and folds the rows into a single ClientTraffic + lastOnline.
|
|
// xray.ClientTraffic.Email is globally unique, so a multi-inbound
|
|
// client's single row is attached to exactly one inbound — iterating
|
|
// per-inbound ClientStats would miss it on the others. Used by GetSubs,
|
|
// SubClashService.GetClash, and SubJsonService.GetJson to keep the
|
|
// sub-info header consistent across all three formats.
|
|
func (s *SubService) AggregateTrafficByEmails(emails []string) (xray.ClientTraffic, int64) {
|
|
var agg xray.ClientTraffic
|
|
var lastOnline int64
|
|
if len(emails) == 0 {
|
|
return agg, 0
|
|
}
|
|
db := database.GetDB()
|
|
var rows []xray.ClientTraffic
|
|
if err := db.
|
|
Model(&xray.ClientTraffic{}).
|
|
Where("email IN ?", emails).
|
|
Find(&rows).Error; err != nil {
|
|
logger.Warning("SubService - AggregateTrafficByEmails: load by email:", err)
|
|
return agg, 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// total/expiry are configured limits owned by the clients table, not the
|
|
// runtime traffic rows. In a multi-node setup the node snapshot can reset
|
|
// client_traffics.total/expiry_time to 0, so fall back to the clients
|
|
// table to keep the Subscription-Userinfo header in sync with the UI (#4645).
|
|
limits := make(map[string][2]int64, len(emails))
|
|
var records []model.ClientRecord
|
|
if err := db.Model(&model.ClientRecord{}).Where("email IN ?", emails).Find(&records).Error; err != nil {
|
|
logger.Warning("SubService - AggregateTrafficByEmails: load client limits:", err)
|
|
} else {
|
|
for _, r := range records {
|
|
limits[r.Email] = [2]int64{r.TotalGB, r.ExpiryTime}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
now := time.Now().UnixMilli()
|
|
first := true
|
|
for _, ct := range rows {
|
|
if ct.LastOnline > lastOnline {
|
|
lastOnline = ct.LastOnline
|
|
}
|
|
total, expiry := ct.Total, ct.ExpiryTime
|
|
if lim, ok := limits[ct.Email]; ok {
|
|
if total == 0 {
|
|
total = lim[0]
|
|
}
|
|
if expiry == 0 {
|
|
expiry = lim[1]
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if first {
|
|
agg.Up = ct.Up
|
|
agg.Down = ct.Down
|
|
agg.Total = total
|
|
agg.ExpiryTime = subscriptionExpiryFromClient(now, expiry)
|
|
first = false
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
agg.Up += ct.Up
|
|
agg.Down += ct.Down
|
|
if agg.Total == 0 || total == 0 {
|
|
agg.Total = 0
|
|
} else {
|
|
agg.Total += total
|
|
}
|
|
normalized := subscriptionExpiryFromClient(now, expiry)
|
|
if normalized != agg.ExpiryTime {
|
|
agg.ExpiryTime = 0
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return agg, lastOnline
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func subscriptionExpiryFromClient(nowMs, expiryTime int64) int64 {
|
|
if expiryTime > 0 {
|
|
return expiryTime
|
|
}
|
|
if expiryTime < 0 {
|
|
return nowMs + (-expiryTime)
|
|
}
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (s *SubService) getInboundsBySubId(subId string) ([]*model.Inbound, error) {
|
|
db := database.GetDB()
|
|
var inbounds []*model.Inbound
|
|
err := db.Model(model.Inbound{}).Where(`id in (
|
|
SELECT DISTINCT inbounds.id
|
|
FROM inbounds
|
|
JOIN client_inbounds ON client_inbounds.inbound_id = inbounds.id
|
|
JOIN clients ON clients.id = client_inbounds.client_id
|
|
WHERE
|
|
inbounds.protocol in ('vmess','vless','trojan','shadowsocks','hysteria','wireguard','amneziawg','mtproto')
|
|
AND clients.sub_id = ? AND inbounds.enable = ?
|
|
)`, subId, true).Order("sub_sort_index ASC").Order("id ASC").Find(&inbounds).Error
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
s.indexStatsBySubId(subId)
|
|
return inbounds, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// indexStatsBySubId loads the traffic rows for just this subscriber's clients
|
|
// into statsByEmail so statsForClient can resolve a client's usage on any of
|
|
// its inbounds. It replaces preloading every matched inbound's ClientStats,
|
|
// which read the entire client_traffics table on every subscription fetch of
|
|
// a large inbound; statsForClient's per-email DB fallback covers any miss.
|
|
func (s *SubService) indexStatsBySubId(subId string) {
|
|
if s.statsByEmail == nil {
|
|
s.statsByEmail = map[string]xray.ClientTraffic{}
|
|
}
|
|
db := database.GetDB()
|
|
var emails []string
|
|
if err := db.Model(&model.ClientRecord{}).Where("sub_id = ?", subId).Pluck("email", &emails).Error; err != nil {
|
|
logger.Error("SubService - indexStatsBySubId: load emails:", err)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
const chunk = 400
|
|
for lo := 0; lo < len(emails); lo += chunk {
|
|
hi := min(lo+chunk, len(emails))
|
|
var rows []xray.ClientTraffic
|
|
if err := db.Where("email IN ?", emails[lo:hi]).Find(&rows).Error; err != nil {
|
|
logger.Error("SubService - indexStatsBySubId: load traffics:", err)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
for _, st := range rows {
|
|
s.statsByEmail[st.Email] = st
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// projectThroughFallbackMaster mutates the inbound in place so its
|
|
// Listen/Port/StreamSettings reflect the externally reachable master
|
|
// when applicable. Covers both fallback mechanisms:
|
|
// - panel-tracked: an inbound_fallbacks row where child_id = inbound.Id
|
|
// - legacy unix-socket: inbound.Listen begins with "@" and some VLESS/
|
|
// Trojan inbound's settings.fallbacks references that listen address
|
|
//
|
|
// Returns true when a projection happened; sub services call this before
|
|
// generating links so a child VLESS-WS bound to 127.0.0.1 emits the
|
|
// master's :443 + TLS state instead of its own loopback endpoint.
|
|
//
|
|
// Projection only applies to a child that is not directly reachable on its
|
|
// own listen (loopback or a unix-domain socket). An inbound on a public or
|
|
// wildcard listen is reachable on its own port, so it advertises its own
|
|
// port + security even when a stale fallback rule still names it as a child —
|
|
// otherwise its share link would leak the master's port and Reality/TLS
|
|
// settings (#4987).
|
|
func (s *SubService) projectThroughFallbackMaster(inbound *model.Inbound) bool {
|
|
if inbound == nil {
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
if !listenIsInternalOnly(inbound.Listen) {
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
db := database.GetDB()
|
|
var master *model.Inbound
|
|
|
|
var rule model.InboundFallback
|
|
if err := db.Where("child_id = ?", inbound.Id).
|
|
Order("sort_order ASC, id ASC").
|
|
First(&rule).Error; err == nil {
|
|
var m model.Inbound
|
|
if err := db.Where("id = ?", rule.MasterId).First(&m).Error; err == nil {
|
|
master = &m
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if master == nil && len(inbound.Listen) > 0 && inbound.Listen[0] == '@' {
|
|
var m model.Inbound
|
|
if err := db.Model(model.Inbound{}).
|
|
Where("JSON_TYPE(settings, '$.fallbacks') = 'array'").
|
|
Where("EXISTS (SELECT * FROM json_each(settings, '$.fallbacks') WHERE json_extract(value, '$.dest') = ?)", inbound.Listen).
|
|
First(&m).Error; err == nil {
|
|
master = &m
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if master == nil {
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
inbound.StreamSettings = mergeStreamFromMaster(inbound.StreamSettings, master.StreamSettings)
|
|
inbound.Listen = master.Listen
|
|
inbound.Port = master.Port
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// mergeStreamFromMaster copies the master's security + tlsSettings +
|
|
// realitySettings + externalProxy onto the child's stream so the child's
|
|
// link advertises the master's TLS / Reality state. Transport (network
|
|
// + ws/grpc/etc. settings) stays the child's.
|
|
func mergeStreamFromMaster(childStream, masterStream string) string {
|
|
var stream map[string]any
|
|
_ = json.Unmarshal([]byte(childStream), &stream)
|
|
if stream == nil {
|
|
stream = map[string]any{}
|
|
}
|
|
var mst map[string]any
|
|
_ = json.Unmarshal([]byte(masterStream), &mst)
|
|
if mst == nil {
|
|
return childStream
|
|
}
|
|
stream["security"] = mst["security"]
|
|
if v, ok := mst["tlsSettings"]; ok {
|
|
stream["tlsSettings"] = v
|
|
} else {
|
|
delete(stream, "tlsSettings")
|
|
}
|
|
if v, ok := mst["realitySettings"]; ok {
|
|
stream["realitySettings"] = v
|
|
} else {
|
|
delete(stream, "realitySettings")
|
|
}
|
|
if v, ok := mst["externalProxy"]; ok {
|
|
stream["externalProxy"] = v
|
|
}
|
|
out, err := json.MarshalIndent(stream, "", " ")
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return childStream
|
|
}
|
|
return string(out)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// GetLink dispatches to the protocol-specific generator for one (inbound, client)
|
|
// pair. Returns "" when the inbound's protocol doesn't produce a subscription URL
|
|
// (socks, http, mixed, wireguard, dokodemo, tunnel). The returned string may
|
|
// contain multiple `\n`-separated URLs when the inbound has externalProxy set.
|
|
func (s *SubService) GetLink(inbound *model.Inbound, email string) string {
|
|
switch inbound.Protocol {
|
|
case "vmess":
|
|
return s.genVmessLink(inbound, email)
|
|
case "vless":
|
|
return s.genVlessLink(inbound, email)
|
|
case "trojan":
|
|
return s.genTrojanLink(inbound, email)
|
|
case "shadowsocks":
|
|
return s.genShadowsocksLink(inbound, email)
|
|
case "hysteria":
|
|
return s.genHysteriaLink(inbound, email)
|
|
case "mtproto":
|
|
return s.genMtprotoLink(inbound, email)
|
|
case "wireguard":
|
|
return s.genWireguardLink(inbound, email)
|
|
case "amneziawg":
|
|
return s.genAmneziaWGLink(inbound, email)
|
|
}
|
|
return ""
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// genWireguardLink builds a per-client wireguard:// share link mirroring the
|
|
// frontend genWireguardLink: the client's private key is the userinfo, the
|
|
// server public key (derived from the inbound secretKey) and the client's
|
|
// tunnel address ride in the query. Returns "" when the client has no key.
|
|
func (s *SubService) genWireguardLink(inbound *model.Inbound, email string) string {
|
|
if inbound.Protocol != model.WireGuard {
|
|
return ""
|
|
}
|
|
settings := s.linkSettings(inbound)
|
|
secretKey, _ := settings["secretKey"].(string)
|
|
|
|
resolved, ok := s.clientForLink(inbound, email)
|
|
if !ok || resolved.PrivateKey == "" {
|
|
return ""
|
|
}
|
|
client := &resolved
|
|
|
|
link := fmt.Sprintf("wireguard://%s@%s", encodeUserinfo(client.PrivateKey), joinHostPort(s.resolveInboundAddress(inbound), inbound.Port))
|
|
params := make(map[string]string)
|
|
if secretKey != "" {
|
|
if pub, err := wgutil.PublicKeyFromPrivate(secretKey); err == nil {
|
|
params["publickey"] = pub
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if joined := strings.Join(client.AllowedIPs, ","); joined != "" {
|
|
params["address"] = joined
|
|
}
|
|
if mtu, ok := settings["mtu"].(float64); ok && mtu > 0 {
|
|
params["mtu"] = strconv.Itoa(int(mtu))
|
|
}
|
|
if dns, ok := settings["dns"].(string); ok && dns != "" {
|
|
params["dns"] = dns
|
|
}
|
|
if client.PreSharedKey != "" {
|
|
params["presharedkey"] = client.PreSharedKey
|
|
}
|
|
if client.KeepAlive > 0 {
|
|
params["keepalive"] = strconv.Itoa(client.KeepAlive)
|
|
}
|
|
return buildLinkWithParams(link, params, s.genRemark(inbound, email, "", ""))
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// amneziaWGHeaderOrDefault mirrors the frontend's amneziaWGHLine: AmneziaWG's
|
|
// H1-H4 magic-header fields always render into the config text, falling back
|
|
// to their protocol-default values (1/2/3/4) when unset rather than being
|
|
// omitted, since a native AmneziaWG client needs all four to be present.
|
|
func amneziaWGHeaderOrDefault(value, fallback string) string {
|
|
if strings.TrimSpace(value) == "" {
|
|
return fallback
|
|
}
|
|
return value
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// amneziaWGConfigText builds the same plain AmneziaWG client .conf text the
|
|
// frontend's genAmneziaWGConfig produces (same field order, same optional-field
|
|
// conditionals) -- this is the payload wrapped into vpn:// links below.
|
|
func amneziaWGConfigText(server *amneziawg.ServerSettings, client *model.Client, host string, port int, remark string) string {
|
|
// These land unescaped in [Interface]; a newline here would inject a
|
|
// config line (e.g. a rogue PostUp) into the subscriber's .conf.
|
|
for _, v := range []string{client.PrivateKey, server.PrimaryDNS, server.SecondaryDNS, remark} {
|
|
if strings.ContainsAny(v, "\r\n") {
|
|
return ""
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var b strings.Builder
|
|
|
|
b.WriteString("[Interface]\n")
|
|
fmt.Fprintf(&b, "PrivateKey = %s\n", client.PrivateKey)
|
|
fmt.Fprintf(&b, "Address = %s\n", strings.Join(client.AllowedIPs, ", "))
|
|
|
|
var dns []string
|
|
if server.PrimaryDNS != "" {
|
|
dns = append(dns, server.PrimaryDNS)
|
|
}
|
|
if server.SecondaryDNS != "" {
|
|
dns = append(dns, server.SecondaryDNS)
|
|
}
|
|
if len(dns) > 0 {
|
|
fmt.Fprintf(&b, "DNS = %s\n", strings.Join(dns, ", "))
|
|
}
|
|
if server.MTU > 0 {
|
|
fmt.Fprintf(&b, "MTU = %d\n", server.MTU)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
fmt.Fprintf(&b, "Jc = %d\n", server.Jc)
|
|
fmt.Fprintf(&b, "Jmin = %d\n", server.Jmin)
|
|
fmt.Fprintf(&b, "Jmax = %d\n", server.Jmax)
|
|
fmt.Fprintf(&b, "S1 = %d\n", server.S1)
|
|
fmt.Fprintf(&b, "S2 = %d\n", server.S2)
|
|
if server.S3 > 0 {
|
|
fmt.Fprintf(&b, "S3 = %d\n", server.S3)
|
|
}
|
|
if server.S4 > 0 {
|
|
fmt.Fprintf(&b, "S4 = %d\n", server.S4)
|
|
}
|
|
fmt.Fprintf(&b, "H1 = %s\n", amneziaWGHeaderOrDefault(server.H1, "1"))
|
|
fmt.Fprintf(&b, "H2 = %s\n", amneziaWGHeaderOrDefault(server.H2, "2"))
|
|
fmt.Fprintf(&b, "H3 = %s\n", amneziaWGHeaderOrDefault(server.H3, "3"))
|
|
fmt.Fprintf(&b, "H4 = %s\n", amneziaWGHeaderOrDefault(server.H4, "4"))
|
|
for i, v := range []string{server.I1, server.I2, server.I3, server.I4, server.I5} {
|
|
if v != "" {
|
|
fmt.Fprintf(&b, "I%d = %s\n", i+1, v)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
optional := []struct{ key, v string }{
|
|
{"HeaderProtectionKey", server.HeaderProtectionKey},
|
|
{"ContentPaddingAddition", server.ContentPaddingAddition},
|
|
{"RekeyAfterTime", server.RekeyAfterTime},
|
|
{"RekeyTimeout", server.RekeyTimeout},
|
|
{"RejectAfterTime", server.RejectAfterTime},
|
|
{"KeepaliveTimeout", server.KeepaliveTimeout},
|
|
{"MaxHandshakeAttempts", server.MaxHandshakeAttempts},
|
|
}
|
|
for _, p := range optional {
|
|
if p.v != "" {
|
|
fmt.Fprintf(&b, "%s = %s\n", p.key, p.v)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if server.RandomTrailers {
|
|
b.WriteString("RandomTrailers = on\n")
|
|
}
|
|
if server.DisableCookies {
|
|
b.WriteString("DisableCookies = on\n")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Peer field order follows wg-quick(8) and the panel's other two AmneziaWG
|
|
// emitters (genAmneziaWGConfig, buildAmneziaWGClientConfig); all three are
|
|
// independent implementations, so any drift here is invisible until a user
|
|
// compares a subscription link against a downloaded .conf.
|
|
fmt.Fprintf(&b, "\n# %s\n", remark)
|
|
b.WriteString("[Peer]\n")
|
|
fmt.Fprintf(&b, "PublicKey = %s\n", server.PublicKey)
|
|
if client.PreSharedKey != "" {
|
|
fmt.Fprintf(&b, "PresharedKey = %s\n", client.PreSharedKey)
|
|
}
|
|
b.WriteString("AllowedIPs = 0.0.0.0/0, ::/0\n")
|
|
fmt.Fprintf(&b, "Endpoint = %s:%d", host, port)
|
|
if client.KeepAlive > 0 {
|
|
fmt.Fprintf(&b, "\nPersistentKeepalive = %d", client.KeepAlive)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return b.String()
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// genAmneziaWGLink builds a per-client vpn://<base64url .conf text> share
|
|
// link matching the real AmneziaVPN app's own share-link scheme (see the
|
|
// frontend's genAmneziaWGLink for the confirmed import-path reasoning).
|
|
// Returns "" when the client or server has no key.
|
|
func (s *SubService) genAmneziaWGLink(inbound *model.Inbound, email string) string {
|
|
if inbound.Protocol != model.AmneziaWG {
|
|
return ""
|
|
}
|
|
var parsed amneziawg.InboundSettings
|
|
if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(inbound.Settings), &parsed); err != nil || parsed.Server == nil {
|
|
return ""
|
|
}
|
|
server := parsed.Server
|
|
|
|
resolved, ok := s.clientForLink(inbound, email)
|
|
if !ok || resolved.PrivateKey == "" {
|
|
return ""
|
|
}
|
|
client := &resolved
|
|
|
|
text := amneziaWGConfigText(server, client, s.resolveInboundAddress(inbound), inbound.Port, s.genRemark(inbound, email, "", ""))
|
|
if text == "" {
|
|
return ""
|
|
}
|
|
return "vpn://" + base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(text))
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// genMtprotoLink builds a per-client Telegram proxy deep link for an mtproto
|
|
// inbound: the server/port pair plus the client's own FakeTLS secret. The link
|
|
// carries no remark fragment — Telegram proxy deep links have no name field, and
|
|
// a trailing "#remark" is appended to the last query value by lenient parsers,
|
|
// corrupting the server address. The remark is shown separately in the panel UI.
|
|
// Returns "" when the client has no secret.
|
|
func (s *SubService) genMtprotoLink(inbound *model.Inbound, email string) string {
|
|
if inbound.Protocol != model.MTProto {
|
|
return ""
|
|
}
|
|
resolved, ok := s.clientForLink(inbound, email)
|
|
if !ok || resolved.Secret == "" {
|
|
return ""
|
|
}
|
|
params := map[string]string{
|
|
"server": s.resolveInboundAddress(inbound),
|
|
"port": fmt.Sprintf("%d", inbound.Port),
|
|
"secret": resolved.Secret,
|
|
}
|
|
return buildLinkWithParams("tg://proxy", params, "")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Protocol link generators are intentionally ordered as:
|
|
// vmess -> vless -> trojan -> shadowsocks -> hysteria.
|
|
func (s *SubService) genVmessLink(inbound *model.Inbound, email string) string {
|
|
if inbound.Protocol != model.VMESS {
|
|
return ""
|
|
}
|
|
address := s.resolveInboundAddress(inbound)
|
|
obj := map[string]any{
|
|
"v": "2",
|
|
"add": address,
|
|
"port": inbound.Port,
|
|
"type": "none",
|
|
}
|
|
stream := unmarshalStreamSettings(inbound.StreamSettings)
|
|
network, _ := stream["network"].(string)
|
|
applyVmessNetworkParams(stream, network, obj)
|
|
if finalmask, ok := stream["finalmask"].(map[string]any); ok {
|
|
applyFinalMaskObj(finalmask, obj)
|
|
}
|
|
security, _ := stream["security"].(string)
|
|
obj["tls"] = security
|
|
if security == "tls" {
|
|
applyVmessTLSParams(stream, obj)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
client, ok := s.clientForLink(inbound, email)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return ""
|
|
}
|
|
obj["id"] = client.ID
|
|
obj["scy"] = normalizeVmessSecurity(client.Security)
|
|
|
|
externalProxies, _ := stream["externalProxy"].([]any)
|
|
|
|
if len(externalProxies) > 0 {
|
|
return s.buildVmessExternalProxyLinks(externalProxies, obj, inbound, email, network)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
obj["ps"] = s.genRemark(inbound, email, "", network)
|
|
return buildVmessLink(obj)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// normalizeVmessSecurity maps the vmess security values xray-core v26.7.11
|
|
// removed ("none"/"zero"), plus the legacy empty string, to "auto" so links
|
|
// and subscriptions stop advertising values the upgraded server rejects on
|
|
// the wire.
|
|
func normalizeVmessSecurity(security string) string {
|
|
switch security {
|
|
case "", "none", "zero":
|
|
return "auto"
|
|
}
|
|
return security
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// vlessEncryptionEnabled reports whether the VLESS inbound settings enable
|
|
// VLESS-level encryption (vlessenc / ML-KEM). When on, the encryption/decryption
|
|
// fields hold a generated dotted string (e.g. "mlkem768x25519plus.native.0rtt.<key>");
|
|
// "none" or empty means off. The value is never the literal "vlessenc" — that is
|
|
// the `xray vlessenc` CLI subcommand name, not a stored value.
|
|
func vlessEncryptionEnabled(settings map[string]any) bool {
|
|
for _, key := range []string{"encryption", "decryption"} {
|
|
if v, ok := settings[key].(string); ok && v != "" && v != "none" {
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// vlessFlowAllowed reports whether a client's XTLS Vision flow belongs in
|
|
// generated links/configs. Mirrors inboundCanEnableTlsFlow in
|
|
// internal/web/service: Vision runs on TCP with tls/reality (classic), and on
|
|
// XHTTP whenever VLESS encryption (vlessenc / ML-KEM) is enabled — there the
|
|
// VLESS-level encryption stands in for the transport TLS that Vision relies
|
|
// on, regardless of the stream security layer (so XHTTP+REALITY+vlessenc
|
|
// keeps its flow too).
|
|
func vlessFlowAllowed(network, security string, settings map[string]any) bool {
|
|
switch network {
|
|
case "tcp":
|
|
return security == "tls" || security == "reality"
|
|
case "xhttp":
|
|
return vlessEncryptionEnabled(settings)
|
|
}
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (s *SubService) genVlessLink(inbound *model.Inbound, email string) string {
|
|
if inbound.Protocol != model.VLESS {
|
|
return ""
|
|
}
|
|
address := s.resolveInboundAddress(inbound)
|
|
stream := unmarshalStreamSettings(inbound.StreamSettings)
|
|
client, ok := s.clientForLink(inbound, email)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return ""
|
|
}
|
|
uuid := client.ID
|
|
port := inbound.Port
|
|
streamNetwork, _ := stream["network"].(string)
|
|
params := make(map[string]string)
|
|
params["type"] = streamNetwork
|
|
|
|
// Add encryption parameter for VLESS from inbound settings
|
|
settings := s.linkSettings(inbound)
|
|
if encryption, ok := settings["encryption"].(string); ok {
|
|
params["encryption"] = encryption
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
applyShareNetworkParams(stream, streamNetwork, params)
|
|
if finalmask, ok := stream["finalmask"].(map[string]any); ok {
|
|
applyFinalMaskParams(finalmask, params)
|
|
}
|
|
security, _ := stream["security"].(string)
|
|
switch security {
|
|
case "tls":
|
|
applyShareTLSParams(stream, params)
|
|
case "reality":
|
|
applyShareRealityParams(stream, params, subKey(client))
|
|
default:
|
|
params["security"] = "none"
|
|
}
|
|
if len(client.Flow) > 0 && !inbound.DisableFlow && vlessFlowAllowed(streamNetwork, security, settings) {
|
|
params["flow"] = client.Flow
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
externalProxies, _ := stream["externalProxy"].([]any)
|
|
|
|
if len(externalProxies) > 0 {
|
|
return s.buildExternalProxyURLLinks(
|
|
externalProxies,
|
|
params,
|
|
security,
|
|
func(ep map[string]any, dest string, port int) string {
|
|
return fmt.Sprintf("vless://%s@%s", applyVlessRoute(uuid, hostVlessRoute(ep)), joinHostPort(dest, port))
|
|
},
|
|
func(ep map[string]any) string {
|
|
return s.endpointRemark(inbound, email, ep, streamNetwork)
|
|
},
|
|
)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
link := fmt.Sprintf("vless://%s@%s", uuid, joinHostPort(address, port))
|
|
return buildLinkWithParams(link, params, s.genRemark(inbound, email, "", streamNetwork))
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (s *SubService) genTrojanLink(inbound *model.Inbound, email string) string {
|
|
if inbound.Protocol != model.Trojan {
|
|
return ""
|
|
}
|
|
address := s.resolveInboundAddress(inbound)
|
|
stream := unmarshalStreamSettings(inbound.StreamSettings)
|
|
client, ok := s.clientForLink(inbound, email)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return ""
|
|
}
|
|
password := encodeUserinfo(client.Password)
|
|
port := inbound.Port
|
|
streamNetwork, _ := stream["network"].(string)
|
|
params := make(map[string]string)
|
|
params["type"] = streamNetwork
|
|
|
|
applyShareNetworkParams(stream, streamNetwork, params)
|
|
if finalmask, ok := stream["finalmask"].(map[string]any); ok {
|
|
applyFinalMaskParams(finalmask, params)
|
|
}
|
|
security, _ := stream["security"].(string)
|
|
switch security {
|
|
case "tls":
|
|
applyShareTLSParams(stream, params)
|
|
case "reality":
|
|
applyShareRealityParams(stream, params, subKey(client))
|
|
if streamNetwork == "tcp" && len(client.Flow) > 0 && !inbound.DisableFlow {
|
|
params["flow"] = client.Flow
|
|
}
|
|
default:
|
|
params["security"] = "none"
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
externalProxies, _ := stream["externalProxy"].([]any)
|
|
|
|
if len(externalProxies) > 0 {
|
|
return s.buildExternalProxyURLLinks(
|
|
externalProxies,
|
|
params,
|
|
security,
|
|
func(_ map[string]any, dest string, port int) string {
|
|
return fmt.Sprintf("trojan://%s@%s", password, joinHostPort(dest, port))
|
|
},
|
|
func(ep map[string]any) string {
|
|
return s.endpointRemark(inbound, email, ep, streamNetwork)
|
|
},
|
|
)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
link := fmt.Sprintf("trojan://%s@%s", password, joinHostPort(address, port))
|
|
return buildLinkWithParams(link, params, s.genRemark(inbound, email, "", streamNetwork))
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// encodeUserinfo percent-encodes a userinfo (password/auth) value so it
|
|
// can be safely embedded in a `scheme://<value>@host:port` URL. RFC 3986
|
|
// allows `=` in userinfo as a sub-delim, but several Trojan and Hysteria
|
|
// clients reject share-links where the password contains literal `/`
|
|
// or `=` (notably the common base64-with-padding shape produced by the
|
|
// panel). Encode them too — this matches encodeURIComponent() on the
|
|
// frontend and round-trips cleanly through net/url's parser.
|
|
func encodeUserinfo(s string) string {
|
|
return strings.ReplaceAll(url.QueryEscape(s), "+", "%20")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// joinHostPort wraps an IPv6 host in square brackets the way RFC 3986
|
|
// requires for URI authorities, while leaving IPv4 addresses and hostnames
|
|
// untouched. It also strips any brackets already present on the input so
|
|
// callers don't have to normalize upstream.
|
|
func joinHostPort(host string, port int) string {
|
|
host = strings.Trim(host, "[]")
|
|
return net.JoinHostPort(host, strconv.Itoa(port))
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (s *SubService) genShadowsocksLink(inbound *model.Inbound, email string) string {
|
|
if inbound.Protocol != model.Shadowsocks {
|
|
return ""
|
|
}
|
|
address := s.resolveInboundAddress(inbound)
|
|
stream := unmarshalStreamSettings(inbound.StreamSettings)
|
|
client, ok := s.clientForLink(inbound, email)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return ""
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
settings := s.linkSettings(inbound)
|
|
inboundPassword, _ := settings["password"].(string)
|
|
method, _ := settings["method"].(string)
|
|
streamNetwork, _ := stream["network"].(string)
|
|
params := make(map[string]string)
|
|
params["type"] = streamNetwork
|
|
|
|
applyShareNetworkParams(stream, streamNetwork, params)
|
|
if finalmask, ok := stream["finalmask"].(map[string]any); ok {
|
|
applyFinalMaskParams(finalmask, params)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
security, _ := stream["security"].(string)
|
|
if security == "tls" {
|
|
applyShareTLSParams(stream, params)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// SIP002 clients (v2rayN) ignore the xray-native type/headerType/host/path
|
|
// params and only read `plugin`. Re-encode a TCP http header as obfs-local so
|
|
// they build a matching tcp/http outbound (v2rayN forces request path "/").
|
|
if streamNetwork == "tcp" && params["headerType"] == "http" {
|
|
host := params["host"]
|
|
delete(params, "type")
|
|
delete(params, "headerType")
|
|
delete(params, "host")
|
|
delete(params, "path")
|
|
params["plugin"] = "obfs-local;obfs=http;obfs-host=" + host
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// SIP002 userinfo is base64(method:password). For SIP022 (2022-blake3-*) the
|
|
// userinfo MUST NOT be base64-encoded; method and password are percent-encoded.
|
|
var userInfo string
|
|
if strings.HasPrefix(method, "2022") {
|
|
userInfo = fmt.Sprintf("%s:%s:%s",
|
|
url.QueryEscape(method),
|
|
url.QueryEscape(inboundPassword),
|
|
url.QueryEscape(client.Password))
|
|
} else {
|
|
userInfo = base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(fmt.Appendf(nil, "%s:%s", method, client.Password))
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
externalProxies, _ := stream["externalProxy"].([]any)
|
|
|
|
if len(externalProxies) > 0 {
|
|
proxyParams := cloneStringMap(params)
|
|
proxyParams["security"] = security
|
|
return s.buildExternalProxyURLLinks(
|
|
externalProxies,
|
|
proxyParams,
|
|
security,
|
|
func(_ map[string]any, dest string, port int) string {
|
|
return fmt.Sprintf("ss://%s@%s", userInfo, joinHostPort(dest, port))
|
|
},
|
|
func(ep map[string]any) string {
|
|
return s.endpointRemark(inbound, email, ep, streamNetwork)
|
|
},
|
|
)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
link := fmt.Sprintf("ss://%s@%s", userInfo, joinHostPort(address, inbound.Port))
|
|
return buildLinkWithParams(link, params, s.genRemark(inbound, email, "", streamNetwork))
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (s *SubService) genHysteriaLink(inbound *model.Inbound, email string) string {
|
|
if inbound.Protocol != model.Hysteria {
|
|
return ""
|
|
}
|
|
var stream map[string]any
|
|
_ = json.Unmarshal([]byte(inbound.StreamSettings), &stream)
|
|
client, ok := s.clientForLink(inbound, email)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return ""
|
|
}
|
|
auth := encodeUserinfo(client.Auth)
|
|
params := make(map[string]string)
|
|
|
|
params["security"] = "tls"
|
|
tlsSetting, _ := stream["tlsSettings"].(map[string]any)
|
|
alpns, _ := tlsSetting["alpn"].([]any)
|
|
var alpn []string
|
|
for _, a := range alpns {
|
|
if s, ok := a.(string); ok {
|
|
alpn = append(alpn, s)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if len(alpn) > 0 {
|
|
params["alpn"] = strings.Join(alpn, ",")
|
|
}
|
|
if sniValue, ok := searchKey(tlsSetting, "serverName"); ok {
|
|
params["sni"], _ = sniValue.(string)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
tlsSettings, _ := searchKey(tlsSetting, "settings")
|
|
if tlsSetting != nil {
|
|
if fpValue, ok := searchKey(tlsSettings, "fingerprint"); ok {
|
|
params["fp"], _ = fpValue.(string)
|
|
}
|
|
if echValue, ok := searchKey(tlsSettings, "echConfigList"); ok {
|
|
if ech, _ := echValue.(string); ech != "" {
|
|
params["ech"] = ech
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if vcn, ok := verifyPeerCertByNameValue(tlsSettings); ok {
|
|
params["vcn"] = vcn
|
|
}
|
|
if pins, ok := pinnedSha256List(tlsSettings); ok {
|
|
for i, p := range pins {
|
|
pins[i] = hysteriaPinHex(p)
|
|
}
|
|
params["pinSHA256"] = strings.Join(pins, ",")
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// salamander obfs (Hysteria2). Emit only the standard URI fields;
|
|
// the non-standard fm=<json> finalmask dump breaks mihomo and other
|
|
// Hysteria2 clients that reject unknown query params.
|
|
if finalmask, ok := stream["finalmask"].(map[string]any); ok {
|
|
if udpMasks, ok := finalmask["udp"].([]any); ok {
|
|
for _, m := range udpMasks {
|
|
mask, _ := m.(map[string]any)
|
|
if mask == nil || mask["type"] != "salamander" {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
settings, _ := mask["settings"].(map[string]any)
|
|
if pw, ok := settings["password"].(string); ok && pw != "" {
|
|
if extra := extraSalamanderKeys(settings); len(extra) > 0 {
|
|
warningKey := fmt.Sprintf("%d:%v", inbound.Id, extra)
|
|
if _, loaded := salamanderWarningSeen.LoadOrStore(warningKey, struct{}{}); !loaded {
|
|
logger.Warningf("SubService - inbound %d: salamander settings %v cannot be expressed in a hysteria2 URI; standard clients will fail the handshake", inbound.Id, extra)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
params["obfs"] = "salamander"
|
|
params["obfs-password"] = pw
|
|
break
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
settings := s.linkSettings(inbound)
|
|
version, _ := settings["version"].(float64)
|
|
protocol := "hysteria2"
|
|
if int(version) == 1 {
|
|
protocol = "hysteria"
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Fan out one link per External Proxy entry if any. Previously this
|
|
// generator ignored `externalProxy` entirely, so the link kept the
|
|
// server's own IP/port even when the admin configured an alternate
|
|
// endpoint (e.g. a CDN hostname + port that forwards to the node).
|
|
// Matches the behaviour of genVlessLink / genTrojanLink / ….
|
|
externalProxies, _ := stream["externalProxy"].([]any)
|
|
if len(externalProxies) > 0 {
|
|
links := make([]string, 0, len(externalProxies))
|
|
for _, externalProxy := range externalProxies {
|
|
ep, ok := externalProxy.(map[string]any)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
dest, _ := ep["dest"].(string)
|
|
portF, okPort := ep["port"].(float64)
|
|
if dest == "" || !okPort {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
epParams := cloneStringMap(params)
|
|
applyExternalProxyHysteriaParams(ep, epParams)
|
|
|
|
link := fmt.Sprintf("%s://%s@%s", protocol, auth, joinHostPort(dest, int(portF)))
|
|
links = append(links, buildLinkWithParams(link, epParams, s.endpointRemark(inbound, email, ep, "quic")))
|
|
}
|
|
return strings.Join(links, "\n")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// No external proxy configured — use the inbound's resolved address so
|
|
// node-managed inbounds get the node's host instead of the central panel's.
|
|
if hopPorts := hysteriaHopPorts(stream); hopPorts != "" {
|
|
params["mport"] = hopPorts
|
|
}
|
|
link := fmt.Sprintf("%s://%s@%s", protocol, auth, joinHostPort(s.resolveInboundAddress(inbound), inbound.Port))
|
|
return buildLinkWithParams(link, params, s.genRemark(inbound, email, "", "quic"))
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// hysteriaHopPorts returns the configured Hysteria2 UDP port-hopping range
|
|
// (finalmask.quicParams.udpHop.ports), or "" when port hopping is off. The
|
|
// range is emitted as the v2rayN-compatible `mport` query param; the URL port
|
|
// field stays numeric so .NET-Uri-based importers (v2rayN) can parse the link.
|
|
func hysteriaHopPorts(stream map[string]any) string {
|
|
finalmask, _ := stream["finalmask"].(map[string]any)
|
|
quicParams, _ := finalmask["quicParams"].(map[string]any)
|
|
udpHop, _ := quicParams["udpHop"].(map[string]any)
|
|
ports, _ := udpHop["ports"].(string)
|
|
return strings.TrimSpace(ports)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// loadNodes refreshes nodesByID from the DB. Called once per request so
|
|
// the per-inbound resolveInboundAddress lookups are pure map reads.
|
|
// We filter to address != ” so a half-configured node row doesn't
|
|
// accidentally produce a useless host like "https://:2053".
|
|
func (s *SubService) loadNodes() {
|
|
db := database.GetDB()
|
|
var nodes []*model.Node
|
|
if err := db.Model(&model.Node{}).Where("address != ''").Find(&nodes).Error; err != nil {
|
|
logger.Warning("subscription: load nodes failed:", err)
|
|
s.nodesByID = nil
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
m := make(map[int]*model.Node, len(nodes))
|
|
for _, n := range nodes {
|
|
m[n.Id] = n
|
|
}
|
|
s.nodesByID = m
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// resolveInboundAddress picks the host an external client should connect to,
|
|
// honoring the inbound's share address strategy the same way the panel's
|
|
// share/QR link builder does (#5208):
|
|
// - "listen": an explicit, client-reachable bind Listen wins, backed by the
|
|
// node's address for node-managed inbounds;
|
|
// - "custom": the inbound's ShareAddr wins, then node, then listen;
|
|
// - "node" (default, and any unknown value): the node's address for
|
|
// node-managed inbounds, then a routable Listen — the pre-strategy order.
|
|
//
|
|
// Every chain ends at the admin's configured public host (Sub/Web domain) and
|
|
// then the subscriber's request host (s.address). Preferring the configured
|
|
// host over the request host for this last resort keeps a wildcard local inbound
|
|
// from advertising a bogus client IP that leaked into the request Host header
|
|
// behind NAT/proxy/CDN (#5425). A loopback/wildcard bind or a unix-domain-socket
|
|
// listen is a server-side detail and is never advertised; External Proxy still
|
|
// overrides everything upstream of this call.
|
|
func (s *SubService) resolveInboundAddress(inbound *model.Inbound) string {
|
|
var nodeAddr string
|
|
if inbound.NodeID != nil && s.nodesByID != nil {
|
|
if n, ok := s.nodesByID[*inbound.NodeID]; ok {
|
|
nodeAddr = n.Address
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
var listenAddr string
|
|
if listen := inbound.Listen; listen != "" && listen[0] != '@' && listen[0] != '/' && isRoutableHost(listen) {
|
|
listenAddr = listen
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
candidates := []string{nodeAddr, listenAddr}
|
|
switch inbound.ShareAddrStrategy {
|
|
case "listen":
|
|
candidates = []string{listenAddr, nodeAddr}
|
|
case "custom":
|
|
candidates = []string{strings.TrimSpace(inbound.ShareAddr), nodeAddr, listenAddr}
|
|
}
|
|
for _, c := range candidates {
|
|
if c != "" {
|
|
return c
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if d := s.configuredPublicHost(); d != "" {
|
|
return d
|
|
}
|
|
return s.address
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func findClientIndex(clients []model.Client, email string) int {
|
|
for i, client := range clients {
|
|
if client.Email == email {
|
|
return i
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return -1
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func unmarshalStreamSettings(streamSettings string) map[string]any {
|
|
var stream map[string]any
|
|
_ = json.Unmarshal([]byte(streamSettings), &stream)
|
|
return stream
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func applyPathAndHostParams(settings map[string]any, params map[string]string) {
|
|
params["path"], _ = settings["path"].(string)
|
|
if host, ok := settings["host"].(string); ok && len(host) > 0 {
|
|
params["host"] = host
|
|
} else {
|
|
headers, _ := settings["headers"].(map[string]any)
|
|
params["host"] = searchHost(headers)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func applyPathAndHostObj(settings map[string]any, obj map[string]any) {
|
|
obj["path"], _ = settings["path"].(string)
|
|
if host, ok := settings["host"].(string); ok && len(host) > 0 {
|
|
obj["host"] = host
|
|
} else {
|
|
headers, _ := settings["headers"].(map[string]any)
|
|
obj["host"] = searchHost(headers)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func applyShareNetworkParams(stream map[string]any, streamNetwork string, params map[string]string) {
|
|
switch streamNetwork {
|
|
case "tcp":
|
|
tcp, _ := stream["tcpSettings"].(map[string]any)
|
|
header, _ := tcp["header"].(map[string]any)
|
|
typeStr, _ := header["type"].(string)
|
|
if typeStr == "http" {
|
|
request, _ := header["request"].(map[string]any)
|
|
requestPath, _ := request["path"].([]any)
|
|
if len(requestPath) > 0 {
|
|
params["path"], _ = requestPath[0].(string)
|
|
}
|
|
host := ""
|
|
if response, ok := header["response"].(map[string]any); ok {
|
|
if respHeaders, ok := response["headers"].(map[string]any); ok {
|
|
host = searchHost(respHeaders)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if host == "" {
|
|
headers, _ := request["headers"].(map[string]any)
|
|
host = searchHost(headers)
|
|
}
|
|
params["host"] = host
|
|
params["headerType"] = "http"
|
|
}
|
|
case "kcp":
|
|
applyKcpShareParams(stream, params)
|
|
case "ws":
|
|
ws, _ := stream["wsSettings"].(map[string]any)
|
|
applyPathAndHostParams(ws, params)
|
|
case "grpc":
|
|
grpc, _ := stream["grpcSettings"].(map[string]any)
|
|
params["serviceName"], _ = grpc["serviceName"].(string)
|
|
params["authority"], _ = grpc["authority"].(string)
|
|
if mm, _ := grpc["multiMode"].(bool); mm {
|
|
params["mode"] = "multi"
|
|
}
|
|
case "httpupgrade":
|
|
httpupgrade, _ := stream["httpupgradeSettings"].(map[string]any)
|
|
applyPathAndHostParams(httpupgrade, params)
|
|
case "xhttp":
|
|
xhttp, _ := stream["xhttpSettings"].(map[string]any)
|
|
applyXhttpExtraParams(xhttp, params)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// applyXhttpExtraObj copies the bidirectional xhttp settings into the
|
|
// VMess base64 JSON link object. VMess supports arbitrary keys, so we
|
|
// flatten the SplitHTTPConfig "extra" fields directly onto obj.
|
|
func applyXhttpExtraObj(xhttp map[string]any, obj map[string]any) {
|
|
if xpb, ok := xhttp["xPaddingBytes"].(string); ok && len(xpb) > 0 {
|
|
obj["x_padding_bytes"] = xpb
|
|
}
|
|
maps.Copy(obj, buildXhttpExtra(xhttp))
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func applyVmessNetworkParams(stream map[string]any, network string, obj map[string]any) {
|
|
obj["net"] = network
|
|
switch network {
|
|
case "tcp":
|
|
tcp, _ := stream["tcpSettings"].(map[string]any)
|
|
header, _ := tcp["header"].(map[string]any)
|
|
typeStr, _ := header["type"].(string)
|
|
obj["type"] = typeStr
|
|
if typeStr == "http" {
|
|
request, _ := header["request"].(map[string]any)
|
|
requestPath, _ := request["path"].([]any)
|
|
if len(requestPath) > 0 {
|
|
obj["path"], _ = requestPath[0].(string)
|
|
}
|
|
host := ""
|
|
if response, ok := header["response"].(map[string]any); ok {
|
|
if respHeaders, ok := response["headers"].(map[string]any); ok {
|
|
host = searchHost(respHeaders)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if host == "" {
|
|
headers, _ := request["headers"].(map[string]any)
|
|
host = searchHost(headers)
|
|
}
|
|
obj["host"] = host
|
|
}
|
|
case "kcp":
|
|
applyKcpShareObj(stream, obj)
|
|
case "ws":
|
|
ws, _ := stream["wsSettings"].(map[string]any)
|
|
applyPathAndHostObj(ws, obj)
|
|
case "grpc":
|
|
grpc, _ := stream["grpcSettings"].(map[string]any)
|
|
obj["path"], _ = grpc["serviceName"].(string)
|
|
obj["authority"], _ = grpc["authority"].(string)
|
|
if mm, _ := grpc["multiMode"].(bool); mm {
|
|
obj["type"] = "multi"
|
|
}
|
|
case "httpupgrade":
|
|
httpupgrade, _ := stream["httpupgradeSettings"].(map[string]any)
|
|
applyPathAndHostObj(httpupgrade, obj)
|
|
case "xhttp":
|
|
xhttp, _ := stream["xhttpSettings"].(map[string]any)
|
|
applyPathAndHostObj(xhttp, obj)
|
|
if mode, ok := xhttp["mode"].(string); ok {
|
|
obj["mode"] = mode
|
|
}
|
|
applyXhttpExtraObj(xhttp, obj)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func applyShareTLSParams(stream map[string]any, params map[string]string) {
|
|
params["security"] = "tls"
|
|
tlsSetting, _ := stream["tlsSettings"].(map[string]any)
|
|
alpns, _ := tlsSetting["alpn"].([]any)
|
|
var alpn []string
|
|
for _, a := range alpns {
|
|
if s, ok := a.(string); ok {
|
|
alpn = append(alpn, s)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if len(alpn) > 0 {
|
|
params["alpn"] = strings.Join(alpn, ",")
|
|
}
|
|
if sniValue, ok := searchKey(tlsSetting, "serverName"); ok {
|
|
params["sni"], _ = sniValue.(string)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
tlsSettings, _ := searchKey(tlsSetting, "settings")
|
|
if tlsSetting != nil {
|
|
if fpValue, ok := searchKey(tlsSettings, "fingerprint"); ok {
|
|
params["fp"], _ = fpValue.(string)
|
|
}
|
|
if echValue, ok := searchKey(tlsSettings, "echConfigList"); ok {
|
|
if ech, _ := echValue.(string); ech != "" {
|
|
params["ech"] = ech
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if vcn, ok := verifyPeerCertByNameValue(tlsSettings); ok {
|
|
params["vcn"] = vcn
|
|
}
|
|
if pins, ok := pinnedSha256List(tlsSettings); ok {
|
|
params["pcs"] = strings.Join(pins, ",")
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func applyVmessTLSParams(stream map[string]any, obj map[string]any) {
|
|
tlsSetting, _ := stream["tlsSettings"].(map[string]any)
|
|
alpns, _ := tlsSetting["alpn"].([]any)
|
|
if len(alpns) > 0 {
|
|
var alpn []string
|
|
for _, a := range alpns {
|
|
if s, ok := a.(string); ok {
|
|
alpn = append(alpn, s)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
obj["alpn"] = strings.Join(alpn, ",")
|
|
}
|
|
if sniValue, ok := searchKey(tlsSetting, "serverName"); ok {
|
|
obj["sni"], _ = sniValue.(string)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
tlsSettings, _ := searchKey(tlsSetting, "settings")
|
|
if tlsSetting != nil {
|
|
if fpValue, ok := searchKey(tlsSettings, "fingerprint"); ok {
|
|
obj["fp"], _ = fpValue.(string)
|
|
}
|
|
if echValue, ok := searchKey(tlsSettings, "echConfigList"); ok {
|
|
if ech, _ := echValue.(string); ech != "" {
|
|
obj["ech"] = ech
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if vcn, ok := verifyPeerCertByNameValue(tlsSettings); ok {
|
|
obj["vcn"] = vcn
|
|
}
|
|
if pins, ok := pinnedSha256List(tlsSettings); ok {
|
|
obj["pcs"] = strings.Join(pins, ",")
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// verifyPeerCertByNameValue extracts tlsSettings.settings.verifyPeerCertByName
|
|
// (the v2rayN `vcn` param) as a trimmed string. Like pinnedPeerCertSha256 it is
|
|
// panel-only and flows into share links so clients verify the server
|
|
// certificate by this name — the replacement for the removed allowInsecure.
|
|
func verifyPeerCertByNameValue(tlsClientSettings any) (string, bool) {
|
|
raw, ok := searchKey(tlsClientSettings, "verifyPeerCertByName")
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return "", false
|
|
}
|
|
s, ok := raw.(string)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return "", false
|
|
}
|
|
if s = strings.TrimSpace(s); s == "" {
|
|
return "", false
|
|
}
|
|
return s, true
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// pinnedSha256List extracts tlsSettings.settings.pinnedPeerCertSha256 as a
|
|
// []string. The field is panel-only (stripped before the run-config reaches
|
|
// xray-core via internal/web/service/xray.go) but flows into share links so clients
|
|
// can pin the server's certificate hash.
|
|
func pinnedSha256List(tlsClientSettings any) ([]string, bool) {
|
|
raw, ok := searchKey(tlsClientSettings, "pinnedPeerCertSha256")
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return nil, false
|
|
}
|
|
arr, ok := raw.([]any)
|
|
if !ok || len(arr) == 0 {
|
|
return nil, false
|
|
}
|
|
out := make([]string, 0, len(arr))
|
|
for _, v := range arr {
|
|
s, ok := v.(string)
|
|
if !ok || s == "" {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
out = append(out, s)
|
|
}
|
|
if len(out) == 0 {
|
|
return nil, false
|
|
}
|
|
return out, true
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// hysteriaPinHex normalises a pinnedPeerCertSha256 entry into the 64-character
|
|
// lowercase hex form that Xray-core's Hysteria2 pinSHA256 parser requires.
|
|
//
|
|
// The panel stores pins in several shapes: base64 (xray-core's native TLS
|
|
// format, used by the generate button and the JSON subscription) and hex —
|
|
// either bare or colon-separated as `openssl x509 -fingerprint -sha256` emits
|
|
// it. Hysteria2 clients hex-decode pinSHA256 and crash on a base64 value, so
|
|
// each entry is coerced to bare hex here. Anything that is neither a 32-byte
|
|
// hex nor a 32-byte base64 SHA-256 is returned unchanged so unexpected data is
|
|
// not silently dropped. Mirrors decodeCertPin in internal/web/service/node.go.
|
|
func hysteriaPinHex(pin string) string {
|
|
pin = strings.TrimSpace(pin)
|
|
if h := strings.ReplaceAll(pin, ":", ""); len(h) == hex.EncodedLen(sha256.Size) {
|
|
if _, err := hex.DecodeString(h); err == nil {
|
|
return strings.ToLower(h)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
for _, enc := range []*base64.Encoding{
|
|
base64.StdEncoding,
|
|
base64.RawStdEncoding,
|
|
base64.URLEncoding,
|
|
base64.RawURLEncoding,
|
|
} {
|
|
if b, err := enc.DecodeString(pin); err == nil && len(b) == sha256.Size {
|
|
return hex.EncodeToString(b)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return pin
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func applyShareRealityParams(stream map[string]any, params map[string]string, clientKey string) {
|
|
params["security"] = "reality"
|
|
realitySetting, _ := stream["realitySettings"].(map[string]any)
|
|
realitySettings, _ := searchKey(realitySetting, "settings")
|
|
if realitySetting != nil {
|
|
if sniValue, ok := searchKey(realitySetting, "serverNames"); ok {
|
|
if sNames, _ := sniValue.([]any); len(sNames) > 0 {
|
|
params["sni"], _ = sNames[random.Num(len(sNames))].(string)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if pbkValue, ok := searchKey(realitySettings, "publicKey"); ok {
|
|
params["pbk"], _ = pbkValue.(string)
|
|
}
|
|
if sidValue, ok := searchKey(realitySetting, "shortIds"); ok {
|
|
if shortIds, _ := sidValue.([]any); len(shortIds) > 0 {
|
|
params["sid"], _ = shortIds[random.Num(len(shortIds))].(string)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if fpValue, ok := searchKey(realitySettings, "fingerprint"); ok {
|
|
if fp, ok := fpValue.(string); ok && len(fp) > 0 {
|
|
params["fp"] = fp
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if pqvValue, ok := searchKey(realitySettings, "mldsa65Verify"); ok {
|
|
if pqv, ok := pqvValue.(string); ok && len(pqv) > 0 {
|
|
params["pqv"] = pqv
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
seed := ""
|
|
if spxValue, ok := searchKey(realitySettings, "spiderX"); ok {
|
|
seed, _ = spxValue.(string)
|
|
}
|
|
params["spx"] = deriveSpiderX(seed, clientKey)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// subKey returns a stable per-client identity for deterministic derivations,
|
|
// preferring the subscription id and falling back to the (unique) email.
|
|
func subKey(c model.Client) string {
|
|
if c.SubID != "" {
|
|
return c.SubID
|
|
}
|
|
return c.Email
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// deriveSpiderX maps the inbound's spiderX seed plus a stable client key to a
|
|
// deterministic per-client "/path"; frontend/src/lib/xray/spider-x.ts mirrors it.
|
|
func deriveSpiderX(seed, clientKey string) string {
|
|
if seed == "" && clientKey == "" {
|
|
return "/" + random.Seq(15)
|
|
}
|
|
sum := sha256.Sum256([]byte(seed + "|" + clientKey))
|
|
return "/" + hex.EncodeToString(sum[:])[:15]
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func buildVmessLink(obj map[string]any) string {
|
|
jsonStr, _ := json.MarshalIndent(obj, "", " ")
|
|
return "vmess://" + base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(jsonStr)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func cloneVmessShareObj(baseObj map[string]any, newSecurity string) map[string]any {
|
|
newObj := map[string]any{}
|
|
for key, value := range baseObj {
|
|
if newSecurity != "none" || (key != "alpn" && key != "sni" && key != "fp" && key != "pcs") {
|
|
newObj[key] = value
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return newObj
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func applyExternalProxyTLSObj(ep map[string]any, obj map[string]any, security string) {
|
|
if security != "tls" {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
if sni, ok := externalProxySNI(ep); ok {
|
|
obj["sni"] = sni
|
|
}
|
|
if fp, ok := ep["fingerprint"].(string); ok && fp != "" {
|
|
obj["fp"] = fp
|
|
}
|
|
if alpn, ok := externalProxyALPN(ep["alpn"]); ok {
|
|
obj["alpn"] = alpn
|
|
}
|
|
if pins, ok := externalProxyPins(ep["pinnedPeerCertSha256"]); ok {
|
|
obj["pcs"] = joinAnyStrings(pins)
|
|
}
|
|
if vcn, ok := ep["verifyPeerCertByName"].(string); ok && vcn != "" {
|
|
obj["vcn"] = vcn
|
|
}
|
|
if ech, ok := ep["echConfigList"].(string); ok && ech != "" {
|
|
obj["ech"] = ech
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func applyExternalProxyTLSParams(ep map[string]any, params map[string]string, security string) {
|
|
if security != "tls" {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
if sni, ok := externalProxySNI(ep); ok {
|
|
params["sni"] = sni
|
|
}
|
|
if fp, ok := ep["fingerprint"].(string); ok && fp != "" {
|
|
params["fp"] = fp
|
|
}
|
|
if alpn, ok := externalProxyALPN(ep["alpn"]); ok {
|
|
params["alpn"] = alpn
|
|
}
|
|
if pins, ok := externalProxyPins(ep["pinnedPeerCertSha256"]); ok {
|
|
params["pcs"] = joinAnyStrings(pins)
|
|
}
|
|
if vcn, ok := ep["verifyPeerCertByName"].(string); ok && vcn != "" {
|
|
params["vcn"] = vcn
|
|
}
|
|
if ech, ok := ep["echConfigList"].(string); ok && ech != "" {
|
|
params["ech"] = ech
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// applyExternalProxyHysteriaParams overrides the cert pin for a single
|
|
// external-proxy entry on a Hysteria link. Hysteria carries the pin as a hex
|
|
// `pinSHA256` (not the `pcs` the URL-param protocols use), so each entry is
|
|
// coerced through hysteriaPinHex like the main pin. sni/fp/alpn are left as
|
|
// the inbound's own — Hysteria external proxies are typically alternate
|
|
// endpoints (port-hop / CDN) fronting the same certificate.
|
|
func applyExternalProxyHysteriaParams(ep map[string]any, params map[string]string) {
|
|
if pins, ok := externalProxyPins(ep["pinnedPeerCertSha256"]); ok {
|
|
hexPins := make([]string, 0, len(pins))
|
|
for _, p := range pins {
|
|
if s, ok := p.(string); ok {
|
|
hexPins = append(hexPins, hysteriaPinHex(s))
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
params["pinSHA256"] = strings.Join(hexPins, ",")
|
|
}
|
|
if ai, ok := ep["allowInsecure"].(bool); ok && ai {
|
|
params["insecure"] = "1"
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// cloneStreamForExternalProxy returns a shallow clone of stream with
|
|
// tlsSettings (and its nested settings map) deep-copied. The external
|
|
// proxy loop mutates tlsSettings per iteration, so without isolating
|
|
// those maps each proxy's SNI/fingerprint/ALPN would leak into the next.
|
|
func cloneStreamForExternalProxy(stream map[string]any) map[string]any {
|
|
out := cloneMap(stream)
|
|
ts, ok := out["tlsSettings"].(map[string]any)
|
|
if !ok || ts == nil {
|
|
return out
|
|
}
|
|
clonedTs := cloneMap(ts)
|
|
if inner, ok := clonedTs["settings"].(map[string]any); ok && inner != nil {
|
|
clonedTs["settings"] = cloneMap(inner)
|
|
}
|
|
out["tlsSettings"] = clonedTs
|
|
return out
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func applyExternalProxyTLSToStream(ep map[string]any, stream map[string]any, security string) {
|
|
if security != "tls" {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
tlsSettings, _ := stream["tlsSettings"].(map[string]any)
|
|
if tlsSettings == nil {
|
|
tlsSettings = map[string]any{}
|
|
stream["tlsSettings"] = tlsSettings
|
|
}
|
|
if sni, ok := externalProxySNI(ep); ok {
|
|
tlsSettings["serverName"] = sni
|
|
}
|
|
if fp, ok := ep["fingerprint"].(string); ok && fp != "" {
|
|
tlsSettings["fingerprint"] = fp
|
|
}
|
|
if alpn, ok := externalProxyALPNList(ep["alpn"]); ok {
|
|
tlsSettings["alpn"] = alpn
|
|
}
|
|
if pins, ok := externalProxyPins(ep["pinnedPeerCertSha256"]); ok {
|
|
settings, _ := tlsSettings["settings"].(map[string]any)
|
|
if settings == nil {
|
|
settings = map[string]any{}
|
|
tlsSettings["settings"] = settings
|
|
}
|
|
settings["pinnedPeerCertSha256"] = pins
|
|
}
|
|
if ech, ok := ep["echConfigList"].(string); ok && ech != "" {
|
|
settings, _ := tlsSettings["settings"].(map[string]any)
|
|
if settings == nil {
|
|
settings = map[string]any{}
|
|
tlsSettings["settings"] = settings
|
|
}
|
|
settings["echConfigList"] = ech
|
|
}
|
|
if vcn, ok := ep["verifyPeerCertByName"].(string); ok && vcn != "" {
|
|
settings, _ := tlsSettings["settings"].(map[string]any)
|
|
if settings == nil {
|
|
settings = map[string]any{}
|
|
tlsSettings["settings"] = settings
|
|
}
|
|
settings["verifyPeerCertByName"] = vcn
|
|
}
|
|
if ai, ok := ep["allowInsecure"].(bool); ok && ai {
|
|
settings, _ := tlsSettings["settings"].(map[string]any)
|
|
if settings == nil {
|
|
settings = map[string]any{}
|
|
tlsSettings["settings"] = settings
|
|
}
|
|
settings["allowInsecure"] = true
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func externalProxySNI(ep map[string]any) (string, bool) {
|
|
if sni, ok := ep["sni"].(string); ok && sni != "" {
|
|
return sni, true
|
|
}
|
|
return "", false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func externalProxyALPN(value any) (string, bool) {
|
|
switch v := value.(type) {
|
|
case string:
|
|
return v, v != ""
|
|
case []string:
|
|
if len(v) == 0 {
|
|
return "", false
|
|
}
|
|
return strings.Join(v, ","), true
|
|
case []any:
|
|
alpn := make([]string, 0, len(v))
|
|
for _, item := range v {
|
|
if s, ok := item.(string); ok && s != "" {
|
|
alpn = append(alpn, s)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if len(alpn) == 0 {
|
|
return "", false
|
|
}
|
|
return strings.Join(alpn, ","), true
|
|
default:
|
|
return "", false
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func externalProxyALPNList(value any) ([]any, bool) {
|
|
switch v := value.(type) {
|
|
case string:
|
|
if v == "" {
|
|
return nil, false
|
|
}
|
|
parts := strings.Split(v, ",")
|
|
out := make([]any, 0, len(parts))
|
|
for _, part := range parts {
|
|
if part = strings.TrimSpace(part); part != "" {
|
|
out = append(out, part)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return out, len(out) > 0
|
|
case []string:
|
|
out := make([]any, 0, len(v))
|
|
for _, item := range v {
|
|
if item != "" {
|
|
out = append(out, item)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return out, len(out) > 0
|
|
case []any:
|
|
out := make([]any, 0, len(v))
|
|
for _, item := range v {
|
|
if s, ok := item.(string); ok && s != "" {
|
|
out = append(out, s)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return out, len(out) > 0
|
|
default:
|
|
return nil, false
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// externalProxyPins extracts an external-proxy entry's pinnedPeerCertSha256
|
|
// as a []any of non-empty strings. The []any element type matches what the
|
|
// JSON/Clash sub builders expect when reading the value back off the cloned
|
|
// stream's tlsSettings.settings.
|
|
func externalProxyPins(value any) ([]any, bool) {
|
|
switch v := value.(type) {
|
|
case []string:
|
|
out := make([]any, 0, len(v))
|
|
for _, item := range v {
|
|
if item != "" {
|
|
out = append(out, item)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return out, len(out) > 0
|
|
case []any:
|
|
out := make([]any, 0, len(v))
|
|
for _, item := range v {
|
|
if s, ok := item.(string); ok && s != "" {
|
|
out = append(out, s)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return out, len(out) > 0
|
|
default:
|
|
return nil, false
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func joinAnyStrings(items []any) string {
|
|
parts := make([]string, 0, len(items))
|
|
for _, item := range items {
|
|
if s, ok := item.(string); ok {
|
|
parts = append(parts, s)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return strings.Join(parts, ",")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// buildVmessExternalProxyLinks is a thin adapter: it maps the legacy
|
|
// externalProxy entries to []ShareEndpoint and renders them through the unified
|
|
// endpoint path. Kept as a thin shim over the unified endpoint builder so
|
|
// genVmessLink keeps calling one helper (now threading transport through).
|
|
func (s *SubService) buildVmessExternalProxyLinks(externalProxies []any, baseObj map[string]any, inbound *model.Inbound, email string, transport string) string {
|
|
eps := make([]ShareEndpoint, 0, len(externalProxies))
|
|
for _, externalProxy := range externalProxies {
|
|
ep, _ := externalProxy.(map[string]any)
|
|
eps = append(eps, externalProxyToEndpoint(ep))
|
|
}
|
|
return s.buildEndpointVmessLinks(eps, baseObj, inbound, email, transport)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// buildLinkWithParams appends ?query and #fragment to a pre-built
|
|
// scheme://userinfo@host:port string without re-parsing it. The caller
|
|
// has already escaped userinfo via encodeUserinfo (or chosen a base64
|
|
// alphabet with no reserved chars); a url.Parse + .String() round-trip
|
|
// would silently decode that escaping because Go's userinfo emitter
|
|
// leaves sub-delims (=, +, ;) literal, which breaks Trojan/Hysteria/SS
|
|
// clients that reject those chars in the password.
|
|
func buildLinkWithParams(link string, params map[string]string, fragment string) string {
|
|
return appendQueryAndFragment(link, params, fragment, "", false)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// buildLinkWithParamsAndSecurity is buildLinkWithParams plus an
|
|
// external-proxy override: the `security` key in params is replaced with
|
|
// the supplied value, and TLS hint fields (alpn/sni/fp/pcs) are stripped
|
|
// when the override is `none`.
|
|
func buildLinkWithParamsAndSecurity(link string, params map[string]string, fragment, security string, omitTLSFields bool) string {
|
|
return appendQueryAndFragment(link, params, fragment, security, omitTLSFields)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func appendQueryAndFragment(link string, params map[string]string, fragment, securityOverride string, omitTLSFields bool) string {
|
|
var sb strings.Builder
|
|
sb.WriteString(link)
|
|
|
|
if len(params) > 0 {
|
|
q := url.Values{}
|
|
for k, v := range params {
|
|
if securityOverride != "" && k == "security" {
|
|
v = securityOverride
|
|
}
|
|
if omitTLSFields && (k == "alpn" || k == "sni" || k == "fp" || k == "pcs") {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
q.Set(k, v)
|
|
}
|
|
encoded := q.Encode()
|
|
if encoded != "" {
|
|
if strings.Contains(link, "?") {
|
|
sb.WriteByte('&')
|
|
} else {
|
|
sb.WriteByte('?')
|
|
}
|
|
sb.WriteString(encoded)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if fragment != "" {
|
|
sb.WriteByte('#')
|
|
// Match the frontend's encodeURIComponent(remark): spaces become
|
|
// %20 (not + as in query strings).
|
|
sb.WriteString(strings.ReplaceAll(url.QueryEscape(fragment), "+", "%20"))
|
|
}
|
|
return sb.String()
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// buildExternalProxyURLLinks is a thin adapter: it maps the legacy externalProxy
|
|
// entries to []ShareEndpoint and renders them through the unified endpoint path.
|
|
// Kept so the genVless/genTrojan/genShadowsocks call sites are unchanged.
|
|
func (s *SubService) buildExternalProxyURLLinks(
|
|
externalProxies []any,
|
|
params map[string]string,
|
|
baseSecurity string,
|
|
makeLink func(ep map[string]any, dest string, port int) string,
|
|
makeRemark func(ep map[string]any) string,
|
|
) string {
|
|
eps := make([]ShareEndpoint, 0, len(externalProxies))
|
|
for _, externalProxy := range externalProxies {
|
|
ep, _ := externalProxy.(map[string]any)
|
|
eps = append(eps, externalProxyToEndpoint(ep))
|
|
}
|
|
return s.buildEndpointLinks(eps, params, baseSecurity, func(e ShareEndpoint) string {
|
|
return makeLink(e.ep, e.Address, e.Port)
|
|
}, func(e ShareEndpoint) string {
|
|
return makeRemark(e.ep)
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func cloneStringMap(source map[string]string) map[string]string {
|
|
cloned := make(map[string]string, len(source))
|
|
maps.Copy(cloned, source)
|
|
return cloned
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// genRemark builds the remark for a non-host link (raw default / legacy
|
|
// externalProxy / synthetic JSON-Clash entry). A set remark template drives it
|
|
// in both the body and display contexts (genTemplatedRemark renders the
|
|
// name-only part on displays); with no template it falls back to the inbound
|
|
// remark, extra and email joined by "-".
|
|
func (s *SubService) genRemark(inbound *model.Inbound, email string, extra string, transport string) string {
|
|
if s.remarkTemplate != "" {
|
|
return s.genTemplatedRemark(inbound, s.lookupClient(inbound, email), extra, transport)
|
|
}
|
|
return fallbackRemark(inbound.Remark, extra, email)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func fallbackRemark(parts ...string) string {
|
|
out := make([]string, 0, len(parts))
|
|
for _, p := range parts {
|
|
if p != "" {
|
|
out = append(out, p)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return strings.Join(out, "-")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// findClientStats returns the inbound's traffic record for email, if present.
|
|
func (s *SubService) findClientStats(inbound *model.Inbound, email string) (xray.ClientTraffic, bool) {
|
|
for _, clientStat := range inbound.ClientStats {
|
|
if clientStat.Email == email {
|
|
return clientStat, true
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return xray.ClientTraffic{}, false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// statsByEmailFromDB resolves a client's traffic row straight from the DB by its
|
|
// globally-unique email, caching the hit into statsByEmail for the rest of the
|
|
// request. It's the last-resort lookup behind statsForClient: the preloaded
|
|
// ClientStats and the statsByEmail index are both keyed by
|
|
// client_traffics.inbound_id, which is written once by AddClientStat and never
|
|
// updated. When an inbound is deleted and recreated it gets a new id, so the old
|
|
// row is orphaned from every loaded inbound and both in-memory paths miss —
|
|
// leaving {{TRAFFIC_USED}} stuck at 0 for pre-existing clients even though their
|
|
// usage is intact (#5567). Matching by email recovers it, the same way the
|
|
// sub-info header's AggregateTrafficByEmails already does.
|
|
func (s *SubService) statsByEmailFromDB(email string) (xray.ClientTraffic, bool) {
|
|
db := database.GetDB()
|
|
if db == nil {
|
|
return xray.ClientTraffic{}, false
|
|
}
|
|
var row xray.ClientTraffic
|
|
if err := db.Model(&xray.ClientTraffic{}).Where("email = ?", email).First(&row).Error; err != nil {
|
|
return xray.ClientTraffic{}, false
|
|
}
|
|
if s.statsByEmail == nil {
|
|
s.statsByEmail = map[string]xray.ClientTraffic{}
|
|
}
|
|
s.statsByEmail[email] = row
|
|
return row, true
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func searchKey(data any, key string) (any, bool) {
|
|
switch val := data.(type) {
|
|
case map[string]any:
|
|
for k, v := range val {
|
|
if k == key {
|
|
return v, true
|
|
}
|
|
if result, ok := searchKey(v, key); ok {
|
|
return result, true
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
case []any:
|
|
for _, v := range val {
|
|
if result, ok := searchKey(v, key); ok {
|
|
return result, true
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return nil, false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// buildXhttpExtra walks an xhttpSettings map and returns the JSON blob
|
|
// that goes into the URL's `extra` param (or, for VMess, the link
|
|
// object). Carries ONLY the bidirectional fields from xray-core's
|
|
// SplitHTTPConfig — i.e. the ones the server enforces and the client
|
|
// must match. Strictly one-sided fields are excluded:
|
|
//
|
|
// - server-only (noSSEHeader, scMaxBufferedPosts, scStreamUpServerSecs,
|
|
// serverMaxHeaderBytes) — client wouldn't read them, so emitting
|
|
// them just bloats the URL.
|
|
// - client-only values are included only when present in the inbound
|
|
// JSON. Some deployments/imported configs carry them there, and the
|
|
// subscription link is the only place clients can receive them.
|
|
//
|
|
// Truthy-only guards keep default inbounds emitting the same compact URL
|
|
// they did before this helper grew.
|
|
func buildXhttpExtra(xhttp map[string]any) map[string]any {
|
|
if xhttp == nil {
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
extra := map[string]any{}
|
|
|
|
if mode, ok := xhttp["mode"].(string); ok && len(mode) > 0 {
|
|
extra["mode"] = mode
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if xpb, ok := xhttp["xPaddingBytes"].(string); ok && len(xpb) > 0 {
|
|
extra["xPaddingBytes"] = xpb
|
|
}
|
|
if obfs, ok := xhttp["xPaddingObfsMode"].(bool); ok && obfs {
|
|
extra["xPaddingObfsMode"] = true
|
|
for _, field := range []string{"xPaddingKey", "xPaddingHeader", "xPaddingPlacement", "xPaddingMethod"} {
|
|
if v, ok := xhttp[field].(string); ok && len(v) > 0 {
|
|
extra[field] = v
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
stringFields := []string{
|
|
"uplinkHTTPMethod",
|
|
"sessionIDPlacement", "sessionIDKey", "sessionIDTable", "sessionIDLength",
|
|
"seqPlacement", "seqKey",
|
|
"uplinkDataPlacement", "uplinkDataKey",
|
|
"scMaxEachPostBytes", "scMinPostsIntervalMs",
|
|
}
|
|
// Values matching xray-core's own defaults are redundant on the wire and
|
|
// the literal scMinPostsIntervalMs=30 is a known DPI fingerprint (#5141).
|
|
// Old panels seeded these defaults into every xhttp inbound, so filter
|
|
// them here instead of requiring every stored config to be re-saved.
|
|
coreDefaults := map[string]string{
|
|
"scMaxEachPostBytes": "1000000",
|
|
"scMinPostsIntervalMs": "30",
|
|
}
|
|
for _, field := range stringFields {
|
|
if v, ok := xhttp[field].(string); ok && len(v) > 0 && v != coreDefaults[field] {
|
|
extra[field] = v
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Legacy inbounds (pre xray-core #6258) stored sessionPlacement/sessionKey.
|
|
// Lift them onto the renamed keys so links from not-yet-resaved configs
|
|
// still carry the session settings. Mirrors the frontend migration.
|
|
for legacy, renamed := range map[string]string{
|
|
"sessionPlacement": "sessionIDPlacement",
|
|
"sessionKey": "sessionIDKey",
|
|
} {
|
|
if _, exists := extra[renamed]; !exists {
|
|
if v, ok := xhttp[legacy].(string); ok && len(v) > 0 {
|
|
extra[renamed] = v
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
// Older clients still read the pre-#6258 names from the subscription
|
|
// extra JSON. Emit aliases after lifting legacy inputs so both old and
|
|
// new clients can consume the same link.
|
|
if v, ok := extra["sessionIDPlacement"].(string); ok && len(v) > 0 {
|
|
extra["sessionPlacement"] = v
|
|
}
|
|
if v, ok := extra["sessionIDKey"].(string); ok && len(v) > 0 {
|
|
extra["sessionKey"] = v
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for _, field := range []string{"uplinkChunkSize"} {
|
|
if v, ok := nonZeroShareValue(xhttp[field]); ok {
|
|
extra[field] = v
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for _, field := range []string{"noGRPCHeader"} {
|
|
if v, ok := xhttp[field].(bool); ok && v {
|
|
extra[field] = v
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for _, field := range []string{"xmux", "downloadSettings"} {
|
|
if v, ok := nonEmptyShareObject(xhttp[field]); ok {
|
|
extra[field] = v
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Headers — emitted as the {name: value} map upstream's struct
|
|
// expects. The server runtime ignores this field, but the client
|
|
// (consuming the share link) honors it. Drop any "host" entry —
|
|
// host already wins as a top-level URL param.
|
|
if rawHeaders, ok := xhttp["headers"].(map[string]any); ok && len(rawHeaders) > 0 {
|
|
out := map[string]any{}
|
|
for k, v := range rawHeaders {
|
|
if strings.EqualFold(k, "host") {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
out[k] = v
|
|
}
|
|
if len(out) > 0 {
|
|
extra["headers"] = out
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if len(extra) == 0 {
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
return extra
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func nonZeroShareValue(v any) (any, bool) {
|
|
switch value := v.(type) {
|
|
case string:
|
|
return value, value != ""
|
|
case int:
|
|
return value, value != 0
|
|
case int32:
|
|
return value, value != 0
|
|
case int64:
|
|
return value, value != 0
|
|
case float32:
|
|
return value, value != 0
|
|
case float64:
|
|
return value, value != 0
|
|
default:
|
|
return nil, false
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func nonEmptyShareObject(v any) (any, bool) {
|
|
switch value := v.(type) {
|
|
case map[string]any:
|
|
return value, len(value) > 0
|
|
case map[string]string:
|
|
return value, len(value) > 0
|
|
case []any:
|
|
return value, len(value) > 0
|
|
default:
|
|
return nil, false
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// applyXhttpExtraParams emits the full xhttp config into the URL query
|
|
// params of a vless:// / trojan:// / ss:// link. Sets path/host/mode at
|
|
// top level (xray's Build() always lets these win over `extra`) and packs
|
|
// everything else into a JSON `extra` param. Also writes the flat
|
|
// `x_padding_bytes` param sing-box-family clients understand.
|
|
//
|
|
// Without this, the admin's custom xPaddingBytes / sessionKey / etc. never
|
|
// reach the client and handshakes are silently rejected with
|
|
// `invalid padding (...) length: 0` — the client-visible symptom is
|
|
// "xhttp doesn't connect" on OpenWRT / sing-box.
|
|
//
|
|
// Two encodings are written so every popular client can read at least one:
|
|
//
|
|
// - x_padding_bytes=<range> — flat param, understood by sing-box and its
|
|
// derivatives (Podkop, OpenWRT sing-box, Karing, NekoBox, …).
|
|
// - extra=<url-encoded-json> — full xhttp settings blob, which is how
|
|
// xray-core clients (v2rayNG, Happ, Furious, Exclave, …) pick up the
|
|
// bidirectional fields beyond path/host/mode.
|
|
func applyXhttpExtraParams(xhttp map[string]any, params map[string]string) {
|
|
if xhttp == nil {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
applyPathAndHostParams(xhttp, params)
|
|
if mode, ok := xhttp["mode"].(string); ok {
|
|
params["mode"] = mode
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if xpb, ok := xhttp["xPaddingBytes"].(string); ok && len(xpb) > 0 {
|
|
params["x_padding_bytes"] = xpb
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
extra := buildXhttpExtra(xhttp)
|
|
if extra != nil {
|
|
if b, err := json.Marshal(extra); err == nil {
|
|
params["extra"] = string(b)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var kcpMaskToHeaderType = map[string]string{
|
|
"dns": "dns",
|
|
"dtls": "dtls",
|
|
"srtp": "srtp",
|
|
"utp": "utp",
|
|
"wechat": "wechat-video",
|
|
"wireguard": "wireguard",
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var validFinalMaskUDPTypes = map[string]struct{}{
|
|
"salamander": {},
|
|
"mkcp-legacy": {},
|
|
"xdns": {},
|
|
"xicmp": {},
|
|
"noise": {},
|
|
"header-custom": {},
|
|
"realm": {},
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var validFinalMaskTCPTypes = map[string]struct{}{
|
|
"header-custom": {},
|
|
"fragment": {},
|
|
"sudoku": {},
|
|
"xmc": {},
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// applyKcpShareParams reconstructs legacy KCP share-link fields from either
|
|
// the historical kcpSettings.header/seed shape or the current finalmask model.
|
|
// This keeps subscription output compatible while avoiding panics when older
|
|
// keys are absent from modern inbounds.
|
|
func applyKcpShareParams(stream map[string]any, params map[string]string) {
|
|
extractKcpShareFields(stream).applyToParams(params)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func applyKcpShareObj(stream map[string]any, obj map[string]any) {
|
|
extractKcpShareFields(stream).applyToObj(obj)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
type kcpShareFields struct {
|
|
headerType string
|
|
seed string
|
|
mtu int
|
|
tti int
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (f kcpShareFields) applyToParams(params map[string]string) {
|
|
if f.headerType != "" && f.headerType != "none" {
|
|
params["headerType"] = f.headerType
|
|
}
|
|
setStringParam(params, "seed", f.seed)
|
|
setIntParam(params, "mtu", f.mtu)
|
|
setIntParam(params, "tti", f.tti)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (f kcpShareFields) applyToObj(obj map[string]any) {
|
|
if f.headerType != "" && f.headerType != "none" {
|
|
obj["type"] = f.headerType
|
|
}
|
|
setStringField(obj, "path", f.seed)
|
|
setIntField(obj, "mtu", f.mtu)
|
|
setIntField(obj, "tti", f.tti)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func extractKcpShareFields(stream map[string]any) kcpShareFields {
|
|
fields := kcpShareFields{headerType: "none"}
|
|
|
|
if kcp, ok := stream["kcpSettings"].(map[string]any); ok {
|
|
if header, ok := kcp["header"].(map[string]any); ok {
|
|
if value, ok := header["type"].(string); ok && value != "" {
|
|
fields.headerType = value
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if value, ok := kcp["seed"].(string); ok && value != "" {
|
|
fields.seed = value
|
|
}
|
|
if value, ok := readPositiveInt(kcp["mtu"]); ok {
|
|
fields.mtu = value
|
|
}
|
|
if value, ok := readPositiveInt(kcp["tti"]); ok {
|
|
fields.tti = value
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for _, rawMask := range normalizedFinalMaskUDPMasks(stream["finalmask"]) {
|
|
mask, _ := rawMask.(map[string]any)
|
|
if mask == nil {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
if maskType, _ := mask["type"].(string); maskType != "mkcp-legacy" {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
settings, _ := mask["settings"].(map[string]any)
|
|
header, _ := settings["header"].(string)
|
|
value, _ := settings["value"].(string)
|
|
if header == "" {
|
|
fields.seed = value
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
if mapped, ok := kcpMaskToHeaderType[header]; ok {
|
|
fields.headerType = mapped
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return fields
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func readPositiveInt(value any) (int, bool) {
|
|
switch number := value.(type) {
|
|
case int:
|
|
return number, number > 0
|
|
case int32:
|
|
return int(number), number > 0
|
|
case int64:
|
|
return int(number), number > 0
|
|
case float32:
|
|
parsed := int(number)
|
|
return parsed, parsed > 0
|
|
case float64:
|
|
parsed := int(number)
|
|
return parsed, parsed > 0
|
|
default:
|
|
return 0, false
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func setStringParam(params map[string]string, key, value string) {
|
|
if value == "" {
|
|
delete(params, key)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
params[key] = value
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func setIntParam(params map[string]string, key string, value int) {
|
|
if value <= 0 {
|
|
delete(params, key)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
params[key] = fmt.Sprintf("%d", value)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func setStringField(obj map[string]any, key, value string) {
|
|
if value == "" {
|
|
delete(obj, key)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
obj[key] = value
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func setIntField(obj map[string]any, key string, value int) {
|
|
if value <= 0 {
|
|
delete(obj, key)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
obj[key] = value
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// applyFinalMaskParams exports the finalmask payload as the compact
|
|
// `fm=<json>` share-link field used by v2rayN-compatible clients.
|
|
func applyFinalMaskParams(finalmask map[string]any, params map[string]string) {
|
|
if fm, ok := marshalFinalMask(finalmask); ok {
|
|
params["fm"] = fm
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func applyFinalMaskObj(finalmask map[string]any, obj map[string]any) {
|
|
if fm, ok := marshalFinalMask(finalmask); ok {
|
|
obj["fm"] = fm
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func marshalFinalMask(finalmask map[string]any) (string, bool) {
|
|
normalized := normalizeFinalMask(finalmask)
|
|
if !hasFinalMaskContent(normalized) {
|
|
return "", false
|
|
}
|
|
b, err := json.Marshal(normalized)
|
|
if err != nil || len(b) == 0 || string(b) == "null" {
|
|
return "", false
|
|
}
|
|
return string(b), true
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func normalizeFinalMask(finalmask map[string]any) map[string]any {
|
|
tcpMasks := normalizedFinalMaskTCPMasks(finalmask)
|
|
udpMasks := normalizedFinalMaskUDPMasks(finalmask)
|
|
quicParams, hasQuicParams := finalmask["quicParams"].(map[string]any)
|
|
|
|
if len(tcpMasks) == 0 && len(udpMasks) == 0 && !hasQuicParams {
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
result := map[string]any{}
|
|
if len(tcpMasks) > 0 {
|
|
result["tcp"] = tcpMasks
|
|
}
|
|
if len(udpMasks) > 0 {
|
|
result["udp"] = udpMasks
|
|
}
|
|
if hasQuicParams && len(quicParams) > 0 {
|
|
result["quicParams"] = quicParams
|
|
}
|
|
return result
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func normalizedFinalMaskTCPMasks(value any) []any {
|
|
finalmask, _ := value.(map[string]any)
|
|
if finalmask == nil {
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
rawMasks, _ := finalmask["tcp"].([]any)
|
|
if len(rawMasks) == 0 {
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
normalized := make([]any, 0, len(rawMasks))
|
|
for _, rawMask := range rawMasks {
|
|
mask, _ := rawMask.(map[string]any)
|
|
if mask == nil {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
maskType, _ := mask["type"].(string)
|
|
if _, ok := validFinalMaskTCPTypes[maskType]; !ok || maskType == "" {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
normalizedMask := map[string]any{"type": maskType}
|
|
if settings, ok := mask["settings"].(map[string]any); ok && len(settings) > 0 {
|
|
normalizedMask["settings"] = settings
|
|
}
|
|
normalized = append(normalized, normalizedMask)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if len(normalized) == 0 {
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
return normalized
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func normalizedFinalMaskUDPMasks(value any) []any {
|
|
finalmask, _ := value.(map[string]any)
|
|
if finalmask == nil {
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
rawMasks, _ := finalmask["udp"].([]any)
|
|
if len(rawMasks) == 0 {
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
normalized := make([]any, 0, len(rawMasks))
|
|
for _, rawMask := range rawMasks {
|
|
mask, _ := rawMask.(map[string]any)
|
|
if mask == nil {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
maskType, _ := mask["type"].(string)
|
|
if _, ok := validFinalMaskUDPTypes[maskType]; !ok || maskType == "" {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
normalizedMask := map[string]any{"type": maskType}
|
|
if settings, ok := mask["settings"].(map[string]any); ok && len(settings) > 0 {
|
|
normalizedMask["settings"] = settings
|
|
}
|
|
normalized = append(normalized, normalizedMask)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if len(normalized) == 0 {
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
return normalized
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func hasFinalMaskContent(value any) bool {
|
|
switch v := value.(type) {
|
|
case nil:
|
|
return false
|
|
case string:
|
|
return len(v) > 0
|
|
case map[string]any:
|
|
for _, item := range v {
|
|
if hasFinalMaskContent(item) {
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return false
|
|
case []any:
|
|
return slices.ContainsFunc(v, hasFinalMaskContent)
|
|
default:
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func searchHost(headers any) string {
|
|
data, _ := headers.(map[string]any)
|
|
for k, v := range data {
|
|
if strings.EqualFold(k, "host") {
|
|
switch v.(type) {
|
|
case []any:
|
|
hosts, _ := v.([]any)
|
|
if len(hosts) > 0 {
|
|
h, _ := hosts[0].(string)
|
|
return h
|
|
}
|
|
return ""
|
|
case any:
|
|
h, _ := v.(string)
|
|
return h
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return ""
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// PageData is a view model for subpage.html
|
|
// PageData contains data for rendering the subscription information page.
|
|
type PageData struct {
|
|
Host string
|
|
BasePath string
|
|
SId string
|
|
Enabled bool
|
|
IsOnline bool
|
|
Download string
|
|
Upload string
|
|
Total string
|
|
Used string
|
|
Remained string
|
|
Expire int64
|
|
LastOnline int64
|
|
Datepicker string
|
|
DownloadByte int64
|
|
UploadByte int64
|
|
TotalByte int64
|
|
SubUrl string
|
|
SubJsonUrl string
|
|
SubClashUrl string
|
|
SubTitle string
|
|
SubSupportUrl string
|
|
SubAnnounce string
|
|
Result []string
|
|
Emails []string
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ResolveRequest extracts scheme and host info from request/headers consistently.
|
|
// ResolveRequest extracts scheme, host, and header information from an HTTP request.
|
|
func (s *SubService) ResolveRequest(c *gin.Context) (scheme string, host string, hostWithPort string, hostHeader string) {
|
|
trusted := s.forwardedHeadersTrusted(c)
|
|
if !trusted {
|
|
warnSuppressedForwardedHeaders(c)
|
|
}
|
|
forwarded := func(name string) string {
|
|
if !trusted {
|
|
return ""
|
|
}
|
|
return c.GetHeader(name)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// scheme
|
|
scheme = "http"
|
|
if c.Request.TLS != nil || strings.EqualFold(forwarded("X-Forwarded-Proto"), "https") {
|
|
scheme = "https"
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// base host (no port)
|
|
if h, err := getHostFromXFH(forwarded("X-Forwarded-Host")); err == nil && h != "" {
|
|
host = h
|
|
}
|
|
if host == "" {
|
|
host = forwarded("X-Real-IP")
|
|
}
|
|
if host == "" {
|
|
var err error
|
|
host, _, err = net.SplitHostPort(c.Request.Host)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
host = c.Request.Host
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// host:port for URLs
|
|
hostWithPort = forwarded("X-Forwarded-Host")
|
|
if hostWithPort == "" {
|
|
hostWithPort = c.Request.Host
|
|
}
|
|
if hostWithPort == "" {
|
|
hostWithPort = host
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// header display host
|
|
hostHeader = forwarded("X-Forwarded-Host")
|
|
if hostHeader == "" {
|
|
hostHeader = forwarded("X-Real-IP")
|
|
}
|
|
if hostHeader == "" {
|
|
hostHeader = host
|
|
}
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// BuildURLs constructs absolute subscription and JSON subscription URLs for a given subscription ID.
|
|
// It prioritizes configured URIs, then individual settings, and finally falls back to request-derived components.
|
|
func (s *SubService) BuildURLs(subPath, subJsonPath, subClashPath, subId string) (subURL, subJsonURL, subClashURL string) {
|
|
if subId == "" {
|
|
return "", "", ""
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
configuredSubURI, _ := s.settingService.GetSubURI()
|
|
configuredSubJsonURI, _ := s.settingService.GetSubJsonURI()
|
|
configuredSubClashURI, _ := s.settingService.GetSubClashURI()
|
|
|
|
// Same base as the panel's Client Information page; s.address is the
|
|
// subscriber's host already normalized away from any loopback/bind IP.
|
|
base := s.settingService.BuildSubURIBase(s.address)
|
|
|
|
subURL = s.buildSingleURL(configuredSubURI, base, subPath, subId)
|
|
|
|
// When subURI is explicitly configured (reverse-proxy setup), use its
|
|
// scheme+host as the base for JSON and Clash URLs so they match the
|
|
// reverse-proxy endpoint instead of the raw sub-server port. Fall back
|
|
// to the request-derived base if subURI is empty or can't be parsed
|
|
// into a scheme+host (e.g. a malformed value with no scheme).
|
|
jsonClashBase := base
|
|
if configuredSubURI != "" {
|
|
if derived := s.extractBaseFromURI(configuredSubURI); derived != "" {
|
|
jsonClashBase = derived
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
subJsonURL = s.buildSingleURL(configuredSubJsonURI, jsonClashBase, subJsonPath, subId)
|
|
subClashURL = s.buildSingleURL(configuredSubClashURI, jsonClashBase, subClashPath, subId)
|
|
|
|
return subURL, subJsonURL, subClashURL
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// extractBaseFromURI extracts scheme://host from a configured URI.
|
|
// e.g., "https://example.com/sub-xxx/" → "https://example.com".
|
|
// Returns "" when the URI is empty or lacks a scheme/host, so callers can
|
|
// fall back to the request-derived base instead of emitting a broken value.
|
|
func (s *SubService) extractBaseFromURI(uri string) string {
|
|
u, err := url.Parse(uri)
|
|
if err != nil || u.Scheme == "" || u.Host == "" {
|
|
return ""
|
|
}
|
|
return fmt.Sprintf("%s://%s", u.Scheme, u.Host)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// buildSingleURL constructs a single URL using configured URI or base components
|
|
func (s *SubService) buildSingleURL(configuredURI, base, basePath, subId string) string {
|
|
if configuredURI != "" {
|
|
return s.joinPathWithID(configuredURI, subId)
|
|
}
|
|
return s.joinPathWithID(base+basePath, subId)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// joinPathWithID safely joins a base path with a subscription ID
|
|
func (s *SubService) joinPathWithID(basePath, subId string) string {
|
|
if strings.HasSuffix(basePath, "/") {
|
|
return basePath + subId
|
|
}
|
|
return basePath + "/" + subId
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// BuildPageData parses header and prepares the template view model.
|
|
// BuildPageData constructs page data for rendering the subscription information page.
|
|
func (s *SubService) BuildPageData(subId string, hostHeader string, traffic xray.ClientTraffic, lastOnline int64, subs []string, emails []string, subURL, subJsonURL, subClashURL string, basePath string, subTitle string, subSupportUrl string) PageData {
|
|
download := common.FormatTraffic(traffic.Down)
|
|
upload := common.FormatTraffic(traffic.Up)
|
|
total := "∞"
|
|
used := common.FormatTraffic(traffic.Up + traffic.Down)
|
|
remained := ""
|
|
if traffic.Total > 0 {
|
|
total = common.FormatTraffic(traffic.Total)
|
|
left := max(traffic.Total-(traffic.Up+traffic.Down), 0)
|
|
remained = common.FormatTraffic(left)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
datepicker := s.datepicker
|
|
if datepicker == "" {
|
|
datepicker = "gregorian"
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
pageLinks := make([]string, 0, len(subs))
|
|
pageEmails := make([]string, 0, len(subs))
|
|
for i, sub := range subs {
|
|
email := ""
|
|
if i < len(emails) {
|
|
email = emails[i]
|
|
}
|
|
for _, link := range splitLinkLines(sub) {
|
|
pageLinks = append(pageLinks, link)
|
|
pageEmails = append(pageEmails, email)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return PageData{
|
|
Host: hostHeader,
|
|
BasePath: basePath,
|
|
SId: subId,
|
|
Enabled: traffic.Enable,
|
|
IsOnline: subIsOnline(emails, s.inboundService.GetOnlineClients()),
|
|
Download: download,
|
|
Upload: upload,
|
|
Total: total,
|
|
Used: used,
|
|
Remained: remained,
|
|
Expire: traffic.ExpiryTime / 1000,
|
|
LastOnline: lastOnline,
|
|
Datepicker: datepicker,
|
|
DownloadByte: traffic.Down,
|
|
UploadByte: traffic.Up,
|
|
TotalByte: traffic.Total,
|
|
SubUrl: subURL,
|
|
SubJsonUrl: subJsonURL,
|
|
SubClashUrl: subClashURL,
|
|
SubTitle: subTitle,
|
|
SubSupportUrl: subSupportUrl,
|
|
Result: pageLinks,
|
|
Emails: pageEmails,
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func subIsOnline(subEmails, onlineEmails []string) bool {
|
|
if len(subEmails) == 0 || len(onlineEmails) == 0 {
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
onlineSet := make(map[string]struct{}, len(onlineEmails))
|
|
for _, email := range onlineEmails {
|
|
onlineSet[email] = struct{}{}
|
|
}
|
|
for _, email := range subEmails {
|
|
if _, online := onlineSet[email]; online {
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func getHostFromXFH(s string) (string, error) {
|
|
if strings.Contains(s, ":") {
|
|
realHost, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(s)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return "", err
|
|
}
|
|
return realHost, nil
|
|
}
|
|
return s, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// extraSalamanderKeys lists salamander settings the hysteria2 URI cannot carry.
|
|
// A server using them rejects every client built from the emitted link.
|
|
func extraSalamanderKeys(settings map[string]any) []string {
|
|
var extra []string
|
|
for k := range settings {
|
|
if k != "password" {
|
|
extra = append(extra, k)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
sort.Strings(extra)
|
|
return extra
|
|
}
|